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ABSTRACT 
 
A Poetics of Care, or  
Time and the Dasein of Modernism in Thomas Mann and Martin Heidegger (1924/1947) 
Kevin Parker Eubanks 
(Under the direction of Eric Downing) 
 
 
A Poetics of ‘Care’, or Time and the ‘Dasein’ of Modernism in Thomas Mann and Martin 
Heidegger (1924/1947) seeks to establish the usefulness of Martin Heidegger’s reformulation 
of time and subjectivity during the period from 1924-1947 for reconceptualizing 
interpretations of time and tragic experience across the spectrum of literary and philosophical 
modernism(s). Between the earliest expressions of his temporality in The Concept of Time 
[Der Begriff der Zeit] (1924) and Being and Time [Sein und Zeit] (1927) and its later 
incarnation(s) in, for example, The Origin of the Work of Art [Ursprung des Kunstwerkes] 
(1936) and The Thinker as Poet [Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens] (1947), Heidegger finds 
conventional modernist approaches to time either too subjectivist or too relativist in 
formulation. Heidegger not only rejects a conception of time as that in which subjectivity 
happens but also an idea of time as that toward which subjectivity is oriented from the 
outside. In neither case, according to Heidegger, do these framings capture the embeddedness 
of time for the subject. For Heidegger, time is much more than the object of a definable and 
radical, even playful, experimentalism with which we have come to associate modernism; it 
is neither comprised of stable modes (past, present, future), nor is it hierarchical, subjective 
or even a relation among other relations that, along with the question of time, are said to have 
preoccupied the modernists, most notably the questions of narrative, history and subjectivity. 
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According to Heidegger, temporality is the relation of being itself, what he calls Dasein as 
being-there or being-in-the-world, and it is thus at Dasein that the very possibility of a 
distinctly modernist narrative, history or subjectivity is configured.  
In a much more fundamental sense, Heidegger proposes time as a phenomenon at 
which subjectivity is always already happening, and as early as 1924 even goes so far as to 
equate time with the subject, or with what he calls “human, historical Dasein.” Although it is 
the most conspicuous heir to the cultural obsession with time that is typically said to have 
dominated high modernism, the full scope of Heidegger’s remarkable study of temporality 
during the period from 1924-1947 has never been elaborated – neither in terms of its 
potential literary applications nor in terms of its engagement with the historical moment of 
modernism itself. Emphasizing the works of Heidegger’s contemporary and fellow German, 
Thomas Mann, namely The Magic Mountain [Der Zauberberg] and Doctor Faustus [Doktor 
Faustus], which bookend this crucial period in Mann’s own development toward what I 
would like to call a Heideggerian recognition, I trace the way in which Dasein, the historical 
moment at which time “temporalizes itself,” emerges as a construct capable of explaining 
these configurations and of fostering radically new interpretations of both the temporality of 
modernism as well as the modernism of temporality. In a final chapter, and taking into 
account Heidegger’s insistence that time or Dasein as being-there is also always a “being-
towards the possibility of its absolute impossibility,” I explore the “rumor” (Geulen) of the 
end of art that preoccupied a later modernism and ultimately argue that the distinguishing 
mark of both modernism and the modernist time-novel is the tragic recognition that 
modernism is the historical being-towards its own impossibility. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
Thomas Mann is arguably Germany’s most revered novelist. This is due not only to 
the ingenious facility of his art but also and in part to a sort of literary heroism with which he 
is typically associated, a liberal-humanist, democratic activism that suffuses every one of his 
most notable works and that in its own way has always stood in strong resistance to the 
conservative forces in art and politics that achieved their ultimate expression in National 
Socialist Germany during World War II. Thomas Mann’s active resistance against fascism in 
Germany, his forced exile, and his emotional struggle with that history is for the most part 
well-known and well-respected. The memory of Martin Heidegger, on the other hand, is 
always bathed in the light of disapproval because of his complicity with the National 
Socialists during the tumultuous years of the Second World War and because of his apparent 
unwillingness to come publicly to terms with this past in the years following the war. His 
short-lived tenure as a Nazi party member and life-long silence on the issue, along with the 
corresponding resentment these realities have provoked, have placed his work, permanently 
it would seem, on trial.  
Despite these well-known differences, it is nevertheless surprising that literary 
scholars in Germany and the United States have thoroughly neglected the very real 
correspondences in the works of Mann and Heidegger, especially during the period from 
1924-1947, which one could argue frames the most important span of their respective 
professional development, and in this very real, historical sense Mann and Heidegger are 
powerful contemporaries. The front end of this period marks the publication of Mann’s self-
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described Zeitroman or time-novel, The Magic Mountain [Der Zauberberg] (1924), as well 
as Heidegger’s The Concept of Time [Der Begriff der Zeit] (1924), a critical preparatory 
work toward the monumental Being and Time [Sein und Zeit] (1927), in which Heidegger 
first introduces readers to his modernist reformulation of time and the subject that he calls 
Dasein. The latter end of this time period not only marks an important moment in the 
definitive maturation of shared ideas first developed in The Magic Mountain and Being and 
Time, but it also culminates in the publication of the so-called greatest efforts of both writers, 
Mann’s Doctor Faustus (1947) and Heidegger’s The Thinker as Poet [Aus der Erfahrung des 
Denkens] (1947) and The Letter on Humanism [Der Brief über den Humanismus] (1947), in 
which both Mann and Heidegger seek explicitly, and with a sympathetic emotional intensity 
that grows out of their mutual proximity to the events themselves, to come to terms with the 
contemporary events in German history that more than anything else determined the 
respective fates of their lives and work.    
In Mann’s late work Doctor Faustus, the protagonist Adrian Leverkühn, much like 
Heidegger himself, violates everything around him – himself, his nation, his art, his friends 
and family, and even history itself – and yet scholars still debate whether in the end he is 
condemned or saved for his hubris.1 In fact, Mann claims that Adrian “bore the suffering of 
the epoch” [“das Leid der Epoche trägt”] and confesses that he has never loved any “creature 
of [his] imagination” more than Adrian Leverkühn [“daβ ich nie eine Imagination […] 
geliebt hätte wie ihn”] (Story 88/Entstehung 81). What strikes me most here is that 
contemporary scholars already predisposed against Heidegger, and who call for a continued 
                                                          
1
 Rüdiger Safranski in Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil [Trans. Ewald Osers. Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1998] not only recognizes this correspondence between the real-life tragic fate of Martin Heidegger and the 
fictional tragedy of Adrian Leverkühn depicted in Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus, but he also organizes 
Heidegger’s biography around Mann’s fictional model. 
  ix
engagement of his philosophy in light of his infamous political ties, ultimately blame 
Heidegger’s downfall on precisely the same cultural-historical milieu with which Mann so 
clearly identifies his most beloved character. Thus the gist of my project is to explore this 
unlikely affiliation and to demonstrate that if “it was through a ‘definite orientation of his 
thought that Heidegger fell into the proximity of National Socialism’” (Wolin 6), then it was 
this same orientation through which Thomas Mann fell away from such proximity. In so 
doing I hope to bring together two very significant figures of German history, whose work is 
often thought, and justifiably so, to be caught up in very different, even diametrically 
opposed, intellectual traditions. Despite the obvious distance(s) between them, however, it is 
partly my goal to show that Mann and Heidegger do indeed belong to similar intellectual, 
historical and aesthetic orbits. One could argue, for instance, that it is precisely the relevance 
of Heidegger’s and Mann’s works for a particular understanding of German history and the 
proximity of these works to the historical period in question that gets the works of the former 
dismissed and those of the latter acknowledged, and it is this dramatic and unfortunate irony 
that my project hopes to both illuminate and reconcile through a juxtaposition of Mann’s and 
Heidegger’s respective literary and philosophical treatments of modernist time and tragic 
experience.  
Though I am steadfastly opposed to the aggressive intolerance of many of 
Heidegger’s critics, my aim is not to exonerate Heidegger. Rather, I am interested in 
reopening the potential of his body of work, in particular the comprehensive temporality 
described in Being and Time, for exploring the historical, even the literary or imaginative, 
character of the controversy that surrounds Heidegger’s thought, a controversy, by the way, 
that Mann himself anticipates and narrates in both The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus, 
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the novels that frame the historical period under study. Put another way, I wish to investigate 
the way the drama and fate of Heidegger’s philosophy resonate with narrative forms of 
possibility, such as the ideas of time and the tragic in modernist literature. Although well-
established figures in the fields of philosophy and literary theory, among them Jacques 
Derrida and Stanley Corngold, have long called on literary scholars to explore the potential 
of Heidegger’s work to facilitate new and provocative entries into literary and cultural 
analysis, the call has gone largely unanswered. To answer this call, A Poetics of ‘Care’, or 
Time and the ‘Dasein’ of Modernism in Thomas Mann and Martin Heidegger (1924/1947) 
carries out a detailed analysis of the evolution of ideas of time in Thomas Mann and Martin 
Heidegger during the period 1924-1947 with a view toward answering, in the end, the ways 
in which the evolution of these correspondences supports a complimentary and 
comprehensive understanding of modernist time and tragic experience.  
Toward this end, the first two chapters of my dissertation set out to accomplish two 
goals, respectively. First, I situate my task within the broader historical scope of transnational 
literary and philosophical modernism in order to demonstrate both the relevance and 
necessity of rereading conventional approaches to modernist time and tragedy in literature 
and philosophy from the standpoint of an approach that requires both Mann and Heidegger. 
The second chapter devotes itself to historically justifying and situating the comparison of 
these two, presumably very different figures by tracing the separate historical development(s) 
of ideas of time and tragic experience in the works of Mann and Heidegger during the period 
1924-1947. Among other things, this task will involve an investigation into both the 
changing weight assigned to history and historical thinking throughout this period (and not 
just by Mann and Heidegger, of course) as well as their unchanging, shared preoccupation(s) 
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with the themes of death, history and the tradition of Bildung. For the purposes of following 
Heidegger’s part in this comparison, I intend to undertake a sort of literary analysis of 
Heidegger’s famous characterization of time and being as Dasein and, in what amounts to the 
same thing, to introduce and explain key principles of his so-called “impenetrable” (Eiland) 
theory of temporality from Being and Time that informs so much of the dissertation. All of 
this will go a long way toward preparing the reader for the close textual analysis that makes 
up the larger part of my argument, toward ameliorating some of the challenges that always 
accompany any encounter with Heidegger’s idiosyncratic and much-criticized language and 
presentation, and toward justifying the analogy I set up between Dasein and Mann’s literary 
world(s). Most importantly, perhaps, my plans for the introduction will go a long way toward 
demonstrating that it is through such correspondences that I ultimately view Heidegger as an 
essential voice in modernist discussions of time and narrative and Mann (and the modernist 
Zeitroman more generally) as the key to reading Heidegger from any position of fairness, 
authority and objectivity, which is also to say, from the position of what Heidegger himself 
might call authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. 
My third chapter explains the problem of time and tragedy in modernist narrative by 
considering the character and nature of the future or what Heidegger calls the coming-
towards of being-towards-death. It argues first and foremost that Heidegger’s description of 
being-towards-death and the tragic deferral that is said to always accompany it resonate 
meaningfully with what has been called the “dilemma of closure” that haunts the narrative 
atmospheres of The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus.2 Heidegger’s famous description 
of death as “the possibility of [Dasein’s] absolute impossibility” (BT 294) and the central 
                                                          
2
 “Although it knows its end absolutely, [Dasein] will always be that in relation to which it will never know 
anything: the knowledge of the end always withdraws, is concealed in being deferred” (Stiegler 231). 
  xii
problem of Being and Time, which Heidegger describes as the impossibility of Dasein’s ever 
grasping itself as a whole, closely parallel Mann’s own time-problems as he presents them in 
The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus, namely the problems associated with the end and 
with endings. My reading in this chapter intentionally limits its attention to the Faustian 
moments in both novels and thus to a direct and focused analysis of what might be called the 
novel’s imagined response to Heidegger’s reading of being-towards-death in order to 
demonstrate the ontological basis of the Zeitverträge [time-pacts] entered into by Hans 
Castorp and Adrian Leverkühn, that is to say, the ontological basis of the “dilemma of 
closure,” which is without question a key narrative feature of both novels. 
My fourth chapter considers the problem of time and tragedy in modernist narrative 
with a view toward the past, or what Heidegger calls both the having-been of Dasein and the 
ontological ground of history. Despite both the influence of Adorno on Mann’s portrayal of 
history in Doctor Faustus as well as the implications of the famous Adorno-Heidegger 
debate, which revolves almost exclusively around Adorno’s rejection of Heidegger’s 
historical metaphysics, Mann cannot be said in Doctor Faustus to have simply and slavishly 
laid out in narrative form Adorno’s influential brand of historicism. As I attempt to 
demonstrate, Mann refuses in the end to deny the past an ontological depth and presence that 
Heidegger likes to call Dasein’s authentic sense of the past as having-been. In The Magic 
Mountain and Doctor Faustus, the difference between what Heidegger calls an inauthentic 
and an authentic history, or the difference between the history that one writes and the history 
that one is, is clearly evident in the tension that marks the impossibility of “telling time” 
(Cohn) in Mann’s novels. The source of this impossibility lies in the awkward demand 
placed upon the narrators to narrate the complex temporalities of their subject(s) – awkward 
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because, as I suggest, “telling time” involves narrating a past that in being told must at the 
same time cast something aside (as both Heidegger and Adorno affirm), and it is precisely 
the recognition and recovery of this loss (however incomplete in the end) that constitutes the 
tragic insight of Mann’s protagonists and any measure of authentic existence in Heidegger. 
Thus, as I hope to confirm, Mann’s treatment of history does indeed describe the deeper 
matter of historical authenticity and of what Heidegger calls being-historical, which emerges 
in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus as the commitment to a notion of the past as 
having-been that in its unavailability, in its being cast aside, remains always alongside 
Dasein and ultimately determines not only the life and fate of Hans Castorp and Adrian 
Leverkühn but also the typically overlooked significance they are meant by Mann to suggest.   
My final chapter also sets for itself two goals and focuses exclusively on Mann’s and 
Heidegger’s later writings and on the intersection that links the question of time with the 
question of the possibility of art under modernism, as is perhaps appropriate for a conclusion 
that hopes to situate Mann and Heidegger at the margins or end of modernism. First, it 
continues to follow the development of Mann’s and Heidegger’s ideas of time and 
temporality by taking up the idea of the end of time as well as the end of art – the latter, of 
course, is the powerful “rumor” (Geulen) that preoccupied both Mann and Heidegger 
throughout their respective careers, but especially during the historical period in question, at 
the end of which Mann and Heidegger directly engage the tragic, unspeakable guilt that 
accompanies a historical trajectory out of which the sort of world emerges in which the 
impossibility of art can even be imagined. Secondly, and with a view toward the question of 
the end of art, I demonstrate the way in which Mann’s narratives help to both mediate the 
alleged differences and also illuminate the correspondences between what is typically 
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understood as a very public and contentious debate between Adorno and Heidegger, a debate, 
moreover, which to a large extent still shapes our beliefs about modernism and modernity. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
Not the Usual Suspects: Toward a Rereading of Modernist Time in Mann and Heidegger 
 
 
This is a dissertation about time and modernism: about the place of time in 
modernism, and about the place of modernism in time (which is also to say, in history). 
Insofar as it plans to explore these topics and their intersection in specific literary and 
philosophical discourses from the modernist period, its first obligation is to sketch out the 
contemporary critical atmosphere that both explains and justifies its approach. 
Almost all contemporary discussions of modernism recognize the importance of 
modernist experimentations with and break from 19th century narrative time conventions and 
the historical conditions which prompted both. On the one hand, modernist representations of 
time are said to have developed as a response to historically specific advancements in 
technology and the cultural and intellectual shifts prompted by these advancements. Just as 
the historical foundations of realism lie in 19th century industrialism, scientific positivism and 
imperialism, modernist representations of changing perceptions of time are often said to 
reflect the even more technically accelerated and epistemologically fragmented nature of 
modern experience in the twentieth century as the bulwarks of 19th century realism collapsed 
under the weight and impossibility of their own ambitions. This is the subject of many 
critical works that explore the question of modernist time, including Stephen Kern’s seminal 
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work The Culture of Space and Time (1983) and Ronald Schleifer’s Modernism and Time 
(2000) (Kavaloski 34-5). 
On the other hand, modernist representations of time developed independently as 
purely aesthetic responses to the restrictive, prohibitive time-conventions of 19th century 
realism. In the realist novel, generally speaking, the predominant mode of time is linearity, 
which relies upon an absolute chronological sequence of beginning, middle and end in which 
the end justifies the beginning and middle in a relationship of predetermined harmony. In 
fact, the success of the realist novel may be said to depend upon the degree to which this 
harmony is realized through its reestablishment at the end of the novel (Kermode 5-7; 
Kavaloski 26-32). Ultimately, realist literature claims to depict not only the world but time 
itself as it is and assumes that it is the same for everyone (Kavaloski 28). Thus it is said that 
narrative moves away from representing time as it is for everyone toward a distinctly 
modernist literature that exposes a very different idea of time and reality as at the very least 
always relative to a subject and thus as diverse as individuals themselves. Walter Pater, a 
prominent early voice in the shift toward modernism, puts it this way: “the first step towards 
seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impression as it really is, to 
discriminate it, to realize it distinctly [and] [O]ur education becomes complete in proportion 
as our susceptibility to these impressions increases in depth and variety” (1507-8). Likewise, 
as Ford Madox Ford would eventually argue, “It became very early evident to us that what 
was the matter with the Novel […] was that it went straight forward, whereas […] To get…a 
man in f[i]ction you could not begin at his beginning and work his life chronologically to the 
end. You must first get him with a strong impression, and then work backwards and forwards 
over his past” (qtd. in Kern 31), and Virginia Woolf, too, laments the “appalling narrative 
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business of the realist” and claims that “[Neither] Life [nor time] is a series of gig-lamps 
symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us 
from the beginning of consciousness to the end” (2089).  
The primarily aesthetic shift that takes place with modernism toward the privileging 
of a subjective, pluralistic experience of time is also the subject of a long critical history; 
some notable examples include A.A. Mendilow’s Time and the Novel (1952), Theodore 
Ziolkowski’s Dimensions of the Modernist Novel (1969) and Ricardo Quinones’s Mapping 
Literary Modernism (1985) (Kavaloski 31-5). In order to summarize these two tendencies 
(the historical and aesthetic influences on modernist representations of time) in the criticism 
of modernist time, I’ll limit my analysis to the works of Kern and Mendilow since they 
constitute, respectively, the most comprehensive and the earliest treatments of the subject, 
and because both so clearly embody traditional and long-accepted approaches to the question 
of time and modernism they will best help prepare readers for the comparison that is the aim 
of my study and that seeks, in part, a reevaluation of the questions these approaches 
obviously privilege. 
Stephen Kern’s The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 claims that “[f]rom 
around 1880 to the outbreak of WWI a series of sweeping changes in technology and culture 
created distinctive new modes of thinking about and experiencing time and space” (1) and 
sets about describing and outlining these changes from a broad variety of perspectives. Kern 
writes that individuals and even nations “behave in distinctive ways when they feel they are 
cut off from the flow of time, excessively attached to the past, isolated in the present, without 
a future, or rushing toward one” (3), and he confirms with respect to the cultural and 
historical specificity of modernity what Mendilow’s observations had already confirmed with 
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respect to the literary treatment of time under modernism: that at least two comprehensive 
changes in thinking about time during this period, both of which  have major implications for 
understanding the literature of the period, include the affirmation of a plurality of times and 
temporal experience and the affirmation of the reality of a private, wholly subjective 
experience of time, for which the philosophy of Henri Bergson is said to form the 
“theoretical core” (8). And finally, he organizes, as does Mendilow to a lesser extent, the 
ideas of this period on the nature of time around three pairs of opposing views that, according 
to Kern, encompass the debate as a whole: whether time was homogenous or heterogeneous, 
atomistic or a flux, irreversible or reversible (11). 
No study of modernist time would be complete if it didn’t acknowledge the 
intellectual contribution of Bergson’s philosophy of time from Time and Free Will, which 
had a far-reaching influence on modernist literature. And the core of this influence is located 
in his theory of durée [duration]. Bergson defines time as pure quality and space as pure 
quantity, the former purely intensive and heterogeneous and the latter purely extensive and 
homogenous. Pure duration is “a qualitative multiplicity, with no likeness to number; an 
organic evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure heterogeneity within which 
there are no distinct qualities [or parts]” (TFW 226). Bergson was solely concerned with the 
way we know ourselves in time, a fact that both influenced and precipitated Heidegger’s 
critique of Bergson’s temporality in Being and Time, and his increasingly predominant focus 
on the value of the past for the present meant that for Bergson time was, as it was implicitly 
for Kant, a matter of freedom, and more particularly, a matter of subjective freedom. In 
Creative Evolution Bergson describes the best outcome of modern philosophy as one in 
which the “material world [will] melt back into a single flux, a continuity of flowing, a 
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becoming” (qtd. in Kern 26). It is precisely this ethical shadow that attends Bergson’s notion 
of duration which shows the most eloquent influence of Bergson on Marcel Proust, that the 
past in duration is the source of freedom and happiness. Thus only a life open to the fluid 
movement of duration has access to an essential source of individual freedom and happiness 
(Kern 62). For Bergson, absolute knowledge can only be given in intuition, such as that sort 
of universal intuition shared by all which is “our own personality in its flowing through time 
– our self which endures.” Referring to time in spatial terms can only end in a relative 
knowledge since the spatial figuratives used to describe temporal experience always fall short 
of articulating the human experience of time, indeed falsify it. Recognizing this, Bergson 
attempts the following definition: “let us free ourselves from the space which underlies 
movement in order to consider only the movement itself [thought without an object], the act 
of tension or extension, in short pure mobility. We shall have this time a more faithful image 
of the development of our self in duration […]” (qtd. in Kern 24). According to Kern, “the 
effect of this trying analogy is to underline the difficulty [and in the process define it] of 
expressing in words the true nature of our existence in time, which [Bergson] calls ‘duration’ 
[…]” (Kern 24-25). Ultimately, the idea of duration as a continuous, heterogeneous flow that 
cannot be measured and that constitutes the comprehensive becoming in which every human 
dwells and which every human consciousness occupies as long as it is greatly influenced 
modernist representations of time in literature and philosophy, including Heidegger’s. 
Adding to the influence of philosophies of time, such as Bergson’s, fields as diverse 
as modern physics, psychology, sociology, economics and industry also mounted forceful 
and convincing oppositions to a classical, Newtonian notion of absolute or homogenous time, 
in which time is defined as a “sum of infinitesimally small but discrete units” (Kern 20) that 
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flows at a steady, uniform rate completely external to the human experience of it. Whatever 
their differences, these developments all posit time as relative, plural and as fraught with 
contradiction. In fact, the most important repercussion of, say, Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
was the conclusion that there is no privileged observer. No one was in such a privileged 
position that he/she could see the world (and time) as it is. Likewise, time could no longer be 
understood as a constant, homogenous, stable and absolute phenomenon. One is always 
seeing things in terms of one’s relation to them. And it was not only modernist literature that 
celebrated and exploited these contradictory elements of nature; rather, contradiction, it was 
discovered, is built into nature itself.  
Modern technological developments, as one would expect, seemed to only confirm 
and exploit the philosophical and scientific revelations about the character of time as a 
relative flux. Kern acknowledges that the cinema, for example, emerged out of modernist 
experiments in photography and cinematography and sought to capture the movement of 
objects in time in order to adequately represent time as flux rather than atomistic and 
discrete, as reversible rather than irreversible. According to Kern, “the structure of history, 
the uninterrupted forward movement of clocks, the procession of days, seasons, and years, 
and simple common sense tell us that time is irreversible and moves forward at a steady rate” 
(29), but the technological innovations of cinema and photography almost immediately 
challenged these views. With cinematic technique, time could be reversed, stopped, spliced, 
fused, interrupted and with the novelty of the photograph, the moment, the perspective, the 
slice or instant was ripped out of the temporal continuum and exposed without commentary 
and thus without the system of control which would have ascribed to it a greater or lesser 
degree of value.  
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 For Kern, the introduction of a standard universal world-time in July 1913, 
precipitated by advancements in communications and transportation and the expansion of the 
global marketplace, dramatically qualified the experience of an absolute, objective, 
international time and supplanted the heterogeneous, cultural, natural time experience of an 
earlier age; and more broadly speaking the establishment of universal standard time enforced 
an experience of time drastically different from an inner experience of time. Nevertheless, 
although this new “public” time was viewed as more or less accurately marking duration and 
succession and the broader public accepted the introduction of standard time without 
question or concern, artists and writers reacted almost immediately to its negative 
implications for human knowledge and experience and to the sharp distinction between 
“public” and “private” time that it emphasized (11-16).  
Kern offers several familiar examples from the world of modernist literature to 
demonstrate the reaction of modernist fiction to this emergent, fundamentally modernist 
understanding of the character and nature of time. Joseph Conrad’s protagonist in The Secret 
Agent is a Russian anarchist in England charged with blowing up the Greenwich observatory, 
the most “graphic symbol of centralized political authority” (Kern 16). Oscar Wilde in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray inverts public and private time when the portrait of Dorian ages 
while he himself remains young. Proust’s Marcel experiences a deeply private and erratic 
time that is out of sync with other characters in the novel and that cannot be accounted for by 
a “dial superficially marked” (qtd. in Kern 16). Kafka’s characters endure an ontological 
terror that is often tied to temporal experience; when Gregor Samsa awakes to find himself 
turned into a giant insect, his initial reaction is shock at having missed the train that will get 
him to work on time. And Joyce’s Ulysses offers the reader various times of extreme 
  8
heterogeneity. Not only are Odysseus’s mythic travels compressed into the very brief 
confines of Bloom’s 24-hour sojourn through Dublin and in turn the strict confines of the 
hours of the day extended backwards and forwards across the spectrum of characters’ inner 
thoughts that seem unconfined by time, but each episode that makes up the novel would 
appear to suggest a unique experience of time. (Kern 16-18) 
Of course, the modernist’s view of time as flux also owes much to the other 
modernist developments in literature, namely the growing belief, first articulated by William 
James in 1884, that human consciousness is “a stream and not a conglomeration of separate 
faculties or ideas” (Kern 24). The notion that thought or consciousness is comprised of 
separate units of feeling or faculty (as in Kant, for instance) implicitly suggests a spatial 
representation of time, which Bergson (and Heidegger) worked continuously to suppress; in 
fact, Bergson called the spatial representation of time a vice. Along with Bergson and 
Husserl, James believed that “[e]ach mental event is linked with those before and after, near 
and remote, which act like a surrounding ‘halo’ or ‘fringe.’ [….] The whole of it surges and 
slows, and different parts move along at different rates, touching upon one another like the 
eddies of a turbulent current” (Kern 24). In short, these three belong more or less to the same 
camp, which believed that time is not composed of discrete parts and thus is not jointed – 
rather, it flows (Kern 24).  
While Kern offers a privileged space for literature in his study, insofar as its specific 
engagement with the cultural, social and technological changes of the age help to reveal the 
scope and measure of the effects of these changes on modernist society as a whole, his 
treatment of literary texts is always brief and marginal. And though it can be argued that the 
literary selections of A. A. Mendilow are anything but comprehensively representative of this 
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engagement, Mendilow’s focus in Time and the Novel is on the aesthetic operations that 
underlie and accompany this shift as opposed to the historical developments that may or may 
not have made them possible but that are nevertheless reflected in modernist literature; 
indeed, according to Mendilow, it is precisely these aesthetic operations that signal the 
modernism of the work.  
For Mendilow, as for Kern, a modernist view of time presents something like 
Spengler intended with his description of modernity as a world of things-becoming rather 
than of things-become, the world-as-history as opposed to the world-as-nature, a world of 
time rather than a world of space (3). According to Mendilow, time under modernism is no 
longer subjugated to space but rather space is made to submit to time. Mendilow anticipates 
studies like Kern’s when he acknowledges the way in which the time-obsession of the 20th 
century is conditioned by the increased pace of living, a wide-spread sense of the transience 
of all forms of modern life, and more particularly, by the rapidity of social and economic 
change. The loss of assuredness and the anxiety typically associated with the rapid changes 
that characterize modernization lies at the foundation of literary modernism’s obsession with 
questions of time. (Mendilow 3-10)  
For the modernist novel, Mendilow writes, the static symmetry and unity of 
Aristotelian-Newtonian time and action could no longer be imposed on the dynamic 
formlessness of life, which the modernists experienced not as an unchanging unity and whole 
but as a variable, flowing and alienating reality. Endings no longer resolve problems but 
rather signal the beginning of new ones. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Mann’s The 
Magic Mountain where the novel ends with the outbreak of world war.  Hence the character 
of our future perspectives shifts continuously and uninterruptedly opens up new horizons 
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almost infinitely. This emphasis on change and movement only underscores the character of 
the time-obsession of the modernists, where time is no longer a matter of faith or certainty 
but only of doubt, but then at the same time, of potential and possibility. Like society and 
culture, the novel in the age of modernism acquires for itself a protean shape, quality, 
character, and focus as it embraces a certain elasticity and release from the rigid, formulaic 
rules of its predecessors. And time, since it functions as a conditions the very possibility of 
narrative, lies at the heart of not only cultural but also narrative experience; this is especially 
true of the problem of portraying the passage of time. (Mendilow 3-21)  
Despite modernists’ efforts to represent time as it really was, fiction, according to 
Mendilow, in its thematic, formal and medial limitations, always resists the attempt:  
As fiction is a time-art, the problems of its structure, conventions and 
techniques form a veritable arabesque of different time-values and factors. 
[….] The novel is not a ‘pure’ art; it must have a subject, related, no matter 
how exiguously, to the world we live in and know through our sense. The 
theme must deal with the behavior of human beings who act, feel, and think in 
time and are subject to all its vagaries, varieties and variations. [….] All 
fiction must as in life begin and end and be comprised of events, however 
tenuously they may qualify as events, which precede, follow and relate 
somehow to each other. [Moreover] The medium of fiction imposes the most 
serious limitation on the expression of a variety of temporal experience 
because the nature of language and communication, even as a time-art, is that 
of distinct and separate units of meaning which must be followed sequentially 
so that meaning unfolds in time […]. (Mendilow 31) 
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The problem arises when the writer wishes in a medium, which is decidedly against the 
attempt, to create the effect of simultaneity, of constant presence or immobility, of 
reversibility, of immediacy, which is all to say, an experience of time which approaches a 
lived, that is, a human or real, rather than artificial, experience of time – the experience of 
duration – and it was, of course, a foundational objective of modernism to experiment with 
pushing the boundaries of the medium in order to accommodate and test the limitations of the 
form (Mendilow 31).  It is important to point out, Mendilow adds, that as hard as the writer 
may try to approximate this experience, it is always the reader whose duration becomes so 
closely bound with the narrative so as to be indistinguishable from it – the sequential 
narrative itself and the reader’s experience of the text as narrative collapse into each other in 
the experience of reading which itself cannot escape participating in the mutual duration it 
signifies. This, according to Mendilow, is why one of the hallmarks of a great novel is the 
extent to which it captures a reader; it is so deceptive, artful, illusory and binding in its 
existence so as to intervene between the reader and his immediate perception of reality, thus 
giving the reader a direct sensation of being in the novel; in this way the reader forgets both 
himself, the author and the novel – the entire artificiality of the experience (Mendilow 32-3). 
 Suffice it to say that, alongside its seminal insights into the relationship between time 
and modernism, Mendilow’s study not only confirms the manner in which Bergson’s theory 
of duration greatly affected the way the modernist novel treated character, plot, and structure, 
but it also inaugurates the critical tradition that cannot seem to move beyond the limits of this 
recognition. Bergson writes in Time and Free Will: “We instinctively tend to solidify our 
impressions in order to express them in language. Hence we confuse the feeling itself, which 
is in a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with 
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the word which expresses the object” (qtd. in Mendilow 150) – consider the word time, for 
example. Such an impasse shows the inherent difficulty of communicating a lived experience 
of time through a medium almost diametrically opposed to the possibility of such 
communication, and this is why fiction may be described as a sort of “contract of error” 
between writer and reader, and between the perceiver and the perceived object (qtd. in 
Mendilow 151). Mendilow describes the novel as “a fictitious narrative in prose which seeks 
to illustrate and illuminate human experience and behavior within the limitations imposed by 
the medium of language and by the necessities of form, by approximating as closely as 
possible to what we apprehend as reality. The test of its immediate success is its power to 
evoke the feeling of presentness in […] and at that reality […]” (238). Thus Mendilow 
successfully shows the difficulties involved in being a novel, especially in a modernist age 
hyper-aware of the complexities and the inescapable aporetic character of communicating or 
representing a lived time and experience. In the end, Mendilow suggests, the modernist 
novelist may be said to have spent a lifetime coming to terms with Bergson’s theory.  
The so-called Bergsonian period of modernist literature from which the “usual 
suspects” are gathered, e.g. Joyce, Woolf, Faulkner, Svevo, Proust, etc., represents a finite 
moment in history when novel ideas of time influenced a series of innovative responses in 
the arts and sciences. But, as T.S. Eliot would perhaps explain it, the introduction of these 
new developments, through the dialectical process of their inclusion in tradition (especially, I 
think, where that process involves a radical break from tradition) simultaneously alters the 
substance and trajectory of that tradition. For my purposes, the question becomes how 
representations of time may be said to have evolved as modernism itself not only progressed 
but as it progressively radicalized the implications of its inheritance. Mann and Heidegger 
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certainly belong to the list of “usual suspects,” but in another sense, as I will argue, their 
special significance and the striking correspondences in their respective treatments of time 
has yet to be acknowledged, much less worked through. It is, moreover, a difference that 
reveals itself precisely in the way they are included, or in Heidegger’s case, excluded, from 
traditional analyses of modernist time. 
Any contemporary study of modernist time contributes little to the debate by simply 
recapitulating the aporias of time that led to this feeling of exhaustion in the first place, that 
is, by demonstrating the way modernist novels “depart drastically from inherited conceptions 
of time” (Kavaloski 7) in terms of agency, duration, development, linearity and direction. It 
is, for instance, well-known that modernist texts expose the mock temporality of realist 
narratives and open up the human experience of time to reflect a more “real” sense of time as 
highly pluralistic and individual. The value and interpretive potential of these conclusions 
notwithstanding, this dissertation seeks to distance itself from these traditional readings and 
to deploy the works of Mann and Heidegger as evidence and justification for a reevaluation 
of a later modernism’s preoccupation with time and temporality.  
First, while conventional readings freely describe the division of time into the binary 
oppositions of private vs. public, subjective vs. objective, etc., as the ground for modernism’s 
otherness, these evaluations rarely elaborate the ground of these divisions itself. The so-
called obsession with the mystery of time’s linearity, continuity, measurability, homogeneity 
and direction that informs so many seminal works of criticism on the subject of modernist 
time and which in the end is said to both facilitate and accompany the turning inward of 
modernism is inevitably treated as the end of such experimentation rather than as having 
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prepared the ground for a philosophy and literature that moves decidedly beyond such 
experimentation and toward dramatizing its implications.  
Secondly, the notion that modernist interpretations of time can only be accessed or 
are wholly dependent on the mediation of other discourses, such as those of philosophy, 
psychology, history or physics (this is seen in the general despair of Mann’s narrator in The 
Magic Mountain when he wonders whether time itself can actually be narrated) fails to 
account for the way in which narrative as such constitutes its own formidable response to and 
dramatization of the problem of time. Contrary to the claims of many critics, however, 
literature cannot give us an unmediated representation of time (Kavaloski 36-7). This is 
confirmed, I think, by de Man’s recognition in The Rhetoric of Temporality that time in the 
ordinary sense of the term is always already a catachresis, an unstable metaphor, which is 
thus always already mediated. In addition, such a reevaluation requires that the diversity of 
responses to time and temporality during the modernist period be viewed not as distinct, 
strictly independent discourses, but rather as symptomatic of a widespread, i.e. transnational 
and interdisciplinary, confrontation with both an interpretive crisis and a crisis of 
interpretation (of which both Mann and Heidegger are essential rather than marginal 
expressions).  
Finally, and most importantly, my dissertation argues that the key to such a 
reevaluation may lie in the historical evolution of modernist approaches to time, an evolution 
that to my knowledge has never been acknowledged and that can be clearly articulated by 
tracing the maturation of literary and philosophical treatments of time during a later 
modernism. Part of the reason for the weariness associated with conventional discussions of 
modernist time is their perennial focus on the influence of Bergson’s theory of duration, 
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which while having provided a lasting and meaningful interpretive tradition and access to the 
heart of many of modernism’s most seminal works, Mann’s included, may have nevertheless 
been pushed to its limits. In the conventional scenario, Mann’s The Magic Mountain is 
viewed as a late modernist response to the Bergsonian and Einsteinean traditions, and 
Heidegger is treated as an afterthought, as a less compelling continuation of what are, after 
all, Bergsonian preoccupations. But this view fails to account for the fact that Mann’s most 
famous time-novel is also only his earliest or that it is followed by two other monumental 
productions that continue his exploration of the subject, and it almost absolutely ignores not 
only Heidegger’s commitment to overcoming Bergson but also the complex and 
comprehensive potential of Heidegger’s temporality to illuminate the narrative world(s) of 
literary modernism.  
If we allow, for instance, for the lasting historical influence on modernist literature of 
Bergson, Einstein and Husserl, we should also allow for the possibility that Heidegger’s 
deliberate reevaluation of time both in terms of and in the midst of this tradition may also 
have ramifications for the critical study of the modernist novels, especially time-novels, that 
emerged in the wake of his vital reconsideration of time and temporality in Being and Time. 
It is, by the way, no counter claim to say that the distinction lies in the fact that while many 
modernist authors were either indirectly or directly influenced by the work(s) of Bergson and 
Einstein, none claim to have been similarly inspired by Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the appearance of Heidegger’s Being and Time emerges out of the same 
historical and intellectual milieu that gave us the evolution of the modernist novel; like the 
novels of the period it is itself a response not only to its predecessors but to the Zeitgeist as 
such. In short, Heidegger’s readings of Bergson, Einstein and Husserl beg for a rereading of 
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modernist time across the board and especially during the historical period which prompted 
such a comprehensive philosophical reevaluation. I believe establishing this link and 
describing this trajectory will release contemporary discussions of modernist time from the 
burden of their untimeliness and reinvigorate critical discussions of the subject, especially 
where Heidegger and Mann are concerned, since this shift is particularly evident in the 
trajectory described in the move from The Magic Mountain (1924) to Doctor Faustus 
(1947).3  
So what does this mean, then – a rereading of modernist time that undertakes to 
compare representations of time and the tragic in Mann and Heidegger? Most importantly, it 
means I will argue that what distinguishes Heidegger’s temporality from that of his 
predecessors in the history of philosophy is precisely what distinguishes Mann’s literary 
treatment of time from many of those writers with whom he is typically associated. If we 
accept that Heidegger’s innovations include, among other things, his emphasis on the 
primacy of human finitude, the ontological weight of history and his reformulation of the 
category of the subject (Dasein), then I will argue that Mann’s narrative preoccupations 
during the period under study reveal a comparable shift of attention and critical effort that in 
turn will help to elaborate Heidegger’s complex temporality. Both Heidegger and Mann 
show us that narrative is not simply grounded in time because “it must deal with the behavior 
of human beings who act, feel, and think in time” or even because “All fiction must as in life 
begin and end and be comprised of events […] which must be followed sequentially so that 
meaning unfolds in time” (Mendilow 31), but because the narrative impulse itself has its 
                                                          
3
 For the broader discussion of the untimeliness of time in contemporary critical theory, see J.H. Miller’s “Time 
in Literature,” Daedalus, 132.2 (Spring 2003): 86-98; and Fredric Jameson’s “The End of Temporality,” 
Critical Inquiry, 29.4 (Summer 2003): 695-718. 
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basis first and foremost in “a mystery – a figment and all-powerful” [“Ein Geheimnis, – 
wesenlos und allmächtig”] (MM 344/ZB 521) articulation of a fundamental temporalization at 
the core of what it means to be human and historical, a temporalization, moreover, that links 
modernist representations of time not only with the traditional tragic category of death, but 
also with categories that emerge as tragic only under the pressures of modernist modes of 
representation, particularly in Mann and Heidegger, namely, the categories of history and 
subjectivity. 
Now that we have elaborated the historical context in which any discussion of Mann, 
Heidegger, and their respective treatments of time and the tragic must be responsibly 
situated, we can venture a discussion of the details of this proposed evolution. With the 
trajectory that takes us from the publication of Mann’s The Magic Mountain and Heidegger’s 
The Concept of Time in 1924 to Doctor Faustus and Heidegger’s later works around 1947, 
we encounter the evolution of a critical exigency that carefully and consciously exceeds 
literary or philosophical experimentations with time typical of conventional readings of 
modernist time and that rather signals the continuation, progression and deepening of such 
preoccupations. Thus Mann goes further than Proust, Joyce and Woolf by making time the 
subject (in both senses of the term) of both The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus; 
likewise, Heidegger seeks to move beyond Bergson, Einstein and Husserl by situating time at 
the ground of what it means to be subject.  
Thus it may be argued that modernism’s initial experimentations with time ultimately 
suggest and result in the growing awareness of the ontological priority of time, which is 
expressed in the emergence of time as tragic subject, that “unique portion of eternity known 
as oneself [that] can always be irredeemably lost” (Eagleton 52), and which is precipitated by 
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an evolution in modernist analyses of death and history and, in particular, the relation of 
these to what we have come to call the modernist narrative and the modernist subject that 
both inhabits it and is transfigured in it. In short, Heidegger’s and Mann’s historical situation 
at the end of their respective traditions in philosophy and literature seem to beg for a 
comparison as they both signal historically specific responses to the same intellectual 
preoccupations, and thus when compared reveal a certain evolution of thought and attention 
with respect to modernist theories of time and the tragic, or better yet, with respect to the 
emergence (in/as modernism) of time as the idea of the tragic and the emergence of the tragic 
as an idea of time.                 
 Stephen Kern’s description of a particularly German sense of time from 1880-1918 
goes a long way toward helping to situate and prepare a reading of time and tragedy in Mann 
and Heidegger during the latter half of the modernist period. Kern argues that the national 
sense of time in Germany that prepared the way for German modernist representations of 
time was characterized paradoxically perhaps by the lack of a unified German national 
identity. A history of political strife and fragmentation produced a cultural anxiety and 
urgency during an age of imperial conquest and expansion that found the Germans 
increasingly obsessed with the question of national unity. On the one hand, the future of 
Germany was plagued by doubts inherited from a legacy of political discontinuity and the 
fact that as a nation Germany itself was still in the uncertainty and vulnerability of its 
infancy. On the other hand, the future was bathed in an anxious light of expectation, the 
result, according to Kern, of the influential historicism of Hegel, Darwin and Marx, all of 
which promised either implicitly or explicitly a future reconciliation and progression out of 
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the discontinuities and tensions of the past. For Kern, a distinctly German temporality 
described a nation in fast-forward, bent on making up for lost time. (Kern 277-78)     
Kern, of course, along with many conventional readings of modernist time and of 
Mann’s place in the modernist time-novel tradition, stops short of recognizing, much less 
elaborating, the implications and impact of his own insight. For Kern, this idea of a national 
sense of time serves only as a historical framework for shedding light on the character and 
nature of narrative representations of time and thus only recapitulates the reciprocal 
relationship between historical and intellectual developments in the modernist period in 
Germany and the way in which writers such as Mann and Heidegger represent this shared 
temporality.  
What this stopping short always seems to neglect are the ontological implications of 
the relationship it admits, namely, that as much as the relationship between modernity and 
modernist representations of time is a matter of historical influence, it is also a matter, in the 
case of Mann and Heidegger, of what it means to be German, or of what amounts to the same 
thing, what it means to be historical. Here we should recall Mendilow’s evaluation of the 
problem of being a novel, for in this way the problem of being and the problem of narrative 
emerge as closely related questions. In fact, it is only after recognizing these implications that 
we are able to see the gravity that binds Mann and Heidegger within similar intellectual 
orbits. This being German is precisely what distinguishes Mann’s and Heidegger’s treatment 
of time and that for both Mann and Heidegger determines, perhaps overdetermines, so much 
of their work and that points well beyond the limited reach of conventional readings which 
identify a merely historical connection between Mann’s and Heidegger’s narrative treatment 
of time and a national–cultural sense of time without elaborating the ontological aspect of 
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such a connection and the implications of this aspect for understanding their respective views 
of time. In short, what Kern describes as a mere analogical correspondence between national 
time and narrative representations of time actually suggests an ontological correspondence 
that is consistently grounded in time and temporality and that my dissertation hopes to 
elaborate. A less important question is whether one buys Kern’s argument for a national 
temporality as the cause of German aggression in the modernist period. What may or may not 
be true about the paradigm described by Kern is grounded in what certainly is true for both 
Heidegger and Mann – the question of time is always also a question of both history and 
ontology, or better, the question of what it means to be German is for Mann and Heidegger 
also the question of what it is to be.  
  
 
 
Chapter II 
 
Dasein and the Time-Novel 
 
Thomas Mann and the Zeitroman 
The maturation of Mann’s treatment of time from 1924-1947 shows very clearly how 
the persistence of an idea of time both remains and evolves amidst shifting historical 
conditions that thus require a corresponding shift in the evolution of Mann’s narrative and 
critical responses to history. In order to advance such a claim it is first of all necessary to take 
for granted what is after all a key assumption of my argument, i.e. that the best place to trace 
this development is not in the so-called philosophical speculation of Mann’s characters (this 
is where most critical interpretations of Mann’s treatment of time begin and end and thus 
why Doctor Faustus is never read against Mann’s conception of the Zeitroman and 
Bildungsroman, i.e. why it is never read as a novel about time) but rather in his careful 
treatment of death, history, and Bildung, the significance of which no one will disagree 
carries over from one novel to another during this period and continues to preoccupy Mann’s 
thought and narrative efforts.   
The Magic Mountain tells the story of Hans Castorp, a young engineer, who ventures 
to the sanatorium Berghof intending a three week stay with his cousin before fulfilling his 
civic duties but ends up spending seven years on the magic mountain. In the words of his 
author, Castorp “is in the end a prototype and forerunner, a little prewar German who by 
‘intensification’ is brought to the point of anticipating the future” [“ist am Ende ein Vortypus 
und Vorläufer, ein Vorwegnehmer, ein kleiner Vorkriegsdeutscher, der durch ‘Steigerung’ 
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zum Anticipieren gebracht wird”] (Letters 132/Briefe 238).4 The expansion of time from 
three weeks into seven years is reflected both in the narrative structure itself as well as in the 
expansion of Castorp’s private experience of time as he struggles to come to terms with the 
static, timeless atmosphere of the Berghof (thus the novel tends to flow at the same rate as 
the temporal expansion it describes). This temporal predicament clearly reflects the sort of 
national time-sense described by Kern above (and Mann himself) in which both the future 
and the anxiety surrounding it are foregrounded. On the one hand, Castorp stands poised on 
the brink of a future filled with hope and active anticipation. On the other hand, the future is 
characterized by a passive expectation in which the future is comprised of monotonous 
repetition and consistently at risk of a falling away into a timeless nostalgia that threatens to 
produce both a public (historical) and private (psychological) stasis if not an active, 
dangerous regression. Along the way Castorp is caught up in an ideological and personal 
struggle that is likewise said to mirror the contest between temporalities. The novel ends as it 
began in what Kern calls a more active futural mood with Castorp finally rejecting the 
Berghof’s temptations to passivity and timeless repetition and actively reengaging with time, 
i.e. history, as he enters the First World War.  
Conventional interpretations of the novel locate its central message in the 
constellation of meanings attached to the novel’s treatment of death, history and Bildung. 
Castorp’s Bildung, in fact, is typically framed within the strict confines of the temporalities 
associated in the novel with both death and history. The curious paradox of Castorp’s time at 
the Berghof, according to Hofrat Behrens, the chief physician, is that the mountain climate 
can be “good for” his disease in the double-sense of the phrase, i.e. that it has the potential to 
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both nourish as well as cure the disease (Reed 231). Thus Castorp’s Bildung is comprised of 
what Reed, Travers and many others, including Mann himself, describe as the “deepening of 
the mediocre individual by contact with death” (Reed 238-9).  It is only through confronting 
death, i.e. falling prey to and eventually overcoming the lure of disease and timelessness at 
the Berghof – “life without time, life without care or hope, life as depravity, assiduous 
stagnation; life as dead” [“das Leben ohne Zeit, das sorg- und hoffnungslose Leben, das 
Leben als stagnierend betriebsame Leiderlichkeit, das tote Leben”] (Magic 627/Zauberberg 
951; qtd. in Reed 264) – that Castorp is able in the end to rejoin history, commit to a life of 
action and historical responsibility and integrate the understanding that death is not so much 
the enemy of life and history but rather it justifies them, makes them worth living and 
defending. 
Mann’s treatment of death in the novel and the tendency it describes toward a 
sympathy with death is said to be simultaneously a critique of European history. The static, 
timeless atmosphere of the Berghof with its patients divided along national lines and its 
politics mired in apparent impasse and irreconcilability, though its symbolic value is 
complicated and extensive, clearly also represents a pre-1914 European society described by 
Kern as “explosive, feverish, constantly taking its temperature, [and] struggling from one 
crisis to the next” (106). Likewise, Reed calls the outbreak of World War I the “detonation of 
these moods, which have built up dangerous pressures” and which predominate on the magic 
mountain:  
The ‘great stupor’ [grosse Stumpfsinn] which results from the monotony of 
sanitorium life and gives rise to the frivolous and sensational pastimes, and 
the ‘great irritability’ [grosse Gereiztheit] which derives directly from the 
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stupor stand for the pointlessness and lack of organic prospects for pre-1914 
Europe and for the aggressive moods which [this] purposeless existence 
fostered. (Reed 263)    
According to Reed, it is this correspondence between the temporality of death and 
decay and the temporality of life and history, which is also the tension between timelessness 
and time, that informs not only the novel’s themes but also the development of Mann’s 
political thinking over the period of the novel’s composition. As a result, Reed argues, and 
rightly so, Castorp’s Bildung comes to reflect the author’s own political education while the 
novel was being written, and it is this ultimate correspondence between the narrative and its 
creator that makes the novel’s status as Bildungsroman both possible and necessary. By the 
time the novel was completed the author of The Magic Mountain had altered his opinions 
with regard to what it had always been the goal of the novel to advocate and in this way 
Mann was fated to realize for himself what Castorp was also surprised to learn (Reed 244). 
Thus, according to most interpretations of the novel, does the symbolic weight of the Berghof 
shift from representing a tragic, Nietzschean aestheticism in which Berghof existence is 
favorably set apart from and elevated above practical historical, bourgeois life to representing 
“a doomed political society […] because of the life it permitted: a life without time, carefree, 
hopeless, stagnant, vicious, dead” (Reed 264).  In the end, Castorp “is more aware of the 
dangers of excessive ‘sympathy with death’ than of the need to integrate it into a mature view 
of life” (Reed 244) and, as Reed also points out, if the world of the Berghof is to be read at 
all positively then it is because Castorp’s Bildung on the magic mountain essentially ends 
with his repudiation of the temptations encountered there (264).           
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If the timeless atmosphere of the Berghof and the sympathy with death that it 
provokes serve to lure Castorp, if only temporarily, away from the call to action and 
historical responsibility (and thus only temporarily “conditions” his experience while 
ultimately allowing him to escape), then an even more pervasive but similar threat literally 
and fatally infects Adrian Leverkühn, the protagonist of Mann’s later novel Doctor Faustus. 
The lack of a commitment to action that characterized the passive waiting of the patients at 
the Berghof in The Magic Mountain has given way not to a wave of renewed civilization and 
historical activity and prosperity but to the active resolution of even darker historical forces 
that much more so than the isolated charms of the magic mountain permeate all levels of 
public and private discourse and experience. 
As its title suggests, Doctor Faustus, Mann’s self-proclaimed last great novel, takes 
the form of a troubling allegory of the psychological, political and historical climate that 
nourished fascism and the collision and constellation of forces that made the German 
atrocities of WW II possible, describing a Germany that has made a fatal bargain with the 
Devil in return for political power and historical supremacy. The protagonist Adrian 
Leverkühn, whose life story is narrated by his intimate life-long friend, Serenus Zeitblom, is 
a coldly detached, extremely cerebral composer whose efforts to produce a radically new 
artistic breakthrough through an innovative and timely compositional form, the so-called 
strict style [strenger Satz], both require and unleash the diabolical forces that of course insist 
on his condemnation and ultimate sacrifice. In keeping with Mann’s continuous fascination 
with the intersections of creativity with disease, decay and the diabolical, Adrian, in 
deliberately infecting not only himself, but also his art and his nation, exchanges his soul and 
the capacity to love for the creative genius that in Mann disease very often inspires. The 
  26
effect of the virus that infects Adrian and Germany, as Mann himself explains it as early as 
1905, is “intoxication, stimulus, inspiration” [“Rausch, Stimulans, Inspiration”] (qtd. in Reed  
361),5 but the productivity it enables demands perhaps unforgivable transgressions against 
self and society and thus, too, inevitable sacrifice and judgment. Just as the disease that 
plagued Germany required both a violent outbreak and the running of its course, Adrian and 
his art teeter on the edge of impossibility and must, too, be resolved. For Adrian the 
judgment for his crimes are resolved only in death, and the consequences of his art likewise 
appear to condemn art itself. Next to the “unfeigned and untransfigured” [“unverstellte und 
unverklärte”] (DF 256/ 323) suffering of history, suffering’s representation in art is no longer 
adequate; as Adorno would eventually explain it, it is barbaric. The novel ends with the oft 
described naïve hopes of the narrator that something of that which he loved in his friend 
would escape the misfortune bestowed upon him and be recovered for the future prosperity 
of his legacy and homeland, a hope, that is to say, for “a miracle that goes beyond faith”  
[“ein Wunder, das über den Glauben geht”] (DF 534/672).  
The abrogation of time that characterized the isolated monotony of life at the Berghof 
is revealed in Doctor Faustus as a more fundamental negation symbolized in Adrian’s 
twelve-tone compositional style. Whereas the humanist idealism of Settembrini is often said 
to win out in The Magic Mountain, Doctor Faustus describes a world in which Settembrini 
not only loses the duel with Naphta, but a world in which the duel has already been lost. The 
moderating role played by Settembrini is generally attributed in Doctor Faustus to the 
narrator, Zeitblom, whose inefficacy and unreliability are now long accepted tropes in 
traditional criticism of the novel. Unlike Settembrini, who exerted a powerful influence over 
                                                          
5
 This early journal entry is also mentioned by Mann in The Story of a Novel 17-18/Entstehung des Doktor 
Faustus 21-22. 
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Castorp, Zeitblom apparently has little influence over the tragic course of his friend’s fate. 
And perhaps it goes without saying that Adrian Leverkühn is much more than a “little prewar 
German who anticipates the future” but rather a monumental (in the Nietzschean sense of the 
term) historical figure from the privileged world and tradition of German art, who actively 
precipitates the future, produces it, brings it into being and consummates it.  
Moreover, the increase in urgency and consequence that accompanies the shift from 
The Magic Mountain to Doctor Faustus can be seen in Mann’s continued thematic treatment 
of death, history and Bildung since they reassert themselves in the latter novel imbued with 
clearer, even more critical meanings and implications. While the sympathy with death in The 
Magic Mountain was, as Mann himself often endeavored to explain, not meant to end in 
nihilism but rather meant to be tempered with humor and what in the end was an affinity with 
life, in Doctor Faustus Adrian Leverkühn bargains away his soul in what amounts to an 
absolute sympathy with death. This absolute sympathy is evident in the comprehensiveness 
of the analogy insofar as it determines not only Adrian’s life and work, but also the life and 
work of the narrator as well as the history recounted and in which the narration takes place. 
As Reed explains it, the function of death and disease in the later novel suggests “a more 
fundamental evil” than the relatively manageable pathology of The Magic Mountain (17). 
Suffice it to say for now that what was depicted as a philosophical discourse on time and 
death in The Magic Mountain is in Doctor Faustus consummated as literal and figurative 
intercourse. 
Likewise, history is said to take on an equal and closely related urgency in the later 
novel as well. Many scholars have noted the contrast between the rather marginal and 
ambivalent role of history in The Magic Mountain and the more concrete allegorical 
  28
equivalence established in Doctor Faustus between Adrian’s fate and the historical fate of 
Germany in the mid-twentieth century. According to these scholars, it is precisely this 
historical fate that gives the later novel its substance, value and distinction among Mann’s 
works and that not only brings into relief themes formed very early on in his writings but that 
allows him to finally situate these themes within “a larger and more significant scheme than 
he ever dreamt of” in 1905 when the idea for the novel was first hatched (Reed 17).  Where 
the First World War was blamed on the passive waiting of European diplomacy, the deferral 
of accountability, cultural resentments and a battle of worldviews, the Second World War is 
traced rather to a resolute sort of reaction and regression represented literally in the emergent 
political threat of fascism and figuratively in the biological march of Adrian’s disease and in 
his development of the strenger Satz.  
The representation of history in Doctor Faustus also achieves an epic specificity 
unparalleled in Mann’s oeuvre. By the time Mann was writing Doctor Faustus in the 1940s 
Mann was wholly aware of the interconnection of German history with his own past and fate. 
What was merely a presentiment in Death in Venice and a prediction in The Magic Mountain 
emerges as a firm conviction in Doctor Faustus, i.e. that “political developments have their 
root in culture” and the psychology of its producers and that any sort of reckoning with one’s 
history must also be a confrontation with the self and with one’s private past (Reed 16). This 
development is emphasized when one considers the complex circumstances and temporality 
of the narrative. Mann wrote the novel in exile, having been chased out of his country by the 
authors of the disease for which his novel is an account, and the bulk of the novel was written 
amidst the unleashing of the very historical forces that the novel is meant to evaluate and 
judge. In the end, it is a powerfully concrete proximity to history that the later novel both 
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exploits and by which it is exploited. Despite the differences, however, between the two 
novels and the over twenty years that separates their composition, Mann undertakes in both 
novels with a strikingly similar allegorical method to warn and educate his readers about the 
character and nature of the same threat at different stages of its historical development.    
Finally, although Doctor Faustus is not typically read as a Bildungsroman and though 
Mann himself, unlike with The Magic Mountain, never identified it as such, there are plenty 
of reasons to interpret the novel in terms of the genre. And not only because it has so much in 
common with Mann’s earlier attempt in The Magic Mountain to engage the genre but 
because it is very consciously about the Bildung, which is also to say, the self-formation and 
self-development of its protagonist. Just as The Magic Mountain accounts for the 
development and consequences of Castorp’s education in the matters of love and death while 
at the Berghof, Doctor Faustus follows Adrian’s encounter with the same through his 
musical education and the fated evolution of the strenger Satz. Where Castorp’s Bildung 
eventually leads him down the mountain away from the sick, death-filled air of the Berghof 
having changed, been gebildet and having found himself, the outcome of Leverkühn’s 
Bildung is inscribed in his compositions as a conscious and seemingly inevitable 
commitment to historical, personal, and narrative stasis. As with The Magic Mountain, 
however, if a positive interpretation is wanted, then it can be found in the curious way in 
which the novel, precisely through their concealment and negation, nevertheless in the end 
illuminates and sets into relief those possibilities forbidden by the composition itself.   
T.J. Reed describes the move from The Magic Mountain to Doctor Faustus as a move 
away from an idea of art as transcendent toward an idea of art as artifact, as always reflective 
of, engaged with and determined by historical experience. And it is important to reiterate 
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here that this movement also has its temporal expression insofar as this shift is typically also 
described as Mann’s move away from an abstract exploration of die Zeit selbst toward a 
more concrete notion of time as history. Following this paradigm, Mann’s early work up to 
The Magic Mountain emphasizes the opposition between the extraordinary sensitivity of the 
artist and the quotidian, bourgeois (historical) society and culture above which the world of 
art and the artist is always precariously situated. This opposition exemplifies the earliest 
expressions of what is otherwise the constant and evolving influence of Nietzsche on Mann’s 
work. On the one hand, in Mann’s early work art eternally justifies the dangerous 
predicament of life and existence. This is the accepted interpretation of Death in Venice, for 
example, where this Nietzschean sympathy helps to explain why Aschenbach’s fate is not 
wholly to be regretted but rather embraced insofar as his death follows the intimate contact 
with a reality justified and made possible only through aesthetic experience (his death is 
justified by his susceptibility to Tadzio’s beauty). On the other hand, in The Magic Mountain 
an art that is completely detached from society and history is negatively reflected in the static 
timelessness of the Berghof; art and culture can only be revitalized if they reengage with 
reality and time, in this case, history. Likewise, in Doctor Faustus, where this trajectory 
achieves its most extreme expression, history is said to thoroughly supplant the once-thought 
timeless capacities and privileges of art and aesthetic experience (Reed); the possibilities for 
artistic production in Doctor Faustus are reduced to parody, to the rearrangement of finite 
musical material and seem to echo Adorno’s claim that in the end, art, like life, must age, 
become rigid and die. The equation of Adrian’s life and work with the rise of fascism finds 
all of the novel’s allegorical value in the concretely historical specificity of the latter rather 
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than in the alleged vagueness of the former, i.e. in the individual, private, subjective, even the 
ontological or biological implications suggested by the narrative of Adrian’s “life and work.”  
Conventional readings of time in Mann’s novels focus almost exclusively on The 
Magic Mountain’s treatment of the theme of timelessness and thus, too, its association with 
other modernist time-novelists, such as Joyce, Faulkner, Woolf and Proust, but these readings 
almost always fail to acknowledge that Mann’s treatment of time in The Magic Mountain 
grew not only out of Mann’s awareness of his place in this tradition but also out of his most 
vital concerns in Death in Venice and that he continued to develop these themes through the 
composition of Doctor Faustus. It is well known, for instance, that Mann himself originally 
intended The Magic Mountain as a sequel and companion piece to the earlier novella (Reed), 
and this dissertation, among other things, would like to trace the maturation of what is really 
always already a preoccupation in Mann’s The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus in order 
to confirm, instead of a fracture or interruption or even a shift in his thought, the ongoingness 
or persistence of this preoccupation with time and temporality from 1924-1947. And this in 
order to demonstrate that Doctor Faustus is every bit as much a Zeitroman as The Magic 
Mountain insofar as the movement from The Magic Mountain to Doctor Faustus constitutes 
not a trajectory away from a preoccupation with time itself but rather toward it.  
Reed’s description of this general tendency away from abstraction is merely the 
consensus of the bulk of scholarship on the issue of the evolution of Mann’s narrative form 
and content to 1947.6 While the paradigm is true enough and useful for exploring the 
insinuation of history upon Mann’s narratives, it doesn’t necessarily and automatically 
demand the decentering, if not the outright exclusion, of the value and influence of the 
                                                          
6
 See Lukacs, Bergsten, Fetzer, Vaget, Scaff, etc. for ongoing examples of this agreement. 
  32
metaphysical that Mann is said to have privileged in his earlier work. It seems more likely, as 
Mann himself seemed to always clarify, that the relationship between the ontological and the 
historical, to recall the opposition with which we began, moves from one of clear distinction, 
the result of a rather naïve, youthful reading of Nietzsche (Mann himself would, of course, 
admit this), toward the more hybrid recognition of a relationship that admits the ontological 
into the historical and vice versa, and toward what is also a more profoundly balanced and 
deeper, mature reading of a more mature Nietzsche in which history is neither contrasted nor 
opposed to essence but out of which history emerges as essence. 
Of course, Mann himself acknowledges this problematic opposition in his famous 
effort to define The Magic Mountain as a time-novel in the double sense: 
[Der Zauberberg] ist ein Zeitroman in doppeltem Sinn: einmal historisch, 
indem er das innere Bild einer Epoche, der europäischen Vorkriegszeit, zu 
entwerfen versucht, dann aber, weil die reine Zeit selbst sein Gegenstand ist, 
den er nicht nur als die Erfahrung seines Helden, sondern auch in und durch 
sich selbst behandelt. (GW, vol. 11, 611-612; qtd. in Cohn, 211)7  
As long as the terms of this doppeltem Sinn are held to be mutually exclusive and as long as 
it is required that the same could not be said of Doctor Faustus, scholarly efforts to come to 
terms with Mann’s attempt at explanation will remain incomplete. The meticulous reduction 
of Mann’s treatment of time in The Magic Mountain (as well as the strict omission of the 
subject as a key narrative feature of Doctor Faustus) to an einmal abstract philosophical 
representation of time and, on the other hand, a zeitgeistlich-historisch representation fails to 
                                                          
7
 “[The Magic Mountain] is in a double-sense a time-romance. First in a historical sense, in that it seeks to 
present the inner significance of an epoch, the pre-war period of European history. And secondly, because time 
is one of its themes: time, dealt with not only as a part of the hero’s experience, but also in and through itself. 
The book itself is the substance of that which it relates” (Making 725). 
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account for not only the plurality of times in the novel(s) but also the ontological certainty 
that makes this plurality possible. Like the obstacle encountered by the narrator of The Magic 
Mountain, who, according to Dorritt Cohn, cannot but fail to adequately represent the 
passage of time for the reader, conventional readings of time in the novel that ignore the 
mutual reciprocity that binds the einmal historisch with die reine Zeit selbst are thus bound to 
exclude time rather than disclose it. 
When Thomas Mann claims that his novel is a time-novel in the double sense of the 
term, a novel about the time in which it was written and about time itself, indeed of time, it is 
assumed that by the latter he is referring solely to the narrator’s and Castorp’s abstract 
philosophical speculations on the character and nature of time and to the author’s 
experimental and vividly modernist notion to have the novel stage the duration described by 
its plot. But Mann’s novel, like so much of his work, is also a novel about the intersection of 
love and disease and evokes an overall “sympathy with death” that resonates across the 
private Erlebnis and public Erfahrung of its hero.  This sympathy is often linked by critics 
with the sense of the time-novel as einmal historisch, i.e. as depicting the spirit of its age, but 
in the analysis which follows I hope to demonstrate that this sympathy can equally be traced 
in the other sense of the time-novel as being about and of die Zeit selbst. And in this way it 
will be shown how Mann’s work on either end of the period under study reveals the 
evolution of a modernist conception of time and narrative that goes beyond mere narrative 
experimentation and moves rather towards the identification of time with death, history, and 
Bildung, which in themselves take on a gradually strengthening ontological character 
throughout the process of this evolution. In making such a claim I hope to demonstrate that 
such themes as those which had always moved him were primarily temporal determinations 
  34
that from 1924-1947 deepened rather than dissolved away as prominent features of his 
narrative inquiry. In the process it will become clear, too, that for the likes of both Mann and 
Heidegger, the Zeitroman is not only “einmal” historisch and on the other hand about die 
reine Zeit selbst; rather, die reine Zeit selbst ist einmal “immer schon” historisch and history 
“immer schon” a determination of die reine Zeit selbst. For it has already been shown, 
according to Reed, that Mann himself was already beginning to see the difficulty of 
unraveling what was essentially entangled even while writing The Magic Mountain; and even 
if we take for granted, which we will not, what Mann appears to have been able to separate in 
The Magic Mountain, i.e. the historical specificity of the epoch and the private experiences of 
his hero, in Doctor Faustus the two have become fused in a deeply meaningful way in the 
figure of Adrian Leverkühn and in a manner that has real implications for critical readings of 
time in the novels written during the period under study here.  
 
Heidegger, Dasein, Sorge 
It is perhaps no coincidence that with Heidegger death and history (and even 
something like Bildung) are systematically incorporated into his philosophical conceptions of 
time and being and that time for the first time is defined in these very terms. In fact, it is 
precisely on the essential character and nature of death, history and the temporality of self-
development for an authentic understanding of time that Heidegger parts ways with his 
predecessors, namely, Kant, Bergson and Husserl. Thus it is fair to say that one may view 
Heidegger’s philosophical development alongside Mann’s narrative development as a 
comparable response (involving and revolving around the same questions) to a distinct 
modernist tradition of philosophical and narrative inquiry.  
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And as also was the case with Mann, critics note a shift in Heidegger’s thought, the 
so-called Kehre, from his preoccupation in Being and Time with the ontological character of 
time toward a preoccupation in later works, including The Origin of the Work of Art 
[Ursprung des Kunstwerkes] (1935), Letter on Humanism [Der Brief über den Humanismus] 
(1947), The Poet as Thinker [Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens] (1947), The Question 
Concerning Technology [Die Frage nach der Technik] (1949), and [Unterwegs zur Sprache] 
(1959), for example, with the more concrete categories of language, history, art and 
technology. While I acknowledge this so-called shift and its historical preconditions, as I 
argued above with respect to Mann’s narrative development, the claims for such a shift 
typically and nevertheless neglect to consider what persists in it, i.e. the way in which as late 
as 1947’s Doctor Faustus Mann was clearly engaged with questions of temporality left 
unsettled in The Magic Mountain and the way in which, as the title indicates, Heidegger’s 
late lecture Time and Being [Zeit und Sein] (1962) clearly marks a return to the central 
preoccupations of his earliest efforts and admits the tragic impossibility of his lifelong task. 
In fact, Heidegger himself denies such a monumental shift in the direction of his thought and 
insists that his later work merely continues the attempt to elaborate his concerns in Being and 
Time, namely, the temporality of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, through a deeper investigation 
into the character and nature of that world.8 
       So where does Heidegger stand with respect to time?   In Being and Time, Introduction 
to Metaphysics as well as in earlier and later writings, time remains existentially bound to the 
question and meaning of Being. In Being and Time Heidegger defines temporality as “the 
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 See Heidegger’s comments in William Richardson’s Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963). 
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meaning of the Being of the entity which we call ‘Dasein’” [“der Sinn des Seins desjenigen 
Seienden, das wir Dasein nennen”] (BT 38/SZ 24): 
Dasein ist in der Weise, seiend so etwas wie Sein zu verstehen. Unter 
Festhaltung dieses Zusammenhangs soll gezeigt werden, daβ das, von wo aus 
Dasein überhaupt so etwas wie Sein unausdrücklich versteht und auslegt, die 
Zeit ist. Diese muβ als der Horizont alles Seinsverständnisses und jeder 
Seinsauslegung ans Licht gebracht und genuine begriffen werden.  Um das 
einsichtig werden zu lassen, bedarf es einer ursprünglichen Explication der 
Zeit als Horizont des Seinverständnisses aus der Zeitlichkeit als Sein des 
seinsverstehenden Daseins. Im Ganzen dieser Ausgabe liegt zugleich die 
Forderung, den so gewonnenen Begriff der Zeit gegen das vulgäre 
Zeitverständnis abzugrenzen […]. (SZ 24)9 
 Heidegger justifies the task of the reinterpretation of temporality in the Introduction 
to Being and Time, where he points to a traditional and reductive misinterpretation of time 
that extends “von Aristoteles bis über Bergson” (SZ 24) and which has always applied time 
as an ontological function for distinguishing various realms of Being, yet which has always 
failed to understand the priority of time’s association with the question of Being as such, that 
is to say, with the temporality of the function itself:  
Die “Zeit” fungiert seit langem als ontologisches oder vielmehr ontisches 
Kriterium der naiven Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Regionen des 
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 “Dasein is in such a way that, by being, it understands something like Being. Remembering this connection, 
we must show that time is that from which Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being at all. 
Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of 
Being. For this to become clear we need an original explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of 
Being, in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein. This task as a whole requires that the concept of time thus 
gained be distinguished from the common understanding of it” (BT 39). 
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Seienden. Man grenzt ein “zeitlich” Seiendes (die Vorgänge der Natur und die 
Geschehnisse der Geschichte) ab gegen “unzeitlich” Seiendes (die räumlichen 
und zahlhaften Verhältnisse). Man pflegt “zeitlosen” Sinn von Sätzen 
abzuheben gegen “zeitlichen” Ablauf der Satzaussagen. Ferner findet man 
eine “Kluft” zwischen dem “zeitlich” Seienden und dem “überzeitlichen” 
Ewigen und versucht sich an deren Überbrückung. “Zeitlich” besagt hier 
jeweils so viel wie “in der Zeit” seiend, eine Bestimmung, die freilich auch 
noch dunkel genug ist. Das Factum besteht: Zeit, im Sinne von “in der Zeit 
sein”, fungiert als Kriterium der Scheidung von Seinsregionen. Wie der Zeit 
zu dieser ausgezeichneten ontologischen Funktion kommt und gar mit 
welchem Recht gerade so etwas wie Zeit als solches Kriterium fungiert und 
vollends, ob in dieser naiv ontologischen Verwendung der Zeit ihre 
eigentliche mögliche ontologische Relevanz zum Ausdruck kommt, ist bislang 
weder gefragt, noch untersucht worden. (SZ 25)10    
Heidegger’s challenge – some would call it anachronistic, but Heidegger, of course, thought 
it very timely – to the history of Western philosophy involves nothing short of unveiling the 
temporal character of Being itself by suggesting that the term temporal cannot denote being 
in time but must refer instead to a more originary, primordial temporality from which such a 
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 “For a long while, ‘time’ has served as the ontological […] criterion for naively distinguishing the different 
regions of beings. ‘Temporal’ beings (natural processes and historical events) are separated from ‘atemporal’ 
beings (spatial and numerical relationships). We are accustomed to distinguishing the ‘timeless’ meaning of 
propositions from the ‘temporal’ course of propositional statements. Further, a ‘gap’ between ‘temporal’ being 
and ‘supratemporal’ eternal being is found, and the attempt made to bridge the gap. ‘Temporal’ here means as 
much as being ‘in time,’ an obscure enough definition to be sure. The fact remains that time in the sense of 
‘being in time’ serves as a criterion for separating the regions of Being. How time comes to have this distinctive 
ontological function, and even with what right precisely something like time serves as such a criterion, and most 
of all whether in this naïve ontological application of time its genuinely possible ontological relevance is 
expressed, has neither been asked nor investigated up to now” (BT 39; BW 61).  
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historical certainty is derived, namely, the certainty that time is something in which human 
being is situated. According to Heidegger’s formulation, the timeless, the eternal, and the 
supra-temporal are all a priori  temporal with regard to their Being, and “not just privatively 
by contrast with something ‘temporal’ as an entity ‘in time’, but in a positive sense” (BT 40), 
which is to say, with regard to the sense [der Sinn] of Being, for which temporality is the 
primary determination: “Thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have 
their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its ‘Temporal’ 
determinateness” [“[W]eil der Ausdruck [‘zeitlich’] […] noch für eine andere Bedeutung in 
Anspruch genommen wird, nennen wir die urspüngliche Sinnbestimmtheit des Seins und 
seiner Charakter und Modi aus der Zeit seine temporale Bestimmitheit”] (BT 40/SZ 26). The 
activity of this determinateness takes place of course at the site of the opening of Being, 
which is always to say, at Dasein, and the interpretation of the opening of Being in terms of 
temporality unfolds therefore as a result of the analytic of Dasein, which is precisely the 
philosophical aim Heidegger had in mind while composing Being and Time. In a different 
but closely related way, Heidegger recapitulates the nature of this relationship of Dasein to 
time in Introduction to Metaphysics [Einführung in die Metaphysik] (1935/1953):  
Daβ wir das Sein verstehen […] ist nicht nur wirklich, sondern es ist 
notwendig. Ohne solche Eröffnung des Seins könnten wir überhaupt nicht ‘die 
Menschen’ sein. [….] [S]treng genommen können wir nicht sagen: es gab eine 
Zeit, da der Mensch nicht war. Zu jeder Zeit war und ist und wird der Mensch 
sein, weil Zeit sich nur zeitigt, sofern der Mensch ist. […] [Und] nicht weil 
der Mensch von Ewigkeit her und alle Ewigkeit hin ist, sondern weil Zeit 
  39
nicht Ewigkeit ist und Zeit sich nur je zu einer Zeit als menschlich-
geschichtliches Dasein zeitigt (EM 90).11 
The above passages generate several important ideas concerning Heidegger’s philosophy of 
time (and the manner in which it resonates with Mann’s goals in/from The Magic Mountain 
and/to Doctor Faustus). The first is Heidegger’s assertion that time is not eternity, which is 
to say, time is neither eternal nor in its essence situated anywhere near the familiar opposition 
of “being-in-time” and “being-outside-time” or “timeless.” Time, in opposition to this – its 
complete Other-ness, the character of which will become increasingly clearer as this analysis 
unfolds – is for Heidegger a condition for the possibility of Dasein’s being-within-time or 
relating itself or other entities in any way to eternity. Secondly, the claim that time 
“temporalizes itself” only in relation to Dasein suggests a basic auto-operation at the level of 
the Being of Dasein, which is associated throughout Being and Time with the original terms 
Geschehen (historicize) and Zeitigen (temporalize), the verbal qualities of which reinforce 
the significance for Heidegger’s philosophy of time that it be construed as an active operation 
at the core of Dasein’s Being as long as it is. Finally, “time always temporalizes itself only at 
one time, as human, historical Dasein” [“Zeit sich nur je zu einer Zeit als menschlich-
geschichtliches Dasein zeitigt”], in which case the temporalization of time is manifested 
always and only as Dasein, not in-time but as time itself. Moreover, this “one time” at which 
Dasein is temporalized as human and historical actually refers to an operation that would 
appear in what Heidegger refers to as the ordinary conception of time to endure over time but 
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 “That we understand Being is not just actual; it is also necessary. Without such an opening up of Being, we 
could not be ‘human.’ [….] [S]trictly speaking we cannot say there was a time when there were no human 
beings. At every time, there were and are and will be human beings, because time temporalizes itself only as 
long as there are human beings, […] not because there are human beings from all eternity and for all eternity, 
but because time is not eternity, and time always temporalizes itself only at one time, as human, historical 
Dasein” (Metaphysics 89). 
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which functions rather alongside Dasein as itself and which constitutes the essence of Dasein 
as the Erstreckung [stretching-along] of its existence. The ontological representation 
Heidegger employs to explain the temporality described is called Sorge [Care], the 
existential-temporal(-izing) structure that simultaneously unifies and enables Dasein, or that 
which is recognized as the Being of Dasein as such.  
 Paul Ricoeur admits that Heidegger’s most innovative contribution to our 
understanding of time lies in his introduction of die Sorge as the primordial source of 
temporality and, in what amounts to the same thing, his association of time not with a theory 
of knowledge or consciousness (as in Kant or Hegel) but rather with Being itself. Thus the 
feasibility of Heidegger’s philosophy of time depends on time retaining the “scars of its 
relation to the question of Being” and its proximity to notions of cognition, will and morality 
without being reducible to any of these, as well as on Heidegger’s ability to provide and 
maintain a structural unity between his tortuous descriptions of existence and temporality 
(Ricoeur 63-64).  
Heidegger identifies three modes of existence, which constitute Dasein’s Being-in-
the-world and which are defined essentially as Sorge: thrownness [Geworfenheit], fallenness 
[Verfallen] and projection [Entwurf]. To borrow a term from Ricoeur, as constitutive of 
Sorge these three “existentials” are also depicted in their onto-temporal character by 
Heidegger as Being-already-in-the-world [Schon-sein], Being-alongside-the-world [Sein-
bei], and Being-ahead-of-itself-in-the-world [sich-vorweg-sein], respectively (BT 236-37). It 
is no accident that the verbal (throwing, falling, projecting), adverbial and locative (already, 
ahead, alongside) expressions display at the basic level of language Heidegger’s deliberate 
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focus on the entanglement of existence and temporality in their relationship to the question of 
Being.12 
 The existential quality of thrownness and its onto-temporal counterpart Being-
already-in-the-world refer to Dasein’s primordial condition of always existing somewhere 
“between” birth and death, of having already “been delivered over to itself – […]” [“ihm 
selbst überantwortet”], and of having already “been thrown into a world” [“je schon in eine 
Welt geworfen”] (BT 236/SZ 255). Fallenness or Being-alongside-the-world indicates that 
factical quality of Dasein’s condition, in which Dasein finds itself at all times “absorbed in 
the world of its concern” [“in der besorgten Welt aufgegangen”] (BT 237/SZ 255), which is 
to say, absorbed in the world of particulars by which it is always immediately surrounded. In 
its fallenness, Dasein tends to “flee in the face of uncanniness” [“das Fliehen vor der 
Unheimlichkeit”] (BT 237/SZ 255), of that which is unfamiliar or that with which it is not 
concerned in its everyday activity – facticity refers to that self-abandonment of Dasein in 
which it no longer recognizes itself as a “thrown fact” [“als geworfenes Faktum”] (BT 376/SZ 
434). Finally, there is the quality of projection or Being-ahead-of-itself-in-the-world, which 
for Heidegger occupies a preeminent place in the triadic structural unity of Sorge. What is 
referred to here is probably best described by Heidegger himself: 
   Das Dasein ist Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht. Das 
‘es geht um…’ hat sich verdeutlicht in der Seinsverfassung des Verstehens als 
des sichentwerfenden Seins zum eigensten Seinkönnen. Dieses ist es, 
worumwillen das Dasein je ist, wie es ist. Das Dasein hat sich in seinem Sinn 
je schon zusammengestellt mit einer Möglichkeit seiner selbst. [….] Das 
                                                          
12
 Ricoeur also recognizes as much (see Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 71). 
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Dasein zum eigensten Seinkönnen besagt aber ontologisch: das Dasein ist ihm 
selbst in seinem Sein je schon vorweg. (SZ 254)13 
Thus a thrown and fallen Dasein in its Being already-in- and alongside-the world finds itself 
simultaneously ahead-of-itself insofar as its factical self-understanding is determined quite 
completely by its potentiality-for-Being something else, something ahead of and beyond 
itself; “Dasein, in grasping itself as potentiality for being, realizes that it must make itself 
something, else face the meaninglessness of being nothing in particular” (Atkins 3). 
In moving from the primary analysis of the structure of Sorge to his principal 
exegesis of the operation of temporality as such, Heidegger distinguishes the existential 
qualities of thrownness, fallenness, projection and the onto-temporal qualities of Being-
already, Being-alongside and Being-ahead from the active temporalizing effects of what he 
calls the ‘ecstases’ of temporality, which have the designations having-been [Gewesenheit], 
making-present [Gegenwärtigen], and coming-towards [Zukommen] (SZ 428-441/BT 370-80) 
and which form the temporal, effectual unity of Sorge and thus also the meaning of the Being 
of Dasein as such. The meaning of authentic Sorge or that upon which the meaning and Self-
constancy of Dasein is founded is for Heidegger the primordial meaning of temporality: “The 
primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” [“Zeitlichkeit enthüllt sich als 
der Sinn eigentlichen Sorge”] (BT 374/SZ 432). This existential primordiality, which endures 
as the in-itself of Dasein, disperses not in but as the human experience into several discrete 
but nevertheless mutually dependent “fugitive” modes of temporalization, namely, 
                                                          
13
 “Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The phrase ‘is an issue’ has been made 
plain in the state-of-Being of understanding – of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. In each case Dasein 
has already compared itself, in its Being, with a possibility of itself. [….] [O]ntologically, Being towards one’s 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself in its being” (BT 236). 
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everydayness [Alltäglichkeit], historicality [Geschichtlichkeit] and within-time-ness 
[Innerzeitigkeit], all of which characterize and make possible that inauthentic existence out 
of which what Heidegger calls “ordinary time” [der vulgäre Zeit] is said to derive (BT 374+).  
Heidegger locates the opening to such a radical conception of time’s basic 
primordiality in the futural quality of projection, of Being-ahead-of-oneself-in-the-world, or 
more specifically, in the essential temporal movement of coming-towards, what Heidegger 
refers to most notoriously in its ontological grounding as Sein zum Tode [Being-towards-
death]. Heidegger writes: “The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality 
is the future” [“Das primäre Phänomen der ursprünglichen und eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit ist 
die Zukunft”] (BT 378/SZ 436), and a moment later he defines Sorge itself as Being-towards-
death: “Care is being-towards-death” [“Die Sorge ist Sein zum Tode”] (BT 378/SZ 436). 
As mentioned, the understanding for Heidegger is that through which Dasein comes 
to know its own potentiality-for-being. In this way Dasein is always ahead of itself and 
comes toward itself. But Dasein’s possibilities, always out in front, culminate in the nullity of 
death, which Heidegger describes not as merely an end to Dasein’s existence, but as the 
ultimate impossibility of Dasein as such. This leads for Heidegger to the most important 
characteristic of temporality, its finitude, which is concealed by the ordinary conception of 
time. Death in the sense described below does not refer merely to the biological death of the 
individual but to an existential and defining limit to Dasein’s existence; as Kim Atkins 
explains it, “[a]s such a limit, death represents the finitude of human being – a finitude that is 
not merely a chronological limit but a semantic limit, a defining limit in relation to which 
one’s life can be given determinate meaning as ‘who’ one is” (3):  
  44
Dieses Strukturmoment [das ‘Sichvorweg’] der Sorge sagt doch unzweideutig, 
daβ im Dasein immer noch etwas aussteht, was als Seinkönnen seiner selbst 
noch nicht ‘wirklich’ geworden ist. Im Wesen der Grundfassung des Daseins 
liegt demnach eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit. Die Unganzheit bedeutet 
einen Ausstand an Seinkönnen. 
   Sobald jedoch das Dasein so ‘existiert’, daβ an ihm schlechthin nichts mehr 
aussteht, dann ist es auch schon in eins damit zum Nicht-mehr-da-sein 
geworden. Die Behebung das Seinausstandes besagt Vernichtung seines Seins. 
Solange das Dasein als Seiendes ist, hat es seine ‘Gänze’ nie erreicht. Gewinnt 
es sie aber, dann wird der Gewinn zum Verlust des In-der-Welt-seins 
schlechthin. Als Seiendes wird es dann nie mehr erfahrbar. (SZ 314-15)14 
Thus Dasein’s potentiality-for-being depends upon and is determined by that constantly 
something still to be settled, which in an everyday sense may refer to any number of real 
possibilities, tasks, debts, etc.,which are constantly and actually deferred, but which in their 
primordial-temporal meaning refer concretely to the greatest negation of all possibility and 
potential, the ultimate deferral at the core of Dasein’s being: “Death is the possibility of the 
absolute impossibility of Dasein” [“Der Tod ist die Möglichkeit der schlechthinnigen 
Daseinsunmöglichkeit”] (BT 294/SZ 333).  
                                                          
14
“The ‘ahead-of-itself,’ as an item in the structure of care, tell[s] us unambiguously that in Dasein there is 
always something still outstanding, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become 
‘actual’. It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled. 
Such a lack of totality signifies that there is something still outstanding in one’s own potentiality-for-Being. 
   But as soon as Dasein ‘exists’ in such a way that absolutely nothing more is still outstanding in it, then it has 
already for this very reason become ‘no-longer’Being-there’ Its Being is annihilated when what is still 
outstanding in its Being has been liquidated. As long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its 
‘wholeness’. But if it gains such ‘wholeness’, this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world. In such a 
case, it can never again be experienced as an entity” (BT 280).  
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It is in Dasein’s disposition toward its own death that its existence is described as 
authentic or inauthentic. Heidegger writes: “Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally 
primordial way in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory 
resoluteness” [“Phänomenal ursprünglich wird die Zeitlichkeit erfahren am eigentlichen 
Ganzsein des Daseins, am Phänomen der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit”] ((BT 351/SZ 402), 
where anticipation [vorlaufenden] denotes Dasein’s authentic Being-towards-death (BT 350), 
or as Otto Pöggeler explains it, the manner in which Dasein (for and on behalf of itself) 
“heightens the possibility, which Dasein is, to its extreme limit where it becomes boundless 
impossibility, namely, the impossibility of any existing as a definite potentiality-for-being” 
(44); and where resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] refers to Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-
being-itself in the world into which it has fallen, that is, it refers to Dasein’s factical 
possibilities as Being-in-the-world and to its “read[iness] for anxiety” [angstbereite] (BT 
343): “[T]his reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready 
for anxiety – we call ‘resoluteness’. [….]. [R]esolution is precisely the disclosive projection 
and determination of what is factically possible at the time” [“das verschwiegene, 
angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste Schuldigsein – nennen wir die Entschlossenheit. 
[….]. Der Entschluβ ist gerade erst das entschlieβende Entwerfen und Bestimmen der 
jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeit”] (BT 343-45/SZ 393-95). Though the details of this 
primordial being-guilty and its entanglement with the other ecstases of Heideggerian 
temporality as well as its connection to tragedy and tragic experience will be carefully 
disclosed throughout the course of the analysis that follows, for now suffice it to say that 
authentic existence is characterized by anticipatory resoluteness and inauthentic existence by 
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a sort of irresolute and both moral and ontological indifference toward Dasein’s own 
potentiality-for-Being and therefore toward death itself.  
However, the distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence in Heidegger is 
less distinct than it appears, for if the existential possibility of Dasein as such is based upon 
the disclosure of Dasein to itself as Being-ahead-of-itself or coming-towards, which is to say, 
as Being-towards-death (294), then this possibility is essentially and always a thrown 
possibility, which in the everyday sense conceals from Dasein its having already been 
“delivered over to its death” [“seinem Tod überantwortet ist”] (BT 295/SZ 333-4). 
Thrownness, according to Heidegger, reveals itself in its most primordial sense, which is to 
say, in its direct relation to Being-towards-death, only in anxiety, a state-of-mind which 
discloses to Dasein the fact that it exists as “thrown Being towards its end” [“geworfenes 
Sein zu seinem Ende”] (BT 295/SZ 333). 
And herein lies the thrust of Heidegger’s notion of care or Sorge as the unity or 
totality of Dasein’s temporality. Dasein’s future is never something merely to come but 
rather it is something toward which Dasein is always already headed; likewise, Dasein is 
never past; it is never “no longer there” and thus cannot ever establish itself as something 
“‘arising and passing away in the course of time’” (BT 375-6). Similarly, what Heidegger 
calls the “moment of vision” and associates with the authentic present constitutes a resolute 
Dasein’s having “brought itself back from falling,” i.e. out of the inauthenticity of its 
everyday concerns, and is really not a moment at all inasmuch as the moment typically refers 
to the finite temporal boundaries of the “now” as being securely situated in between the 
‘before’ and ‘after’; rather, what Heidegger calls the “Augenblick” is a seeing through such 
inauthenticity toward the stretching-along [Erstreckung] which Dasein, as Sorge, essentially 
  47
is and taking action in any given situation on the basis of this recognition and disclosure (BT 
376) as the authentic Being-alongside this Erstreckung. That this seeing-through essentially 
takes Dasein outside of itself testifies to the ecstatic nature of Heideggerian temporality. 
Dasein does not occur in time but as time, and it is only because it is fundamentally temporal 
that it can imagine its existence as occurring in or out of time (in the ordinary sense) at all: 
“Temporality is the primordial ‘out-side-of-itself’ in and for itself. We therefore call the 
phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the ‘ecstases’ of 
temporality” (BT 377), which constitute “the totality of the structure of care” (BT 376). Thus 
along with the coming towards and the having been, an authentic present requires that a 
resolute Dasein be there more authentically by recognizing itself anew as that entity which at 
every moment comes towards itself as having-been.   
Consequently, the ecstatic movement which takes Dasein outside of itself also, and 
perhaps even more importantly, projects an anxious Dasein toward itself, and this function of 
Sorge, even if we admit for the moment that the structural complexity of care makes it hard 
to keep it comprehensively and consistently in view, has major ramifications for our analysis 
of literature and Mann’s treatment of Bildung, in particular. This is because for Heidegger 
care is first and foremost the “hermeneutical situation” (BT 358) in which Dasein always 
finds itself. If as Heidegger claims, “Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is 
[always already] an issue,” (BT 236) then time is also the issue for Dasein. This “being-an-
issue” for Dasein signifies its authentic hermeneutical task, that “for the sake of which” 
Dasein exists (BT 236), and Sorge is both the why and how of its being raised as an issue.  
That Dasein cares about itself and others is what initially and authentically opens 
itself toward itself and the world. And with this, though he never explicitly says as much, 
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Heidegger’s task completely coincides with the ideal purposes of narrative, namely, a caring 
that opens a world and which describes a deep and abiding care for that world which it opens. 
This is why it is no surprise that Heidegger’s earliest intuitions of care begin not only with a 
discussion of Dasein as a necessary philosophical reformulation of traditional attitudes 
toward subjectivity but from within a strictly literary context that establishes care as a matter 
of selfhood and as a matter of interpretation – moreover, as a matter of self-interpretation, 
which is, of course, also to say, a matter of Bildung. 
According to Heidegger, Dasein authentically engages itself only when it identifies 
itself constantly with that with which it is authentically concerned, namely, its very being as 
care, “the entity for which the issue is the Being of the entity that it is” (BT 369). When 
Heidegger writes that “The they-self keeps on saying ‘I’ most loudly and most frequently 
because at bottom it is not authentically itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-
Being” or that “Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one’s authentic potentiality-
for-Being-one’s-Self – that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care” or that 
“The self-constancy of the Self […] is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-
constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling” (BT 369), he explicitly corrects and 
redirects conventional conceptions of Bildung and the processes of subject-formation that 
constitute it insofar as he both reorients the task of Bildung as the authentic interpretation of 
one’s being-in-the-world as care (i.e. temporality, esctases, the going outside of oneself in 
order to come towards oneself as having been) and the character, nature and identity of the 
subject that undertakes such a task.           
Elsewhere in Being and Time Heidegger ventures to explain temporality as the 
ontological meaning of Sorge from which his discussion of selfhood is derived and long 
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before he writes The Origin of the Work of Art, in which he locates the truth of art and Dasein 
in the dialectical strife between “world” and “earth,” he even more explicitly connects Sorge 
with the purposes of Bildung. In the section entitled “Confirmation of the Existential 
Interpretation of Dasein as Care in terms of Dasein’s Pre-ontological Way of Interpreting 
Itself,” Heidegger relates an ancient fable that reveals the historical, i.e. literary, origins of 
man as a function of Sorge, and it is to this historical origin that Heidegger’s complex 
ontology is indebted and from it that he inherits his notion of temporality as the meaning of 
Sorge and as the basis of Dasein’s being-in-the-world:  
Als einst die Sorge über ein Fluβ ging, sah sie tonhaltiges Erdreich: sinnend 
nahm sie davon ein Stück und begann es zu formen. Während sie bei sich 
darüber nachdenkt, was sie geschaffen, tritt Jupiter hinzu. Ihn bittet die Sorge, 
daβ er dem geformten Stück Ton Geist verleihe. Das gewährt ihr Jupiter gern. 
Als sie aber ihrem Gebilde nun ihren Namen beilegen wollte, verbot das 
Jupiter und verlangte, daβ ihm sein Name gegeben werden müsse. Während 
über den Namen die Sorge und Jupiter stritten, erhob sich auch die Erde 
(Tellus) und begehrte, daβ dem Gebilde ihr Name beigelegt werde, da sie ja 
doch ihm ein Stück ihres Leibes dargeboten habe. Die Streitenden nahmen 
Saturn [die Zeit] zum Richter. Und ihnen erteilte Saturn folgende anscheinend 
gerechte Entscheidung: ‘Du, Jupiter, weil du den Geist gegeben hast, sollst bei 
seinem Tode den Geist, du, Erde, weil du den Körper geschenkt hast, sollst 
den Körper empfangen. Weil aber die Sorge dieses Wesen zuerst gebildet, so 
möge, solange es lebt, die Sorge es besitzen. Weil aber über den Namen Streit 
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besteht, so möge es ‘homo’ heiβen, da es aus humus (Erde) gemacht ist. (SZ 
262-3; emphasis mine)15 
First of all, the passage, according to Heidegger, signifies a historical proof of his 
temporal ontology; in other words, this “ancient fable in which Dasein’s interpretation of 
itself as care has been embedded” (BT 242) demonstrates the ancient, pre-philosophical 
characterization of Dasein as that entity first and foremost for whom its being is an issue and 
signifies this being-an-issue as the originally historical basis of its drive toward self-
interpretation. Secondly, it is no coincidence that these earliest, elemental attempts of Dasein 
to interpret itself take the form of a historical, literary document. For Heidegger, this accords 
to literature not only a privileged hermeneutical authority but also links all modern literary 
efforts with modes of mythological inquiry. Perhaps even more importantly, it helps to 
justify (according to the critical demands of historicism) that his “existential Interpretation is 
not a mere fabrication, but that as an ‘ontological construction’ it is well grounded and has 
been sketched out beforehand in elemental ways” (BT 242) and that he has been “brought to 
the existential conception of care from Dasein’s pre-ontological interpretation of itself as 
‘care’” (BT 244).  
Third, the nature of Sorge cannot be described merely as a hermeneutical model made 
available to Dasein in order that it might interpret its being-in-the-world, but much more 
                                                          
15
 “‘Once when Care was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to 
shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. Care asked him to give it spirit, and 
this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded 
that it be given his name instead. While Care and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own 
name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn [Time] to 
be their arbiter, and he made the following decision: ‘Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive 
that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since Care first 
shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now no dispute among you as 
to its name, let it be called ‘homo’, for it is made out of ‘humus’ (earth).’” (BT 242) 
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fundamentally, it emerges here, according to Heidegger, as the hermeneutical process to 
which Dasein essentially belongs “‘for its lifetime’” and thus “‘Being-in-the-world’ always 
already retains the stamp of ‘care’” (BT 243). Fourth, Heidegger argues, it is not insignificant 
that the name given to man (homo) stems not from the source of its being but from that out of 
which it is made (humus), for the source of its being, according to Heidegger, lies in the 
negotiation established between the arbiter, Saturn (Time), and Sorge, to which Dasein’s 
being belongs. This ancient transaction, in fact, is the basis for Heidegger’s entire temporal 
analytic of Dasein where Sorge essentially binds and equates the terms in the title of 
Heidegger’s treatise, namely, being and time: “Thus the pre-ontological characterization of 
man’s essence expressed in this fable, has brought to view in advance the kind of Being 
which dominates [Dasein’s] temporal sojourn in the world, and does so through and through” 
(BT 243).  
Finally, tracing the historical etymology and uses of the term, Heidegger links the 
various meanings of Sorge over time not only with something like Bildung but also with 
terms which will play a fundamental role in the chapters that follow, including mortality, 
conscience, and anxiety, and it is through these connections that we will come to understand 
how Heidegger ultimately defines Sorge as the unity of the ecstases of temporality. Suffice it 
to say, for now, that while Heidegger notes throughout Being and Time the various meanings 
of Sorge in its ontical, everyday usage over time as “anxious exertion,” “carefulness,” 
“devotion,” “worry,” “concern,” etc.,  all of these ontical descriptions of Sorge have their 
ontological basis “in a state of Being which is already underlying in every case,” which is to 
say, the meaning of Sorge as the being of Dasein or temporality as the ontological meaning 
of Sorge.  
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According to Heidegger, when Seneca, for instance, recognizes the relationship 
between man’s mortality and his perfectability as a function of Sorge (Cura), he historically, 
like the fable, reiterates the ontological truth Heidegger is hoping to establish: “‘Among the 
four existent natures (trees, beast, man, and God), the latter two […] are distinguished in that 
God is immortal while man is mortal. Now when it comes to these, the good of the one, 
namely God, is fulfilled by Nature; but that of the other, man, is fulfilled by care’” (BT 243). 
Consequently, Heidegger argues, the goal of man’s Bildung, namely, the possibility of both 
his perfectability and the source of both his conscience and his thoroughgoing anxiety, are 
wholly determined by Sorge, which is also to say, by his mortality or the temporality of 
Dasein’s being as its authentic coming-towards itself as having-been: 
Die perfectio des Menschen, das Werden zu dem, was er in seinem Freisein 
für seine eigensten Möglichkeiten (dem Entwurf) sein kann, ist eine 
‘Leistung’ der ‘Sorge’. Gleichursprünglich bestimmt sie aber die Grundart 
dieses Seienden, gemäβ der es an die besorgte Welt ausgeliefert ist 
(Geworfenheit). [Deshalb] [d]er ‘Doppelsinn’ von ‘cura’ meint eine 
Grundverfassung in ihrer wesenhaft zweifachen Struktur des geworfenen 
Entwurfs. (SZ 264)16   
What distinguishes Heidegger’s philosophy of time from its forerunners, namely, 
Augustine, Kant, Bergson and Husserl, is the primacy with which Heidegger invests the 
future, which was anticipated in the discussion above of authentic Being-towards-death and 
                                                          
16
 Man’s perfectio – his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities 
(projection) – is ‘accomplished’ by ‘care’. But with equal primordiality ‘care’ determines what is basically 
specific in this entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (thrownness). 
[Thus] In the ‘double-meaning’ of ‘care’, what we have in view is a single basic state in its existentially twofold 
structure of thrown projection. (BT 243) 
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its close, one might say dependent, relationship with projection, Being-ahead-of-itself and the 
coming-towards of authentic existence and primordial temporality. Furthermore, the 
character of this primacy, which has led to critical misreadings of Heidegger that will occupy 
us more explicitly later, is unique in that the future or coming-towards for Heidegger is 
always bound to and includes the past as having-been. Thus the ontical phenomena of death, 
history and even Bildung find their ontological answer and justification precisely in 
Heidegger’s so-called “hermeneutic phenomenology,” and it is fair to say that for Heidegger, 
as for Mann, a coming to terms with time means at the same time a coming to terms with 
death as a sort of coming-towards and history as having-been because the process of this 
coming to terms is fundamentally grounded in what Heidegger calls Zeitlichkeit, or 
temporality. For Heidegger, I will argue, this process belongs to the essential constitution of 
Dasein as Sorge; for Mann, it belongs to the essential development of Bildung. As I will 
demonstrate, for Heidegger being-towards-death and history are something that we are and 
something which we are always becoming, and as such they are also something which, if we 
are living authentically, we are always endeavoring to interpret and understand, and it is my 
humble opinion that Thomas Mann, especially in the period under study, dramatizes time as 
precisely such a markedly human, modernist and, ultimately, tragic endeavor. 
My argument relies quite confidently on the assumption that Heidegger’s analytic of 
Dasein and the theory of temporality upon which it is based can be usefully applied to 
literature insofar as the latter may be understood as the “self-expression of Dasein” (Alleman, 
qtd. in Corngold, 441). Such a claim is not without precedent. Ricoeur famously refers to 
narrative as fundamentally a way of staging being-in-the-world (qtd. in Vanhoozer 49). And 
Stanley Corngold makes an explicit call toward just such an understanding in his well-known 
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analysis of Heideggerian Stimmung [mood] and literary emotions when he emphasizes the 
“reluct[ance] to speak of an ‘essential’ absence of connection between Sein und Zeit and 
literature” (439). Though Corngold traces Heidegger’s influence in the literary theories of 
Staiger, Blanchot, de Man and Derrida, among others, he rightfully seeks to validate an even 
more explicit and “essential” connection between Being and Time and literature, a 
connection that pivots (although it is never explicitly engaged by Corngold in his essay) 
around the question of die Sorge. In this I also share Corngold’s enthusiasm. But even 
Corngold doesn’t produce in any way a comprehensive analysis of Heideggerian temporality 
in terms of literature, much less in terms of contemporary German literature and the so-called 
“modernist epoch in German poetics” that his argument suggests Heidegger is responsible for 
inaugurating. Rather, Corngold’s presentation merely prepares the way for the sort of reading 
I intend and is, in the end, more a call to action than a critical study of the topic.  
Though Corngold certainly grasps the essential value of Heideggerian mood for 
literary analysis, insofar as he emphasizes Heidegger’s original perception that “the poetic 
character of language could be the measure with which language realizes the possibilities of 
the disclosure reserved to mood” (441), he never elaborates the “poetic character of 
language” nor the “possibilities of the disclosure” it makes possible in terms of what 
Heidegger clearly identifies as their reciprocal basis in Dasein’s temporality, nor does he 
specifically relate his observations to the broader tradition of modernist poetics, which would 
bring him into not only Thomas Mann’s orbit but also the more fundamental orbit of 
modernist literary evaluations of time and tragic experience. Nevertheless, Corngold’s 
acknowledgement of this meaningful correspondence, that in Heidegger we are confronted 
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by a “vital moment within an epoch of German poetics” (441) seems to me to beg for a 
careful and thorough response and elaboration that this project hopes to be. 
Heidegger’s earliest description of Dasein as temporality appears in The Concept of 
Time [Der Begriff der Zeit] (1924) and states as explicitly as anywhere in his writings the 
fundamental connection between time and the being of Dasein: “In summing up, we can now 
say: Time is Dasein” [“Zusammenfassend ist zu sagen: Zeit ist Dasein”]  (BZ 123-5/CT in 
Becoming 212). Consequently, if we grant the possibility forwarded by Corngold that 
literature occupies a privileged place in the tragic, i.e. temporal, disclosure of being and that 
in fact with Heidegger it may be said to stage the self-interpretation of Dasein’s being, and if 
we accept Heidegger’s apparent equation of Dasein as being-there with time and temporality 
as such, then we can justifiably proceed with an analysis that is bent on convincing readers of 
the value of reading the Zeitroman as something like a Daseinsroman, in which Mann’s 
evolving treatment of time in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus emerges as a sort of 
coming-towards a thoroughly Heideggerian recognition, and likewise of reading Heidegger’s 
analytic of Dasein as, at the very least, a plausible basis for interpreting the modernist 
Zeitroman. 
  
 
Chapter III 
 
Being-Towards-Death and the ‘Dilemma of Closure’ 
 
 
In what follows I argue that Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein in Being and Time 
(1927), in particular the interpretation of death that grounds and accompanies it, both 
illuminates readings of death in The Magic Mountain (1924) and Doctor Faustus (1947) as 
well as anticipates what Susan von Rohr Scaff and other scholars have called the “dilemma 
of closure” in Mann’s late work Doctor Faustus. I also argue in turn that Doctor Faustus, as 
Mann’s principal and final attempt at narrating a theory of time (that it is such an attempt is 
in fact one of my primary claims), helps to clarify both his more famous and more 
conspicuous treatment of time and death in the earlier novel as well as Heidegger’s persistent 
struggle throughout his philosophical career to systematically grasp the meaning of time for 
being as such. Though few readers will deny that Doctor Faustus is a tragic novel and that its 
tragic implications are the very point of the novel, the question of time in Doctor Faustus is 
one that has been taken up only sporadically, always in an extremely limited sense, and that 
has rarely been explained in terms of these tragic implications.  
These conversations rightly and inevitably compare the treatment of time in Doctor 
Faustus to the way in which the theme is rendered even more centrally in The Magic 
Mountain or the Joseph novels and thus see in Mann’s development as a novelist a 
movement away from a preoccupation with an abstract conception of time as such (“die reine 
Zeit selbst”) towards a very different and more urgent investment in a notion of time as 
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history. Generally speaking, these readings of time in Doctor Faustus commence from the 
reference point of what was originally described by Gunilla Bergsten as the novel’s multiple 
time-levels that constitute both the narrative world and the world of the narrative and with 
which readers of the novel are already quite familiar.  At any rate in almost every case the 
subject of time in the novel is mediated through and remains distinct and subordinate to other 
themes around which the novel is said to primarily turn.17 So to argue that Doctor Faustus is 
a Zeitroman (time-novel) is still a bit of a novelty and as such often meets with a certain and 
typically equal degree of suspicion and curiosity.18  
These reactions, of course, are partly justified insofar as they stem from the fact that 
Mann himself attributed the title of Zeitroman only to his much earlier work The Magic 
Mountain, where the temporality of the novel always carries with it a double sense: “First in 
a historical sense, in that it seeks to present the inner significance of an epoch, the pre-war 
period of European history. And secondly, because time is one of its themes” [“einmal 
historisch, indem er das innere Bild einer Epoche, der europäischen Vorkriegszeit, zu 
entwerfen versucht, dann aber, weil die reine Zeit selbst sein Gegenstand ist”] (Making 725). 
On the one hand, then, Reinhard Mehring’s claim that Doctor Faustus is a Zeitroman reflects 
my own claim in what follows. On the other hand, however, and thus in tandem with 
contemporary ideas about the meaning of time in the novel, Mehring restricts his 
understanding of the Zeitroman to its limited and familiar correspondence with 
Geschichtsdeutung as first outlined by Bergsten, which is to say, as a novel of its (historical) 
time. And while I certainly wouldn’t disagree that Doctor Faustus is exactly that – a novel of 
                                                          
17
 All of the scholars I contend with in this chapter (Vogel, Scaff, Cobley, Mehring) can be said to limit their 
discussions of time in this way. 
18
 See most recently Reinhard Mehring’s “Apokalypse der deutschen ‘Seele’? Thomas Manns Doctor Faustus 
als Zeitroman.” 
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its time – it seems to me that in Doctor Faustus we witness an extreme maturation of Mann’s 
views on time, views which certainly do not dispense with the author’s preoccupation in The 
Magic Mountain with “die reine Zeit selbst” in favor of a purely historical time but rather 
which seek to reveal the ontological character of history. These views posit a notion of 
history as thoroughly implicated in and interwoven with a complex and evolving 
interpretation of what Heidegger might call the temporality of being and the apriori  
historical nature of Dasein as such.  
But before we can agree that Doctor Faustus is as much a Zeitroman as The Magic 
Mountain, we must first establish what Mann meant to accomplish with the genre when he 
set about writing The Magic Mountain and the way Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-
death resonates with Mann’s earlier and later undertakings to stage and describe what Paul 
Ricoeur has called the ‘epic of death and tragedy of culture’, which is also to say, Mann’s 
efforts to write into existence Hans Castorp and Adrian Leverkühn, for both of whom, above 
all things and much like Heidegger’s Dasein, “time is the issue.” That the dilemma of closure 
in Doctor Faustus is closely tied to Mann’s conception of the end is well known. Mann 
himself characterized Doctor Faustus as “ein Buch des Endes” – a novel of and about 
endings – and in such a way, I think, as to suggest that the evolution of his views on time 
since The Magic Mountain had finally settled, as they did with Heidegger, on the perhaps 
essential problem of the meaning of death for history, culture, and the individual.19 What 
may be novel about the approach presented here, however, is my staging of this problematic 
in Mann against arguably the most prominent theory of time of any of Mann’s 
contemporaries that to my mind both anticipates and allows for a provocative rereading of 
                                                          
19
 qtd. in Ball, Scaff, Vaget, et al.; for original claim see December 9, 1948 letter to Karl Kerényi and Enstehung 
des Doktor Faustus (83). 
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this critical aspect of the novel, namely, Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein and its grounding in 
being-towards-death. Of course before we can accomplish this we must clearly define and 
elaborate what is so fascinating and relevant – especially for literary analyses (what Corngold 
calls “Heidegger’s poetics”) – about Heidegger’s notion of Sein zum Tode or being-towards-
death. 
 
Heidegger and Sein zum Tode 
I have already explained Heidegger’s innovations with respect to contemporary 
philosophies of time at the time he was writing Being and Time (1927) as a sort of post- (or 
past-) modernism if when we bring modernist time into view we see only Joyce or Woolf, 
Einstein or Bergson. One of the most important ways that Heidegger undertook this 
revaluation of time is to theorize death as a temporal concept. For example, if time was 
always relative to the subject (as a certain strain of modernist literature is often said to have 
demonstrated), that is to say, to what Heidegger calls Dasein, or being-there, then time was 
always relative, too, to the prospect of Dasein’s not-being-there, to its being-gone – in short, 
to Dasein’s end or death. And thus the question of being-towards-death begins with 
Heidegger’s prioritization of the future and of the being of Dasein as primordially and a 
priori futural. Thus, too, I have already ventured to explain the priority assigned by 
Heidegger to being-towards-death in his so-called “analytic of Dasein” in Being and Time 
(1927). There Heidegger describes not only the human experience of time but Dasein itself, 
which is after all the name for this duration (and thus, too, for being itself) in terms of the 
interestingly eroticized entanglement of what he calls the Ekstase [ecstases] of temporality, 
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in which Being-ahead and coming-towards as the existential and temporal expressions of 
being-towards-death hold a preeminent position.  
To recall the existential basis of being-towards-death requires first that we revisit 
Heidegger’s concept of Dasein’s understanding: “‘Understanding, as existing in the 
potentiality for Being, however it may have been projected, is primarily futural.’ [….] The 
future is meaningful because it is a way of existing for Dasein [or] what it means to be in 
time” (qtd. in Vanhoozer 44).20 More precisely, it is the only way of existing, according to 
Heidegger since Being and Time defines Dasein itself as understanding:  
‘Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-
Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its 
Being is capable of.’ Dasein ‘understands’ a situation when its grasps the 
possibilities available to it, when it ‘knows’ what it is capable of in a given 
situation. The means by which understanding grasps its possibilities, and thus 
its own being, is ‘projection’. [And] Interpretation, according to Heidegger, is 
the ‘working out of possibilities projected in understanding.’ (Vanhoozer 43)21  
For this reason, however, it is incorrect to assume that Ricoeur provides a “narrative 
corrective” to Heidegger by replacing Heidegger’s “ontology of understanding” with an 
“epistemology of interpretation” because Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology already 
assumes the centrality and significance of interpretation at the very basis of Dasein’s being. 
In fact, it is fair to say, that Heidegger’s ontology is a matter of interpretation.  An 
understanding that comes towards itself and towards its most extreme possibilities is always 
also a Dasein coming towards its own death, not in time but as time itself – Dasein is 
                                                          
20
 See SZ 446/BT 387. 
21
 See SZ 192/BT 184. 
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precisely this coming towards itself in the persistent mode of self-interpretation that 
necessarily ends in the impossibility which is incapable of being seized by Dasein’s 
understanding, of interpreting or being interpreted – death, or “the possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Dasein.” Unlike in Ricoeur, however, literature is not necessarily privileged 
by Heidegger; instead, it joins the many other ways available to Dasein to interpret its being-
in-the-world, including psychoanalysis, philosophy, science, and the everyday mandate to be 
something, or else “risk being nothing at all”.  
Furthermore, as we will soon see, Mann’s narratives help to elucidate Heidegger’s 
distinction between an everyday and an authentic understanding of Dasein’s self-projection 
and its nature as first and foremost interpretive. In The Magic Mountain we find Hans 
Castorp in the beginning of the novel pondering his future as a civil engineer just as in 
Doctor Faustus much time is devoted to Adrian’s musical education and the uncanniness of 
his biographical Bildung towards music. But the everydayness of these possibilities are 
interrupted and fused throughout both novels by the understanding that both possibilities 
(engineer, musician) serve as sort of palimpsests for a deeper understanding that each novel 
and the course of the protagonists’ fate in each novel is meant to interpret; indeed, the task 
that each novel gives to its protagonist to interpret involves the most extreme possibilities 
available to each. As Heidegger points out repeatedly throughout the writing of Being and 
Time, “In so far as it holds before Da-sein its most extreme possibility, the forerun (Vorlauf-
zumTod) is the fundamental way in which the [self-] interpretation of Da-sein is carried 
through” [“Der Vorlauf ist, sofern er die äuβerste Möglichkeit des Daseins ihm vorhält, der 
Grundvollzug der Daseinsauslegung”] (CT in Becoming 208/BZ 117).  
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Projection expresses itself temporally in what Heidegger calls Dasein’s coming-
towards. Consequently, to be in time, according to Heidegger, means only to constantly 
approach one’s possibilities for being. As Kevin Vanhoozer explains the situation: “Because 
Dasein is the kind of being that is constituted by projecting itself ahead in possibilities, 
Heidegger can say that ‘Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is’” (Vanhoozer 42). Or 
as John Macquarrie writes: ‘Man is possibility. He is always more than he is, his being is 
never complete at any given moment […]’ (qtd. in Vanhoozer 42). 
For Heidegger, though, Dasein’s most extreme possibility (the possibility of being 
nothing at all) is precisely its own death, and it is in this way that death authentically dictates 
the temporalities of life and world, or being-there (da-sein). The possibility of death – the 
prospect of being-gone, of being nothing at all, or rather, not being – comprises both 
Dasein’s primordial as well as its everyday understanding of itself. Primordially, Dasein is its 
own death in so far as it is always already on its way toward its being gone. But even in the 
everyday sense, the sense in which Dasein persistently flees from the recognition of this 
inevitability, death reveals itself as “the from-which of our fleeing” and thus reasserts itself: 
Dasein ist kein Vorgang, der Tod nichts, was gelegentlich hinten nachkommt. 
Der Tod ist etwas, was den Menschen bevorsteht, worum das Leben selbst 
weiβ. Damit ist allerdings noch keine Definition des Todes gegeben. Es steht 
mir Vieles bevor. Aber hier ist ein Unterschied! Wenn mir ein Ereignis 
bevorsteht, so ist das ein Vorgang, der mich trifft, der mir aus der Welt 
begegnet. Der Tod kommt nicht irgendwo her auf mich zu, sonder er ist etwas, 
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was ich selbst bin; ich selbst bin die Möglichkeit meines Todes. Der Tod ist 
das äuβerste Möglichkeit meines Daseins. (DK 167)22  
If the understanding is equated with being-there (Da-sein) and with the potentiality of 
being something else, then it is equally and always concerned with the utmost extreme of this 
possibility. Consequently, as its own potentiality for being, Dasein is always out ahead of 
itself and is said to be futural. As I pointed out in the introduction, this being-gone of Dasein 
is much more than a chronological or biological limit, but it is a semantic and hermeneutic 
limit, and Heidegger goes through great pains to explain this fundamental and, perhaps most 
importantly, this irrevocable aspect of the concept:  
Dieses Vorbei, als zu welchem ich vorlaufe, macht in diesem meinem 
Vorlaufen zu ihm eine Entdeckung: es ist das Vorbei von mir. Als dieses 
Vorbei deckt es mein Dasein auf als einmal nicht mehr da; einmal bin ich 
nicht mehr da bei den Sachen, bei den und den Menschen, bei diesen 
Eitelkeiten, diesen Winkelzügen und dieser Geschwätzigkeit. Das Vorbei jagt 
alle Heimlichkeiten und Betriebsamkeiten auseinander, das Vorbei nimmt 
alles mit sich in das Nichts. Das Vorbei ist keine Begebenheit, kein Vorfall in 
meinem Dasein. Es ist ja sein Vorbei, nicht ein Was an ihm, das sich ereignet, 
                                                          
22
 “Dasein is not a process, nor is death something that incidentally comes afterward, at the end. Death is 
something that stands imminently before human beings; it is something that life itself knows. But this still does 
not give us a definition of death. There are many things that are imminent for me. But here there is a difference! 
When an event [Ereignis] is immanent for me it is something that pertains to me and that meets me in the world. 
Yet death is not something that comes to me from somewhere and sometime, it is rather what I myself am. I am 
myself the possibility of my own death. Death is the uttermost end of what is possible in my Dasein; it is my 
most extreme possibility” (DK in Becoming 263). 
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das ihm zustöβt und das es ändert. Dieses Vorbei ist kein Was, sondern ein 
Wie. Und zwar das eigentliche Wie meines Dasein. (BZ 117)23 
  In fact, narrative’s emphasis on the future, like the emphasis that coordinates Dasein’s 
relation to its own being, stems not only from the threatening certainty of its own finitude, of 
its being-gone, but Dasein equally regrets the indeterminacy of its own death, being thrown 
toward a fate it will never know and never experience. Death, and consequently, too, Dasein 
itself, is always deferred; moreover, the process of deferral is described by Heidegger as the 
primordial manner of its existence, the ‘how’ of Dasein. This aspect of being-towards-death, 
the aspect of deferral, amounts to a problem of closure rarely acknowledged in Heidegger, 
and certainly this compelling feature of Dasein’s predicament can be read alongside what 
scholars admit is a similar dilemma in Mann’s historical novels. 
That Dasein is constantly more than it factually is, that its being is never complete as 
long as it is testifies both to the permanence of Dasein’s coming-towards but also to the 
problem of deferral, which is, after all, also a problem of closure that is rarely taken up by 
critics who write about being-towards-death, including those predisposed to agree with 
Heidegger. Bernard Stiegler, however, is a relatively recent and notable exception – Stiegler 
describes Heideggerian deferral as follows, and it will help me to elaborate what in both 
Mann and Heidegger amounts to a “dilemma of closure”:  
Dasein is the being who […] defers. [….] Dasein is for the end, but its end is not for 
it. The end of Dasein is the indeterminate. [….] This never-being-finished constitutes 
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 “This being-gone, as that to which I forerun, brings about a discovery in my thus forerunning to it: it is my 
being gone. As thus being gone, it uncovers my Da-sein as all at once no longer there; all of a sudden I am no 
longer there in the midst of such and such matters, intimate with such and such people, surrounded by these 
vanities, these tricks, this verbosity. This being gone dissipates all secretiveness and busyness, it takes 
everything with it into the nothing. Being gone is not some occurrence, not some chance incident in my Da-
sein. It is its own being gone, not some ‘what’ about it, some event that by chance befalls Da-sein and alters it. 
This being gone is not a ‘what’, but a ‘how’, indeed the proper ‘how’ of my Da-sein” (CT in Becoming 207). 
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the mark of Dasein’s finitude, the infinitude of the finite, that is, of the radical end as 
what can only be completed in being deferred […]. (231) 
In its everydayness Dasein flees from the knowledge of death’s inevitability:  
Leben beruhigt über den Tod und versucht durch die Art, wie es ihn auslegt, 
sich ihm zu entfremden, ihn aus dem Horizont des Lebens zu schaffen [….] 
[Dasein] sorgt sich von dieser Möglichkeit des Todes weg. Es sorgt ständig 
dafür, daβ es versäumt, den Tod als Möglichkeit. (DK 167)24  
Consequently, not only does Dasein in its everydayness avoid death as a possibility, but as 
Heidegger also shows, the inevitability and certainty of death as the most extreme of 
Dasein’s possibilities is always already punctuated by an even deeper avoidance and 
indeterminacy, the indeterminacy that lies in its most extreme possibility being an 
irrevocable impossibility.  
Grasping this paradoxical reality as one’s own is not only the measure of Dasein’s 
authenticity but also, I would maintain, the measure of Castorp’s and Leverkühn’s and thus, 
too, of venturing a reinterpretation of the treatment of time and death in Mann’s The Magic 
Mountain and Doctor Faustus. Moreover, such a task involves venturing not only to explain 
how Doctor Faustus may also be quintessentially a Zeitroman in the same tradition as the 
earlier novel but also to provide a very different answer to Ricoeur’s very insightful question 
about moving beyond the facile temporal dichotomies that are typically said to constitute The 
Magic Mountain’s treatment of time and death. When Ricoeur asks, for instance – “Must the 
decomposition of time be interpreted as a prerogative of the world of sickness, or does this 
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 “Life tranquilizes itself regarding death and, by interpreting it in a certain way as something foreign to life, 
abolishes it from the horizon of life [….] [Dasein] is continually taking care to omit the possibility of taking 
hold of [its own] death” (DK 264). 
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world constitute a sort of limit-situation for an unprecedented experience of time?  (115) – he 
simultaneously throws into question conventional readings of the novel, anticipates the same 
problem in Doctor Faustus (without ever mentioning the later novel), and takes up the task of 
describing such an unprecedented experience. But as I have already pointed out, Ricoeur’s 
answer not only fails to answer the question, but he also neglects – ironically, of course, 
since Heidegger’s temporality forms the basis of his entire narrative theory – to define both 
the unprecedented experience of time and its relation to death and sickness in terms of 
Heidegger’s being-towards-death or in terms of the particularly modernist character of its 
emergence. 
 
The Magic Mountain 
 
In the analysis of The Magic Mountain that follows, I undertake to explain the 
correspondences that link Heidegger’s understanding of being-towards-death with Mann’s 
treatment of death in The Magic Mountain. First, and by way of introduction, I attempt to 
establish the overarching link between what Mann calls “the meaningful interweaving of life 
and death” [“das Sinngeflecht von Leben and Tod”] (Letters 131/Briefe 238) and 
Heidegger’s insistence on what he calls the “how” of death’s proximity to life. For both 
Mann and Heidegger, a life that seeks to avoid death not only evades life itself, but it also 
fails to acknowledge the temporality that is the basis of its authenticity – while this 
temporality is attested to in Heidegger by the coming-towards of Dasein as the possibility of 
its ownmost extreme impossibility, namely, in being-towards-death, in Mann it is grounded 
primarily in the Faustian temporality that governs the narrative structure of The Magic 
Mountain and haunts the progressive teleology of Castorp’s Bildung.  
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Secondly, I will discuss the way in which for both Mann and Heidegger death 
functions as a possibility of life. The relentless teleology of being-towards-death in Dasein’s 
coming-towards itself as the possibility of an extreme impossibility resonates with the 
positive and distinctly modernist telos of Hans Castorp’s Bildung in The Magic Mountain. 
This telos, I will argue, is manifested in several critical “moments” in the novel: young 
Castorp’s arrival on the mountain and his subsequent habituation to the routine of the cure, 
his “sudden enlightenment” [“plötzliche Klarheit”] (DZ 332-3)  upon encountering his own 
death in the x-ray image of his hand, and the alleged completion of his Bildung with the 
thunderous outbreak of the first world war that ends the novel.  
Finally, I will discuss the way in which for both Mann and Heidegger death functions 
as the impossibility of life. By following the more negative, subtractive, yet still “productive 
significance” [“produktiven Bedeutung”] of many of these same moments,25  I engage that 
other fundamental aspect of being-towards-death, namely, death as the possibility of an 
impossibility. Such an approach will go a long way toward laying out the correspondences 
between this oft-described problem of closure in Heidegger and the so-called ‘dilemma of 
closure’ (Scaff 91-5) in The Magic Mountain and toward comprehensively elaborating what 
Heidegger would certainly be apt to call the ontological status of death in The Magic 
Mountain. 
* 
It is revealing that in between his 1924 preparatory lectures at Marburg on “The 
Concept of Time” and his hasty publication of Being and Time (1927), itself an incomplete 
fragment (speaking of the problem of closure), Heidegger had read The Magic Mountain and 
                                                          
25
 This term is used by Mann in Freud und die Zukunft (1936) to denote Freud’s recognition of the dynamic 
bond between a “will to[ward] truth” and a “will to[ward] death”. (GW, Bd. 9, 480-2) 
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given some indication as to what he viewed to be the most salient of the novel’s insights. 
And though his remarks are so open as to leave room for any number of possible 
interpretations, none of which may be called definitive, it is my opinion that his remarks 
could be said to resonate quite meaningfully not only with Mann’s own assessment of the 
metaphysical questions raised by the novel but also with the author’s frequently-felt 
obligation to clarify his intentions in the novel and, consequently, to interpret the novel for 
his readers.  
In July 1925 Heidegger shares the first impressions made on him by the novel with 
his then student, Hannah Arendt: 
   Ich habe den Zauberberg angelesen. [….] Freilich die Gröβe der Darstellung 
– ist unerhört; was ich bislang von der “Zeit” zu lesen bekam, ist nicht 
überwältigend – aber es ware lächerlich, wollte ich daraufhin das Werk 
absuchen. 
   Aber daβ Phänomen wie das Dasein von seiner Umwelt gelebt wird und nur 
vermeintlich selbst lebt, das ist mit einer Meisterschaft angesetzt, daβ ich 
vorläufig einzig darauf konzentrieren bleibe. (Briefe 40)26 
Any translation which reads the mention of “Dasein” in the above passage as denoting mere 
“existence” and not as simultaneously charged with the attributes of Heidegger’s 
contemporary philosophical inquiries into the questions of being and time risks missing the 
point of Heidegger’s observations, for it is clear that Heidegger is wont to read Castorp’s 
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 “I have begun reading The Magic Mountain. [….] Of course, it is extraordinary how brilliantly that world is 
depicted; what I have read until now about that ‘time’ was unremarkable – but it would be absurd to comb 
through the work from that standpoint. 
   But the phenomenon, as well as existence, is lived by its surroundings and only apparently lives itself – that is 
developed with such mastery that for now I am concentrating on that alone” (Letters 28).  
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predicament and quest as Dasein’s own – the Dasein of his 1924-5 lectures and of Being and 
Time, in which Dasein is confidently defined as time or authentic temporality as such, or 
even better, as the “human, historical” site at which time takes place as being-in-the-world.27  
In addition, Heidegger recognizes the problem of “time” in the novel in terms of 
complications also recognized by Mann when the author describes the temporality of the 
Zeitroman as einmal historisch and on the other hand about die reine Zeit selbst. As I point 
out in the previous chapter, the impression made by the novel is something much more than 
either.  
At the time of the letter, of course, Heidegger could not have been privy to the 
retrospective insights into the novel offered by Mann in his 1939 lecture “The Making of The 
Magic Mountain” [“Einführung in den Zauberberg”], but Heidegger’s interests in the novel 
certainly anticipate Mann’s recognition of the novel’s complexity with respect to its 
treatment of time. Just as Mann says The Magic Mountain is intended to “be that of which it 
speaks” [“immer zugleich das zu sein, wovon es handelt und spricht”] (Making 725/ GW, Bd. 
12, 441), Heidegger clearly suspects a correspondence between his own understanding of 
Dasein as a function of time – “wie das Dasein von seiner Umwelt gelebt wird und nur 
vermeintlich selbst lebt” – and the “Ehrgeiz” of a novel that proposes to be “das, wovon es 
erzählt” – in other words, the ambition of a novel that seeks to be time (GW, Bd. 12, 441). 
Consequently, what seems like irony – that for Heidegger “time” is not the way into the 
novel: “ [es] ware lächerlich, wollte ich daraufhin das Werk absuchen” – is really in line with 
both his and Mann’s understanding at the time of the need for a more complex and radically 
different treatment of the subject of time altogether.  
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 “Zusammenfassend ist zu sagen: Zeit ist Dasein” [In summing up, we can now say: Time is Dasein” (BZ 123-
5/(CT in Becoming 212).  
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If for Heidegger the temporality of Dasein has its essence in being-towards-death, 
then it seems appropriate to make an entry into the claim that Heidegger’s temporality might 
help to illuminate Mann’s treatment of time and death in The Magic Mountain precisely 
where the correspondence lies – at the intersection of Heidegger’s efforts to maintain his idea 
of death as Dasein’s being-towards “the possibility of [its] absolute impossibility” [“die 
Möglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Daseinsunmöglichkeit”]  and what the critical tradition in 
Mann scholarship has come to call the crisis of narrative closure in The Magic Mountain (BT 
294/SZ 333).28 Heidegger’s struggle to elaborate the existential-ontological structure of death 
and Mann’s dilemma of closure amount to the same problematic desire – an effect of 
temporality that seeks ultimately to describe the structural unity of death within life and to 
explore the affinity, or, perhaps, the authenticity of their relation rather than their 
presupposed, mutual, and hostile opposition.  
This correspondence reveals itself most forcefully in Heidegger’s insistence on the 
imminence of death in life as well as on the meaning of death as a possibility of life and in 
Mann’s well-known insistence throughout much of his work that life enjoys and suffers a 
complex sympathy with death. Just as Heidegger will claim that ““Der Tod kommt nicht 
irgendwo her auf mich zu, sondern er ist etwas, was ich selbst bin; ich selbst bin die 
Möglichkeit meines Todes. […] Ich selbst bin mein Tod gerade dann, wenn ich lebe […] 
[und] den Tod zu verstehen als Möglichkeit des Lebens” (DK 166),29 Mann describes the 
central motif of The Magic Mountain as Hans Castorp’s coming towards a very similar 
recognition:  
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 See, for example, Vaget, Vogel, Scaff, Cobley, Travers, and Wiegand. 
29
 “[…] [D]eath is not something that comes to me from somewhere or sometime, it is rather what I myself am. 
I am myself the possibility of my own death. […] I myself am my death precisely when I live […] [and] 
understand death as a possibility of life” (DK in Becoming 263).  
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[Der Zauberberg] zeigt, wie dem jungen Mann aus dem Erlebnis von 
Krankheit, Tod, Verwesung die Idee des Menschen erwächst, des 
“Hochgebilds” organischen Leben, dessen Schicksal seinem schlichten 
Herzen nun zu einem wirklichen und dringlichen Anliegen wird. [Castorp] ist 
sinnlich und geistig verliebt in den Tod […]; aber diese schlimme Liebe 
läutert sich wenigstens moment- und erleuchtungsweise zu einer Ahnung 
neuer Humanität, die er als Keim in seinem Herzen trägt […]” (Briefe 232).30 
Mann himself says quite emphatically that this vital pairing was much more important 
to him than the einmal historisch social implications of the novel and, I would argue, much 
more important, too, than the many irresolvable inquiries into the nature of die reine Zeit 
selbst that take up a good portion the novel: “Aber freilich, das ‘andere’, das Sinngeflecht 
von Leben und Tod […] war mir viel, viel wichtiger” (Briefe 238).31 And no one would 
disagree that both The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus ultimately seek to engage the 
question of the “productive significance” of this “schlimme Liebe.” As I do argue, however, 
the productivity of this familiar bond in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus between 
“the ‘sublime structure’ of organic life” [“des ‘Hochgebilds’ organischen Leben”] and 
“sickness, death, and decay” [“Krankheit, Tod, Verwesung”], a bond traced primarily in the 
history of Mann’s engagements with Nietzsche and Freud, always follows the demands of a 
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 See letter to Josef Ponten (2/25/1925): “[The Magic Mountain] shows how there grows in the young man, out 
of the experience of sickness, death, and decay, the idea of man, the ‘sublime structure’ of organic life, whose 
destiny then becomes a real and urgent concern of his simple heart. He is sensuously and intellectually 
infatuated with death (mysticism, romanticism); but his dire love is purified, at least in moments of 
illumination, into an inkling of a new humanity whose germ he bears in his heart […]” (Letters 125); See also 
Mann’s comments in “Zur Begrüβung Gerhart Hauptmanns in München” (1926): “The German […] reaches 
health only by acquiring final knowledge of sickness and death” (qtd. in Travers, “Death, Knowledge”  36). 
31
 “But I grant you that the ‘other things,’ such as [music and] the meaningful interweaving of life and death, 
were much, much more important to me” (Letters, to Julius Bab, 4/23/1925, 131, emphasis mine).  
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fundamental temporality that neither Freud nor Nietzsche ever acknowledged, but which both 
Mann and Heidegger in 1924 certainly, and finally, do elaborate. 
Mann’s preoccupation with the “dire love” [“schlimme Liebe”] between life and 
death mirrors Heidegger’s own preoccupations with what he calls the “how” of death’s 
proximity to life, and it is, in fact, precisely over the question of “how” death is proximate to 
life that both Mann and Heidegger appear to be in agreement, an agreement that I believe 
warrants further study. Mann’s “schlimme Liebe” not only resonates with Heidegger’s 
insistence on death as at once both a “possibility of life” [“Möglichkeit des Lebens”] and as 
the “possibility of the impossibility of Dasein” [“Möglichkeit der Daseinsunmöglichkeit”], 
but the temporality of this echo also sheds light on the productivity of the correspondence. As 
I will demonstrate, the “how” of death’s proximity to life is also a question of “how” Dasein, 
as life or existence, is disposed toward its future as coming-towards the possibility of its own 
ending.  
In the passages above, these correspondences are highlighted in such a way that will 
guide the rest of this analysis. For Heidegger, death’s proximity to life lies in its 
embeddedness in and as Dasein itself: “Death is not something that comes to me from 
somewhere and sometime, it is rather what I myself am” [“Der Tod kommt nicht irgendwo 
her auf mich zu, sondern er ist etwas, was ich selbst bin”]. Moreover, insofar as death is 
always a futural prospect, it emerges in Heidegger’s thought as a distinct possibility of life, 
just as that life, Dasein, emerges as the constant unfolding of its own future: “I am myself the 
possibility of my own death” [“Ich selbst bin die Möglichkeit meines Todes”]. And finally, 
for Heidegger, as with Mann, the prospect of authentic life hinges upon Dasein’s recognition 
of itself as this “meaningful interweaving of life and death” [“das Sinngeflecht von Leben 
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und Tod”] that is consequently governed by the future as being-towards-death. And insofar 
as Dasein’s temporality is governed by the future, which is to say, by the coming-towards of 
possibility, its future is at the same time characterized by the absolute impossibility toward 
which it is destined, namely, the liminal possibility of its own death and disappearance.  
Likewise, Mann’s synopsis of the productive capacity of this “schlimme Liebe” 
reveals a similar temporality. For Mann, death’s proximity to life also lies in an 
embeddedness like that suggested by Heidegger. As is the case for Dasein, death does not 
come at Castorp from “somewhere or sometime,” but rather it “grows” out of his very own 
experience, “[a] germ he bears in his heart” [“als Keim in seinem Herzen”]. Consequently, 
Mann seems to suggest, along with Heidegger, that death is indeed a possibility of life, for it 
is only “out of death” [“aus dem Tod”] that Castorp is able to arrive at a sublime 
understanding of organic life [“des ‘Hochgebilds’ organischen Leben”]. Moreover, it is also 
equally clear that the idea of humanity [“Idee des Menschen”] that grows out of Castorp’s 
intimate contact with death is at the same time an idea of himself as well as an idea of his 
own fate [Schicksal], which now weighs on his heart precisely because it is his own. Finally, 
this orientation toward the future also betrays the temporal complexity of that “schlimme 
Liebe” as being-towards the possibility of an impossibility, for in as much as Castorp’s 
proximate experience of and contact with death [“Erlebnis von […] Tod”] in the Snow 
episode calls forth the unimagined possibilities of human life and existence, i.e. Dasein, he is 
still, at the end of the novel, headed toward his own death, which is of course also to say, 
toward the very real possibility of his being nothing at all. In addition, and as Heidegger 
points out with respect to the novel’s “end without an end” [“Ende ohne Ende”] – “What is 
left unsaid throughout the novel is really the most positive” [“Was so unausgesprochen im 
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Ganzen steht, ist wirklich das Positivste”] (Briefe 45)  – the possibilities eternally suggested 
by the hope invested by Mann in Castorp’s and Germany’s future are complicated by 
Castorp’s unspoken “dream of love” [“Ein Traum von Liebe”], which is, after all, still both a 
dream and a wish, “die er als Keim in seinem Herzen trägt, während der Bajonettangriff ihn 
mit sich reiβt” (Briefe 232).32 Thus, too, it is a dream of love “out of death” and out of the 
future, which as such is not yet able to speak: “Augenblicke kamen, wo dir aus Tod und 
Körperunzucht ahnungsvoll und regierungsweise ein Traum von Liebe erwuchs” 
(Zauberberg 1085; emphases mine).33  
Suffice it to say I believe the source of the productivity of this typically maligned 
combination that Mann calls “the dire love between love and death” [“die Schlimme Liebe 
zwischen Leben und Tod”] lies in the temporality of what Heidegger calls being-towards-
death and what Mann on more than one occasion calls a “passing through” [e.g. 
“durchlaufen,” “hindurchgehen”] it (Making 726); as with being-towards-death, such a 
“passing through” clearly connotes that stretching-along or Erstreckung that Heidegger calls 
Dasein or life as being-there, and as such this passing through also connotes the temporality 
of Dasein’s coming towards both the possibility and impossibility of itself. Conseqently, and 
in such a way that will have major ramifications for our understanding of Mann’s innovative 
reconceptualization of the modernist Bildungsroman, I suggest not only that the 
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 “whose germ he bears in his heart as the bayonet attack carries him along” (Letters, to Josef Ponten, 2/5/1925, 
126). See also Mann’s famous description of Castorp in a letter to Julius Bab: “Hans Castorp ist am Ende ein 
Vortypus und Vorläufer, ein Vorwegnehmer […] der durch ‘Steigerung’ zum Anticipieren gebracht wird. Das 
ist in der Entlassungsanrede direkt ausgesprochen, und während der Arbeit sagte ich immer: ‘Ich schreibe von 
einem […] der vorm Kriege schon über den Krieg hinauskommt’” (Briefe 239). [“Hans Castorp is in the end a 
prototype and forerunner, a little prewar German who by ‘intensification’ is brought to the point of anticipating 
the future. This is as good as said in the author’s final words of dismissal, and in the course of the work I was 
constantly telling myself: ‘I am writing about a young German who before the war has already reached beyond 
the war’” (Letters, to Julius Bab, 4/23/1925, 132, emphasis mine)]. 
33
 “Moments there were, when out of death, and the rebellion of the flesh, there came to thee, as thou tookest 
stock of thyself, a dream of Love” (Magic 716). 
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unausgesprochene Zeit – which Heidegger senses as “wirklich das Positivste” in The Magic 
Mountain and that refers to the coming-towards of Dasein as the possibility of its own 
impossibility, and thus, too, its coming-towards itself as time – is the temporality of what 
Mann calls “das Sinngeflecht von Leben and Tod,”  but, even more importantly, I will also 
argue that Castorp, like Dasein – insofar as it is the possibility of its own death – emerges as 
the site of this continuous exchange in the novel. 
* 
Though Susan von Rohr Scaff is the only scholar to my knowledge to undertake the 
comparison, no one will argue that the so-called atemporality of the Berghof, “Das Leben 
ohne Zeit, das sorg- und hoffnungslose Leben, das Leben als stagnierend betriebsame 
Liederlichkeit, das tote Leben” (Zauberberg 951),34 prefigures the “consummate  ‘a-
temporal’ experience” (Scaff 73) of Leverkühn’s strict style [strenger Satz], or that the 
problem of Adrian’s salvation is anticipated in the problem of deferral that unnaturally delays 
Castorp’s departure from the Berghof or characterizes the so-called ending of the novel, 
which barely accomplishes its goal, the “end without an end” [“das Ende ohne Ende”], as 
Heidegger describes it. According to Scaff, the timeless world of the Berghof is mitigated 
only by the promise of self-transformation that the ending of the novel suggests and that the 
conventional Bildungsroman demands; in Doctor Faustus, however, Mann offers no respite 
from the crisis of timelessness. In the latter novel, Scaff claims, time itself, as the very 
ground of Bildung, is thoroughly negated, whereas in the former novel its negation and 
decomposition are only alleged and ultimately judged inauthentic. In so far as this is the case, 
Scaff reasserts the more or less common view that Doctor Faustus merely recapitulates with 
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 “Life without time, life without care or hope, life as depravity, assiduous stagnation; life as dead” (Magic 
627; qtd. in Reed 264). 
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more urgency Mann’s exploration of the dangerous psychological and historical 
consequences of a German culture obsessed with the problem of eternity and guided too 
heavily by a collective “sympathy with death.” Nevertheless, what Mann scholars have never 
considered is the fundamental temporality of this major motif (of atemporality) in both 
novels, which is also to ask, whether the portrayal of the atemporality of death isn’t rather the 
portrayal of a distinct, and, as Heidegger would dare to add, a priori and vital temporality. 
 Elaborating this vitality begins fundamentally with the Faustian model and 
temporality that informs the structure of the narrative itself. Mann himself admits that the 
novel conforms to the Faustian paradigm, in which the  
Held […] der Himmel und Hölle durchstreift, es mit Himmel and Hölle 
aufnimmt und einen Pakt macht mit dem Geheimnis, mit der Krankheit, dem 
Bösen, dem Tode, mit der anderen Welt […]. – auf der Suche nach dem 
‘Gral’, will sagen nach dem Höchsten, nach Wissen, Erkenntnis, Einweihung, 
nach der Stein der Weisen, dem aurum potabile, dem Trunk des Lebens” (GW, 
Bd. 12, 445).35  
Hans Castorp, after all, like Adrian Leverkühn, does make a Faustian bargain when he 
decides to remain on the magic mountain, and he is certainly taken on a Mephistophelean 
journey that reaches its climax on Walpurgisnacht and in the end of the novel quite literally 
deposits him a changed man whose account has been balanced through a deeply subjective 
recognition (about the nature of time, death and, ultimately, too, himself), which constitutes 
the completion of his Faustian Bildung.    
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 In which the “hero […] ranges heaven and hell, makes terms with them, and strikes a pact with the unknown, 
with sickness and evil, with death and the other world […]. He is forever searching for the Grail – that is to say, 
the Highest: knowledge, wisdom, consecration, the philosopher’s stone, the aurum potabile, the elixir of life” 
(Making 727-8). 
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Though the correspondences run very deep throughout the novel that would help to 
verify the Faustian structure and content of The Magic Mountain, I must limit my remarks to 
what is, after all, my primary concern: the question of the novel’s distinctly Faustian 
temporality. As I showed in the previous chapter, there seems to be a consensus, following 
Stephen Kern’s description of what he calls a particularly German sense of time under 
modernism, that the “future” of modernity was characterized by a frenetic, anxious 
expectation. And it is certainly worth pointing out that the quintessentially German tragedy 
Faust, even with all its historical variations, remains a tragedy of anticipation, and, thus, too, 
of a time very much like that described by Kern. Faust, “the most famous German 
representative of the form” (Making 727), is, after all, the tale of a quest for the infinite, a 
quest to be set free from the boundaries of the finite that in each case is completed only upon 
the very condition of that finitude – it must, after all, end, and Faust must live up to his end 
of the bargain. Thus are we given Castorp at the end of the novel mired not only in the 
excited anticipation of battle but suffering under the burden of a “wirklichen und 
dringlichen” anxiety over his inevitable fate. Faust is driven solely by the sort of 
fundamental anticipation of death that Heidegger associates with the coming-towards of Sein 
zum Tode – indeed, Heidegger would certainly admit that the Faust myth is merely a 
narrative representation of Dasein’s coming-towards.36 The protagonist, along with the 
narrator and reader, looks forward to the moment of the pact and then again to the long 
narrative of its terms – indeed, its very literal coming to term(s), which, of course, the novel 
itself always already is. Thus the long process of Castorp’s Bildung and Faustian Abenteuer 
is not only characterized by the drawn out terms of something like what Heidegger calls 
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 See Emil Staiger’s Grundbegriffe der Poetik (1946) in which Staiger explains the temporality of dramatic 
action explicitly in terms of Heideggerian Entwurf or projection.  
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Dasein’s coming-towards itself as being-towards-death, but even at the end of the novel, 
Castorp is not yet finished but rather still given as the very process of this fundamental 
anticipation – a “little prewar German” poised to anticipate the future of Germany [“ein 
kleiner Vorkriegsdeutscher, der durch ‘Steigerung’ zum Anticipieren gebracht wird” ] (Briefe 
239). 
The Faustian bargain of The Magic Mountain not only involves a bargain to acquire 
death “as an instrument of knowledge,”37 which is also to say, a bargain for the knowledge of 
the future, but it also requires, along the way and in living up to the truth disclosed by this 
knowledge, that Faust become that future. For instance, even as Mann claims that his hero’s 
quest is a quest for the “Highest,” he simultaneously suggests that Castorp is himself a 
“heightening” of the “ordinary stuff of which he is made” (Making 725). This Steigerung, of 
course, is facilitated by and associated by Mann throughout the novel with Castorp’s 
“passing through” death even as he is headed inexorably toward it (Making 726). 
Consequently, Castorp’s quest is at the same time the anticipatory process of Castorp’s 
coming towards himself as his own death.  It is for this reason that we can say with some 
confidence that Castorp’s Bildung is motivated by his consistent and progressive 
identification with death throughout the novel, though he is in the midst of “seeming life,” or 
that we can sense the coming-towards and the notion of death as a possibility of life in 
Heidegger’s recognition that Castorp finds himself already in the “nassen Graben” long 
before he is finally dismissed by the narrator and his “contract” has come to term.  
Moreover, Castorp’s acquisition of this knowledge and the becoming or Bildung that 
it signifies is anything but static and atemporal – in fact, it is the very stuff of time, according 
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 Mann, Freud und die Zukunft (in Essays of Three Decades, 414) 
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to Heidegger, the way that time temporalizes itself for and as Dasein and what he called 
earlier the “how” of death’s proximity to life. With this in mind, one could argue that what 
The Magic Mountain signals is not merely a preoccupation with the timelessness of death as 
such but rather with the temporality of the approach toward death, or what is a lot like it, i.e. 
Mann’s confirmation that “Leben ist Pein, und nur solange wir leiden, leben wir. –” 
(Entstehung 128).38 This as long as not only sums up the temporality and thus, too, the 
ontological status of both the Berghof and the strenger Satz, Faustian dilemmas through and 
through, but it also clearly reiterates the tragic temporality of being-towards-death in so far as 
it emphasizes the perpetuity of life as suffering alongside and as the approach of the until, 
the “moment” at which, of course, Dasein is no longer.  
* 
Castorp’s drawn-out “arrival” at the Berghof demonstrates very clearly the 
temporality of the coming-towards that is the ontological basis of death as Dasein’s most 
extreme possibility. Very early on in the novel, before Castorp actually arrives at the 
Berghof, the changes in landscape (this spatial metaphor the narrator relates explicitly to 
changes in Castorp’s temporal perspective) that accompany Castorp on the journey to the 
Berghof parallel and prefigure the perception of time (or supposed lack of it) that prevails at 
the Berghof itself. Among other things, this coincidence serves to show not only that the 
temporal changes are not solely the result of the strange life at the Berghof but rather of the 
movement of life itself when the veil of ordinary existence is lifted and an authentic time is 
prepared for disclosure, but also that his traveling remains a continuous climb, that his 
journey is not yet at an end when he arrives at the Berghof. Perhaps even more importantly, 
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 “Life is pain, as long as we live we suffer” (Story 144, emphasis mine). 
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it demonstrates that the sort of time described is not solely aligned with a world of corruption 
and disease but with the movement away from his everyday “attachments” toward something 
more primordial, what Heidegger, and I think, Mann, too, would call an authentic, 
unprecedented, and “unspoken” [“unausgesprochene”] experience of time:  
Der Raum, der sich drehend und fliehend zwischen ihn und seine Pflanzstätte 
wälzt, bewährt Kräfte, die man gewöhnlich der Zeit vorbehalten glaubt; von 
Stunde zu Stunde stellt ihr innere Veränderungen her […]. Gleich ihr erzeugt 
er Vergessen; er tut es aber, indem er die Person des Menschen aus ihre 
Beziehungen löst und ihn in einen freien und ursprünglichen Zustand versetzt 
[…]. Zeit, sagt man, ist Lethe; aber auch Fernluft ist so ein Trank. (DZ 12)39 
The dynamic predicament Mann describes here clearly resonates with certain fundamental 
principles of Heidegger’s notions of authenticity and being-towards-death, namely, that an 
authentic forgetting counters the inauthentic forgetting of everyday existence, the latter of 
which is characterized by the industrious commercial life Castorp is leaving behind in the 
world below. With the authentic forgetting that accompanies Castorp’s travels up the 
mountain, he is simultaneously reminded of something like being itself, given something 
back as he is beginning to acquire a “free and original” [“freien und ursprünglichen”] 
knowledge or memory of himself as precisely this coming towards. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize the incongruity between the alleged stasis of 
timelessness and the dynamism of the approach toward it. Remember that Stephen Kern 
describes the atmosphere of The Magic Mountain and of the national sense of time in 
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 “Space, rolling and revolving between him and his native heath, possessed and wielded the powers we 
generally ascribe to time. From hour to hour it worked changes in him […]. Space, like time, engenders 
forgetfulness; but it does so by setting us bodily free from our surroundings and giving us back our primitive, 
unattached state […]. Time, we say, is Lethe; but change of air is a similar draught […].” (Magic 4) 
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Germany in 1914 as anxious, explosive, feverish. Such an idea already complicates a 
traditional scholarly insistence upon stasis by implying the friction of activity. Here in the 
very beginning one can see, for instance, the duplicity and complexity of Castorp’s (and 
Mann’s) recognition that his An-kunft at the Berghof is not merely the end but also the 
beginning of his journey, or better, that the moment of his arrival (Ankunft) at the Berghof 
already contains the possibilities of his future (Zukunft) within it and is thus more of an 
“approach” than it is an “arrival” in the sense of having-finished. 
In fact, it is precisely the unique significance of the temporality of this moment into 
which Heidegger’s concept of being-towards-death allows us some provocative insight. On 
the one hand, like the ending of the novel, as Heidegger reads it, Castorp’s arrival or 
beginning is also “eine Ende ohne Ende,” especially if we consider the seven years he spends 
there (having only intended a three week stay) or the fact that the so-called end of his journey 
is precisely the beginning of his Bildung in the dark matter(s) of sickness and death, which he 
has already begun to “pass through” on the way to the Berghof. For example, along the way 
toward the Berghof Castorp not only passes through marshes once thought to be 
“bottomless” [“unergründlich”], but at the same time his ascent above the tree-line, where 
life no longer flourishes, is accompanied by thoughts of “the impoverishment of life” 
[“Gedanke des Aufhörens und der Verarmung”] and sparks his earliest attacks of nausea that 
signal the earliest moments of his progressive physical and psychological habituation 
[Gewöhnung] to these internal changes [“innere Veränderungen”]. In another sense, 
however, Castorp has indeed arrived at the end, which is also to say, at a place where the end 
is and resides, both because it is the end of the line and because the place itself, this landed 
estate of the “aristocracy of death,” dramatizes and rehearses the end of life. In either case we 
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are confronted in Castorp’s awkward “arrival” at the Berghof with the dynamic temporality 
of his gradual attunement to what it may mean to be-towards-death. 
Nevertheless, it is not simply death as the end which resonates, but rather the being 
toward it in a Heideggerian sense. In being-towards-death, the end resonates back over the 
course of Castorp’s life which, after all, continuously calls him toward his utmost possibility 
– this alleged being “zwischen ihn und seine Pflanzstätte” is not at all unlike what Heidegger 
calls Erstreckung or the stretching-along of Dasein that is always also a being-toward. And it 
is this traveling, the “continuous climbing,” that in the novel first draws Castorp’s attention 
to the spatio-temporal changes that comprise the course and trajectory of his Bildung: 
Heim und Ordnung lagen nicht nur weit zurück, sie lagen hauptsächlich 
klaftertief unter ihm, und noch immer stieg er darüber hinaus. Schwebend 
zwischen ihnen und dem Unbekannten fragte er sich, wie es ihm dort oben 
ergehen werde [….]. Er wünscht, am Ziel zu sein, denn einmal oben, dachte 
er, würde man leben wie überall und nicht so wie jetzt im Klimmen daran 
errinert sein, in welchen unangemessenen Sphären man sich befand. Er sah 
hinaus: der Zug wand sich gebogen auf schmalen Paβ [….] [und durch] 
[s]tockfinstere Tunnel kamen […]. (DZ 13)40 
Here, too, Mann emphasizes both the paradox of the arrival as both beginning and ending – 
“He wished he were at the end of his journey [so that] he could begin to live” – as well as his 
insistence on what Heidegger would certainly call Dasein’s duration as a being-between – 
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 “Home and regular living lay not only far behind him, they lay fathoms deep beneath him, and he continued 
to mount above them. Poised between them and the unknown, he asked himself how he was going to fare [….]. 
He wished he were at the end of his journey; for once there he could begin to live as he would anywhere else, 
and not be reminded by this continual climbing of the incongruous situation he found himself in. He looked out. 
The train wound in curves along the narrow pass [….] and passed through pitch-black tunnels […]” (MM 4; 
emphases mine; Trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter). 
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“Poised between them and the unknown.” In addition, we find in this passage, as in the one 
before it, Mann’s emphasis on the “internal changes” taking place within Castorp and the 
“incongruous situation” in which he finds himself. These alchemistic movements serve to 
emphasize Castorp’s anxious approach toward the source of these alterations – his immanent 
approach toward the unknown, which lies quite explicitly in the eventualities of Castorp’s 
future that comprise the rest of the narrative; the most extreme of these possibilities, of 
course, is his inevitable death. And it almost goes without saying that the temporality of this 
approach is only underscored by the spatial and atmospheric changes he is undergoing during 
his “arrival” – “Zeit, sagt man, ist Lethe; aber auch Fernluft ist so ein Trank. [….] Heim und 
Ordnung lagen nicht nur weit zurück, sie lagen hauptsächlich klaftertief unter ihm, und noch 
immer stieg er darüber hinaus” – and by the very literal coming towards of the train that 
takes him inexorably toward his destination or arrival, which, as we have already established, 
is not quite an arrival after all. 
The temporality of Castorp’s arrival reinforces very early on in the novel what can 
only be called a major leitmotif of the treatment of time and death in both The Magic 
Mountain and Doctor Faustus, namely, time’s tendency to quicken as one approaches death. 
In the chapter most often cited to by scholars in defense of what has been called the 
“politically suspect” atemporality of the Berghof and the “life without time” that it appears to 
advocate and to engender in our protagonist, “Excursus on the Sense of Time” [“Exkurs über 
den Zeitsinn”],  the narrator tells the reader quite explicitly that the process of Castorp’s 
habitutation to the sort of time endured at the Berghof tends to dispense with time altogether, 
while the constant “change and incident” of ordinary life in the flatland is what “rejuvenates” 
both the time and self:  
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Gewöhnung ist ein Einschlafen oder doch ein Mattwerden des Zeitsinns, und 
wenn die Jungenjahre so langsam erlebt werden, das spätere Leben aber 
immer hurtiger abläuft und hineilt, so muβ auch das auf Gewöhnung beruhen. 
Wir wissen wohl, daβ die Einschaltung von Um- und Neugewöhnungen das 
einzige Mittel ist […] unseres Zeitsinn aufzufrischen […], eine Verjüngung 
[…], und damit die Erneuerung unseres Lebensgefühls überhaupt zu erzielen 
(DZ 160).41 
It is this predicament that traditional readings of the novel take at face value. But as with 
everything else in Mann, there is built into this predicament a natural ambivalence not unlike 
the one described by Castorp earlier as his own and often unaccounted for by critics. To 
demonstrate such an incongruity we need only turn to one of the more powerful and complex 
symbols employed by Mann as early as Death in Venice but that reappears again and again in 
both The Magic Mountain and Doktor Faustus – the Sanduhr or hour-glass, since this symbol 
not only emphasizes the “hastening while” of time’s passage but also what amounts to the 
same thing, the relentlessness of time’s passage and the approach toward the end as 
Castorp’s coming towards the most extreme possibility of himself.  
While it may in fact be true that time passes more slowly for the young precisely 
because they are by nature not yet habitutated to the seemingly infinite vicissitudes of life, 
which are precisely what the narrator claims rejuvenate and “refresh our sense of time,” it is 
certainly not the case – neither for those who have in “later life” become habituated to 
novelty and change, nor, especially, for those heightened toward the Gewöhnung itself as 
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 “Habituation is a falling asleep or fatiguing of the sense of time; which explains why young years pass 
slowly, while later life flings itself faster and faster upon its course. We are aware that the intercalation of 
periods and change and novelty is the only means by which we can refresh our sense of time […] and 
rejuvenate it, and therewith renew our perception of life itself. (MM 104)” 
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Castorp is – that their conception of time involves merely a “falling asleep” or a “fatiguing” 
of the sense of time. As the narrator reminds us, in “das spätere Leben” the timely approach 
of death forces time not so much to fall asleep but rather to awaken and “fling itself faster 
and faster upon its course.” This paradox is certainly worth mentioning in conjunction not 
only with the earliest moments of Castorp’s Gewöhnung but also with the subject of this 
chapter, which is the way in which death, as the most extreme change and incident of life, 
does anything but stall time, but rather quickens and underscores it. And this is the case for 
our hero throughout the novel and the explanation, to cite just one example, for the 
quickening of the novel’s end, which has him rushing amidst change and incident toward his 
certain fate. It is put simply, the difference between being the spectator and being the 
spectacle itself, between watching the sand filter through to the bottom chamber of the glass 
and being the hour-glass.    
 For my purposes in this chapter, what is important to recognize in this early tone-
setting by Mann is the hidden Faustian terms around which it is organized. We are not only 
confronted early on with what I have already called the Faustian temporality of the approach 
that, among other things, contests the common claim of “atemporality” in the novel, but we 
are also confronted with a temporality that links the bargain with life itself, a temporality not 
at all unlike the one that Heidegger attributes to Dasein, which is the being- or coming-
towards these ordinarily hidden terms and whose authenticity, like Castorp’s, I would argue, 
lies in their receptiveness to the disclosure of these terms. In the first instance, the Faustian 
correspondence lies in the quickening of time that accompanies the immanent approach 
toward death and directly foreshadows the very literal terms of the Devil’s bargain with 
Adrian Leverkühn in Doktor Faustus – “our gift is the hour-glass” [“unsere Gabe [ist] das 
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Stundglas”].42 Such a temporality, of course, also reiterates the vital anticipation that is both 
the Faustian legacy of The Magic Mountain and the hidden, unausgesprochene temporality 
(insofar as “[es] nimmt für das Auge gar nicht ab im oberen Hohlraum, nur ganz zuletzt, da 
scheints schnell zu gehen und schnell gegangen zu sein”) that accompanies Castorp from the 
beginning of the novel. 
In the second instance, just as Heidegger calls Dasein “the possibility of [its] own 
death,” Mann clearly insists upon the identification of his hero with precisely such a 
temporality in so far as the bargain refers much less to an isolated moment in either Castorp’s 
or Leverkühn’s life but rather to the temporality of that duration that is called Dasein. As the 
possibility of his own death, Castorp is the coming towards that Heidegger calls being-
towards-death, and the process of his identification with such a temporality is obvious from 
the outset as I have already demonstrated in the example of his approach toward the Berghof. 
But the function of the hour-glass serves to reinforce this particular aspect of the temporality 
of Castorp’s Bildung. Near the end of the novel, the image of the Stundglas is recalled in 
connection with Castorp’s cigar-smoking in order to emphasize Castorp’s ultimate 
identification with his duration as being-towards-death and in such a way, I believe, to 
enforce this very important equation that links being-towards-death with the processes of 
Castorp’s Bildung and self-formation, indeed with the self as such: 
[Hans Castorp] hatte hier oben eine Marke gefunden […]: ein Fabrikat, das 
[…] mit dem versehen, man einfach wie am Meere lag und es aushalten 
konnte, -- eine besonders gut gephlegte Sandblattzigarre [...] [die] zu 
                                                          
42
 “Zeit ist das Beste und Eigentliche, das wir geben, und unsere Gabe das Stundglas, -- ist ja so fein, die Enge, 
durch die der rote Sand rinnt, so haardünn sein Gerinnsel, nimmt für das Auge gar nicht ab im oberen 
Hohlraum, nur ganz zuletzt, da scheints schnell zu gehen und schnell gegangen zu sein […]” (DF 306). 
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schneeweiβer, haltbare Asche […] daβ sie dem Genieβenden statt einer 
flieβenden Sanduhr hätte dienen können und ihm nach seinen Bedürfnissen 
auch so deinte, denn seine Taschenuhr trug er nicht mehr. Sie stand, sie war 
ihm eines Tages vom Nachtisch gefallen, und er hatte davon abgesehen, sie 
wieder in messenden Rundlauf setzen zu lassen, -- aus denselben Gründen, 
weshalb er auch auf den Besitz von Kalendern […] schon längst verzichtet 
hatte: […] dem stehenden Immer-und-Ewig zu Ehren. (DZ 1074).43 
Here we are given a very changed Hans Castorp, who at the end of the novel appears to have 
resolutely accepted time as something very much like being-towards-death when he learns to 
“measure” time by the smoking of his cigar, which he likens to watching the sand of the 
hour-glass fall away. The temporality of the Sanduhr, which is also the temporality of the 
“quicksilver cigar” called the “silent sister” [“stumme Schwester”] – a thermometer without 
figures said to measure “what time actually is” [“was eigentlich die Zeit sei”], but whose 
verdict in the novel remains unausgesprochen – is not only reiterated, but Castorp essentially 
learns that he himself is like both the Sanduhr and the “Stumme Schwester,” that he is the 
unknown that he has always already been coming-towards.44 Moreover, this temporality, we 
will remember, is foreshadowed in the opening pages of the novel, where the difference 
“zwischen ihn und seine Pflanzstätte” is quickly altered into the difference “zwischen [Heim 
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 “Hans Castorp could lie and bear it out indefinitely, as one does at the sea-shore. It was an especially well-
cured brand […] evenly consuming to a snow-white ash […] so evenly and regularly that it might have served 
the smoker for an hour-glass, and did so, at need, for he no longer carried a time-piece. His watch had fallen 
from his night-table; it did not go, and he had negkected to have it regulated, perhaps on the same grounds as 
had made him long since give up using a calendar […]. Thus he did honour to his abiding-everlasting” (MM 
708). 
44
 “[…] als ihm ganz unverhofft die ausgezeichnete Einsicht zuteil wurde, was eigentlich die Zeit sei: nämlich 
nichts anderes, als einfach eine Stumme Schwester, eine Quecksilbersäule ohne Bezifferung”/“ […] when he 
was unexpectedly vouchsafed a signal insight into the true nature of time; it proved to be nothing more or less 
than a ‘silent sister,’ a mercury column without degrees” (DZ 141)/MM 92]. 
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und Ordnung] und die Unbekannten,” a move that effectively identifies Castorp himself not 
only with the unknown, unheimliche sense of time found at the Berghof but also with that 
unknown aspect of himself, indeed with the very self toward which his Bildung will 
eventually lead him.  
Likewise, the narrator’s recollection in this passage of Castorp’s “walk by the ocean 
of time” serves merely to reinforce the recognition that Castorp belongs to time, that he is 
time [“denn du bist der Zeit”] (MM 546; emphasis mine) and that the alleged vanishing of 
time is only apparent insofar as it merely vanishes into the self of which it is made, a self, by 
the way, that is always already underway, as Heidegger would certainly describe it, toward 
its own end.45 And this is the meaning, I think, of the abiding-everlasting [“das Immer-
Ewig”] to which Castorp has devoted himself toward the end of the novel; it signals the 
hero’s “forever searching” for the eternal sleep of death, a search made manifest as a coming 
towards the self as the possibility of its own death, but at the same time it signals the infinite 
deferral of his “arrival” that is always only the possibility of Dasein’s absolute impossibility. 
That such a temporality clearly asserts itself here demands, if not merely the reader’s 
recognition, then reconciliation with the sort of temporality typically attributed to the 
Berghof – the sense of the timeless, what Ricoeur calls “the decomposition of time,” which is 
said to characterize life there. The same incongruity that characterizes the distinction 
between the timelessness of the Berghof and the temporality of the approach toward the 
Berghof is not at all unlike “[die] unangemessenen Sphären” Castorp finds himself in at the 
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 “Du gehst und gehst…du wirst von solchem Gange niemals zu rechter Zeit nach Hause zurückkehren, denn 
du bist der Zeit und sie ist dir abhanden gekommen”/ “You walk and walk – never will you come home at the 
right time, for you are of time, and time has vanished” (Zauberberg 824/Magic 546; emphasis mine). The use of 
the genitive here, “du bist der Zeit,” only emphasizes the equation that links both Castorp and Dasein with time 
as such. Time is thus not something in which they move or to which they are externally related; rather time is 
something to which they essentially belong. 
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outset of the novel as he winds his way to the magic mountain – in fact, the incongruity he 
hopes to forget when he arrives there is precisely the incongruity to which he is all along 
being introduced, that is to say, toward which he is heading, and which is the certain object 
of his Bildung. As he ventures up the mountain, he stands poised between “home and regular 
living,” where death has no place in the everydayness of his concerns, and the unknown, 
where death will rule his thoughts and thus, too, the processes of his self-formation. 
Consequently, the idea that the perception of time at the Berghof threatens to dispense 
altogether with the experience of duration is not so much the case after all. Instead, if we 
accept that Dasein itself is this duration and that the object of Castorp’s Bildung is to 
discover himself as this duration, then it is precisely an authentic duration which he finally 
encounters at the Berghof and that he is finally prepared to engage when he is thrust out of 
the gates by the outbreak of war.  
While one sort of time-perception indeed falls away, the sort “[daβ] mit dem 
Lebensgefühle selbst so nahe verwandt und verbunden ist, daβ das eine nicht geschwächt 
werden kann, ohne daβ auch das andere eine kümmerliche Beeinträchtigung erführe” (DZ 
159),46 another is given back, disclosed, and this must be the sort of time that is so closely 
bound up with the consciousness of death or the [un]known. However, as long as Castorp’s 
bourgeoning consciousness of death is contrasted to the time-sense of “Heim und Ordnung” 
and an everyday, inauthentic “consciousness of life,” the productive capacity of the former 
remains inaccessible. And it is Heidegger that helps to explain both the reason and the 
difference when he writes: “Die erzwungene Unbekümmertheit des Sorgens des Lebens um 
seinen Tod vollzieht sich in der Flucht in die welthaften Besorgnisse. Das Wegsehen vom 
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 “that is so closely bound up with the consciousness of life that the one may not be weakened without the 
other suffering a sensual impairment” (MM 104). 
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Tode ist aber doch so wenig ein Ergreifen des Lebens an ihm selbst, daβ es gerade ein 
Ausweichen des Lebens vor sich selbst und seinem Seinscharakter wird” (PA 244).47 The sort 
of time-perception that calls for a “looking [toward] death” in the midst of life mustn’t be 
associated with a lack of duration or atemporality when in fact all the vitality of the coming-
towards and Sein zum Tode can be attributed to it. Similarly, Heidegger explicitly 
distinguishes the inauthentic, measurable, calculable time of ordinary life – the time of 
“Heim and Ordnung,” which in its measuring evades death and thus, too, life itself – with the 
authentic “unangemessenen Sphären” of primordial temporality, the ontological basis of 
which is being-towards-death.  
In fact, an important moment in Castorp’s Bildung is his arrival at precisely this 
understanding as he contemplates his cousin, Joachim’s, imminent death. Here Castorp 
comes to understand, much like Heidegger, “daβ also [auf der einen Seite] zwischen uns und 
dem Tode gar keine reale Beziehung besteht und er ein Ding ist, das uns überhaupt nichts 
[…] etwas angeht, -- weshalb, denn auch alle Wesen ihm mit groβer Ruhe, Gleichgültigkeit, 
Verantwortungslosigkeit und egoistischer Unschuld, entgegenblicken” (DZ 801).48 Castorp 
not only clearly suggests a distinction between his own awakening toward an authentic 
knowledge of death, at the heart of which is his acknowledgement of its mutual entanglement 
with life, and the various ways in which others flee inauthentically (though quite necessarily 
and thus understandably, according to both Castorp and Heidegger) in the face of its 
irrevocability. He also appears to recognize his proper obligation to treat death neither with 
                                                          
47
 “The forced absence of anxiousness about death in caring for life gets actualized in the flight into world-laden 
concerns. Looking-away from death, however, is so little a seizing of life in itself that it becomes precisely 
life’s own evasion of life and an evasion of life’s proper character of being” (PA in Becoming 163).  
48
 “[that on the one hand] between death and us there is no rapport; it is something with which we have nothing 
to do […]. And that is why all living creatures can contemplate it with composure, with indifference, 
unconcern, with egoistic irresponsibility” (MM 532).  
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“Gleichgültigkeit” nor “Verantwortungslosigkeit,” but rather with an authentic and sensitive 
reverence inasmuch as it is always bound up with his continuing, which is to say, with his 
life. Moreover, there is certainly no evidence that with the crack of the Donnerschlag Castorp 
recovers his time-piece or his calendar or, for that matter, a sense of time unbound to death – 
in fact, just as the cigar evenly consumes itself toward smoke-white ash, so, too, is Castorp 
thrown toward his end at the end of the novel, consumed in the smoke-white mist of battle 
and comported toward his own death and, thus, too, toward his own impossibility. 
 For Heidegger, the coming-towards of authentic being-towards-death is an active, 
hermeneutical task “vouchsafed” [“bestimmt”] to Dasein, and well beyond the complicated 
temporality of Castorp’s “arrival” at the Berghof, indeed throughout the drawn-out process of 
Castorp’s Gewöhnung to life on the magic mountain, he is made progressively receptive to 
this task, especially with respect to his education in death and its accompanying temporality. 
We have only to consider Castorp’s disquiet, disguised as naïve laughter, in learning that the 
dead bodies are delivered from the mountain on bob sleds: “Ihre Leichen? Ach so! […] Auf 
dem Bobschlitten! Und das erzählst du mir so in aller Gemütsruhe?” (DZ 20) – in what can 
only be called a dream-wish (given both Joachim’s and Castorp’s actual fate), Castorp later 
imagines his cousin Joachim riding down the mountain on a bobsled stricken with a 
“dislocated attitude” [“sonderbare verrenkter Lage”] (an interesting picture of what 
Heidegger would call Nichtmehrdasein); or that the young hero’s first night at the Berghof 
finds him suddenly awakened to the awareness that he is already lying in his death-bed; or 
that the narrator finds it necessary to interweave with Castorp’s arrival at the Berghof rare 
but influential thoughts of death in his dream-recollection of Castorp’s parents’ and 
grandfather’s deaths (and thus, too, an even earlier prevision of Castorp’s own death): “Denn 
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es war ja nun schon das drittemal binnen so kurzer Zeit und bei so jungen Jahren, daβ der 
Tod auf den Geist und die Sinne […] des kleinen Hans Castorp wirkte” (DZ 45); or that the 
“prevailingly horizontal” [“horizontale Art” (DZ 131)] way of being at the Berghof as well as 
the early somatic symptoms of Castorp’s habituation signal that he is, in a sense, already 
dead: “Aber wenn einem das Herz nun ganz von selber klopft, grundlos und sinnlos und 
sozusagen auf eigene Hand […] wie eine toter Körper” (DZ 111); or even his recognition 
much later on in the novel that time on the magic mountain is not so much “contracted” into 
timelessness (as the critical emphasis often claims) but rather extended, especially through 
the facility of older patients to distend time forward by putting it behind them in a rush 
toward the end, where holidays, for instance, were treated as “Turngeräte, woran sich über 
leere Zwischenzeiten behende hinwegvoltigieren lieβ. Sie hatten alle Fieber, ihr Stoffumsatz 
war erhöht […] beschleunigt – es mochte am Ende wohl damit zusammenhängen, daβ sie die 
Zeit so rasch und massenhaft durchtrieben” (DZ 409); or, finally, that in the passive waiting 
condemned by Settembrini there is at the same time always an active anticipation, where, for 
instance, Castorp’s expectant waiting for the Sunday Postverteilung is described as a 
“Voraneilen” [“hurrying ahead”] and an excited “überspringen” [“leaping over”] (DZ 
364/MM 239), which is also always the coming-towards of possibility – in the case of the 
Postverteilung, this means both the possibility of Castorp’s encountering Pribislav 
Hippe/Clavdia Chauchat and of the utmost impossibility she represents, namely, death.49 
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 “‘Their bodies? Oh, I see, Imagine!’ […] ‘On bob-sleds! And you can tell it me just like that, in cold blood!’” 
(MM 9); “thus for the third time in so short a space and in such young years did death play upon the spirit and 
senses […] of the lad” (MM 26); “when the heart palpitates all by itself, without any reason, senselessly, of its 
own accord, so to speak […] like a dead body (MM 71); “vaulting-pole[s], with which to leap over empty 
intervening spaces. They all had fever, their metabolism was accelerated […] keyed up – all this perhaps 
accounted for the wholesale way they could put time behind them” (MM 270).   
  93
  It is also no coincidence that upon his “arrival” at the Berghof the young Castorp’s 
first spoken words in the novel not only defer his arrival but also point ahead toward it – 
“[B]ut I’m not there, yet” [“Ich bin aber noch nicht da”] – or that the there to which he refers, 
if we accept that the goal of his Bildung is the arrival at a mature understanding not only of 
who he is but also of the place toward which he is destined, i.e. his fate, lies in the novel’s 
repeated conflation of Castorp’s identity with the essential plot traced not so much in the 
story of time’s decomposition at the Berghof but in the truth revealed in the inescapable 
biological teleology of the x-ray – what Settembrini explicitly calls Castorp’s “identity card” 
(MM 241) [“einen Ausweis” oder “ihre Legitimation” (DZ 367)] – a clear and palpable 
expression of the object of his Bildungsreise that is and has always been underway, namely, 
the authentic encounter with his own being-towards-death (MM 222, 233, 241) “vouchsafed” 
to him as a glimpse into his own grave: 
Das spätere Geschäft der Verwesung sah er vorweggenommen durch die Kraft 
des Lichtes, das Fleisch, worin er wandelte, zersetzt, vertilgt, zu nichtigem 
Nebel gelöst, und darin das kleinlich gedrechselte Skelett seiner rechten Hand, 
um deren oberes Ringfingerglied sein Siegelring, vom Groβvater her ihm 
vermacht, Schwarz und lose schwebte: ein hartes Ding dieser Erde, womit der 
Mensch seinem Leib schmückt, der bestimmt ist, darunter wegzuschmelzen, 
so daβ es frei wird und weiter geht an ein Fleisch, das es eine Weile wieder 
tragen kann. Mit den Augen jener Tienappelschen Vorfahrin erblickte er einen 
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vertrauten Teil seines Körpers, durchschauenden, vorrausehenden Augen, und 
zum erstenmal in seinem Leben verstand er, daβ er sterben werde. (DZ 333)50 
This is arguably the correlate to the Teufelsvertrag scene in Doctor Faustus or even to the 
moment when Adrian Leverkühn willingly seals his fate by engaging his love for Esmeralda, 
the moment when Castorp, our “little” Faust, is suddenly enlightened as to the terms of the 
contract that has been inherited from his past and that had already been agreed upon at his 
birth, long before he even thought of his journey to the Berghof. It is thus no coincidence that 
Castorp’s realization in the passage recalls both his paternal ancestry and the Taufschale 
scene as well as his maternal, Tienappel “Vorfahren” or that the passage is also accompanied 
by the “awkward affection[s]” of his childhood, which is to say, by the erotic presence of 
Pribislav Hippe/Clavdia Chauchat, who follows Castorp into the x-ray room for a private 
glimpse into the future of her own being-towards.  
This scene is also arguably the most important moment in the novel with respect to its 
treatment of that unausgesprochene Zeit that Heidegger finds such a compelling “statement” 
on the nature and character of Castorp’s Bildung. It is thus because it confirms the 
temporality of death as one which is grounded in a resolute anticipation of the protagonist’s 
certain demise – “for the first time in his life he understood that he would die” [“zum 
erstenmal in seinem Leben verstand er, daβ er sterben werde”] – and it is such a growing 
resolve – “how there grows in the young man, out of the experience of […] death, […] the 
idea of man” [“wie dem jungen Mann aus dem Erlebnis von […] Tod, […] die Idee des 
                                                          
50
 “The process of decay was forestalled by the powers of the light-ray, the flesh in which he walked 
disintegrated, annihilated, dissolved in vacant mist, and there within it was the finely turned skeleton of his own 
hand, the seal ring he had inherited from his grandfather hanging loose and black on the joint of his ring-finger 
– a hard, material object, with which man adorns the body that is fated to melt away beneath it, when it passes 
on to another flesh that can wear it for yet a little while. With the eyes of his Tienappel ancestress, penetrating, 
prophetic eyes, he gazed at this familiar part of his own body, and for the first time in his life he understood that 
he would die” (MM 218-19). 
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Menschen erwächst”] – that colors the entire course of Castorp’s analytical receptiveness, his 
Bildung, throughout the novel from beginning to end despite all the meandering, otherwise 
irresolvable inquiries into the character of time as such (i.e., whether it be short or long, 
measurable or immeasurable, private or public, finite or infinite, etc.) on which so many 
traditonal analyses of modernist time in the novel focus their attention.  
It is true, of course, that Settembrini warns Castorp against the sort of morbid analysis 
prompted by the unprecedented access to the x-ray; in fact, Settembrini claims that, although 
analysis in one sense promotes the impulse to freedom and is thus “an instrument of 
enlightenment and civilization” [“ein Werkzeug der Aufklärung und Zivilisation”], it also 
may very well “belong to death” [“der Tod, zu dem sie denn doch wohl eigentlich gehören”]  
in so far as it “stands in the way of action” [“die Tat verhindert”] (MM 222/DZ 338). This 
paradox is indeed the same paradox that guides traditional readings of the novel, but what is 
typically overlooked is the way in which being-towards-death as analysis resolves the so-
called dilemma between action or duty and the mere waiting for death at the Berghof that 
Settembrini despises. For even though it may be said that Castorp’s glimpse is yet another 
milestone along the path toward his habituation into the morbid rhythms of Berghof 
existence, it is not only an active glimpse and hermeneutical resolve that characterizes the 
experience for him, but it also exposes something like a truth, which is, after all, the 
privileged virtue of both enlightenment and civilization, as Settembrini tells us. 
In this passage, death, or what is called from the very beginning of the novel das 
Unbekannte, is on its way toward becoming the known and becoming integrated into 
Castorp’s feeling for “Heim und Ordnung.” Moreover, since Castorp’s Bildung is 
synonymous with the processes of this “enlightenment” (as is the x-ray itself, which, after all, 
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is revealed precisely through the process of “enlightenment”),  and since his own death is 
clearly linked in this passage with both his past – the ring of his paternal grandfather and the 
gift of prevision inherited from his Tienappel “Vorfahrin,” whose own x-ray vision allowed 
her to see the images of the skeletons of those who were about to die [“die baldigst sterben 
sollten’] – and the future – the glimpse into his own grave [“er sah in sein eigenes Grab”] – it 
may be argued that what is forcefully revealed or exposed by this material epiphany or 
“photographic truth” (Downing) is not only being-towards-death as such but also the being-
towards that Castorp is and has always been, as well as Castorp’s emergent recognition of 
this identification or otherwise “plötzliche Klarheit” [“sudden enlightenment”] (MM 218-
19/DZ 332-3). 
Thus does Heidegger’s being-towards-death allow us to interpret Castorp’s glimpse 
into his own grave and the resolute, anticipatory knowledge that it discloses as Castorp’s 
being-towards the possibility of his own impossibility. In After Images, Eric Downing shows 
us how Castorp’s revelation in this scene serves to displace the teleology and thus, too, the 
conventional temporality of the Bildungsroman:  “The x-ray photograph […] disassociates 
both the moments of truth and death from the end point and relocates them, along with their 
joint authority, elsewhere and earlier on (and on)” (59).  While Downing’s claim is especially 
informed by Freud, Benjamin and Barthes and while he probably does not have Heidegger 
anywhere in view, his recognition certainly encourages a Heideggerian interpretation.  
Being-towards-death does indeed betray a relentless teleology toward the end, but as 
we have seen this teleology is grounded in a fundamental impossibility. Thus Bildung bis 
zum Tode can not simply be accounted for in the traditional telos of the Bildungsroman, in 
which the end “impart[s] a structure of analeptic closure to a life” (59). In fact, for 
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Heidegger, being-towards-death disperses the end in precisely the way Downing describes, 
and we have already considered plenty of examples of this dynamic in The Magic Mountain. 
With Castorp’s glimpse into his ownmost impossibility he begins to understand that he is and 
always has been his own end, the living possibility of his own death. Just as it is the sound of 
death that echoes from the Castorps’ Taufschale, Castorp here identifies himself early on 
with “the flesh in which he walked […] that is fated to melt away” and with the “hastening 
while” that he is and that could be called Mann’s would-be correlate or response to Dasein’s 
Erstreckung. The end is always already there precisely because it is always a possibility; it is 
that which Dasein is relentlessly coming-towards as itself. Thus Settembrini inquires 
awkwardly, because much too early on, whether Castorp already knows his fate (MM 57); 
and the body emerges here under the analytical flash of the x-ray and thus in all of its 
illuminated specificity as a likely answer to Castorp’s question: “Den Raum nehmen wir 
doch mit unseren Organen wahr, mit dem Gesichtssinn und dem Tastsinn. Schön. Aber 
welches ist denn unser Zeitorgan?” (DZ 103).51  Given Castorp’s fundamental identification 
with the “photographic truth” of the x-ray, the distinction between mind and body collapses 
here in such a way that exposes the body as the self and thus exposes the self or Dasein as 
being-towards-death, as being-towards the possibility of its own impossibility.  
Consequently, when Hans turns from the apparently irresolvable “subject of time” 
toward more ordinary matters, namely, the concerns of the body, he is not turning away from 
time but toward it, as the encounter with his x-ray later bears out. And it is Dasein’s 
authentic engagement with this recognition that constitutes its Bildungsweg and motivates the 
processes of its Steigerung, which, we are told by Mann, is, after all, an “alchemistic” 
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 “Space we sense with our organs, with our senses of sight and touch. Good. But which is our organ of time – 
tell me that if you can?” (MM 66). 
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process that Heidegger would certainly identify with Dasein’s coming-towards its own 
otherness, i.e. the possibility of its Nichtmehrdasein. Thus it is no surprise that the most 
salient and fundamental aspect of Heidegger’s conception of being-towards-death is exposed 
not only in Castorp’s awakening upon the occasion of his cousin’s death but also in the 
Hofrat’s confirmation of it. Where Castorp stumbles across the core wisdom of Heidegger’s 
concept, namely, that “Solange wir sind, der Tod nicht ist, und daβ, wenn der Tod ist, wir 
nicht sind” (DZ 801)52 and that as a result “unser Sterben mehr eine Angelegenheit der 
Weiterlebenden, als unserer selbst” (DZ 801),53 the Hofrat reminds us that this amounts to a 
hermeneutical slippage precisely because death is something “we do not experience” [man 
erlebt ihn nicht] (MM 537/DZ 809), even though, as Heidegger points out, it is one of the few 
experiences that authentically belongs to us in the first place: “Das Sterben […] wesenhaft 
und unvertretbar das meine ist” (SZ 336-7). 54  Thus, both Castorp and the Hofrat Behrens 
would appear to mark both the deferral and ultimate negation that death is, but also, and 
perhaps even more importantly, the Heideggerian recognition that insofar as death is always 
more of a concern for the living, the living are thus always along the way toward it, or better, 
that life is being-towards-death, just as Heidegger knows that Dasein is for the end, but its 
end is not for it (Stiegler).   
We are also told that only the dead are timeless and thus bear witness to another 
attempt by Mann to equate life itself, and consequently something like Dasein or being-there, 
with time as such. Again, the question of atemporality and of a “life without time,” or even 
whether Castorp’s Bildung issues in action, is made more complicated precisely because of 
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 “So long as we are, death is not; and when death is present, we are not” (MM 532). 
53
 “a man’s dying is more the survivors’ affair than his own” (MM 532). 
54
 “Dying […] is essentially mine in such a way that no one can be my representative” (BT 297). 
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this reconfiguration, in which time as such emerges as the primary object of the protagonist’s 
active interest and pursuit. With the combined strength of these revelations it is revealed that 
the impossibility of time can only coincide with the impossibility of the self, which is 
anticipated all along, not only in being-towards-death as being the possibility of the 
impossibility of Dasein, but also in the decompositional strategies of the x-ray, which 
likewise serve to emphasize the possibility of Castorp’s death. Consequently, for Mann time 
occupies the same privileged position as the self in conventional and classic examples of the 
Bildungsroman genre, and this helps to clarify, too, not only Heidegger’s insistence on 
Dasein as a function of time but also Mann’s innovative reconfiguration of Bildung in The 
Magic Mountain. 
Likewise, the famous ending of the novel also reasserts the temporality of being-
towards-death, especially in so far as it is, as Heidegger aptly puts it, “eine Ende ohne Ende.” 
Castorp’s death is so clearly anticipated that the matter is considered resolved in Mann 
scholarship, although he does not technically speaking die at all; his is a purely rhetorical 
death and the only sort of death narrative is capable of providing: “Lebewohl, Hans Castorp, 
des Lebens treuherziges Sorgenkind! Deine Geschichte ist aus. Zu ende haben wir sie erzählt; 
sie war weder kurzweilig noch langweilig […]” (DZ 1085).55 It is here that Castorp emerges 
as the seeker, the eternal quester and Faust figure that is the foundation of the Bildungsroman 
as a novel of adventure, but the ending of the novel emphasizes not so much the epic but 
rather the temporal aspect of the adventure novel as Zeitroman (in the Heideggerian sense). 
The seeker indeed passes through his encounter with death and disease while at the Berghof 
and emerges with a new knowledge of its affinity with life, but not merely to dispense with 
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“Farewell, honest Hans Castorp, farewell, Life’s delicate child! [Echo?] Your tale is told. We have told it to 
the end, and it was neither short nor long […]” (MM 715).   
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it, but rather to relate this knowledge of having passed through with that toward which he is 
still heading when the novel ends, or put another way, that for the sake of which he has 
passed through. And it is thus certainly not an escape from the abstract timelessness of life up 
above to a measured, healthy time of action and duty down below, but rather an escape from 
death to death and one filled with the sort of open-ended anticipation that perfectly describes 
his coming-towards his most extreme impossibility: “und die uns bestimmen könnte, zart mit 
der Fingerspitze den Augenwinkel zu tupfen bei dem Gedanken, daβ wir dich weder sehen 
noch hören werden in Zukunft” (DZ 1085).56 Despite the ironic and incredulous 
sentimentality of the narrator, nowhere else does the novel more clearly conflate the limits of 
the possibilities of both life and narrative and thus, too, emphasize the temporality of being-
towards-death both in and as narrative, which, after all, it was Mann’s goal from the outset in 
structuring the equation between the form and content of the novel. 
The problem of the timeless, then, or better yet the well-known conflict between time 
and eternity that constitutes the familiar polarities of his Bildungsfrage, emerges as a 
derivative of our reckoning, both Mann’s and Castorp’s reckoning, with the question of what 
it means to be in time, which is also to say, what it means to be-towards-death. Consequently, 
the substance of the novel’s treatment of time lies not so much in how quickly or slowly time 
appears to move for those up above or those down below but rather, as both Heidegger and 
Mann would have it, in that “for the sake of which” time appears to move at all: death. 
* 
So far I have attempted to establish the correspondence between Heidegger’s  
description of death “as a possibility of life,” and thus, too, as a fundamental being-towards 
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 “which could even lead us to press a finger delicately to our eyes at the thought that we shall see you no 
more, hear you no more for ever” (MM 716). 
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that not only dominates Dasein’s essential temporality but that also may be identified with 
Dasein’s Erstreckung between birth and death – indeed, with Dasein itself – and Mann’s 
portrayal of Castorp’s Bildung in The Magic Mountain as something very much like his own 
being-towards just such a recognition. Nevertheless, if I have shown how being-towards-
death as a temporality of possibility stands opposed to what has been called the threat of 
atemporality and stagnation that is typically associated with the sort of time lived out on the 
magic mountain, we mustn’t forget that for Heidegger death is always the possibility of an 
impossibility, and though I have been obliged to touch upon the nature of this insistence 
above, I have yet to elaborate the fullness of its character or the nature of its significance for 
alternative readings of time and death in The Magic Mountain. I have demonstrated, for 
instance, how Castorp’s authentic “hurrying ahead” toward death suggests a resolute and 
aniticipatory Dasein coming-towards the possibility of its uttermost impossibility – its death, 
the moment of its passing over into Nichtmehrdasein or no-longer-being-there, but 
Heidegger’s evaluation of being-towards-death as being-towards-an-impossibility resonates 
with Mann’s narrative in other compelling ways, all of which serve to illuminate the 
character and nature of what has been called the “dilemma of closure” in The Magic 
Mountain. Consequently, being-towards-death as being-towards-an-impossibility must be 
viewed as a critical aspect not only of Heidegger’s modernist reformulation of time and the 
subject but also of Mann’s modernist reconfiguration of the Bildungsroman. Suffice it to say 
that in as much as being-towards-death is positively expressed in the teleology of The Magic 
Mountain’s Bildung bis zum Tode, there is a subtractive quality to its telos, a negative 
certainty and value that insinuates itself upon and completes the necessary ‘circularity’ of 
this tragic insight. 
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As I showed earlier Castorp’s struggle to achieve closure is introduced as soon as the 
novel begins when his arrival at the Berghof is deferred by his paradoxical insistence that he 
is not yet there, and it is reiterated again in what Heidegger’s calls the novel’s “Ende ohne 
Ende.” But this not yet does more than simply bookend the novel; in fact, it is dispersed back 
over the course of the narrative in much the same way that Dasein’s end – what is for it the 
absolute impossibility of itself – is displaced and redistributed back over the course of 
Dasein’s life in such a way, Heidegger claims, that Dasein is the living possibility of its own 
death. 
The dilemma of closure in The Magic Mountain is reconfirmed very soon after 
Castorp’s arrival when the narrator relates the story of young Castorp’s experience at his 
grandfather’s wake, which serves mainly both to obscure and defer rather than settle the 
meaning of death for him and to further emphasize the problem of closure and of endings, 
more generally. As a result, Castorp’s encounter with his grandfather’s corpse is a milestone 
on the path toward his recognition of death as both a possibility and impossibility – indeed, a 
(im)possibility that both belongs to him and that he is – and thus it lies at the core of the 
novel’s Bildungsweg. What the narrator calls the dual aspect of death that haunts Castorp’s 
dream and that is signaled in Castorp’s reflections upon his grandfather’s corpse – “Es hatte 
mit dem Tod eine fromme, sinnige und traurig schöne […] and zugleich eine ganz andere, 
geradezu gegenteilige, sehr körperlich […] die man weder als schön, noch als sinnig, noch 
also fromm, noch auch nur als traurig eigentlich ansprechen konnte” (DZ 46)57 – involves 
what Heidegger would call the inherent hermeneutic slippage that occurs upon encountering 
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 “[O]ne aspect of death was possessed of a certain mournful beauty. In another it was […] precisely the 
opposite, it was very physical […] [and] could not possibly be called either holy, pensive, or beautiful” (MM 
27). 
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another’s death. As Heidegger explains it, death is first and foremost my death, and Dasein 
never is the Other: “den Anderen bin ich nie” (BZ 115/ BZ in Becoming 206).  
Castorp contends that the corpse of his grandfather (which will become as the novel 
progresses a repetitive image for Castorp himself) stands in for what was once his flesh-and-
blood grandfather. Regarding the substance of the corpse, Castorp marvels at the “face and 
hands of what had been [his] Grandfather” [“des ehemaligens Groβvaters” (MM 27/DZ 47); 
emphasis mine). The illusion is a trick played by death, and properly integrating and 
interpreting it is portrayed as among the first serious challenges of Castorp’s Gewöhnung, 
which this scene certainly reminds us has already begun long before Castorp’s “arrival” on 
the magic mountain. But this challenge is not so much, as it is often understood to be, a 
contest between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, between the aesthetic and the physical or 
vital, but rather the challenge involves the confirmation of their inextricability. Thus it is in 
the veiling of death that the corpse manages to confirm death. The corpse, after all, is the 
artistic representation of the grandfather, linked as it is with his portrait, and it essentially 
refers, according to the narrator, to the realm of substance, to an utter materiality void of 
spirit, and only to it – “He who lay there – or, more correctly, that which lay there – was not 
Grandfather himself, but a shell [of his former Grandfather]” [“Der da lag, oder richtiger: 
was da lag, war also nicht der Groβvater selbst, sondern eine Hülle [des ehemaligen 
Groβvaters]”] (MM 27/DZ 47). Consequently, the question of the grandfather’s authenticity, 
indeed of his very possibility, is what disturbs Castorp “in the depth of his being” [“[im] 
Grund seines Wesens”]: 
und auch da nur flüchtig gesehen hatte, konnte er, wie wir sagten, nicht 
umhin, dies seine bildhafte Erscheinung als seine eigentliche und wirkliche zu 
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empfinden und in dem Groβvater des Alltags sozusagen einen Interims-
Groβvater, einen behelfsweise und nur unvollkommen angepaβten zu 
erblicken. [….] [D]as Ergebnis aber, vor das er sich im Saale gestellt fand, 
lieβ sich dahin zusammenfassen, daβ der Groβvater der Interimsanpassung 
nun feierlich überhoben und in seine eigentliche und angemessene Gestalt 
endgültig eingekehrt war […] (DZ 43-4).58  
On the one hand, the artistic aspect that veils the physical, lowly side of death suggests an 
eternal, authentic grandfather frozen in the greatness of a perspective, continually suggestive 
of the authentic possibility of the grandfather; on the other hand, such authenticity serves to 
remind one only of that which once was the grandfather but is no longer, or put differently, 
the nothingness the grandfather is, his having been, the authentic impossibility of the 
grandfather, as Heidegger would have it. As a result of Castorp’s identification with his 
grandfather’s corpse/portrait, we see him simultaneously engaged with the question of his 
own authenticity, which is of course also to say, with the possibility of his own impossibility.   
Castorp’s other encounters with death in the novel not only reinforce the certainty of 
death as an impossibility that belongs to Castorp and toward which he is always already 
destined, but these encounters also perfectly underscore Heidegger’s description of the way 
in which an inauthentic Dasein interprets and evades death in its ordinary, everyday life and 
thus, too, the way in which its life is always comported towards death as an impossibility:  
Der Tod begegnet in der Alltäglichkeit täglich. Wir erfahren ihn, wissen um 
das Sterben, das aus-der-Welt-gehen des Menschen in einer gewissen 
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 “But he could not help feeling that this presentment [i.e. the portrait] was the genuine, the authentic 
grandfather, and the everyday one merely subsidiary, not entirely conformable – a sort of interim grandfather, 
as it were. [….] Thus he was glad from his heart that it should be the authentic, the perfect grandfather [i.e. the 
corpse] who lay there resplendent on that day when he came to take last leave of him” (MM 25-6). 
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Gleichgültigkeit als etwas, das uns vielleicht auch einmal treffen kann. In 
dieser Gleichgültigkeit liegt ein Moment des sich selbst Abddrängens vom 
Tode. Das Dasein weicht dem Tode aus, es schiebt ihn als Möglichkeit weg. 
[….] Die Alltäglichkeit sucht dies unbestimmte Gewiβheit abzudrängen. Sie 
rechnet mit dem, was dem Dasein noch bleibt. Sie drängt die Unbestimmtheit 
in die Verschiebung, und die Gewiβheit in ein Nicht-daran-denken. [….] In 
diesem Fliehen vor dem Tode zeigt sich gerade sein Da-sein. Im Wovor des 
Fliehens zeigt sich der Tod. (DF 167)59 
Closely connected to these observations, and in order to further demonstrate that the 
distinction between a time up above at the Berghof and a time down below in the flatland is 
not as determinate as it is often assumed to be, we have only to consider the observations of 
Paul Ricoeur or Dorritt Cohn, for instance, both of whom recognize that even those at the 
Berghof, including Castorp, have creative (and dutiful) ways of marking the passage of time, 
a behavior and capacity associated throughout the novel with the time-sense that prevails in 
the flatland.60 As Heidegger shows us, these creative ways of marking time’s passage at the 
Berghof amount squarely to an avoidance of death’s sympathy with life. Like Dasein, who in 
its “inauthentic way of standing-before-death” simultaneously evades it [“Das uneigentliche 
Vor-dem-Tod-stehen ist also das Ausweichen”], the inhabitants of the Berghof involve 
themselves daily in creatively and actively excluding and deferring death, even as their entire 
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 “Death is encountered daily in everydayness. We experience it and know, in a rather indifferent way, that 
dying is a human being’s departure from this world that can perhaps even affect us one day. In this indifference 
lies the moment of our pushing death aside. Here Dasein evades death and pushes it aside as a possibility. [….] 
Everydayness seeks to thrust aside this indefinite certainty. It underscores all that still remains for Dasein. It 
pushes the indefiniteness of death away into the state of postponement and suppresses its certainty in an attitude 
of ‘not thinking about it’ [….] It is precisely in this flight from death that the being-there […] of death shows 
itself. Death shows itself in the from-which of our fleeing”” (DF in Becoming 264). 
60
 See Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2 and Cohn, “Telling Timelessness” in Casebook, Vaget, ed., 2008. 
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being, like Dasein’s, is also caught up in “waiting” for it. In their fascination with death they, 
too, Castorp learns , both wait for it and escape it, clean up after it and replace it. When early 
on Castorp asks his cousin Joachim whether many patients had died during the latter’s time 
at the Berghof, his cousin answers:  
‘Mehrere sicher,’ […] ‘Aber sie werden diskret behandelt, verstehst du, man 
erfährt nichts davon oder nur gelegentlich, später, es geht im strengsten 
Geheimnis vor sich, wenn einer stirbt, aus Rücksicht auf die Patienten und 
namentlich auch auf die Damen, die sonst leicht Zufälle bekämen. Wenn 
neben dir jemand stirbt, das merkst du gar nicht. Und der Sarg wird in aller 
Frühe gebracht, wenn du noch schläfst, und abgeholt wird der Betreffende 
auch nur solchen Zeiten, zum Beispiel während des Essens.’ (DZ 83)61  
Important, here, is the way in which a culture so thoroughly associated with death in 
traditional readings of the novel rather clearly attempts to have nothing to do with death. For 
most of the inhabitants at the Berghof (Castorp is the most poignant exception), death is 
precisely the comic figure Mann describes it as (see Letters to Ponten) – it comes down 
mountains on bobsleds, and gives the ladies quite a shock, and takes place while others are 
eating, etc. The authenticity of Castorp’s character and development lies precisely here in the 
distinction between his emergent understanding of authentic death as the possibility of his 
very own impossibility and the inauthentic obsession with it that characterizes the attitudes 
and determines the routine of the cure for the bulk of the Berghof’s inhabitants, including 
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 “‘Several, certainly’ […] ‘But they are very discretely managed, you understand; you hear nothing of them, 
or only by chance afterwards; everything is kept strictly private when there is a death, out of regard for the other 
patients, especially the ladies, who might easily get a shock. You don’t notice it, even when somebody dies next 
door. The coffin is brought out very early in the morning, while you are asleep, and the person in question is 
fetched away at a suitable time too – for instance, while we are eating’” (MM 53). 
  107
Joachim, namely, those who willfully exclude death from their lives and for whom it is ‘gar 
nicht’ etwas that should impose upon their routine.  
Such flight, like its opposite – one’s resolute anticipation of one’s own death – is for 
Heidegger always a matter of interpretation. In fleeing from death Dasein interprets death as 
somehow hostile to life, and it is in this way that readings of The Magic Mountain that 
oppose the atmosphere of death at the Berghof with a life-affirming atmosphere in the world 
down below in their own way also flee from the authentic possibilities called for in the 
novel’s treatment of the subject – possibilities, moreover, as I have shown, of which Mann 
and Heidegger were acutely aware. As Mann put it earlier, it is only through death that the 
highest possibilities of life are made available to his hero: “[Der Zauberberg] zeigt, wie dem 
jungen Mann aus dem Erlebnis von Krankheit, Tod, Verwesung die Idee des Menschen 
erwächst, des “Hochgebilds” organischen Leben.” Likewise, as we have already seen, 
Heidegger, too, embraces the productive weight of this correspondence: “Das Wegsehen vom 
Tode ist aber doch so wenig ein Ergreifen des Lebens an ihm selbst, daβ es gerade ein 
Ausweichen des Lebens vor sich selbst und seinem Seinscharakter wird” (PA 244).62 
Castorp’s question to Joachim that provoked the response above – “[H]ave there been 
many deaths since you came?” [“Sind sonst schon viele Todesfälle vorgekommen, seit du 
hier oben bist?”](MM 53/DZ 83) – is precipitated by the knowledge that his room was made 
conveniently available by a “case” that had just passed away before his arrival. As is the case 
with the ring of his grandfather’s that he now wears, the clear suggestion (one which 
Castorp’s Bildung will certify as time goes on) is that he has simply replaced the Dasein 
which had been there before him and that he, too, will one day be replaced – Castorp will one 
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 “Looking-away from death, however, is so little a seizing of life in itself that it becomes precisely life’s own 
evasion of life and an evasion of life’s proper character of being” (PA in Becoming 163).  
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day be forced to hand over the ring, so to speak, “so daβ es frei wird und weiter geht an ein 
Fleisch, das es eine Weile wieder tragen kann.” In fact, the litany of names and histories 
shared with Castorp by his grandfather around the family Taufschale and obviously meant to 
sweep him up into the thrownness that he is, into the being-towards of both his heritage and 
his destiny, like his emotional reaction to this newly acquired insight regarding the “case” 
before him, betrays the temporal and, and thus, too, authentic nature of his recognition: “ein 
schon erprobtes Gefühl kam ihn an, die sonderbare, halb träumerisch, halb beängstigende 
Empfindung eines zugleich Ziehenden und Stehenden, eines wechselnden Bleibens, das 
Wiederkehr und schwindelige Einerleiheit war” (DZ 40).63 And perhaps it goes without 
saying that such a temporality betrays nothing like a “Life without time” but rather a forceful 
and irrevocable coming-towards in the Heideggerian sense of the term.   
For the most part, the interpretive measures taken by Dasein upon encountering 
another’s death facilitate an inauthentic looking-away (in so far as this death is not mine); on 
the other hand, these encounters prepare the ground, so to speak, for a more authentic 
understanding of death’s imminent relation to life, and such is the case with Hans Castorp, 
and in my opinion, at the very heart of his Bildung in the matters of time and self. This 
fleeing, for both Mann and Heidegger, conceals a more authentic understanding of the 
meaning of time and death in the novel. For instance, having told Castorp of the way death is 
covered up for the benefit of the other patients, Joachim explains to the new arrival of the one 
time he had a glimpse “behind the scenes”  [“Hinter den Kulissen”] of this staged avoidance 
(MM53/DZ 83). Such language clearly anticipates the analytical depth of the x-ray into which 
Castorp reads his own death and suggests precisely what I think Heidegger can bring to a 
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 “A familiar feeling pervaded the child: a strange, dreamy, troubling sense: of change in the midst of duration, 
of time as both flowing and persisting, of recurrence in continuity” (MM 23). 
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rereading of time and death in the novel, namely, that “behind the scenes” at the Berghof, 
scenes which typically dictate conventional readings of death in the novel, there moves eine 
unausgesprochene Zeit, an unexpectedly authentic background and depth to the supposed 
atemporality and stagnation of life there, an authentic life behind the veil that comports itself 
toward death as the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.     
Of course, the impossibility which Dasein is and toward which it is headed as itself is 
closely connected to what has been called the crisis of narrative closure in The Magic 
Mountain. The impossibility that Dasein confronts in attempting to identify with the death of 
others and the concomitant impossibility of experiencing its own death meaningfully 
resonates with Mann’s own recognition of the impossibility of narrating the end and of thus 
bringing the story of Castorp’s “life” to a close. For Heidegger death is precisely that which 
cannot be told through because it is “in each case mine”: “Darum vermag das Dasein der 
Anderen nicht Dasein im eigentlichen Sinne zu ersetzen, wenn anders die Jeweiligkeit als 
meinige festgehalten werden soll. Das Dasein des Anderen habe ich nie in der ursprünglichen 
Weise, der einzig angemessenen Art des Habens von Dasein: den Anderen bin ich nie” (BZ 
115).64 It is, after all, Castorp’s story, and this specificity is key to understanding 
conventional readings of both The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus since it may be the 
singularity of Castorp’s and Leverkühn’s characterization that authenticates their redemption 
or at least undermines the traditional way of condemning them.  
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 “the Da-sein of others cannot substitute for Da-sein in its proper sense, if in any case its particular whileness 
as in each instance mine is to be maintained. I never have the Da-sein of the other in an original way […]: I 
never am the other” (Becoming 115). In the next section of this chapter (and even moreso in the fourth chapter) 
I elaborate the relation Heidegger establishes between the whileness that belongs to Dasein (and is in such a 
way that Dasein is this whileness) and the problem of Dasein’s ever encountering itself as a whole. The problem 
of closure suggested by this comparison not only explains the “waiting” that takes place at the Berghof and thus 
informs my reading of Castorp’s authentic recognition in The Magic Mountain, but it also and even more 
convincingly characterizes the problem of the temporality of the strenger Satz in Doctor Faustus (see Becoming 
262-3). 
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 As a result, the most striking examples of Castorp’s authentic confrontation with 
death as impossibility in the novel bring us around full circle, once more to the moment when 
Castorp is “vouchsafed” a glimpse which “it is not permitted for man to see” – thus 
“[Castorp] looked into his own grave” (MM 218) and once more to the novel’s end, where 
the full weight of this significance is finally gathered. That it is his own grave into which he 
stares is precisely what is ontologically prohibited – an impossibility, I would argue, that it is 
precisely the point of his Bildung to confirm. Hans Castorp’s seeing through is always also a 
seeing-toward; moreover, it is a seeing toward an impossibility, in this case, the literal 
impossibility of experiencing death at all, for as Heidegger so aptly insists, “Wie aber soll 
dieses Seiende in seinem Sein erkannt werden, bevor es zu seinem Ende gekommen ist? Bin 
ich doch mit meinem Dasein immer noch unterwegs. Es ist immer noch etwas, was noch 
nicht zuende ist. Am Ende, wenn es soweit ist, ist es gerade nicht mehr. Vor diesem Ende ise 
es nie eigentlich, was es sein kann; und ist es das, dann ist es nicht mehr” (BZ 115).65 And 
this is precisely what is meant by the dilemma of closure in The Magic Mountain and what 
the ending of the novel recapitulates, where both the narrator and our hero dissolve away at 
the moment of truth/revelation.  
That which Castorp is headed towards is neither the timelessness of the Berghof nor 
the time of the flatland but the temporality viciously concealed by both – if in the novel those 
down below are ignorant of it, those up above flee more consciously in the face of it. It is the 
authenticity of a time marked not by divisions but only by the finitude that, according to 
Heidegger, is in each case mine – this is an indivisible, unmarked time characterized not by 
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 “Yet how is this entity to be known in its be-ing before it has come to an end? After all, I am always still 
under way with my Dasein. It is still always something that is not yet finished, at an end. In the end, if it really 
has gone that far, it is no more. Before this end, it never really, properly, is what it can be; and when it is that, 
then it is no more” (Becoming 206). 
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contraction, stagnation or timelessness but by a clear and strongly felt being-towards 
described in the novel as a passing, running, and flowing onward [“verfloβ,” “verrann,” 
“strömte…immer fort”] (MM 541/DZ 816). In the end, and given the narrator’s casual 
dismissal of his hero and tale, readers are encouraged to ask themselves how Castorp’s death 
can, in fact, be narrated at all: “We even confess that it is without great concern we leave the 
question open” [“Ehrlich gestanden, lassen wir ziemlich unbekümmert die Frage offen”] 
(MM 716/DZ 1085), for isn’t such a task clearly the possibility of an impossibility in the 
sense intended by Heidegger. Thus the narrator of The Magic Mountain allows his hero to 
disappear into the mist to experience his death, however and whenever it may come, on his 
own.  
 
Doctor Faustus 
 
I have said that the trajectory which takes us from The Magic Mountain to Doctor 
Faustus is one that leads toward a progressively more-felt and conspicuously Heideggerian 
recognition. In this final chapter section I argue that the ontological status of death, as I claim 
it is disclosed in The Magic Mountain as a sort of coincidental literary correlate to 
Heidegger’s fundamentally paradoxical conception of death as at once “a possibility of life” 
[“eine Möglichkeit des Lebens”] and “a possibility of the impossibility of Dasein” [“eine 
Möglichkeit der […] Daseinsunmöglichkeit”], is reconfirmed with even more urgency in 
Doctor Faustus.  The connection(s) that bind the novels in a formidable kinship have been 
elaborated – if The Magic Mountain is about the beginning of an idea of the end in Thomas 
Mann, and so also an idea of impossibility, then Doctor Faustus is at least about the 
confirmation of this idea insofar as it is about the end of modernism, the end of art, and the 
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end of an idea of Germany, too, all of which are cast in and through the narrative of Adrian 
Leverkühn’s life and death as it is narrated by his lifelong friend, Serenus Zeitblom.  
Whereas it was necessary in the first sections of the chapter, for the sake of clarity 
and classification, to carefully distinguish between being-towards-death as, on the one hand, 
the ontological source of life’s possibilities, and, on the other hand, as yet absolutely heir to 
an ultimate impossibility toward which life or Dasein is always teleologically oriented 
(consequently, we described the temporality of Hans Castorp’s Bildung on the magic 
mountain as one in which the protagonist’s richest possibilities lay in his progressive self-
awareness that he himself is this coming-towards his own eventual impossibility), their 
inextricability has been dutifully established, and in the analysis of Doctor Faustus that 
follows they will be properly dealt with in terms of their natural proximity. Thus we will 
continue where we left off with The Magic Mountain, at the question of how these 
possibilities have their basis in an utter impossibility, and it will be the point of this section 
not only to trace the various ways in which an atmosphere of impossibility shrouds the entire 
surface of the novel and thus begs the question(s) I undertake to answer in the analysis that 
follows, but also to explain just how Doctor Faustus represents the temporality of this 
impossibility and how Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death can help to illuminate the 
urgency of such a representation. 
Toward this end I will first situate my analysis within the fold of contemporary 
critical readings of the novel (e.g. Susan von Rohr Scaff’s ‘dilemma of closure’ and Evelyn 
Cobley’s ‘infinite semiosis’) and within the context of more or less contemporary critical 
engagements with the sorts of problems introduced in the novel (e.g. Frank Kermode’s The 
Sense of an Ending) with respect to the intersecting questions of narrative, temporality and 
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impossibility. Secondly, I respond to and elaborate these arguments by bringing Heidegger’s 
notion of being-towards-death as Dasein’s being-towards “die Möglichkeit der […] 
Daseinsunmöglichkeit” [“the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein”] to bear upon the 
interpretation and analysis of several key temporalities in the novel: the temporality of  the 
infamous Teufelsvertrag and of the strenger Satz, the temporality of Adrian’s evolution 
toward his final composition, The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus, and, finally, the temporality 
of its inspiration in the “moment” of Echo. 
For both Mann and Heidegger one is always more or less proximate to the end, and 
this proximity not only begs the comparison but also determines the authenticity of Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world just as it determines narrative meaning in The Magic Mountain and 
Doctor Faustus. Because Doctor Faustus is situated even closer to this end, both imagined 
and real, it may be said that the significance of being-towards-death and the problem of 
closure that accompanies it is even more relevant to readings of the later novel, where the 
question of closure, which is also to say, the question of endings, is thematized in a way that 
moves well beyond (though still very much in the same direction) what was merely a 
leitmotif in The Magic Mountain. One can plainly see that what is aptly sustained as an 
approach toward an idea of endings in The Magic Mountain finally arrives only with the 
publication of Doctor Faustus. One almost needn’t repeat, for instance, Mann’s famous 
explanation, most notably in his 1948 letter to Karl Kerényi, but also scattered elsewhere 
throughout the author’s correspondence about the “central idea”[“vorgetragenen Werk-Idee”] 
(Story III.30/Entstehung III.31) or the “fundamental motif” [“Grundmotiv”] (Story 
VI.64/Entstehung VI.60) of the novel, that Doctor Faustus, just as The Magic Mountain 
proposed to be that which it is about – a novel about time – is first and foremost “ein Buch 
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des Endes” [“a Book of the End”] (Briefe 12/9/1948) – a book which both is and is about the 
problem of the end and endings. As we have already seen, however, to come to the end, 
according to both Mann and Heidegger, is rarely the same as arriving in the sense of having 
finished. 
 Even in Doctor Faustus the idea of the end is still infused with the dynamism of 
something like what Heidegger calls Dasein’s being-towards [Zukommen]. The being-
towards of the novel is built into and everywhere apparent in the narrative itself, especially 
inasmuch as Doctor Faustus is an even more transparently Faustian narrative, in which the 
essential content of the story involves the revelation or exposure of a public and private 
anxiety surrounding the anticipation of a bargain and a fate that is always already known. In 
the following passage from The Story of a Novel, Mann describes the shifting and 
accelerating temporality of the novel following Adrian’s infamous meeting with the Devil, 
and in it he clearly conflates the coming-towards of history with the coming-towards of the 
narrative he is involved in writing as well as the coming-towards of the fate of his protagonist 
that it is the task of his composition to elaborate:   
Damals entstanden die Partien des Romans, welche, die zeitliche Ebene 
wechselnd, die vormalige Katastrophe Deutschlands mit der schrecklicher 
heranwachsenden  kontrapunktierend, das Schicksals des Helden und anderer 
Bewohner des Buches […] weitertreiben […], [und] das Gefühl des Endes in 
jedem Sinn accelerando heraufzubeschwören und im Grunden mit jedem Wort 
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auf Leverkühns entscheidendes und repräsentatives Werk, das apokalyptische 
Oratorium hinstreben. (Entstehung 117)66  
If we accept what we have already established with respect to The Magic Mountain and 
Heidegger’s insistence on being-towards-the-end as Dasein’s coming-towards the possibility 
of its own impossibility, then latent in Mann’s description of this narrative expectation in the 
novel is the clear suggestion of the same temporality, one in which the feeling of the end, the 
impossibility prefigured by it, is made manifest in the coming-towards it, the impossible fate 
toward which the novel “heranwachsenden [und] weitertreiben [und] hinstreben.” This 
distinctly Heideggerian reading of the above passage is neither forced nor can it any longer 
be merely coincidental, but rather it is confirmed everywhere in Mann’s own intuition of the 
novel’s deepest symbolic implications. 
Such implications clearly lie somewhere in the novel’s complex and symbolic 
network of contradictions – consider the possibility of a “Buch des Endes” that proposes to 
account for a devastating history in which “[i]n Wahrheit endete nichts, sondern ein 
unaufhaltsamer Prozeβ […] Weltveränderung, der von einem Menschenalter begonnen hatte, 
rollte abenteuerträchtig ohne wirkliche Unterbrechung weiter” (Entstehung 118),67 or the 
possibility of the fate of a protagonist whom the author finds it “mysteriously forbidden” and 
“impossible” [“unmöglich”] to describe – “Wie leicht wäre das gewesen! Und wie 
geheimnisvoll unzulässig, in einem noch nie erfahrenen Sinn unmöglich war es doch wieder! 
                                                          
66
 “During this period I was at work on those parts of the novel where the temporal plane is forever being 
shifted, so that the downfall of Germany is counterpointed by the catastrophe that draws ever and more 
balefully closer. I was also pushing forward the fate of the hero and other inhabitants of the book [….] to 
conjure up accelerando the feeling of the end in every sense. Fundamentally, every word in them guides the 
mind toward Leverkühn’s decisive and representative work, the apocalyptic oratorio” (Story 131). 
67
 “In reality, nothing ended; rather, an inexorable process […], which had begun throughout the world a 
generation before, rolled on without any actual interruption, pregnant as ever with fantastic possibilities” (Story 
133). 
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Unmöglich auf andere Art, als es die Selbstbeschreibung Zeitbloms gewesen ware. Ein 
Verbot war hier einzuhalten – oder doch dem Gebot gröβter Zurückhaltung zu gehorchen bei 
einer äuβeren Verlebendigung, die sofort den seelischen Fall und seine Symbolwürde, sein 
Repräsentanz mit Herabsetzung, Banalisierung bedrohte” (Entstehung 81)”68 – and, of 
course, most famously, the possibility of an art working itself out at the very edge of its own 
impossibility as the narrator Zeitblom claims – “Ja, Bewunderung und Traurigkeit gingen 
beim Anschauen dieser Musik ganz eigentümlich ineinander [….] als indem ich sie ein nie 
entspanntes und spannend halsbrecherisches Spielen der Kunst am Rand der Unmöglichkeit 
nenne (Faustus 293).69  
Doctor Faustus places life and existence itself, what Heidegger calls Dasein, under 
the harrow of impossibility, and insofar as I claim Dasein is disclosed in the coming-towards 
of history, narrative and in the coming-towards of Adrian Leverkühn’s fate, so, too, is this 
coming-towards linked with fundamental prohibitions that make Dasein what it is, namely, 
the possibility of its own impossibility. Just as for Heidegger, where Dasein’s authentic 
possibilities are said to lie in its utmost impossibility, the fates of Adrian Leverkühn, modern 
art, and post-war Germany are intimately linked up with the question of their own 
impossibility. As such, the very theme of impossibility and the temporality that accompanies 
it is as much engaged by Mann’s novel as it is in Heidegger’s philosophical conception of 
being-towards-death. 
                                                          
68
 “How easily that could have been done! And yet how mysteriously forbidden it was, how impossible, in a 
way that I had never felt before! Impossible in a different sense from the impossibility of Zeitblom describing 
himself. Here there was a prohibition to be kept – or, at any rate, a commandment of maximum restraint. To 
depict Adrian’s outer appearance was instantly to threaten him with spiritual downfall, to undermine his 
symbolic dignity, to diminish and render banal his representativeness” (Story 89). 
69
 “Yes, in the contemplation of this music, admiration and sadness mingled in the most peculiar way […] – 
which I do not know how to characterize other other than to call it an unrelenting, tense, breakneck game played 
by art at the very edge of impossibility. And that was what made one sad. But admiration and sadness, 
admiration and worry, is not that almost […] love?” (Faustus 233). 
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* 
Two well-known illustrations of the critical debate over the question or problem of 
closure in Doctor Faustus are Evelyn Cobley’s “Closure and Infinite Semiosis in Mann’s 
Doctor Faustus […]” (1989) and Susan von Rohr Scaff’s chapter from Myth and Music: 
Thomas Mann’s Timely Fiction (1998) entitled “Unending Apocalypse: The Crisis of 
Musical Narrative in Doctor Faustus.” 70 Of these only the latter makes the question of time 
as such central to a discussion of the problem of closure, and so even though both will serve 
as references as I describe the nature and significance of this so-called dilemma in the novel, 
it is Scaff’s analysis of the crisis of musical narrative that will form the primary basis of my 
analysis in the final section of this chapter.  
According to Scaff, the crisis of musical narrative in Doctor Faustus is symbolic of a 
broader historical crisis in which a sense of time essential to human progress has been 
overwhelmed by a more threatening atmosphere of historical stasis and impossibility: 
In the contemporary “Faustian” era music has declined to stasis, and Mann 
hopes that the striving musician may reinstate the sense of time that is the 
foundation of narrative, music, and life itself. In fact, the salvation of 
modernity rests symbolically upon the composer’s disengagement from a 
spatializing tendency and return to the age-old art of storytelling. (67) 
In the novel this spatializing tendency clearly points to the culmination of musical stasis in 
the “strict,” twelve-tone style of Adrian Leverkühn’s Apocalypsis cum figuris and to the 
historical impasse at which Germany had arrived by the mid-1940s. According to Scaff, 
though the Devil offers Adrian the gift of narrative time, it is ultimately life-negating, and the 
                                                          
70
 Scaff’s chapter appeared originally in Germanic Review 65 (1990): 30-9.  
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Devil does not follow through with his part of the bargain but rather allows Adrian to become 
mired in the static objectivity and repetitive atemporality of the Apocalypse oratorio. And 
any recovery from this crisis will require a recovery of narrative possibility, or more 
specifically, the recovery of a sense of time upon which narrative depends. Accordingly, 
Scaff explains, although Adrian’s Apocalypse oratorio leaves the reader with the feeling that 
“there will be no more new stories for the civilized world to tell,” his final effort, The 
Lamentation of Dr. Faustus “delivers humankind from an apocalyptic state of mind and […] 
ushers in new times” (Scaff 70). Thus, Scaff claims, it is up to Adrian himself, in the 
Lamentation, to “burst the devil’s snares and tell a tragic story through to its end” (Scaff 79), 
and as Zeitblom tells us, in fact, in the Lamentation Adrian for the first time manages to 
generate from the strict formalism of the piece an emotional intensity and life-affirming 
narrative time that reanimates and escapes the atemporality of the musical form and thus, 
according to Scaff, moves history forward again by reinstating the life-force of narrative 
form and possibility (88).  
For Scaff, even though this dilemma is apparently less urgent in the earlier novel, the 
proposed resolutions in both novels amount to the same thing. For instance, just as she reads 
Castorp’s fate as unproblematically resolving the well-known conflict between time and 
timelessness in The Magic Mountain – the recovery of a sense of time upon which narrative 
depends, the time of history with “a beginning and end” and in which “there is always 
something going on, and every moment has a certain meaning” [“so daβ immer was los ist 
und jeder Augenblick einen gewissen Sinn bekommt”] (MM 114/DZ 175) enables Castorp’s 
self-renewal and is restored to Castorp when he is set free from the spell of his seven year 
sojourn on the mountain and reenters history – Adrian and Germany are delivered from their 
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Teufelsvertrag in very much the same way, according to Scaff, and Mann successfully brings 
his novel to a close.  
Yet Scaff admits that her redemptive reading may in fact be countered by the novel 
itself. In the final section of her chapter on Doctor Faustus entitled “The Dilemma of 
Closure” she mentions in particular the way in which Leverkühn’s almost certain damnation 
may in fact preclude the glory of his sacrifice and, perhaps even more convincingly, the way 
in which the formal, thematic and narrative structure of the novel, insofar as it is bound to 
multiple cycles of inescapable doublings and repetitions, would seem to reinforce the 
“eternal crisis” of time and history and “lock itself into the fateful circularity” of the 
Apocalypse oratorio (91). 
Scaff’s ultimate ambivalence with respect to the severity of this historical “crisis” is 
confirmed by Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending, in which modern individuals are 
said to endure under the myth of “eternal transition, perpetual crisis” that has modern 
civilization literally “suspended in fear” (Scaff 69; Kermode [101]93-124). Following 
Kermode and Peter Brooks, among others, Scaff claims that the cultural apprehension 
precipitated by this myth of “intemporal agony” is ultimately mediated by the closure of the 
text: “[…] it is the conclusion that provides meaning. The end point offers a retrospective 
glance over all that has gone before and transforms a random series into a pattern” (Scaff 76). 
More importantly, perhaps, is the human effort required to counter the threat of this modern 
myth: “plot is the […] ‘active shaping force, the product of our refusal to allow temporality 
to be meaningless, our stubborn insistence on making meaning in the world and in our lives’” 
(qtd. in Scaff 76).  
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Despite Kermode’s and Brooks’s insistence that literary endings comprise the very 
hope guaranteed by endings, they also point squarely to a “lack of confidence” in real 
endings and thus posit both as distinctly modern anxieties about time itself: “In Kermode’s 
terminology [modern individuals] comprehend their historical crisis as a stage of revelation 
that is formally a transition to catastrophe but in reality an endless waiting” (Scaff 69). While 
it is customary to cite Kermode’s faith in narrative endings to interrupt and assuage the 
“endless waiting” of modernity, one shouldn’t overlook the fact that for Kermode narrative 
closure is always a catachresis, a metaphor or Ersatz ending, that is grounded in what is 
fundamentally Dasein’s constant relation to death – “Men fear it, and as far as we can see 
have always done so; the End is a figure for their own deaths. (So, too, perhaps are all ends in 
fiction […])” (7) – a relation that is based as much in the tragic certainty of human finitude as 
it is in the infinite deferral of this certainty. The end, according to Heidegger, and as we shall 
see, according to Mann, too, is precisely that which cannot be “told through.” It is that 
impossibility only the edge of which may be encountered. And though Scaff clearly 
recognizes the character and implications of this tragic deferral at the ground of modern 
experience, rather than solving the dilemma of closure her theory of narrative time, indeed 
narrative time itself, actually constitutes and reiterates it. 
Following Zeitblom’s own interpretation of The Lamentation, Evelyn Cobley 
explains how the possibility of narrative closure paradoxically opens up experience to 
something like an infinite signification or what she calls “a liberation from all constraints” 
and thus only reinforces its own impossibility:  
In ‘The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus,’ […] the formal organization has thus 
become so totalized that there are neither free notes nor unthematic elements; 
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nothing accidental, incidental, or contingent is tolerated so that everything 
spontaneous has been thoroughly repressed by a calculated rational pattern. 
Paradoxically, though, this rigidly controlled and highly artificial form allows 
for the most spontaneous outcry of human suffering and despair. Leverkühn’s 
lament represents a return to the most elemental human expression, the 
primitive and barbaric state of howling from which culture is meant to have 
liberated humanity through the imposition of form and order. The effect of 
Leverkühn’s extreme semiotic closure is thus a liberation from all constraints. 
(353) 
Scaff explains this paradoxical result as the consequence of Adrian’s deeply felt love for his 
nephew, Echo, and the suffering felt by Adrian at the child’s premature death: “The 
difference [between the Apocalypse and the Lamentation] is that [in the latter] Leverkühn is 
moved by love. Without the inspiration of love, Leverkühn would never have been able to 
transmit deep feeling in dodecaphonic music or in any other style” (88). To help explain how 
an unconstrained love is able to grow from a formalism that systematically prohibits it, 
Cobley goes on to describe the dialectical nature of a semiotics of narrative closure by which 
“an extreme semiotic closure generates an unconstrained proliferation of the excluded other” 
(354). Thus, on the one hand, along with Scaff, Cobley agrees that insofar as in The 
Lamentation Adrian comes to terms with his profound love for Echo and the even more 
profound loss his death represents, Adrian’s lament and the sort of pre-musical “spontaneous 
outcry of human suffering and despair” it signifies escapes the burden of “form and order” 
the strenger Satz would otherwise demand. On the other hand, where Scaff sees in Adrian’s 
lament the overcoming of the strict limitations of the strenger Satz and, consequently, too, 
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the promise of narrative closure, Cobley clearly associates narrative as such not with the 
possibility of closure but rather with an “unconstrained” signification or disclosure. In fact, 
that Adrian knows this, or better, that a large part of his own Bildung involves the coming 
toward precisely this acknowledgement, seems to be communicated not only in the formal 
expressivity of the Lamentation but even more strongly in his description of his own unique, 
and decidedly modern, path to salvation put forward during his conversation with the Devil, 
where Adrian imagines: “‘A sinfulness so hopeless that it allows its man fundamentally to 
despair of hope is the true theological path to salvation’” [“‘Eine Sündhaftigkeit so heillos, 
daβ sie ihren Mann von Grund aus am Heile verzweifeln läβt, ist der wahrhaft theologische 
Weg zum Heil’”] (DF 262/332).  
Heidegger’s conception of being-towards-death as Dasein’s being-towards the 
possibility of its own impossibility helps to reconcile or at least explain the temporality of 
this apparent impasse represented in the readings of Scaff, Cobley and Kermode, where the 
question remains how the impossibilities described and enforced by the strenger Satz are able 
to give way to the possibilities that Adrian’s final monumental effort is thought to unleash. 
Scaff is certainly not wrong in her recognition that at stake in The Magic Mountain is at least 
in part this contest between the life-affirming teleology of narrative time and the death-wish 
of a timeless waiting, which corresponds quite readily with the sort of worlds sanctioned, 
respectively, by the flatland and by the Berghof. And if it is fair to say that the latter time-
perspective is “suspect” [“verdächtig”] in The Magic Mountain, then it is, on the surface, at 
least, outright charged in Doctor Faustus. And if anything is in dispute it is certainly not the 
significance of the end or of the problem of narrative closure; rather, as was the case for The 
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Magic Mountain, it is the temporality of the end and of the promise of closure, i.e. the 
temporality of impossibility, that calls out for reconsideration. 
* 
If we accept the link that binds Adrian’s musical Bildung to his eventual fate, then the 
temporality of that Bildung can be found where that fate is once and for all confirmed in the 
novel – in Adrian’s conversation with the Devil. It is often overlooked, for instance, that time 
is both the subject and object of the Devil’s infamous conversation with Adrian Leverkühn. 
The Teufelsvertrag is in this sense also very much a Zeitvertrag, and as I have shown, this is 
in keeping with a Faustian temporality, more generally speaking, whatever version the reader 
has in view. Moreover, the function of time in the novel demonstrates that the sort of time 
thrust upon Adrian is the authentic temporality that his music seeks to represent. It is here at 
the very literal center of the novel that the relationship between time, death and the end of 
art, and thus, too, that the character of the so-called ‘dilemma of closure’ in the novel is 
situated or “displaced,” as Downing might emphasize, away from the end of the novel and 
reoriented toward the end.  
When Adrian’s mocking arrogance begins to wear on the patience of his dark visitor, 
the Devil interrupts him and reminds Adrian of the true reason for the unexpected visit: 
Zeit ist das Beste und Eigentliche, das wir geben, und unsere Gabe das Stundglas, -- 
ist ja so fein, die Enge, durch die der rote Sand rinnt, so haardünn sein Gerinnsel, 
nimmt für das Auge gar nicht ab im oberen Hohlraum, nur ganz zuletzt, da scheints 
schnell zu gehen und schnell gegangen zu sein, -- aber das ist so lange hin, bei der 
Enge, daβ es der Rede und des Darandenkens nicht wert ist. Nur eben daβ das 
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Stundglas gestellt ist, der Sand immerhin zu rinnen begonnen hat, darüber wollt ich 
mich gern mit dir, mein Lieber, verständigen [….] 
   Ist alles eine Sache der Reife und der lieben Zeit. Eben darüber möcht ich ja mit 
dir reden. (DF 306)71 
According to Scaff, what the Devil gives to Adrian is the “gift of time” (79): “Well 
before Leverkühn writes the Apocalypse, the devil proffers release from the hopelessness that 
engenders such despairing art. To the artist struggling to narrate humanity’s joys and sorrows 
Sammael offers the ground of story-telling, time itself” (75). Scaff here is merely reiterating 
her analysis of the temporal problem exposed by and in The Magic Mountain, where 
narrative (and, consequently, history as well) is said to organize time in such a way as to 
provide its infinite “flowing, […] succession […], [its] one thing after another” with 
significance and determinate meaning within the confines of a narrative whole that first and 
foremost admits the possibility of closure (qtd. in Scaff 67; MM 541). However, although the 
Devil does indeed offer something like “the ground of story-telling, time itself” – such a time 
is probably not meant to assuage the “hopelessness of a despairing art” or to revitalize a 
nonnarrative universe; rather, as I will argue, such a time is meant to confirm that the 
temporality of the ground of narrative lies in the possibility of its own impossibility, 
including the impossibility of closure.  
In the passage above, for example, what the Devil gives is again that familiar 
symbolic relic from The Death in Venice and The Magic Mountain: the Stundglas. The 
                                                          
71
 “‘Time is what is real, the best we give, and our gift is the hour-glass – indeed ‘tis subtly narrow, that bottle 
neck through which the red sand runs, so hairlike its trickle that the eye beholds no diminishment in the upper 
chamber, and only at the very end does it appear to go fast and fast be gone. But that is yet so distant, what with 
the narrowness, that it deserves nor mention nor thought. Simply that the hour-glass has been turned, that the 
sand has begun to run – about that would I come to an understanding with you, dear boy [….] 
   […] It is all a matter of ripeness and sweet time. And for that reason would I speak with you” (DF 243; 
emphasis mine). 
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difference is that here the Stundglas is much more than a symbol or metaphor; rather it is 
passed off as a matter of fact. The language itself, in fact, testifies to an important distinction 
between narrative time and an eigentliche Zeit: the deceptive drama of the hour-glass sand in 
its development from a “hairlike” trickle to a quickening completion, rendered poetically in 
the passage above, is purely derivative of the ontological and thus more primary truth of its 
having been turned, which is rendered much more matter-of-factly at the end of the passage 
and is forcefully suggested as the real matter about which the Devil has come to speak with 
Adrian. Thus the sort of time described by the Devil in the passage above is precisely not 
bound to narrative but rather to something more fundamental and primary than narrative or 
so-called historical time. The high-flying time of genius that Adrian is promised, the passage 
of which “ist ja so fein, die Enge, durch die der rote Sand rinnt, so haardünn sein Gerinnsel, 
nimmt für das Auge gar nicht ab im oberen Hohlraum,” is always countered by the fact of the 
contract’s finite terms expressed not so much in the terms themselves, which call for Adrian 
to sacrifice love and life, but in his being-towards those terms, his very literal coming-to-
term, so to speak.  
The Sanduhr passage from Chapter XXV demonstrates the critical nature of the sort 
of impossibility about which the Devil has come to remind Adrian, and it provides an 
excellent example of what Heidegger means when he claims that Dasein, in authentically 
acknowledging itself as being-towards-death, also acknowledges itself as the possibility of an 
utter impossibility. Just as Hofrat Behrens provided Hans Castorp the opportunity of looking 
into his own grave, the Devil’s appointed task is to enlighten Adrian as to the nature of the 
time he has been given. Like Castorp, then, Adrian is provided a glimpse into his 
fundamental predicament, which it would ordinarily not be “vouchsafed” for him to see: 
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“[es] nimmt für das Auge gar nicht ab im oberen Hohlraum.” Insofar as the hour-glass has 
been turned, the terms of the bargain and, thus, too, Adrian’s inevitable death, are not only 
confirmed and predicted at this moment in the novel, but even more importantly, Adrian’s 
dying is said to be already underway: “Nur eben daβ das Stundglas gestellt ist, der Sand 
immerhin zu rinnen begonnen hat, darüber wollt ich mich gern mit dir, mein Lieber, 
verständigen.” In this way, Adrian, like Dasein, is revealed as something quite like being-
towards-death, as being the coming-towards his own impossibility, an impossibility, 
moreover, which it is not only in every sense forbidden for Dasein to see but even, as 
Heidegger insists and as the Devil more subtly manages to suggest, it is also prohibited to 
interpret in the midst of life – “[Der Tod, das Ende] ist so lange hin, bei der Enge, daβ es der 
Rede und des Darandenkens nicht wert ist” – or to experience at the moment of its 
occurrence – “nur ganz zuletzt, da scheints schnell zu gehen und schnell gegangen zu sein.”  
It is in this way that the temporality of the Sanduhr prepares the ground for an idea of 
impossibility toward which not only Adrian but also modern narrative, art and Germany are 
always already headed in the novel. In other words, that the Sanduhr schon gestellt ist both 
unleashes the possibilities of Adrian’s future Durchbruch even as it certifies Adrian’s 
already having been delivered over to his own death, which is also to say, even as it 
describes his coming-towards the possibility of his own impossibility.  
The contact here between the themes of time, suffering, and the end of art is anything 
but coincidental. In fact, where Scaff would contend that the reinvocation of narrative time 
redeems Adrian Leverkühn, the Devil is clear on one point: to understand Adrian’s 
predicament the reader must first concede the specificity of the historical moment being 
described in which such a time is precisely what is fundamentally prohibited. Indeed, as it 
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stands in the novel fiction is no longer possible: “Zulässig ist allein noch der nicht fictive, der 
nicht verspielte, der unverstellte und unverklärte Ausdruck des Leides in seinem realen 
Augenblick. Seine Ohnmacht und Not sind so angewachsen, daβ kein scheinhaftes Spiel 
damit mehr erlaubt ist” (DF 323).72 Time, too, the Devil insists, is what is real. It is in this 
sense that it is precisely not narrative time which is given but rather a time that is “not 
fictitious, not a game,” a plot which does not seek to mitigate eternal transitions but to narrate 
these transitions directly. In short, as the Sanduhr analogy suggests, what is a game “[ist] die 
Enge, durch die der rote Sand rinnt, so haardünn sein Gerinnsel, nimmt für das Auge gar 
nicht ab im oberen Hohlraum, nur ganz zuletzt, da scheints schnell zu gehen und schnell 
gegangen zu sein”; what isn’t a game at all is the irrevocable fact that the Stundglas “[schon] 
gestellt ist.”  
Not only does this distinction remind us of Heidegger’s distinction between an 
inauthenticity which backs away from this fundamental recognition and an authentic being-
towards-death which takes over the possibilities that are released by the prohibition itself, but 
one could also argue that Heidegger’s conception of authentic being-towards-death 
corresponds precisely with what the Devil says it is the distinct provenance of modern art to 
comprehend: the “unfeigned and untransfigured expression of suffering in its real moment.” 
Of course, just as Heidegger’s being-towards-death belongs to no moment per se but rather to 
the very literal stretching-along [Erstreckung] that Dasein always already is, so, too, for 
Mann the “real moment” of suffering belongs to the course of life itself, the fundamental 
teleology of which, along with the telos of modern art, narrative and history, involves a 
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 “Only what is not fictitious, not a game, is still permissible – the unfeigned and untransfigured expression of 
suffering in its real moment. For suffering’s impotence and affliction have swelled till illusion’s games can no 
longer be endured” (DF 256). 
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process of clarification whose closest kin is death: “Freilich ist diese Klärung etwas dem 
Tode sehr Nahes oder auch erst nach ihm sich Vollziehendes. Leben ist Pein, und nur solange 
wir leiden, leben wir” (Enstehung 128).73 Consequently, while the authenticity of 
Dasein/Adrian may be measured by the degree to which they admit themselves as the 
coming-towards their own impossibility, the authenticity of modern art is to be measured by 
the degree to which it records the circumstances of its own untergehen [“going under”]. 
  It can be argued that it is only in terms of the temporality disclosed in the moment of 
the pact that the temporality of Adrian’s most important musical compositions can be fully 
elaborated. Consequently, before we analyze the temporality of Adrian’s music and the 
impossibilities it stages and presents, we will continue our interpretation of the Faustian 
terms of Adrian’s bargain and, thus, too, the ultimate suggestiveness of the “gift” of the 
Stundglas. The goal, of course, will be to show that Adrian’s redemption in The Lamentation 
of Dr. Faustus, which Scaff sees as the promise of closure in the text, is certification not of 
the possibility of closure but of its impossibility, and that the path toward this recognition 
begins with the Devil’s insight, not with Zeitblom’s – for now it is sufficient to note that the 
fundamental prohibitions contained in the terms of the contract are those to which the 
Apocalypse oratorio and the Lamentation are creative musical responses and stagings. The 
Devil’s description of the End and of “Hell’s horrid hole” reiterates this dynamic: 
Mit Symbolis, mein Güter, muβ man sich durchaus begnügen, wenn man von 
der Höllen spricht, denn dort hört alles auf, -- nicht nur das anzeigende Wort, 
sondern überhaupt alles, -- dies ist sogar […] was der Neukömmling dort 
zuerst erfährt, und was er zunächst mit seinen sozusagen gesunden Sinnen gar 
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 “To be sure, this clarification is something very close to death, or comes about only after it. Life is pain, and 
we live only as long as we suffer” (Story 144). 
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nicht fassen kann und nicht verstehen will […] weil es unglaublich ist, 
unglaublich zum Kreideweiβwerden, unglaublich, obgleich es einem gleich 
zur Begrüβung in bündig nachdrücklichster Form eröffnet wird, daβ ‘hier alles 
aufhört’, jedes Erbarmen, jede Gnade, jede Schonung, jede letzte Spur von 
Rücksicht auf den beschwörend ungläubigen Einwand ‘Das könnt und könnt 
ihr doch mit einer Seele nicht tun’: es wird getan, es geschieht, und zwar ohne 
von Worte zur Rechenschaft gezogen zu werden, im schalldichten Kellar, tief 
unter Gottes Gehört, und zwar in Ewigkeit. Nein, es ist schlecht davon reden, 
es liegt abseits und auβerhalb der Sprache, diese hat nichts damit zu tun, hat 
kein Verhältnis dazu, weshalb sie auch nie recht weiβ, welche Zeitform sie 
darauf anwenden soll und sich aus Not mit dem Futurum behilft, wie es ja 
heiβt: ‘Da wird sein Heulen und Zähneklappern’. Gut, das sind ein paar 
Wortlaute […] aber eben doch nur schwache Symbole und ohne rechte 
Beziehung zu dem, was ‘sein wird’ – rechenschaftslos, in Vergessenheit, 
zwischen dicken Mauern. [….] Darum, zu deiner Beruhigung sei es gesagt, 
wird dir denn auch die Hölle nichts wesentlich Neues, -- nur das mehr oder 
weniger Gewohnte, und mit Stolz Gewohnte, zu bieten haben. Sie ist im 
Grunde nur eine Fortsetzung des extravaganten Daseins. (DF 329-31)74  
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“One  must, my good man, be entirely content with symbolis when one speaks of hell, for there all things 
cease – not only the signifying word, but everything altogether – that is, indeed […] what the newcomer first 
experiences and what he at first cannot grasp […] because it is unbelievable, so unbelievable that it turns a man 
chalk-white, unbelievable, although in the very greeting upon arrival it is revealed in a concise and most 
forcible form that ‘here all things cease,’ every mercy, every grace, every forbearance, every last trace of 
consideration for the beseeching, unbelieving objection: ‘You cannot, you really cannot do that with a soul’ – 
but it is done, it happens, and without a word of accountability, in the sound-tight cellar, deep below God’s 
hearing, and indeed for all eternity. No, it is bootless to speak of it, for it lies apart from and outside language, 
which has nothing to do with it, has no relation to it, and that is also why language never rightly knows which 
tense to apply to it and makes shift perforce with the future, for as it is said: ‘There shall be wailing and 
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This long passage affords us the opportunity to recall in more detail its significance 
alongside the trajectory I have described that leads from The Magic Mountain to Doctor 
Faustus.  Just as The Magic Mountain was a time-novel or a novel of time in the double 
sense that it both belonged to time and proposed to be a novel about time, Mann calls Doctor 
Faustus a book of endings, which may, of course, also be read in this double sense of being 
on the one hand a novel about endings and on the other hand a book which itself belongs to 
the end. This affinity between an ontology of time and one of endings is precisely the crux of 
what makes Mann’s and Heidegger’s treatment of the subject so critical to a revised and 
updated evaluation of a late modernism’s understanding of time, which it is after all the 
overarching goal of my project to illuminate. Simply put, the shift from a focus on time to a 
focus on the end is much less a shift away from a preoccupation with time than it is a 
progressive coming toward a tragic idea of time as the end, and in this case, in particular, an 
idea of time as being-towards-death.   
Consider the heightened awareness (since The Magic Mountain) of the nature of 
endings described in the above passage, in which both the finality of no-longer being-there as 
well as the policy of deferral so critical to an understanding of Heideggerian finitude and 
being-towards-death are powerfully emphasized and reinforced. On the one hand, in the end 
toward which Adrian, and not just Adrian, is headed “all things cease – not only the 
signifying word, but everything altogether – that is, indeed […] what the newcomer first 
experiences and what he at first cannot grasp […].” This emphatic end, of course, resolutely 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
gnashing of teeth.’ Good, those are a few quoted words […], but for all that, mere weak symbols and with no 
real connexion to what ‘shall be’ – unaccountable, in oblivion, between thick walls. [….] Therefore, to your 
consolation, let it be said that hell will have nothing essentially new to offer you – only that to which you are 
more or less customed, proudly customed. In its fundament it is merely a continuation of your extravagant 
existence” (DF 262).  
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includes Adrian himself, or, as Heidegger would certainly maintain, it describes the radical 
impossibility of Adrian as such. On the other hand, such an idea of the end signals other 
impossibilities, including the impossibility of the end itself. As in Heidegger, the end 
proffered by Mann’s Devil cannot be expressed in language; it is essential to it that it is 
precisely what cannot be “told through.” Just as Dasein is always out ahead of itself in 
coming towards its end, an end which it can never know, the Devil claims “it is bootless to 
speak of it” – insofar as mankind is to speak of the end at all, he must always refer to it in the 
tense to which it belongs, namely, the future tense. Consequently, Adrian emerges out of this 
correspondence, if not with the knowledge, then at least having been warned not only that he 
is his own coming-towards this end in which he and “everything altogether” will cease – he 
is the possibility of his own impossibility – but also that this end is not for him. Instead, its 
arrival and judgment will offer no insight, so Adrian is left with the awkward and perplexing 
consolation that the end “will have nothing essentially new to offer you – only that to which 
you are more or less customed, proudly customed. In its fundament it is merely a 
continuation of your extravagant existence.”     
Perhaps it is no surprise that the Devil’s pronouncements on the character and nature 
of death and the afterlife, which is also to say, the fatal consequences of the blood-pact, 
refigure the subject as it is imagined in Goethe’s version of the myth; accordingly, and more 
specifically, the Devil in Doctor Faustus singles out time as the basis of the pact. According 
to Mann’s 1938 essay on Goethe’s Faust, “[Faust und Mephistopheles] reden einander 
vorbei, zeitlich und auch moralisch. Der Bund wird auf der Grunde verschiedenartige 
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Vorstellungen geschlossen […]” (GW.IX.1960. 611).75 Elaborating the “temporal” and thus, 
too, as both Heidegger and Mann would likely argue, the “moral” aspect of this 
misunderstanding, is precisely the essential distinction and innovation of Mann’s re-vision of 
the Faust myth and yet another justification for calling the novel, like The Magic Mountain, a 
modernist Zeitroman.  
Whereas Goethe’s Mephisto inhabits the afterlife of the popular and primitive 
imagination and calls for Faust’s eternal service there, Faust represents the incredulous 
scientific spirit of modern man unconvinced by metaphysical notions of the afterlife and thus, 
too, naively fearless of Mephisto’s warning – Heidegger, of course, describes this incredulity 
in terms of Dasein’s backing away in flight from the truth of this possibility, the possibility, 
remember, of its own impossibility. Like Goethe’s Faust, Adrian Leverkühn “verschreibt sich 
dem Teufel aus demselben menschlich hohen Streben, dem Wissenschaft, Geist, Erkenntnis 
nicht Genüge tun konnten; mit derselben unbedingten und niemals zu sättigenden 
Leidenschaft, die ihn am Denken und Wissen verzweifeln lieβ, wird er sich dem Genuβ 
ergeben […]” (GF 611)76 and with no thought toward the implications of its terms, which he 
arrogantly takes for granted, namely, that he will die. Both Faust’s and Adrian’s attitude 
toward the seemingly primitive terms of the contract is characterized by an ironic 
condescension and contempt:  
Schon der Blut-Pakt, den Mephistopheles, weil er eben in Gottes Namen 
wirklich der Teufel ist, doch notwending braucht, ist Fausten so widrig wie 
                                                          
75
 “Neither [Faust nor Mephisto] understands the other – either temporally or morally. The bargain is struck on 
the basis of two different conceptions” (Essays 31, Trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter). 
76
  “makes his pact with the devil out of the same high and human aspiration that mind, science, knowledge had 
been unable to satisfy; with the same absolute and insatiable passion that made him despair of thought he gives 
himself to pleasure” (Essays 31). 
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altvertraut, er nennt ihn verächtlich eine ‘Fratze’. Was braucht es der 
abergläubischen Floskel und Formalität der Blut-Unterschrift? Da es doch ein 
haltendes und haltbares Versprechen nicht gibt im Fluten des Geschehens, 
wenn auch der edle Mensch festhalten möchte an dem Wahn der Treue. (GF 
610)77 
Like Faust’s Mephistopheles, Mann’s Devil is interested in precisely that which does not 
interest Faust or Adrian: the end, or more to the point, their end. For Goethe, Mann claims, 
“[Mephistopheles] speaks of the hereafter as an actuality in the popular mind and his own 
[…]. But Faust answers him as a humanist and earth-bound human spirit, who does not 
believe in a hereafter, or at least is not interested in one” (30); and, indeed, at the end of 
Faust’s second part Faust’s ascenscion to heaven confirms such a conception; it is, after all, a 
place in which they “find themselves” after the pact has run its course: 
  Ich will mich hier zu deinem Dienst verbinden 
Auf deinen Wink nicht rasten und nicht ruhn: 
Wenn wir uns drüben wiederfinden, 
Dann sollst Du mir das Gleiche tun (qtd. in Essays 30)78 
The important difference lies precisely in the nature of the temporality of this end, the 
temporality of the “hereafter.” Mann’s Devil not only describes a very different “hereafter” 
but insists throughout the dialogue from beginning to end on its being precisely the reason 
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 The blood-pact – vital to Mephisto because after all, he really is the Devil – Faust knows about that, too, it is 
as familiar as [it is] repulsive to him; he refers to the pact with contempt, as a piece of tomfoolery. Why must 
they have such a superstitious flourish as the signature in blood, when after all, in the eternal flux of things, 
there can be no such thing as a binding promise, however much a high-minded man would wish to cling to the 
delusion of truth?” (Essays 30). 
78
 Here I bind myself unto your service, 
      Ever at your beck and call to be; 
      When we find ourselves in the hereafter, 
      Then you shall do the same for me. (Essays 30) 
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for his visit: “‘darüber wollt ich mich gern mit dir, mein Lieber, verständigen [….] [e]ben 
darüber möcht ich ja mit dir reden’” (DF 306).79 For Mann, it would appear, the Devil is 
even more forcefully and resolutely a spirit of negation -- his description of the end negates 
not only Adrian but himself, too; it is, after all, “where all things cease.” And he criticizes 
Adrian’s faith in an afterlife as a derivative illusion that belongs to a vulgar, earthly sense of 
time (DF 260). In Mann’s modernist version of the tale, not only have both secular and 
theological considerations of the true nature of the before and after of death appear to have 
become fused in such a way as to suggest their ontological basis in a temporality of 
impossibility like that described by the Devil in the passage above, but it is also the Devil’s 
recognition and clarification of Goethe’s original “temporal” misunderstanding, one brought 
to Mann’s attention under the pressures and vicissitudes of history, that rather explicitly 
echoes Heideggerian conceptions of temporality and being-towards-death as being towards 
the possibility of an impossibililty.  
In fact, it is fair to say that what distinguishes the entire dialogue in Doktor Faustus is 
precisely this temporality of impossibility as well as the detailed discourse that surrounds it. 
The elaboration of what Mann calls Mephisto’s and Faust’s misunderstanding with respect to 
time and its moral aspect, which Goethe left unexplored, or at least subtly concealed,  is 
exactly that which is highlighted and made a leitmotif in Doctor Faustus. As the Devil says 
to Adrian: “Daβ wir zum Ende und zum Beschluβ kommen, wird dir genehm sein. [….] 
Kurzum, zwischen uns braucht’s keinen vierigen Wegschied im Spesser Wald und keine 
Zirkel. Wir sind im Vertrage und im Geschäft, -- mit deinem Blut hast du’s bezeugt und dich 
gegen uns versprochen und bist auf uns getauft – dieser mein Besuch gilt nur der 
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 “‘about that would I come to an understanding with you, dear boy [….] And for that reason would I speak 
with you’” (DF 243). 
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Konfirmation” (DF 333).80 Given the running commentary on the nature of the end and of 
endings that makes up the bulk of the conversation between him and Adrian, the way in 
which the Devil concludes the whole affair is at the very least suggestive insofar as in 
“com[ing] to an end” the Fiend not only brings his conversation with Adrian to a conclusion, 
but he also demands agreement with and acknowledgment of, regardless of Adrian’s 
willingness to grant it, the clearly ontological (and biological) truth of the promise involved, 
namely, that Adrian will end when the Zeitvertrag has come to term. 
Yet the promise of closure is the promise of an impossibility with which Adrian and 
Dasein are not just merely related but rather identified. The problem of closure is at the same 
time the problem of Adrian, and his promise lies before him, so to speak; it only magnifies 
what he always has been and thus, too, already is: “‘Darum, zu deiner Beruhigung sei es 
gesagt, wird dir denn auch die Hölle nichts wesentlich Neues, -- nur das mehr oder weniger 
Gewohnte, und mit Stolz Gewohnte, zu bieten haben. Sie ist im Grunde nur eine Fortsetzung 
des extravaganten Daseins.’”81 In this way, Mann insists, along with his Devil and in strict 
opposition to Goethe’s Faust, that there are indeed such things as “binding promises” – long 
before the conversation with the Devil, Adrian had already made the promise, which lives 
itself out in his body, in the “soft, silent” industry of the disease, which works continuously 
away at and toward its morbid task and goal well beneath the surface of Adrian’s public life 
and persona. Consequently, Adrian’s very continuation, and the creative, productive 
possibilities for which this continuation allows, remain bound to the course of his disease, to 
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 “That we come to an end and a conclusion is surely agreeable to you. [….] In short, betwixt us there need be 
no four crossway in the Spesser Forest and no circles. We are in league and in business – with your blood you 
have certified it and promised yourself to us and are baptized ours – this visit of mine is intended merely for 
confirmation” (DF 264). 
81
 “Therefore, to your consolation, let it be said that hell will have nothing essentially new to offer you – only 
that to which you are more or less customed, proudly customed. In its fundament it is merely a continuation of 
your extravagant existence.”  
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Adrian’s so-called Illumination – Adrian’s unrelenting biological march toward death, which 
is to say, toward his very own impossibility. Thus, as the Devil pointed out earlier, what it is 
important for Adrian to know is not so much the certainty of what is, after all, the most 
certain even as it is at the same time the least available, namely, that Adrian will cease to be 
when the terms of the bargain are up, but rather only that the “sand has begun to run,” the 
Stundglas “gestellt ist,” the fate or Illumination, which Adrian essentially is, is already 
underway.  
* 
For Heidegger the problem of closure and deferral, which for Kermode is restricted to 
the surface area of modern history as a primarily psychological and theological phenomenon, 
reaches deep into what Heidegger calls the primordial finitude of Dasein’s existence, or 
being-towards-death. It is no surprise, then, that the chapter of Being and Time that focuses 
most explicitly on the phenomenon of being-towards-death also takes up the question of the 
possibility of Dasein’s being-a-whole. Heidegger, of course, would argue that the dynamics 
of closure are among the basic expressions of the temporality of being and the very ground of 
what he understands as tragic experience (Gover). According to Heidegger, it is not in time 
that we suffer but rather as time. Consequently, whether narrative or static time make or 
unmake the possibility of closure is not the question so much as whether the end both makes 
and unmakes the possibility of time, which is also to say, the possibility of Dasein.  
Death, Heidegger says, is that which both wholly belongs to the individual as its 
ownmost possibility and which is at the same time never possessed: “Das Erreichen der 
Gänze des Daseins im Tode ist zugleich Verlust des Seins des Da. Der Übergang zum 
Nichtmehrdasein hebt das Dasein gerade aus der Möglichkeit, diesen Übergang zu erfahren 
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und als erfahrenen zu verstehen” (SZ 316).82 This is precisely why language cannot articulate 
the ‘es wird’ and why the Devil urges Adrian not to dwell on the end but rather upon the 
truth of the temporality suggested by it, namely, his being-towards-the-end or the fact that the 
sand has already begun to run into the bottom chamber. As we shall also see, when Dasein’s 
utmost possibility is its being thrust toward an end it can never know, the problem of closure 
transcends and at the same time subsumes the merely narrative or historical. Thus whether 
we are dealing with the endless waiting of the strict style or the graceful transitions of 
narrative time we are always dealing with an ontology of endings and with a strict policy of 
tragic deferral of which narrative and history are iterations, not resolutions, which should 
bring us, finally, and also quite naturally, to the relevance of Heideggerian time for a 
rereading of the problem of the end in Doctor Faustus. 
Bernard Stiegler’s description of Heideggerian deferral bears repeating here: 
   Dasein is the being who […] defers. [….] The being who defers by putting 
off till later anticipates: to anticipate always means to defer. Dasein has to be: 
it is not simply – it is only what it will be; it is time. Anticipation means being-
for-the-end. Dasein knows its end. Yet it will never have knowledge of it. Its 
end is that toward which it is, in relation to which it is; yet its end is what will 
never be for Dasein. Dasein is for the end, but its end is not for it. Although it 
knows its end absolutely, it will always be that in relation to which it will 
never know anything: the knowledge of the end always withdraws, is 
concealed in being deferred. The end of Dasein is the indeterminate. [….] 
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 “When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there.’ By its transition 
to no-longer Dasein […], it gets lifted right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of 
understanding it as something experienced” (BT 281). 
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This never-being-finished constitutes the mark of Dasein’s finitude, the 
infinitude of the finite, that is, of the radical end as what can only be 
completed in being deferred […]. (231)  
Scaff, of course, following Kermode, recognizes the problem of deferral that 
underlies the Devil’s contract, but in stressing the ironic paradox of its simultaneously finite 
conditions she fails to recognize that her loophole, the alleged coming to closure achieved by 
Adrian in the Lamentation, reveals that such a policy is anything but ironic; rather, as both 
the Devil and Heidegger point out, it is to be expected, just as the Devil tells Adrian his 
coming was to be expected: “Zeit hast du von uns genommen, geniale Zeit, hochtragende 
Zeit, volle vierundzwanzig Jahr ab dato recessi, die setzen wir dir zum Ziel. Sind die herum 
und vorüber gelaufen, was nicht abzusehen, und ist so eine Zeit auch eine Ewigkeit, -- so 
sollst du geholt sein” (DF 333).83 Here the strict, definitive terms of Adrian’s finite existence 
are apparently released, opened up to eternity, and in such a way that forcefully links the 
problem of closure and the question of Adrian’s salvation in the novel with Heidegger’s 
description of Dasein’s never-being-finished. 
For Heidegger the crucial peculiarity of Dasein’s death is that it is both certain and 
indefinite, infinite and finite, and in Doctor Faustus Mann offers a tempting literary 
expression of this problem. Dasein is certain of its death insofar as it is only in relation to its 
end (Stiegler), yet this certainty is concealed from it inasmuch as neither the moment of its 
death nor the certainty with which such a moment is invested can ever be translated into an 
experience for Dasein or grasped by its understanding. Instead, Dasein in its everydayness 
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 “Time you have taken from us, a genius’s time, high-flying time, full XXIV years ab dato recessi, which we 
set to you as the limit. When they are finished and fully expired, which is not to be foreseen […], and such a 
time is also an eternity […] – then you shall be fetched” (DF 264; qtd. in Scaff 72). 
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flees from this certainty and thus consciously defers what is already ontologically deferred. 
Likewise, the Devil explains to Adrian, whose sole concern is precisely how and when it will 
end for him, that despite the “uncertainty and haphazard of the moment when it will be time 
to think on the end” [“Die Unsicherheit und Beliebigkeit des Augenblicks, wo es Zeit wird, 
ans Ende zu denken”] (DF 245/308), that he will end nevertheless “demands agreement” 
[“das will ausgemacht sein”] (DF 246/309).  
The sort of time proffered by the Devil – “Great time, mad time, most devilish time, 
in which to soar higher and higher still” [“Groβe Zeit, tolle Zeit, ganz verteufelte Zeit, in der 
es hoch und überhoch hergeht […]” (DF 246/309) – is also an “abundant, immeasurable 
time,” which in Heidegger’s vocabulary is precisely the mistaken eternal that flows out of an 
ordinary, vulgäre Zeit, an everyday sense of time that is here clearly associated with the time 
in which Adrian accomplishes his public Durchbruch and “may plainly and honestly deem 
himself a god” [“daβ er sich schlecht und recht für einen Gott halten mag”] (DF 246/309). 
Such a time, according to Heidegger and the Devil, only reinforces the concealment of the 
end, makes it difficult if not impossible to think on the end – “How would such a man ever 
come to be fretted by the point in time when it is time to think on the end!” [“Wie kommt so 
Einer dazu, sich um den Zeitpunkt zu kümmern, woe s Zeit wird ans Ende zu denken!”] (DF 
246/309) – and thus also makes thinking on the end always somehow untimely.  
For example, even while he demands to hear of the end, Adrian speaks of what comes 
after the end, of what “life [will be] like in Old Scratch’s house” [“Wie lebt sich’s in 
Klepperlins Haus?”] (DF 260/328; emphasis added) and of what awaits him there. Thus does 
Adrian practice the art of deferral that Heidegger describes. This sort of thinking on the end 
the Devil calls thinking unhistorically, for – and here Mann seems to be in complete 
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agreement with Heidegger’s revaluation of history as an ontological phenomenon – an 
authentically historical thinking demands an entirely different disposition toward the past 
and the future, that is to say, toward the truth of the hour-glass’s having been turned, that “his 
bill [will] be presented him” [“die Rechnung endlich präsentiert wurd”] (DF 252/318) at the 
end, which of course both constitutes and is contested by Dasein’s very being. 
In other ways, too, Heidegger’s analysis of the temporality of Dasein, like Mann’s 
novel, is heavily invested with a particularly Faustian ontology. Heidegger admits that the 
possibility of Dasein’s being-a-whole is seemingly inconsistent with what Heidegger calls 
die Sorge or care, the temporalizing structure at the ground of Dasein’s being that expresses 
itself in the unity of being-already-, being-alongside-, and being-ahead-of-itself-in-the-world. 
Being-ahead-of-itself in particular is not only what makes possible being-towards-death but it 
is also that which lies at the foundation of the dilemma of closure:  
‘Solange es ist’, bis zu seinem Ende verhält es sich zu seinem Seinkönnen. 
Auch dann, wenn es, noch existierend, nichts mehr ‘vor sich’ und ‘seine 
Rechnung abgeschlossen’ hat, ist sein Sein noch durch das ‘Sichvorweg’ 
bestimmt. […] Diese Strukturmoment der Sorge sagt doch unzweideutig, daβ 
im Dasein immer noch etwas aussteht, was als Seinkönnen seiner selbst noch 
nicht ‘wirklich’ geworden ist. Im Wesen der Grundverfassung des Daseins 
liegt demnach eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit. (SZ 313)84   
                                                          
84
 “‘As long as it is’, right to its end, [Dasein] comports itself towards its potentiality-for-Being. Even when it 
still exists but has nothing more ‘before it’ and has ‘settled […] its account’, its Being is still determined by the 
‘ahead-of-itself’. [….] The ‘ahead-of-itself’ tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something 
still outstanding, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become ‘actual’. It is essential 
to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled […]” (BT 279). 
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Consequently, Dasein cannot know that in relation to which it is and thus cannot 
come to closure about itself. Self-knowledge is always deferred, rendered unavailable, so that 
Dasein’s richest possibility lies in the very impossibility of its being anything at all. As a 
result, and as the Devil points out for Adrian, indeed it is the primary reason for his visit, the 
Devil has come to remind Adrian of that toward which he is headed and of that which has 
already been established: “this visit of mine is intended merely for confirmation” [“mein 
Besuch gilt nur der Konfirmation”] (DF 264/333).  
As we have seen, according to the Devil, what remains to be settled with respect to 
Adrian’s bargain is not the “price in pence and farthings” of the deal itself but rather the 
disclosure of the truth of the meaning of the bargain, which lies not in the coming to term of 
the twenty four years but rather in the more fundamental fact of the hour-glass’s having-
already-been-turned. The verbal complicity of the passage from Mann with Heidegger’s 
well-known reliance upon verbal etymologies suggest here a useful correlation with the 
temporal structure of die Sorge: not only is the turning already the case when the Devil 
arrives so that his visit serves essentially as a Konfirmation, but it is very obvious to the 
reader and to the narrator that Adrian’s existence alongside this turning has also been the 
case, a fact that very clearly justifies the solitary and frigid anxiety with which he lives his 
life and invests his musical works.  
But perhaps most importantly for our arguments here, the having-been-turned 
suggests the element of anticipation that grounds Dasein’s existence – being-ahead-of-itself 
and being-towards-death – insofar as what is disclosed in the fact of the hour-glass’s having-
been-turned is both the certainty of Dasein’s finiteness as well as the alethetic concealment of 
this disclosure. In Heidegger’s vocabulary this amounts to both an ontic concealment insofar 
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as the “eye beholds no diminishment in the upper chamber, and only at the very end does it 
appear to go fast and fast be gone […]” and an ontological one inasmuch as in being-
towards-the-end this having-been-turned is bound together with the never-being-finished that 
“constitutes the mark of Dasein’s finitude, the infinitude of the finite, that is, of the radical 
end as what can only be completed in being deferred […]” (Stiegler).  Consequently, when 
the Devil points out to Adrian that he is not alone and that “Everywhere the hour-glass has 
been turned,” he simultaneously suggests not only the ubiquity but also the elemental 
permanence of this turning; the only settlement that is offered is one that lies in the 
impossibility of settlement, in the infinite deferral of the finite limits of Dasein (and history), 
or more precisely, in the “Seeming Impossibility of Getting Dasein’s Being-a-whole into our 
Grasp” [“Die scheinbare Unmöglichkeit einer ontologischen Erfassung und Bestimmung des 
daseinsmäβigen Ganzseins”] (BT 279/SZ 314). 
Furthermore, it is no mere coincidence that both Mann and Heidegger bring to bear 
upon the dilemma of closure and the problem of wholeness the closely related question of 
ripeness (and thus, too, the authenticity of what in Doctor Faustus could certainly be called a 
sort of ‘organic’ time). As the Devil reminds Adrian and the readers, “[I]t is all a matter of 
ripeness and sweet time.” 85 Heidegger also examines the various meanings of the term in 
order to show firstly that the character of that which is always still outstanding for Dasein is 
formally analogous to the organic process of ripening and not at all like the character of the 
remainder owed in order for a debt to be cancelled – this latter model, by the way, is 
particularly relevant to our reading of Doctor Faustus since it is usually the one that guides 
                                                          
85
 “Ist alles eine Sache der Reife und der lieben Zeit” (DF 306); we may also want to recall Zeitblom’s lament 
much later on that Echo was “subject to time and fated to ripen” (DF 489). 
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traditional interpretations of the Faustian bargain; and secondly to show that the formal 
analogy of ripeness with the type of ending that belongs to Dasein can only be taken so far:  
   Die unreife Frucht zum Beispiel geht ihrer Reife entgegen. Dabei wird ihr 
im Reifen das, was sie noch nicht ist, keineswegs als Noch-nicht-vorhandenes 
angestückt. Sie selbst bringt sich zur Reife, und solches Sichbringen 
charakterisiert ihr Sein als Frucht. Alles Erdenkliche, das beigebracht werden 
könnte, vermöchte die Unreife der Frucht nicht zu beseitigen, käme dieses 
Seiende nicht von ihm selbst her zur Reife. (SZ 324)86 
On the one hand, it is precisely this temporality that I think the Devil means to impart to 
Adrian in their conversation. The “not-yet” of Dasein’s end is that toward which it is always 
already headed; as such, the debt, as balance and remainder, is always already “included in 
the very being of [Dasein], not as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive” 
(BT 288). In this way being-towards-death and the having-been-turned of the Stundglas are 
intimately connected:  
   So wie das Dasein vielmehr standing, solange es ist, schon sein Noch-nicht 
ist, so ist es auch schon immer sein Ende. Das mit dem Tod gemeinte Enden 
bedeutet kein Zu-Ende-sein des Daseins, sondern ein Sein zum Ende dieses 
seienden. Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, sobald es 
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 “When, for instance, a fruit is unripe, it ‘goes toward’ its ripeness. In this process of ripening, that which the 
fruit is not yet, is by no means pieced on as something not yet present-at-hand. The fruit brings itself to 
ripeness, and such a bringing of itself is a characteristic of its Being as a fruit. Nothing imaginable, which one 
might contribute to it, would eliminate the unripeness of the fruit, if this entity did not come to ripeness of its 
own accord” (BT 287). 
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ist. ‘Sobald ein Mensch zum Leben kommt, sogleich ist er alt genug zu 
sterben’ (SZ 326)87 
On the other hand, what distinguishes the ripening of the fruit from that of Dasein is 
precisely the problem of fulfillment that Heidegger clearly describes as a problem of closure 
and which is, of course, the Faustian predicament in the novel. In ripening the fruit is 
fulfilled, but as Heidegger points out, Dasein often dies without reaching fulfillment, without 
“having exhausted its specific possibilities” or even “passes its ripeness before the end” (BT 
288). Here the translators of Being and Time note an important distinction between the 
variable meanings of ripening as bringing to an end or terminating versus bringing to a state 
of completion or perfection. Whereas the fruit needn’t tarry with the question of its coming to 
ripeness, for Dasein this is a hermeneutical dilemma of the first rank insofar as its being is 
always an issue for it, as Heidegger is fond of saying. Since Dasein, however, ends for the 
most part inauthentically in unfulfillment or else by “having disintegrated and been used up” 
(BT 288), it can grasp itself in its wholeness only in a very limited and negative sense, which 
is to say, in and through the authenticity [“Eigentlichkeit”] with which it relates to its own 
death, so that coming to any sort of closure has to do with Dasein’s disposition or way of 
being towards its end as “the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein.” This certainly 
doesn’t solve the dilemma of closure, but it does highlight it as a formidable preoccupation of 
Heidegger’s own analysis and thus more strongly synthesizes the fundamental concerns of 
Doctor Faustus with Heidegger’s concerns in Being and Time. It also brings us full circle, 
                                                          
87[…] just as Dasein is already its ‘not-yet’, and is its ‘not-yet’ constantly as long as it is, it is already its end 
too. The ‘ending’ which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end 
[…] but a Being-towards-the-end […] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it 
is. ‘As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.’ (BT 289). The author of the final line of the 
passage is said to be Der Ackermann aus Böhmen, and it is interesting to note (given my own preoccupations) 
that Heidegger pulls the quotation from a contemporary (1917) history of the tradition of German Bildung from 
the Middle Ages to the Reformation. 
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which is to say, back to Adrian’s musical ambitions, to Mann’s struggle to end the novel, and 
to the question of Adrian’s salvation and the fulfillment it either or both promises and/or 
problematizes. 
* 
It seems to me the question of grasping the wholeness of Dasein as being-towards-
death and Mann’s struggle to narrate Adrian’s salvation amount to similar dilemmas. As we 
have seen, according to Scaff the Apocalypse oratorio mirrors the infinite deferral or 
protracted crisis of modernity described by Kermode, a crisis which can be overcome only by 
recovering the meaningfulness of time provided by a successful coming to closure, which is 
to say, by ending. The Apocalypse is called a “consummate ‘a-temporal’ experience” that in 
its inescapable circularity “jars and frustrates the aesthetic sensibility with harsh chords 
‘endlessly’” (Scaff 73) as well as a “musical model of ‘non-narration’ that in its strict 
uniformity, lacking both a beginning and an end and “persisting without hope for either 
salvation or damnation,” exemplifies what Hans Castorp says dissolves the “‘experience of 
time’ that is ‘so closely related and bound to our feeling for life’” (qtd. in Scaff 75). In an 
effort to reinstate this life-force, after writing the Apocalypse all of Adrian’s compositions, 
including a violin concerto and several pieces of chamber music, seek with varying degrees 
of success to reinstate narrative and historical possibility by bringing a tale to its end and 
successfully narrating humanity’s joys and sorrows (Scaff 85). Ironically, it is with his 
masterpiece The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus, a work even more totalizing and subject to an 
even stricter formalism than the Apocalypse, that Adrian finally achieves his breakthrough 
and salvation. Scaff describes how the stringency of the Lamentation that formerly repressed 
music’s potential for narrative expressivity now paradoxically enables such feeling, and thus 
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we witness in the Lamentation Leverkühn fulfilling his “youthful dream of [achieving] a 
calculated whole” (88). 
This overtly optimistic reading, however, fails to register the temporality of the 
strenger Satz but rather carefully denies and avoids it; specifically, it overlooks the 
temporality of the anxiety the strenger Satz describes and that is its very basis. Bringing 
Heidegger’s philosophy of time to bear upon a discussion of music in Doctor Faustus will at 
least be unexpected, if not outright suspect, but there are reasons for doing so. To begin with, 
Howard Eiland, in an insightful review of George Steiner’s Martin Heidegger (1979), 
criticizes Steiner for underestimating the potential of the musical analogy to elaborate 
Heidegger’s notion of Sorge [care] from Being and Time as well as the “theological charge” 
of fundamental concepts from Heidegger’s later writings. Though Eiland never develops this 
connection between Heidegger and music, his brief acknowledgment of the correspondence 
resonates powerfully with my purposes here. Eiland writes:  
In the interaction of melody and rhythm, we find a paradigm of entelecheia. 
Like the circular being of Dasein, melody is futural: in its beginning is its end. 
Musical meaning or dimension […] involves a stretching and turning through 
time-space that recalls Heidegger’s delineation of ‘geschehen’ in Being and 
Time […]. In particular, the analogy of music reminds us of the crucial section 
in Division Two of Being and Time, ¶ 65, ‘Temporality as the Ontological 
Meaning of Care’ […]. In my opinion, the finite, spherical conception of 
temporality, of existence at once anticipatory and recapitulatory, [also] 
contains the germ of Heidegger’s later preoccupation[s] [….]. (313)  
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According to Eiland, a hermeneutic circularity forms the conceptual core of the 
correspondence he forges between Heidegger’s notion of care and fundamental aspects of 
music and musical narrative. In fact, however, the correspondences that connect Sorge with 
the narrative and musical world of Doctor Faustus reach far beyond a decidedly incomplete 
description of Sorge as “at once anticipatory and recapitulatory.”  Even Eiland overlooks the 
potential of his own insight, in particular, the relevance of the connection Heidegger 
maintains between Sorge, anxiety and conscience.  
In the section of Being and Time entitled “Conscience as the Call of Care,” Heidegger 
quite naturally employs an explicitly aural, if not musical, analogy to describe Sorge as 
essentially a matter of Dasein’s anxiety and conscience and in the process (and certainly 
inadvertently) situates the general thrust of his temporal ontology well within the range of 
Mann’s own preoccupations with music in Doctor Faustus. Heidegger writes:  
Unheimlichkeit ist die […] Grundart des In-der-Welt-seins. Das Dasein selbst 
ruft als Gewissen aus dem Grunde dieses Seins. [….] Der durch die Angst 
gestimmte Ruf ermöglicht dem Dasein allererst den Entwurf seiner selbst auf 
sein eigenstes Seinkönnen. [….] [Deshalb] [d]as Gewissen offenbart sich als 
Ruf der Sorge: der Rufer ist das Dasein, sich ängstigend in der Geworfenheit 
(Schon-sein-in…) um sein Seinkönnen. [….] Der Ruf des Gewissens, das 
heiβt dieses selbst, hat seine ontologische Möglichkeit darin, daβ das Dasein 
im Grunde seines Seins Sorge ist. [….] Das rechte Hören des Anrufs kommt 
dann gleich einem Sichverstehen in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen, das heiβt 
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dem Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste eigentliche Schuldigwerdenkönnen. (SZ 
368-81)88  
Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein’s authenticity can be measured by the degree to which it 
“hears” the call of conscience forcefully reminds us not only of the musical analogy more 
generally but also of the endings of both novels under consideration here, the “dream of 
love” and the “light of hope,” as well as of Mann’s 1938 essay on Goethe’s Faust, where 
Mann describes the possibility of Faust’s and modernity’s redemption as follows: “[W]ir 
wollen an dem anti-teuflischen Vertrauen festhalten, daβ die Menschheit im Grunde ein 
feines Gehör hat, und das Worte, die, aus eigenem Bemühen geborgen, ihr zugute kommen 
möchten, in ihrem Herzen nicht untergehen werden” (GF 621).89  
Even more importantly, perhaps, Heidegger in one fell swoop forges the constellation 
that links Dasein’s conscience and its potentiality-for-Being, which it could be argued is 
Heidegger’s answer to the tradition of Bildung, with the already musical temporality of Sorge 
and the musical analogy, more generally. Dasein’s authenticity is said to be “attuned” 
through anxiety, and the temporality by which it is always already determined is said to be 
guided by a conscience described as a calling to be “heard correctly.” Though the full impact 
of its acknowledgement will be elaborated in the next chapter, for now it is important to 
emphasize that whether it inauthentically flees from death or resolutely anticipates, Dasein’s 
                                                          
88
 “Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world […]. Out of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein 
itself, as conscience, calls. […]. The call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible 
first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. [….] [Thus] [c]onscience 
manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is 
anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. [….] The call of conscience – that is, conscience itself – has its 
ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care. [….]. Hearing the appeal 
correctly is thus tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being – 
that is, to projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty” (BT 322-34). 
89
 “But let us hold fast to the anti-diabolic faith, that mankind has after all a keen hearing, and that words born 
of one’s own striving may do it good and not perish from its heart” (GF in Essays 42; emphases mine). 
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conscience is determined not only by the anxiety and guilt associated with its own death – 
that which for Dasein is always outstanding and still to be settled – but Dasein is also always 
already guilty because it is always already thrown into a world behind which it can never go. 
Out of its thrownness emerges another type of unavailability that, like its own death – for 
which it is, but which is not for it – determines its ontological guilt.  
Interestingly, one way of explaining Heideggerian guilt, if only superficially for now, 
is by recalling exactly what Castorp learns on his walk with Joachim just before the latter 
dies and what Hofrat Behrens says to Joachim’s mother in “consolation”. Castorp not only 
admonishes the “Gleichgültigkeit, Verantwortungslosigkeit und egoistischer Unschuld” of 
those who dare not admit the intimate relation between life and death and concurs with 
Hofrat Behrens that death is much more a matter of thought for the living than it is for the 
deceased, but the Hofrat himself goes on to playfully confirm the ontological negation at the 
ground of this anxious flight and in the process echoes Heidegger: “But about death – no one 
who came back from it could tell you anything […]. We come out of the dark and go into the 
dark again, and in between lie the experiences of our life. But the beginning and the end, 
birth and death, we do not experience” (MM 536-7). The in-between of our life experiences, 
of course, Heidegger calls the Erstreckung that Dasein is, and Dasein’s being-guilty lies in 
the darkness out of which Dasein comes and into which it goes, as the Hofrat puts it, but 
which it is forbidden for Dasein to experience. Thus Dasein always begins in media res and 
for that it is guilty, according to Heidegger. In drawing these connections it is at least fair to 
say that Heidegger here creates powerful correspondences with Mann’s ambivalent and 
challenging temporality that also guides the strenger Satz. In anxiety Dasein turns towards its 
own authentic temporality: “Dasein itself, as conscience, calls.” Anxiety is the mood that 
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opens Dasein to the fullness of its suffering, or what amounts to the same thing – “Hearing 
the call correctly” opens Dasein to the fullness both of its own time and of the time that it is: 
in a word, Sorge. 
Thus it is no mere coincidence that Adorno begins his preface to Philosophy of 
Modern Music with the claim that modern music is both the form and expression of a modern 
anxiety that has its basis in what can only be described as a distinctly Heideggerian 
temporality, a concurrence that, given the close proximity of Adorno’s theory of modern 
music to the musical analogy in Doctor Faustus, more than justifies the comparison with 
Mann: “How disordered is life today at its very roots if its shuddering and rigidity are 
reflected even in a field no longer affected by empirical necessity, a field in which human 
beings hope to find a sanctuary from horrifying norms, but which fulfills its promise to them 
only by denying to them what they expect of it” (PMM xiii). The twelve tone reflects the 
temporality of Dasein’s anxious waiting towards death, its constant waiting under the threat 
of impossibility: “Today the only works which really count are those which are no longer 
works at all….[Twelve-tone] conceptions are portrayal[s] of anxiety....The security of form 
establishes itself as a medium for shock absorption…These impulses do not permit lasting 
resolution” (30-2).  
That the twelve-tone is an expression of anxiety contradicts the limits of its form, 
which excludes anticipation and expectation, which of course are the very material of 
anxiety, and it is my aim to reveal the temporality of this contradiction and bring this 
temporality to bear upon a rereading of Adrian’s fate and self-development in light of the 
strenger Satz [the strictly organized form of twelve-tone compositions]. Thus, in the same 
way that Adrian’s excessive sin prepares him for salvation, the critique of progress inherent 
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to the twelve-tone system, its disdain for endings and its embrace of stasis and inescapable 
circularity, is simultaneously the authentic and sincere expression of Dasein’s temporality. 
This seemingly paradoxical relationship is of course the key to both Heideggerian 
authenticity, as I’ve already shown, and Adorno’s convictions about the autonomy of art, in 
which art, despite the restrictions placed upon it by history and the finiteness of musical 
material, subsists by always pointing to something outside itself, beyond itself, or what is 
quite simply not itself (PMM 49).  Like the twelve-tone and the anxiety it figures, Sorge 
signifies Dasein’s having-been thrown out of and toward an impossibility – it denies and 
negates even while it promises and prohibits lasting resolution. 
We might say of the proposed resolutions to this dilemma that they offer little 
consolation to the reader and typically end like the music described by Adorno. But these 
offerings certainly highlight the complexities of the ontological-historical predicament Mann 
is trying to narrate. We might say, for instance, that the dodecaphonic style that Scaff claims 
makes it impossible to end cannot disavow itself of the intentionality that makes narrative 
form and development possible and that must therefore inevitably move towards itself. Not 
only can the strenger Satz not dispense with the endings it seeks to avoid, it cannot but be 
this end insofar as, like Dasein, it is its own ending. Thus it is not that the twelve-tone 
musical style obviates the beginning and the end but rather that the beginning and the end are 
bound to one another in a circularity that likewise constitutes the stretching-along 
[Erstreckung] of Dasein; it needn’t manifest itself as a narrative development or progression 
but merely as a stretching-along or turning which Dasein itself is prior to and alongside any 
notion of the former. And it is perhaps in this way that the musicality which “scorns 
extension in time” should be understood, not as somehow destroying narrative possibility but 
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grounding it, conditioning the very possibility of what Heidegger would call the derivative 
experience of being-in-time.  
For Adorno, the anxiety portrayed by the twelve-tone is also its material; as a result, 
the twelve-tone not only describes the fate of music but is at the same time the fate of music 
itself (67-8). When considered in terms of narrative, then the relationship between narrative 
possibility and the so-called atemporality described by the narrative is not one of opposition 
but is rather an equation of mutual and consistent interdependence, simultaneity and duration. 
This equation, of course, clearly recalls the way in which Dasein is itself the temporality it 
describes, and thus the constellation of history, music and fate as it is portrayed in both 
Philosophy of Modern Music and Doctor Faustus begs a comparison with Heidegger’s 
description of temporality as Sorge, and not surprisingly, the acknowledgement of this 
correspondence necessarily returns us to the questions of being-towards-death as Dasein’s 
coming towards itself as the possibility of impossibility, that is, its dilemma of closure. 
Music, as Adorno demonstrates, and in particular the twelve tone compositional 
technique, not only the negation of an idea, it is also the fate of an idea of negation. In the 
extremity of the twelve tone, we witness music’s turn toward itself as that which “fulfills its 
promise to them only by denying to them what they expect of it.” Just as for Heidegger 
Dasein is described as the very unfolding of a fate, the authenticity of which is measured by 
the degree to which Dasein turns toward its own impossibility, the possibility of an authentic 
art and of an authentic music in Doctor Faustus involves their turning towards their own 
impossibility, what literary scholars and cultural critics have conceded to call modernism. 
The passive emergence of this correspondence in The Magic Mountain is engaged by Doctor 
Faustus with a technical, which is also to say a “timely” specificity that, like modern music 
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itself, according to Adorno, not only reflects the very coming-to-be of the fate of music and 
even demonstrates that musical evolution undergoes the same fate of which it is an 
expression, but it also exposes the coming-to-be of an idea of modernist time – namely, that 
in its negation of time, in staving it off, so to speak, the twelve-tone, rather than dispensing 
with time actually engages time in a way that narrative music cannot. Such an idea of 
modernist time also encourages us to emphasize the development of this correspondence 
from the relatively threadbare relationship between Castorp and music in The Magic 
Mountain to the virtual identity Mann establishes between the fate of Adrian Leverkühn and 
the fate of modern music in Doctor Faustus. In addition, it clearly situates discussions of the 
strenger Satz within the orbit of philosophical approaches to the novel that hope to take 
Heidegger’s account of temporality into consideration.  
Doctor Faustus is both the story of Adrian’s fate and the story of his development 
toward such a fate; it is also permeated by a narrator’s anxiety that is itself grounded in the 
anticipation of the fate he describes. According to Heidegger, the authenticity of such a fate 
is measured precisely by the degree to which this fate turns resolutely toward itself, that it is 
to say, by the degree to which both Adrian and music anticipate their own end. Consequently, 
this tragic development is told through both the vehicle of the musical analogy insofar as the 
fate of music is bound up with the fate of the protagonist as well as through the evolution of 
an idea of time toward/for which the protagonist and the world he inhabits are being 
prepared.  
Leverkühn’s now infamous description and justification of the twelve-tone form and 
its anticipated development from the Brentano cycle through to the Lamentation perfectly 
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exposes the nature and limits of both music’s and his own temporality as Heidegger would 
have it:  
Das ist ganz aus einer Grundgestalt, einer vielfach variablen Intervallreihe, 
den fünf Tönen h-e-a-e-es abgeleitet, Horizontale und Vertikale sind davon 
bestimmt und beherrscht, soweit das eben bei einem Grundmotiv von so 
beschränkter Notenzahl möglich ist. Es ist wie ein Wort, ein Schlüsselwort, 
dessen Zeichen überall in dem Lied zu finden sind und es gänzlich 
determinieren möchten. Es ist aber ein zu kurzes Wort […]. Man müβte von 
hier aus weitergehen und aus den zwölf Stufen des temperierten Halbton-
Alphabets gröβere Wörter bilden, Wörter von zwölf Buchstaben, bestimmte 
Kombinationen und Interrelationen der zwölf Halbtöne, Reihenbildungen 
[…]. Jeder Ton der gesammten Komposition, melodisch und harmonisch, 
müβte sich über seine Beziehung zu dieser vorbestimmten Grundreihe 
auszuweisen haben. Keiner dürfte wiederkehren, ehe alle anderen erschienen 
sind. Keiner dürfte auftreten, der nicht in der Gesamtkonstruktion seine 
motivische Funktion erfüllte. Es gäbe keine freie Note mehr. Das würde ich 
strengen Satz nennen. (DF 258)90  
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 “It all comes from one basic figure, from a row of intervals capable of multiple variation, taken from the five 
notes B-E-A-E-E-flat – both the horizontal and the vertical lines are determined and governed by it, to the 
extent that is possible in a basic motif with such a limited number of notes. It is like a word, a key word that 
leaves its signature everywhere in the song and would like to determine it entirely. It is, however, too short a 
word […]. One would have to proceed from here and build longer words from the twelve steps of the tempered 
semitone alphabet, words of twelve letters, specific combinations and interrelations of the twelve semitones, 
rows of notes – […]. Each tone in the entire composition, melodic and harmonic, would have to demonstrate its 
relation to this predetermined basic row. None would dare recur until all have first occurred. No note would 
dare appear that did not fulfill its motif function within the structure as a whole. Free notes would no longer 
exist. That is what I would call a strict style” (DF 205). 
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The prohibitions on function and freedom that inhere in the structure of the twelve tone 
mirror the temporal prohibitions in Heideggerian temporality, namely the nullity that is 
Dasein’s basis or the being-guilty that in coming-towards only brings Dasein back to itself, 
so to speak, to that which it has always been, that is to say, being-towards-death. And yet 
balancing out this prohibition is its opposite, the anticipation of the being-towards that 
constantly awaits the until, which has its basis in the infinite deferral of endings and in the 
paradoxical risk and freedom of repetition. In addition, the twelve-tone, insofar as it is 
imagined as music stripped to its fundamental basis, without ornament, reveals not the 
antithesis or enemy of musical development but rather its ground, which, as we have seen, is 
time itself (Scaff).  
The sanction on musical “freedom” by the strenger Satz or “strict style” is also the 
sanction of traditional ideas of human subjectivity as the “tonal” center of experience, a 
move mirrored of course in Heidegger, for whom Dasein may be described as a comparable 
rejection or overcoming of traditional (Kantian/Hegelian) notions of freedom and 
subjectivity. Dasein replaces the tonal center with a temporal-spatial construct, not unlike a 
musical row, along which time as such works itself out according to the fundamental 
requirement that insofar as it has begun it must also end. Though the twelve-tone certainly 
obscures the possibility of conclusions, it nevertheless emphasizes endings. As Adorno puts 
it, the strenger Satz not only anticipates its own end but it stages this end and thus is revealed 
as the fate of music itself. Consequently, in the tragic waiting described by Adrian’s music, 
readers are given a very clear idea of the infinite deferral associated with being-towards-
death and modernist anxieties about the end of time and history (Kermode).  
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This is clearly the case with the repetitive and anticipatory function of the Haetera 
Esmerelda motif, which not only helps to illustrate Adrian’s compositional strategy but also 
thoroughly determines the structure of his fate and the narrative itself. Hetaera Esmeralda is, 
in fact, the name that incorporates the punishment in the sin, “das Schlüsselwort” that 
“haunts his work like a rune” [“geistert runenhaft […] durch sein Werk”] (DF 165-6/DF 
208). Just as every aspect of Adrian’s mature compositions (from his earliest 
experimentations with the theme in the Brentano songs to his final masterpiece, The 
Lamentation of Doctor Faustus) is organized absolutely around this tonal theme, to the extent 
that every possible variation is a mere derivative of it, the same is true of the organizing 
principle that motivates his life and being. As we can see, this is neither a trivialization of 
historical development (Scaff 71) nor a failure to recognize history (Adorno 60) but rather a 
coldly passionate indictment of it. And this is the crux of Adrian’s frustration with the 
limitations imposed upon both musical material and the possibilities of musical narrative at 
the end of a history in which method and content have been exhausted. Moreover, such a 
predicament desperately recalls the significance Heidegger attaches to the way in which 
being-towards-death and historicality collaborate to form the “essential content” of Dasein’s 
experience as being-towards-death or Sorge. 
It will also be remembered that the Teufelsvertrag [Devil’s pact] was served merely 
to remind Adrian of his fate, not to inaugurate it. The pact constitutes neither beginning nor 
end but functions rather as a technical, literary device to establish the thematic leitmotif of 
the novel, the development of Adrian’s infection in which his fate is and always has been 
inscribed (H-A-E-T-E-R-A). The “Illumination” that this motif is meant to facilitate and that 
would ordinarily correspond to Adrian’s anticipated enlightenment is rather the conspicuous 
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yet always hidden somatic indicator of his very literal coming-towards what he already is 
and always has been, which is to say, the very site of his own stretching-along and the 
ongoing working-through and working-toward of his own mortality: “‘Die Illumination […] 
liegt bereits in deiner Natur, wir auferlegen dir beileibe nichts Neues, die Kleinen machen 
nichts Neues und Fremdes aus dir, sie verstärken und übertreiben nur sinnreich alles, was du 
[schon] bist’” (DF 334-5).91  
Insofar as this is the case, the atonal polyphonic crisis of the twelve-tone, with its lack 
of a tonal center and so-called atmosphere of impotence and stagnant repetition, betrays in its 
“lettered symbol” a vital tonal center that is dispersed throughout the composition and points 
much less to impotence and stagnation than it does to movement and desire and the mortal 
resolve of human being over the moment of its lifetime. Thus out of the brevity of the highly 
compact musical moment grows the revelation of the nature and character of time’s passage 
as Sorge. In the tightly woven compositional form, the moment of significance pervades the 
entire length of the composition, remains the same even amidst its multiple variations and 
rather than returning/repeating itself in a surrender to stagnation comes toward itself out of its 
having been which itself arises out of the coming towards of the fate of the moment. The 
decisive moments of Adrian’s Bildung, whether his encounter with Esmerelda or his 
commitment to the blood-pact, are thus, strictly speaking, not moments at all; rather, they 
constitute a reverberation of the same motif that has always guided Adrian’s development 
and will ultimately determine his future and fate – a fate, by the way, which, as the 
possibility of his own impossibility, remains an irrevocable judgment that Adrian (and, of 
course, Dasein) is unable to decipher because its deciphering is tantamount to his ending. 
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 “‘The Illumination [….] already lies in your nature, verily, we impose nothing new, the small folk make 
nothing new and strange to you, they do but deftly bolster and magnify all that you [already] are’” (DF 265). 
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All of this is especially significant if critics such as Howard Eiland are correct in 
associating this description of time not only with the musical analogy as such but also with 
Heidegger’s description of Sorge and with what Heidegger calls geschehen or the historicity 
of Dasein that, along with being-towards-death, is a constitutive element of Dasein’s 
temporal being. This, I think, is the meaning of the repetitive mantra “I am Kaisersaschern” 
that haunts the novel’s possibilities and that will be explored in more detail in the following 
chapter. The possibilities toward which Dasein is always already headed are fundamentally 
limited by Dasein’s past, to its being-already-in-the-world, to the extent that its futural 
disposition or its coming-towards is anything but wide open, but rather it is always forced 
into a conservative return. This return, essential to Dasein’s historicality, and its 
interdependence with the coming-towards of Dasein or being-towards-death, is also essential 
to Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s guilt. Though the full impact of this recognition and 
of what the being-guilty of Dasein insures will become clearer later on, for now it should be 
noted only that Dasein’s ontological guilt is replicated in the so-called atemporality of the 
twelve-tone composition, and as such this compositional formalism is anything but 
atemporal. According to Heidegger, the twelve-tone would suggest a highly temporalized 
expression of Dasein’s being-guilty, and so it is not surprising that Scaff and others recognize 
its obvious relationship to history since the question of Dasein’s guilt is as much connected 
with Dasein’s historicality as it is to the problem of care and being-towards-death just as the 
question of Adrian’s guilt is intimately linked with the transgressions of German history. 
* 
It has not been my aim to solve the dilemma of closure in Doctor Faustus but rather 
to bring to bear upon it Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death in order to explain why it 
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is first and foremost a dilemma. My first objective was to show that, according to 
Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein and the theory of time that informs it, the opposition of time 
and eternity that defines Scaff’s analysis of the novel is ultimately misguided. Both the 
stagnant atemporality of the Apocalypsis cum figuris and the promise of narrative 
development that inheres in the Lamentation, rather than mutually excluding each other, 
actually constitute together deeply felt responses to what Heidegger calls primordial 
temporality or being-towards-death, the essential character of which lies in its being both 
absolutely certain and at the same time always unavailable to Dasein. Thus the promise of 
salvation at the end of the novel, the “miracle that goes beyond faith,” rather than solving the 
dilemma of closure actually demonstrates it. My second and final objective was to clarify the 
nature of the tragic deferral at the foundation of Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death 
and to show that as a result the sort of closure described by Scaff is plainly impossible, for 
Dasein’s richest possibilities always lie precisely in its impossibility, and the same may be 
said of narrative. The reinstatement of narrative potential allows not for closure but only for 
continuation, and the salvation it suggests is neither an answer to the dilemma of closure nor 
closure itself but rather the very expression of its deferral. Consequently, the possibility of 
grasping itself as a whole is denied to Dasein and causes it to flee in the face of the anxiety 
produced by the certainty that it will one day not be.  
This is, however, not quite the whole story. Although Heidegger’s notion of being-
towards-death would appear to preclude both the possibility of closure as well as the 
possibility of being delivered from the finality of death, he is reluctant to admit completely to 
such outright prohibitions. If Adrian is indeed saved at the end of the novel, having reached 
his intended fulfillment or moment of ripeness, then the vehicle for this salvation must
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what Heidegger calls authenticity or Eigentlichkeit, for it is only authentically that Dasein 
may grasp itself as whole and comport itself with resolute anticipation rather than flee that 
towards which is thrown – its own death. Thus to be authentically disposed towards one’s 
ownmost possibility is to embrace that which is still outstanding, the possibility of the 
impossibility of one’s existence (or even of one’s art). Heideggerian authenticity describes 
the manner in which Dasein “heightens the possibility, which Dasein is, to its extreme limit 
where it becomes boundless impossibility, namely, the impossibility of any existing as a 
definite potentiality-for-being” (Pöggeler 44). And one could certainly argue that in Adrian’s 
diabolical pact, in his coldness and isolation, in his morbid preoccupation with death and his 
feverish distance from society that he embodies a Dasein poised in resolute anticipation of its 
own end.  
Thus the only way for Dasein to get around the infinite deferral of the end is to 
anticipate it or to bring it to oneself; like the fruit which never goes unfulfilled, Adrian brings 
himself to ripeness through his willing self-destruction (and yet, like the ripening fruit, 
despite himself). This dynamic is especially evident in the fact that even Zeitblom sees some 
measure of authenticity in both Esmerelda’s choice to warn Adrian against himself and in 
Adrian’s resolve to embrace the “ill-fated creature” of his imagination, Haetera Esmerelda, 
the name which corresponds to the dominant musical motif around which both his twelve-
tone expressions as well as Adrian’s life are organized: “a trace of love’s purification” 
[“Einschlag von Liebesläuterung”] (DF 164/205) and “the bond of love [that lent] some 
shimmer of human soul” [“einer Liebesbindung […], was […] einen Schimmer des 
Seelenhaften verlieh”] (DF 164/206-7) to Adrian’s fateful choice and interaction. According 
to Zeitblom, this trace saves Adrian from certain damnation, and the musical motif in which 
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this potential is inscribed can thus not be said to represent either irresolution or atemporality 
but rather signals the active resolve of a human spirit deeply concerned with the time which it 
essentially is. Such an authentic temporality is also displayed in the tale of Nepomuk 
Schneidewein, or Echo, Adrian’s nephew; and the return here of the question of ripeness is 
not unimportant, for the theme itself returns when Zeitblom relates the story of Echo’s death 
(DF 489) – the event, remember, that Scaff associates most explicitly with facilitating 
Adrian’s salvation by evoking within him the powerful love that had until that moment been 
denied him.92  
Like the infection growing in Adrian’s body, the true impact of such a temporality 
remains latent throughout most of Adrian’s career. It gathers its fullest clarity and 
significance only with his final composition, The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus, and with 
the death and transfiguration of his nephew Echo, which inspires both its success and 
completion. It is well known that The Lamentation is Adrian’s breakthrough. However, it is 
not in spite of the twelve-tone that Adrian escapes the diabolical circularity of the 
Apocalypse oratorio, as most critics of the novel suggest it is, but through it, because of it. 
Moreover, the musical motif that guided the Brentano lieder guides The Lamentation even 
more decisively and has its narrative parallel in the story of Echo and in the ongoing affinity 
between love and death that signals for Heidegger the very essence of Sorge. Indeed, the 
crisis of representation in modern art, the truth about the relationship between art and reality, 
between art and life, is for Mann all too real, and his awareness of it is crystallized in the 
tragic events that describe the coming and going of Adrian’s angelic young nephew.  
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 See John Fetzer’s “Music, Love, Death, and Mann's Doctor Faustus” for a closer look at the intersection in 
the novel between music, love and death. 
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The little boy’s name is mentioned very early on in the novel and tactically throughout as 
a prelude to his symbolic significance. Echo’s death effectively closes the novel – it can be 
argued that nothing happens after that, there is no more talk of art; what follows Echo’s death 
is Adrian’s less than triumphant attempt to introduce the world to his most accomplished 
effort, The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus, which ends, tragically, in silence, failure and the 
final onset of Adrian’s ultimate decay. Echo’s life and fate are of course closely linked with 
both Adorno’s and Mann’s speculations on the fate of art in modern culture.  What is 
personified in the character of Echo is both the mortality of art, which, like the young 
nephew, must age, become rigid, and die (AT 6) and also the impossibility of art in the 
modern world, a prohibition upheld in the Devil’s insistence upon Echo’s death and his being 
stripped away from Adrian. Echo is like the little servant in the story told to him by Adrian, 
the “little spirit [who] had no age, but was the same delicate child of the air both before and 
after his imprisonment” [“der Kleine habe kein Alter gehabt, sondern sei vor und nach der 
Gefangenschaft immer dasselbe zierliche Kind der Lüfte gewesen”] (DF 493/621). “Yes, he 
comes from a long way off” [“Ja, der ist weither”] (DF 492/619), Adrian says, emphasizing 
the untimely nature of the boy, who, like the work of art itself, is at once an autonomous 
thing of beauty and an object constrained by the “imprisonment” of history (of having-been), 
both free to anticipate its own immortality and subject to disintegration over time, “fated to 
ripen and fall prey to things of this earth” [“der beschieden war, zu reifen und dem Irdischen 
zu verfallen”] (DF 489/615). Nepomuk is often described as an object of beauty “new to this 
earth” [“auf Erden noch Neuen”] (DF 487/614) and yet somehow “strikingly finished and 
definitive” [“Ausgeprägt-Fertiges und Gültiges””] (DF 484/609). His musical voice and 
archaic manner of speech, according to Zeitblom, “although utterly charming often tended to 
  163
make his meaning seem obscure and enigmatic” [“eher verwischenden und verfremdenden 
und dabei höchst anmutigen”] (DF 484/609).  
In the end Echo is indescribable, calling to Zeitblom’s mind “language’s inadequacy at 
making things visible” [“Untauglichkeit der Sprache […], Sichtbarkeit zu erreichen”] (DF 
484/609); in fact, rather than attempting a portrait of Echo, Zeitblom, like the cherub who 
gazes into the “abyss of God’s eternal resolve” (DF 172) simply states that “tears well up in 
[his] eyes at the thought of him” [“die Tränen mir in die Augen treten beim Gedanken an 
ihn”] (DF 484/609-10). For Zeitblom there was something in Nepomuk Schneidewein “that 
made one incapable of believing in time, in its vulgar work and its power over this gracious 
presence […] That presence could not deny the inevitability of growth, but it found refuge in 
a conceptual sphere that is mythic and timeless, where all things are simultaneous and abide 
in parallel” (DF 489).93 Zeitblom’s optimism here is certainly not shared by Adrian, who is 
completely disconcerted by his very deep love for Echo and who knows that both the love 
itself as well as the object of that love are forbidden by history, which is perhaps the reason 
why, as time passes in the novel, Adrian relinquishes his arrogant propensity for coldness and 
laughter and betrays instead a rather alarming warmth and seriousness, especially with 
respect to Echo, around whom, Adrian says, “There is no reason to laugh” [“Ist auch kein 
Grund zum Lachen”] (DF 485/611). In short, the possibility of art and love in the modern 
world are at least in one sense violently negated in Echo’s premature death.  
Echo, then, is symbolic of art, life, desire and mortality personified in the process by 
which beauty is deformed, love denied, and art made the study of the impossible. Nepomuk 
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 “was einen auβerstand setzte, an die Zeit und ihr gemeines Werk, an ihre Macht über diese holde Erscheinung 
zu glauben […]  Sie konnte die Unvermeidlichkeit des Wachstums nicht leugnen, aber sie rettete sich in eine 
Vorstellungssphäre des Mythisch-Zeitlosen, Gleichzeitigen und neben einander Bestehenden” (DF 616). 
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is many things: a young nephew, a muse, and insofar as Adrian covets him like an object, not 
involving himself in the actual care of the child, who after all is a real boy, Echo is the work 
of art. But then it is not his illusory qualities, not his similarities with the artwork or art in 
general, that give him his true significance; it is the reality of Echo – the tragic beauty that 
more than any other confirms the human, a beauty that is situated squarely in the world of 
time and exists very well right in front of one in the flesh and blood of this dying child; such 
a beauty is the truth of one’s inability to protect the beloved, to alter the outcome of its 
destiny and the impossibility of art to ever assuage the reality of its own disappearance. The 
story of Echo reflects in pristine clarity the Devil’s pronouncement on the state of artistic 
possibility in the modern period, on the negation of art by life, that “[o]nly what is not 
fictitious, not a game, is still permissible – the unfeigned and untransfigured expression of 
suffering in its real moment.” 
Echo is indeed a reminder that the game is no longer permissible, that the authenticity 
of Adrian’s encounter with Echo is certified in its revocation, but only because and not in 
spite of his love, both the prohibition placed upon it and the irrevocable will toward it. And 
since Echo is himself characterized by a distinct temporality, like the temporality of Adrian’s 
wound, the pact between love and death is, too. Isn’t this what is meant when the Devil says 
that art has its conscience set against illusions and games, that art wants to stop being illusion 
and to become, rather, comprehension, and isn’t this precisely what art does when it takes the 
form of Adrian’s beloved Echo, art as no longer a game, art as “unfeigned” and 
“untransfigured”? And isn’t this what Adrian is trying to accomplish with the twelve-tone, 
too, a stripping bare of ornamentation and of illusion that makes his final work, The 
Lamentation, a masterpiece and breakthrough, a breakthrough in which art merges so 
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imperceptibly with the reality of its loss? According to traditional readings of Echo’s 
significance in the novel, among them Scaff’s and Cobley’s, Adrian’s love for Echo is 
fundamentally opposed to the general thrust of the twelve-tone – the love is guided by 
narrative, whereas the musical style (inspired as it is by the Devil) is said to prohibit both 
love and any temporality associated with it, but it seems more likely that it is the prohibition 
that provokes the love, the prohibition out of which the love grows. This is a subtle 
distinction but one that nevertheless has ramifications for understanding and interpreting the 
complexity of Mann’s “most beloved character.”  
In conclusion, the authentic meaning of narrative time must be found within the strict 
style itself, a plausible claim given the infamous ambiguity of its status in the novel; it is 
itself a “timely” caring on the end for the sake of humanity. When critics argue that the 
problem of narrating time in both novels is a matter of “engaging the soul in recognizable 
experiences apart from the aesthetically ordered psychological impulsions of dodecaphony” 
(Scaff 82) or of portraying “a human being’s (a character’s) moment-to-moment experience” 
(Cohn 210), they fail to appreciate the way the strenger Satz in the one novel and the idea of 
Bildung in the earlier novel function as history and as fate or the way these tropes “secrete” 
historicity (Ziarek) and a psychology of Sorge. Consequently, Dasein’s caring, both for its 
own time and for the time that it always already is, is exposed in the “psychological 
impulsion” of the strenger Satz and in the so-called “timelessness” that permeates The Magic 
Mountain. As a result, these readings also fail to register the authentic meaning of 
temporality as grounding rather than negating or destroying the so-called narrative impetus 
that motivates meaning in the novels. Furthermore, when Scaff claims that “[Adrian’s] 
arrogance provokes him to configure the twelve-tone chromatic tones in a superhuman 
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‘cosmic’ order, but a deep longing to make human contact also keeps alive a latent melodic 
impulse,” she misses the crucial point that the development and the compositional form itself 
is grounded in precisely such a deep longing, as the novel reiterates many times, a longing 
that is far from being the opposite of that diabolical tendency which frightens Zeitblom, but 
at every moment is complicit with it and, in fact, refigures its devilry into something very 
different; remember, too, that what strikes Zeitblom most about his friend’s life and fate is 
the greatness and intensity of his deep love for the world, that both the most angelic and the 
most disturbing aspects of Adrian’s character and predicament are somehow always 
grounded first and foremost in this love, or better perhaps, in something very much like what 
Heidegger calls Sorge. 
Adrian’s unconditional love forcefully recalls the prohibition and limit it has always 
stood for, the prohibition of human finitude and being-towards-death, of which the story of 
Echo is the novel’s most dramatic example. On the one hand, as Adrian’s emotional response 
to Echo’s death, the Lamentation has its source in an extreme anxiety over both the 
premature loss of the nephew as well as the remorse attached to Adrian’s responsibility for 
that loss. In this way, too, Echo’s death serves as another reminder of Adrian’s certain fate 
even while the Lamentation functions as a narrative deferral of this certainty because it 
translates and embodies the guilt that is bound up with his survival and continuing. On the 
other hand, Adrian’s freedom towards death is clearly communicated in and through the 
Lamentation inasmuch as in it he looks forward to the moment when he will be delivered 
from the suffering that he essentially is. Echo is indeed impossible, and the Lamentation is an 
ode to this loss and the guilt that it signifies and leaves behind as a remainder. 
  
Chapter IV 
Authenticity and the Jargon of History 
 
 
Historicism’s ardent distrust of Heideggerian essentialism, a legacy of suspicion that 
includes the full scope of the Heidegger controversy as well as extended evaluations, such as 
Adorno’s influential critique of Heidegger’s metaphysics, poses many challenges to a reading 
that hopes to treat Heidegger’s theory of history as if its interpretive potential had not been 
exhausted, as if the whole matter of Heidegger had not yet been decided. And it is no less 
interesting, though perhaps it is mere coincidence, that the same confidence (of closure, of 
having reached an end) suffuses the entire atmosphere of Mann criticism, especially where 
The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus are concerned (Fetzer et al.). Nevertheless, since 
Heidegger’s idiosyncratic interpretation of history has never been read against the 
contemporary background of Mann’s celebrated historical novels (nor has it ever been 
explained in terms of its own historical contingency), it is my aim in what follows to show 
how at least one opening can be found in a reading that juxtaposes the two and explains one 
in terms of the other. 
Just as in the previous chapter, where I ventured to interpret Hans Castorp’s and 
Adrian Leverkühn’s fate and the problem of closure in the novels in terms of being-towards-
death, my purpose here is to show that Mann’s novels also help to illuminate Heidegger’s 
theory of historicality [Geschichte, Geschichtlichkeit], a theory which in turn helps to reopen 
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the question of history in the novels. Among other things, the novels appear to stage and 
potentially reconcile, in their own way of course, the conflict between historical materialism, 
which requires that historical conditions of specificity guide and accompany any authentic 
(i.e. critical) understanding of the past, and the so-called metaphysical “jargon” of an 
altogether different sort of authenticity that Heidegger describes as flowing out of the basic 
historicity of the individual. The novels answer, along with Heidegger, that these historical 
conditions of specificity tend always to confirm rather than contradict the specificity of what 
it means to be historical in the first place (and precisely in the sense indicated by Heidegger). 
But first I must lay out separately (and briefly recall), as I do in my introductory 
chapter, both the historical context from which any reading of Mann’s and Heidegger’s 
respective concerns with history must necessarily emerge as well as the character and nature 
of Heidegger’s understanding of history and of what it means to be historical. For 
Heidegger’s part, this means providing a brief explanation of both his advancement of 
Dilthey’s sense of life and history as well as his break from Husserlian phenomenology and a 
Bergsonian and Einsteinean relativity; and for Mann’s part, this means providing a brief 
explanation of his narratives’ changing disposition with respect to history and historical 
meaning during the period that begins with The Magic Mountain and ends with the 
publication of Doctor Faustus. The changes that make up this evolution are generally 
attributed to the influence of Mann’s readings of Benjamin and Adorno and to the 
accompanying development of Mann’s own peculiar brand of historicism, which is why 
scholars typically see the “[nur] einmal historisch” approach of the earlier novel as giving 
way to a more thoroughly material, durchdringendes historicism in the later novel (e.g. 
Bergsten et al.).  
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Scholarly approaches that insist on the correspondence between Adorno’s and 
Mann’s shared understanding of history during the composition of Doctor Faustus (an 
insistence, by the way, that I know is not only justified and productive but at the same time 
historical and attested) nevertheless risk overlooking that aspect of Mann’s engagement with 
history that resonates with a Heideggerian conception of history. To articulate the link 
between Heidegger’s historical ontology and Mann’s treatment of history in The Magic 
Mountain and (especially) Doctor Faustus is in fact at the same time to acknowledge the 
Adorno-Heidegger debate, the key features of which must at some point be acknowledged in 
any contemporary critical analysis of Heidegger. Consequently, it may be shown that the 
problematic relationship between Mann’s and Adorno’s ideas of history helps to illuminate 
Adorno’s famous critique of Heidegger’s jargon of authenticity and that Mann’s treatment of 
history in the novels under consideration, instead of slavishly describing an Adornian 
historicism, may be said to operate somewhere between a Heideggerian and Adornian 
conception of history. Moreover, a rereading of Mann’s representation(s) of history may 
serve us to dispense with the debate altogether by helping to show that the presumed 
opposition between history and ontology is somehow always already resolved and in such a 
way, in fact, as Heidegger had already emphasized with his persistent claim that history is 
not only not the enemy of being, but that being as such is first and foremost historical. 
Most critical assessments of Heidegger’s understanding of history rightly begin with 
his detailed exposition of the Dilthey-Count Yorck correspondence from 1877-97, from 
which Heidegger borrows one of his most emphatic and significant claims, namely, that we 
are history [“Wir sind Geschichte”] (DF 174), or that Dasein is history [“Dasein ist 
Geschichte”] (BZ 86).  For Heidegger, however, although Dilthey was certainly right to 
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emphasize the essentially historical nature of human existence [Dasein], Dilthey never 
ventured to explain the ontological conditions that such a historicity presumes, which is to 
say, what it means to be historical. This task, Heidegger thought, was left to him and would 
be emphasized in both his lectures on The Concept of Time and the subsequent Being and 
Time as well. The impact of Dilthey’s insight, according to Heidegger, in addition to being 
valid in its own right, also helped Heidegger to establish the significance of his own 
philosophical efforts with respect to rewriting time and history over and against the views of 
his mentor, Husserl, as well as the other subjectivist intellectual currents of his day, namely, 
those set in motion by Bergson and Einstein.  
For Heidegger, Husserlian phenomenology was marked by a “Geschichtlosigkeit und 
–feindlichkeit” [“lack of history, even an animosity toward [it]]” (DF 176) and fell short 
precisely in so far as it dispensed with the past (and thus, too, with history) in its limited 
emphasis on the immediate data of consciousness, which by its very nature appeared to 
exclude or bracket out the past. Heidegger also offered up his own radical notion of history in 
opposition to Bergsonian conceptions of time. According to Stephen Kern, “Bergson based 
his theory of knowledge on the way we know ourselves in time […] and our ability to 
integrate the past in the present is one source of our freedom” (45-6). Time, for Bergson, 
which includes a past that is capable of being lost behind us, is something that both happens 
outside of us, or, even better, something in which we happen to be, and which only an 
authentic apprehension of duration enables us to recover and subsequently integrate: “It is 
into pure duration that we plunge back, a duration in which the past, always moving on, is 
swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new…We must, by a strong recoil of 
our personality on itself, gather up our past which is slipping away, in order to thrust it, 
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compact and undivided, into a present which it will create by entering” (qtd. in Kern 46; CE 
219). Furthermore, as the passage above indicates Bergsonian duration privileges only the 
private, psychic past of the individual and takes little notice of the historical context of the 
ontological and material processes that such an apprehension presupposes. Bergson’s 
primary oversight, according to Heidegger, lies in his misunderstanding this mobility as 
something in which being happens as opposed to being as this happening itself, being as a 
sort of duration-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, time is neither something in which 
human being takes place nor is the past merely that which is no longer but which is capable 
of being reified and integrated into one’s present experience. In a much more fundamental 
sense, the past is always already integrated insofar as Dasein is its own past [“eigene 
Vergangenheit”](DF 174) and the private past of the individual is thoroughly determined by 
and inseparable from the historical processes in the world (in) which Dasein always already 
is. 
Thus, too, according to Heidegger, the real discovery uncovered by Einstein’s theory 
of special relativity is the conflict that arises when time is said to be both local, i.e. to depend 
upon the place where it is measured, as well as constitutive of universal motion and change 
(DF 172-3/Becoming 269-70). But for Heidegger this exposes not so much an impassable 
obstacle but rather a truth of a very different nature. Whereas for Einstein the place from 
which the relative motion of time must be measured is the position of a stationary subject in 
the world, for Bergson the psychic motion of that observer is itself characterized by constant 
flux and a pure and ongoing qualitative mobility; consequently, one could argue that in 
seeking to reconcile this apparent contradiction Heidegger proposes time as relative to the 
movement of a subject that is not within time but that is time itself. This is why I pointed out 
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earlier that Einstein’s oversight (due in part to his own goals and motives) was not to 
consider the relative motion of the subject from which an authentic time was supposed to be 
measured. For Heidegger, the motion of being-there (Dasein) is always relative to a future – 
in being towards the future, Dasein is this future; moreover, claims Heidegger, and in stark 
opposition to a Bergsonian line of argumentation, it is not so much that we “gather up our 
past which is slipping away, in order to thrust it, compact and undivided” into the future; 
rather, it is the future out of which any idea of the past must emerge: 
Das Vorlaufen ist eine Bewegung, die das Dasein in seiner eigenen Zukunft 
ausführt. Dies Vor-sich-selbst-gehen ist die Grundbewegung, aus der 
Geschichte entsteht, denn durch es wird die Vergangenheit aufgedeckt. […] 
Unsere Zukunft legt aus der Vergangenheit heraus. Wir tragen an der 
Vergangenheit” (DF 174).94 
This is, I believe, the best way of describing the way Heidegger moves beyond both 
Bergson and Einstein as well as Dilthey and Husserl to prepare the way for a radical new 
conception of time and one that radically opens new ways of reading the past and thus, too, 
not only Thomas Mann but narrative more generally. So this is where Heidegger stood in 
1924 when Mann, too, was on the verge of publishing his self-described time-novel The 
Magic Mountain, which would become, along with Joyce’s Ulysses, Proust’s Remembrance 
of Things Past, Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway and Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, a model 
example of the genre. Nevertheless, it can be shown that Mann’s treatment of time and 
history in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus helps to illuminate Heidegger’s response 
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 “Anticipatory running forward is a movement that Dasein carries out in its own future. This getting-ahead-of-
itself is the basic movement from which history arises, for it is by way of its going-forth that the past is 
uncovered. […] Our future is lived out of the past. We carry the past with us” (Becoming 268-271). 
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to and revaluation of these conventional modernist approaches to time and history and vice-
versa, and thus Heidegger and Mann may be read together in this context as venturing a more 
radical conception of time and history than is usually assumed to be the case. 
      It would be difficult to argue that Thomas Mann in 1924 did not also take history 
seriously. T. J. Reed’s classic study The Uses of Tradition better than perhaps any other lays 
out the complicated way in which The Magic Mountain traces Mann’s own shifting political 
“education” (the title of Reed’s chapter on the novel) with respect to the historical events in 
Germany during the long period of its composition (1912-1924) before, during and after the 
great war which erupts at the ending of the novel. The distinction between the representation 
of history in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus lies rather in the complexity of its 
function within both novels. In 1924, Mann states that The Magic Mountain is only on the 
one hand a historical novel in so far is it sought to throw into relief the inner life of the pre-
war European society whose “Dionysian coziness” (interestingly described as such in Doctor 
Faustus) left it both vulnerable, unprepared and also somehow responsible for the 
unprecedentedly violent historical actuality it was unconsciously preparing. But it is clear 
that the relationship of historical reality to the narrative world of the novel was a merely 
analogical one and that history as such is marginally present in the novel and takes a sort of 
backseat to the novel’s abstract disputations on die reine Zeit selbst and the Bildung of its 
protagonist. In a sense, then, as the title of Reed’s chapter on Doctor Faustus suggests, the 
portrayal and function of history in the later novel constitutes a “reckoning” with the ultimate 
consequences both of misapprehending the true potential of those inchoate historical forces 
that erupted in 1914 and thus, too, with the naiveté and incompleteness of that earlier part of 
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the author’s and protagonist’s “education” in the matters of history, in particular, German 
history.  
Coupled with the historical urgency of the rise of National Socialism and Mann’s 
growing proximity to the historical events themselves (despite his ironic distance from them 
– since the novel was written in America) was Mann’s continuing education in philosophies 
of history during the composition of Doctor Faustus. His readings of Adorno and Benjamin, 
among others, not only influenced his treatment of the subject in Doctor Faustus but also, as 
the author himself points out, only augmented and reinforced his own developing 
understanding of the dialectical forces at work in history (Entstehung 46). Thus it bears 
repeating that although the two novels clearly are dealing with the same threat at various 
stages of its historical development, i.e. the conservative psychological and cultural forces 
that underlay the historical emergence of National Socialism, including the cult of death 
dramatized in the ritual cure of the Berghof, the latter novel certainly proffers a more direct 
and intimate relation between history and narrative. And several scholars, among them 
Ehrhard Bahr, describe this shift as moving from a Nietzschean to an Adornian perspective 
(145-6).  
The influence of Adorno’s Philosophy of Modern Music on Mann’s composition is 
well-known, but Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama on Doctor Faustus also 
shaped Mann’s thinking on the function of history. In fact, Adorno introduces Philosophy of 
Modern Music with a respectful recognition of Benjamin’s work. Among other things, what 
Adorno and Benjamin set out to do is to show that neither music nor the idea of the tragic, 
respectively, are governed by natural laws that operate independently from historical 
processes, and their revelations are directly related with what Mann in Doctor Faustus sets 
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out to do with his allegorical conflation of Adrian’s musical compositions and Germany’s 
historical fate.95  
The attempt, unthought in The Magic Mountain, where Mann’s intentions with 
respect to history were purely representative insofar as the novel was “[nur] einmal 
historisch, indem er das innere Bild einer Epoche, der europäischen Vorkriegszeit, zu 
entwerfen versucht” (GW.XII.441) and meant to serve as a sort of “Schwanengesang [einer] 
Existenzform” and in which music functioned only as a formal leitmotif and sensual 
ornamentation (GW.XII.435), was to demonstrate that historical necessity lies latent in the 
material of history and music itself (Adorno [Schoenberg] 41), that there are irreversible 
historical tendencies present both in the work of art and in the cultural attitudes that produce 
it. Just as Mann recognizes his own preoccupations in Benjamin’s acknowledgement that the 
Baroque Trauerspiel and Elizabethan tragedy necessarily preserve traces of medieval 
religious dogma and ritual (Entstehung 187), he sympathizes with Adorno’s insistence that 
“the twelve-tone system is a product of historical necessity. Its origin was the next logical 
step following late nineteenth-century chromaticism” (Mitchell and Blomster ix). As a result 
of this shift in Mann’s understanding of history, it becomes clear that The Magic Mountain 
can not be the “Schwanengesang” it was meant to be and that, in fact, within this 
“Existenzform” that Mann claims in 1939 is no longer liveable lie latent the historical forces 
that erupt in that same year and that eventually provoke Mann’s taking up the task of writing 
Doctor Faustus. Insofar as this task involves an elaboration of these radical new proposals 
about the function of history and his exploration of the fundamental inextricability of 
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historical, social and aesthetic forces, Doctor Faustus is said to be a historical novel through 
and through, and thus “[nicht nur] einmal historisch.”  
But again this is not to say that with Doctor Faustus Mann dispenses with his interest 
in time as such. Although Mann’s move toward a dialectical reading of history is typically 
said to do just that, it is my point here that despite the well-known debate between Adorno 
and Heidegger on the subject of history, what Mann achieves in Doctor Faustus is certainly 
not the doing away with a focus on die reine Zeit selbst in favor of a purely material history. 
Rather Doctor Faustus seems to suggest that even the idea of time as such, distinguished 
sharply from the author’s “einmal historisch” intentions in The Magic Mountain, is shown to 
be inextricably bound to the same historical necessity that lies concealed in its material 
content. And the way in which Mann goes about describing this inextricability in the novel 
not only echoes and helps to elaborate Heidegger’s claim that “Dasein is history,” but it also 
helps to explain why Adorno’s philosophy of history confirms rather than contradicts 
Heidegger’s. And it is also why Reed’s statement about the paradoxical relationship between 
German history and Mann’s private past is really not paradoxical at all: “It is paradoxical that 
a body of work […] so narrowly preoccupied with the problems of the writer’s self […] 
should also contain so much history” (Reed, “History” 1). Reed’s rather benign recognition is 
also taken up by critics of Heidegger’s historical ontology, such as Adorno and Eagleton,96 
for whom a Heideggerian metaphysics of history dispenses with actual historical conditions 
and by critics, such as Lukacs, who makes the claim in a postscript to the 1953 edition of The 
Historical Novel (1937), of which Doctor Faustus is treated as a prime but unique example, 
that the only true path toward understanding the human character of a work is first and 
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 See Adorno’s Jargon of Authenticity, Negative Dialectics, and Metaphysics, especially. See also Terry 
Eagleton’s Literary Theory (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 2003. 53-7). 
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foremost through laying bare the “objective connections and material content” of the larger 
matrix of material social conditions in which this character was cultivated and made possible 
(306). Nevertheless, as I will attempt to explain below, the rigid distinction between the 
collective (social, political, etc.) forces of history and the private history of the individual for 
Heidegger (and Mann, too) collapses under the weight of Heidegger’s insistence that 
“History happens to me. I am this happening” [“Geschichte geschieht mit mir selbst; ich bin 
dieses Geschehen”] (DF 174). 
 
Heidegger, Geschichte, Eigentlichkeit 
Although it was appropriate to begin a Heideggerian reading of the dilemma of 
closure in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus with a detailed examination of being-
towards-death, being-towards-death is only one of the critical moments in the complex 
triadic structure of Heideggerian temporality. Being-towards-death cannot be adequately 
interpreted outside of its interdependence with the other so-called ecstases of temporality – 
thrownness or being-already-in-the-world and fallenness or being-alongside-the-world, all of 
which together form the tripartite unity of die Sorge. This chapter deals with the first of these 
moments and its entanglement with being-towards-death and both narrative and historical 
possibility in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus.  
If the existential possibility of authenticity is based upon the disclosure of Dasein to 
itself as being-towards-death (BT 294), then this possibility is essentially and always a 
thrown possibility, and as such conceals from Dasein its having already been “delivered over 
to its [own] death” (BT 295). The be thrown into a world is one of the cornerstones of a 
Heideggerian temporality; by having been thrown Heidegger means to say that the remotest 
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origins of our past lie shrouded in mystery and that we ourselves, without having made the 
choice to be, are thrust into the trajectory of this world, our world, unawares and always 
underway. What Heidegger calls thrownness is indicative of Dasein’s a priori being-there, 
which finds Dasein always already an entity in the world which cannot possibly get behind 
itself to a point in time in which it was not already Dasein. Instead, it remains the thrown 
projection of its own past, “eine Erstreckung” [“a stretching along”] prohibited from 
knowing either its beginning or its end (SZ 427). And this thrownness [Geworfenheit] is also 
the basis of a Heideggerian theory of history, for it is only because Dasein has been thrown 
into a world, the momentum of which gathers up more and more of its past as it comes 
towards its future, that Dasein must grasp itself as “human, historical Dasein,” and it is 
precisely the history that it is that Dasein in its authenticity must dare to interpret and engage: 
“Die Zugangsmöglichkeit zur Geschichte gründet in der Möglichkeit, nach der es eine 
Gegenwart jeweils versteht, zukünftig zu sein. Das ist der erste Satz aller Hermeneutik” (BZ 
123).97 
In his Kassel lectures of 1924 (which constitute the earliest expression of themes that 
would eventually surface with even more fanfare and a much broader audience in The 
Concept of Time and then, ultimately, Being and Time), Heidegger set for himself two tasks. 
The first was to reinterpret the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence in such a way as to illuminate 
and advance his own distinctive views of time and history, and the second was for the first 
time to describe what he saw as a sharp and all important distinction between two typically 
synonymous German terms: Geschichte and Historie. These two tasks were of course very 
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each time [jeweils] understands how […] to be futural. This is the first principle of all hermeneutics” 
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closely related in so far as Geschichte was intended to denote precisely that lived history 
which Heidegger understood Count Yorck to indicate with his claim that Dasein is in fact its 
own history, while Historie would suffice to refer to that history which is supposedly lost and 
recovered in being written about, recorded, even remembered – in short, the sort of history 
that is the basis of both our everyday way of remembering the past and of historical science. 
Geschichte refers to what Heidegger understands as the ontological basis for both private 
memory as well as any public consent over and preoccupation with the scientific 
interpretations of the past; it is what is meant by being-historical, and it is only because 
Dasein is a priori temporal in this way that it has a past for memory to recall or a past that 
makes the development of historiology as a science both possible and probable (SZ 381, 
389). Dasein’s historicity or historizing is an ongoing happening which Dasein at all times is 
(Kisiel, Becoming, 239-40), and a Heideggerian Geschichte thus refers to the “historical 
existence that we happen to be and are thus called upon to be and to live out” (Kisiel, 
Becoming, 487).  
That this distinction first appears in the Kassel lectures delivered around the same 
time as the publication of Mann’s The Magic Mountain is certainly not a mere coincidence. 
As Theodore Kisiel points out, the title of the lectures themselves, “Wilhelm Diltheys 
Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung” 
[“Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview”], 
demonstrates that Heidegger’s goals are “not motivated by antiquarian interests, but always 
in relation to the ‘current struggle’ on the intellectual front” in Germany” (Becoming 241). 
Consequently, Heidegger’s intentions and the historical specificity with and in which they 
are invested coincide quite meaningfully with the historical context, atmosphere and 
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narrative thrust of Mann’s novel(s) during the period that begins and ends with The Magic 
Mountain and Doctor Faustus, respectively. What Kisiel calls the “practical upshot” of the 
lectures lies in their emphasis on bracketing and redefining what a historical worldview 
might mean in light of a post-war German world in which the First World War was generally 
regarded by intellectuals, including Mann, as a battle of contending worldviews, including 
the well-known contest between Mann and his brother Heinrich, which was very literally 
played out during the entire period of the The Magic Mountain’s composition. In fact, it may 
be said that Castorp’s Bildung involves in part negotiating the historical worldviews thrust 
upon him by Naphta and Settembrini and in the end being resolved to submit to neither 
(Reed). Just as Mann wished to attribute the historical crises of pre-war European society to 
these irreconcilable worldviews and the static impasse they described, Heidegger, too, 
understood the crisis of the European sciences immediately following the war as lying first 
and foremost in its lack of insight into the ontological ground that make such historical 
worldviews possible in the first place. In other words, Mann and Heidegger were not only 
interested in the conditions that underlay the aggressive interpretations of history that 
comprised either side of the political and intellectual debates of the day, but, more generally 
speaking, both were responding to the same cultural-historical milieu, the currency of which 
punctuates the urgency of their work.  
Heidegger remarks, for instance, that the sort of historical thinking that gives way to 
the potential of a historische worldview always already presumes an ontological sense of 
being-historical that the history of philosophy had yet to elaborate or even recognize: 
   Historische Weltanschauung ist eine solche, in der das Wissen um die 
Geschichte die Auffassung von Welt und Dasein bestimmt. Sie gründet in 
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dem geschichtlichen Charakter der Weltentwicklung und des menschlichen 
Daseins. – Kampf besagt Kampf um die Erringung einer solchen Position aus 
dem Wissen um den geschichtlichen Charakter von Welt and Dasein.  Er geht 
darauf, die bestimmenden Mächte der Geschichte zu den primären für die 
Überzeugungsbildung und das Daseinsbewuβtsein zu machen. Das ist nur da 
möglich, wo die Geschichte als eigene Wirklichkeit in das menschliche 
Bewuβtsein [schon] getreten ist. [….] Erst wenn Geschichte so gesehen wird, 
daβ die eigene Wirklichkeit in diesen Zusammenhang mit hineingesehen wird, 
kann man sagen, daβ das Leben um die Geschichte, in der es steht, weiβ, daβ 
ein historisches Bewuβtsein da ist. Die eigene Epoche wird erfahren als 
Situation, in der die Gegenwart selbst steht, und das nicht nur gegenüber der 
Vergangenheit, sondern zugleich als Situation, in der sich die Zukunft 
entscheiden wird bzw. entschieden hat. So ist das Wachwerden und Wachsein 
des historischen Bewuβtseins nicht selbstverständlich und dem Leben 
gegeben. Es ist vielmehr eine Aufgabe, es zu entwickeln. (DF 145)98 
The analysis that follows will hope merely to show that, with respect to the earlier novel, 
what Castorp learns in his time at the Berghof is the inauthenticity of the historical 
(historisches) worldview, which he exchanges for a more authentic historical 
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 A historical worldview is one in which the knowledge of history determines our conception of the world and 
of existence, Dasein. It is based on the historical sense of the development of the world and of human Dasein. 
Struggle in this context means a struggle to attain a position based on our knowledge of the historical character 
of the world and of Dasein. It is a matter of making the determining forces of history primary in the shaping of 
convictions and in the consciousness of Dasein. That is possible only when history has [already] pervaded 
human consciousness as its most unique reality. [….] There is historical [geschichtliche] consciousness only 
when one’s own reality is viewed within its historical context such that human life knows about the history in 
which it stands. One’s own epoch is experienced as a situation in which the present itself stands, and this not 
merely by standing over against the past, but at once standing in a situation in which the future will be decided 
or has been decided. Thus the awakening and vigilance of historical consciousness is not obvious and given in 
life. It is much more a task to be cultivated (Becoming 243-4). 
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(geschichtliches) self-knowledge in which what is disclosed to him is his own historicity in 
the Heideggerian sense, and this insight, I believe, is at least in part what Mann was hoping 
to achieve through the experience of his “kleiner Vorkriegsdeutscher” [“little, prewar 
German”] (Briefe 238); in fact, Heidegger explicitly states that “Es gehört zum Sinn des 
Menschen, nicht nur Bewuβtsein von der Welt zu haben, sondern darin mitbegriffen ein 
Wissen um sich selbst. Historisches Erkennen ist eine ausgeprägte Form des Wissens um sich 
selbst” (DF 153).99 One of my aims in what follows is to show that Heidegger’s view of 
history as Dasein and his view of historical knowledge as self-knowledge provide us with a 
useful lens through which to read Mann’s own conceptions of history, Bildung, and narrative 
subjectivities in The Magic Mountain just as Mann’s novels will help us to grasp the scope, 
significance, and, to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, the usefulness of Heidegger’s 
distinctive brand of history.  
As Heidegger points out, “time always temporalizes itself only at one time, as human, 
historical Dasein” (BT 89). This accords to time both a fundamental position with respect to 
any reference of history to the past as well as what Paul Ricoeur has called an “ontological 
density” that certifies the historicity of Dasein insofar as the past is always bound up with 
being-towards-death and thus makes the future a precondition of historical experience 
(Memory 347). As the previous chapter helps to explain, both Heideggerian temporality and 
the fundamental temporality of both novels under consideration here are grounded in the 
projected course of Castorp’s Bildung and in the decisiveness of Adrian Leverkühn’s fate as 
it is narrated by his lifelong friend, Zeitblom, and thus, too, in being-towards-the future, a 
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 “It belongs to the sense of being human not only to have a consciousness of the world [history] but also a 
knowledge of itself as an inherent dimension of this consciousness. And historical knowledge is a prominent 
form of self-knowledge” (Becoming 250). 
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coming-towards that is described in the very anticipation of such a fate, which is also the 
anticipation of Germany’s fate and, in the latter novel in particular, the fate of modern art. 
Yet, as I have already pointed out (and this is Heidegger’s most original insight into the 
nature of time), the past does not precede this future or coming-towards; rather, it is Dasein’s 
being-ahead-of-itself, its constantly coming towards its ownmost possibilities (the most 
extreme of which is its own death) out of which its past is uncovered and revealed: “Das 
eigentliche Sein zum Tode, das heiβt die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit, ist der verborgene 
Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins” (SZ 410).100  
Consequently, in this coming towards Dasein is never really past: 
‘Solange’ das Dasein faktisch existiert, ist es nie vergangen [….] Und es kann 
nur gewesen sein, solange es ist. Vergangen dagegen nennen wir Seiendes, 
das nicht mehr vorhanden ist. Daher kann sich das Dasein existierend nie als 
vorhandene Tatsache feststellen, die ‘mit der Zeit’ entsteht und vergeht und 
stückweise schon vergangen ist. Es ‘findet sich’ immer nur als geworfenes 
Faktum. In der Befindlichkeit wird das Dasein von ihm selbst überfallen als 
das Seiende, das es, noch seiend, schon war, das heiβt gewesen ständig ist. 
(SZ 434).101 
Heidegger cites at least two possible reasons for the derivation of historicality from the 
having-been of primordial temporality.  The first has to do with Dasein’s constant alienation 
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 “Authentic Being-towards-death – that is to say, the finitude of temporality – is the hidden basis of Dasein’s 
historicality” (BT 438). 
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 “‘As long as’ Dasein factically exists, it is never past [….] And only as long as Dasein is, can it be as having 
been. On the other hand , we call an entity ‘past’, when it is no longer present-at-hand. Therefore Dasein, in 
existing, can never establish itself as a fact which is present-at-hand, arising and passing away ‘in the course of 
time’, with a bit of it past already. Dasein never ‘finds itself’ except as a thrown Fact. In the state-of-mind in 
which it finds itself, Dasein is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was – that is to say, 
which it constantly is as having been” (BT 376). 
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from itself over what appears to be “the course of time.” Here Dasein recognizes that it is 
both the self it has always been and yet so changed, so distant from that “earlier” version of 
itself, and yet at the same time it lives unaware of its existential and temporal proximity to 
the future, unaware of its always coming towards itself.  That Dasein ist nie vergangen 
means that for Dasein, like Being itself, the past must always be an issue for it; moreover, 
this being an issue is always closely connected with Dasein’s understanding, with its 
projection toward its ownmost possibilities; thus Dasein’s past becomes for it the history that 
it has been and is yet to come.  
The second reason for the supposed derivation of historicality from primordial time is 
intimately tied to Dasein’s understanding of its own Erstreckung, or its situation in the 
interval between the “‘now’ of the beginning and that of the end’” (Ricoeur, Time 72). In 
fact, Heidegger writes, “Als Sorge ist Dasein das ‘Zwischen’” [As care, Dasein is the 
‘between’”] (SZ 495/BT 427).  It is in this stretching-along of life that Dasein sees the implicit 
and explicit connectedness of itself with the past and can anticipate its connectedness with a 
future, both of which culminate for Dasein in the possibility of historical narrative. But 
through his analysis of historicality, Heidegger shows that it is only because Dasein 
historicizes itself that history in the ordinary sense is meaningful for Dasein:  “[Dasein ist] 
nicht ‘zeitlich’ […], weil es ‘in der Geschichte steht’, sondern daβ es umgekehrt 
geschichtlich nur existiert und existieren kann, weil es im Grunde seines Seins zeitlich ist” 
(SZ 498).102 When, for instance, the time between birth and death is resituated within the 
context of die Sorge and primordial temporality, it ceases to be an interval between two 
distinct points of human experience, but rather it is seen to constitute and enable the very 
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possibility of that experience. Ricoeur explains: “Dasein does not fill up an interval of time 
but, by stretching-along, constitutes its true being as this very stretching-along, which 
envelops its own beginning and its own end, and gives meaning to life as “‘between’” (Time 
72; BT 426).  This stretching-along that constitutes Dasein and which emerges as a sort of 
Being-towards-the-beginning and in so doing at least partially usurps from the future its 
primacy in Dasein’s everyday disposition toward itself, is what Heidegger calls historicality, 
and its complicated situation within the hierarchy of temporal levels as both equiprimordial 
yet degraded only attests to the entanglement characteristic of Heidegger’s philosophy of 
time.  
In Being-towards-the-beginning, Heidegger specifies three processes of historicality 
that serve to both distinguish it from the ordinary understanding of history and historical 
science and also to further unite historicality with primordial temporality and the authentic 
meaning of care as such: these are heritage [Erbe, Erbschaft], repetition [Wiederholung] and 
destiny [Geschick]. Just as “[t]here is no impetus toward the future that does not turn back 
toward the condition of finding itself already thrown into the world” (Ricoeur, Time 74), nor 
can any impetus toward the past avoid coming toward itself as it is. Thus, as with the 
authentic future of Dasein, the coming-towards, whereby in resolute anticipation the future is 
ordained through conscience, responsibility and action, so too is the past or the having-been 
ordained by what Heidegger calls heritage, that source, Ricoeur explains, of “the innermost 
and most permanent possibilities held in reserve” (Time 74) that are handed down from 
Dasein to itself in the moment of fate and to a group or nation in the deliverance of destiny. 
For this reason, when it is said that in the anticipation of its future Dasein returns only to find 
itself thrown into the world, it would be more accurate and compelling to say a world, a 
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particular realm of possibilities forcefully conditioned by the specificity of Dasein’s own 
spatio-temporality. Put another way, Pöggeler writes, “To be historical means to have a 
destiny, to anticipate death, to let oneself be thrown back upon the factical There and its 
finitude, to surrender to traditional possibilities, and thus to exist ‘in an insightful moment’ 
for one’s own time […]” (46).   
The priority accorded to authentic being-towards-death is unique in that the future or 
coming-towards for Heidegger is always bound to and includes the past as having-been in all 
of its concreteness. This is clearly the case with the inextricable relationship that semantically 
and etymologically links authentic history, Geschichte, with the future-oriented coming-
towards of fate, Schicksal, and destiny, Geschick. As Ricoeur explains, “The passage from 
the future to the past no longer constitutes an extrinsic transition because ‘having-been’ 
appears to be called for by the future as ‘coming-towards,’ and in a sense, to be contained 
within it” (Time 69). More specifically, in authentic being-towards-death, it is shown that 
Dasein’s anticipatory resoluteness, essentially its freedom, is delimited by its having already 
been thrown into a world towards which Dasein is always moving insofar as it is always 
ahead-of-itself. But for Heidegger to be authentic means also to be Self-constant and 
resolute, which is to say that, although Dasein cannot get behind its thrownness, it is able to 
take it over through a constant returning (repetition) to that which it already was or that 
which it always has been (BT 373; Ricoeur, Time 69-70, Pöggeler 46): 
Wenn zum Sein des Daseins das eigentliche bzw. uneigentliche Sein zum Tode 
gehört, dann ist dieses nur möglich als zukünftiges […]. ‘Zukünftiges’ meint 
hier nicht ein Jetzt, das, noch nicht ‘wirklich’ geworden, einmal erst sein wird, 
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sondern die Kunft, in der das Dasein in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen auf sich 
zukommt. [….] 
   [Aber] Nur sofern Dasein überhaupt ist als ich bin-gewesen, kann es 
zukünftig auf sich selbst so zukommen, daβ er zurück-kommt. Eigentlich 
zukünftig ist das Dasein eigentlich gewesen. [….] Dasein kann nur eigentlich 
gewesen sein, sofern es zukünftig ist. Die Gewesenheit entspring in gewisser 
Weise der Zukunft. (SZ 430-31)103 
Moreover, the essence of this interdependence in Heidegger between the future and the past 
is bound to notions of conscience and guilt. Otto Pöggeler writes:  
Conscience attests to the fact that Dasein can be itself in an authentic manner. By the 
‘call’ of conscience, Dasein calls itself forth into its unique potentiality-for-being, 
into ‘resoluteness.’ It is thereby understood that Dasein is ‘guilty’ [schuldig]. This 
‘Being-guilty’ [Schuldigsein] does not indicate moral guilt, but is meant in an entirely 
formal manner as ‘Being-the-basis for a being which is determined by a not [….] 
[T]his nullity arises from the fact that Dasein has not itself thrown the thrownness 
which is its basis, and yet it must accept this thrownness. Dasein is not master of its 
Being; its possibilities stem from an ultimate impossibility [….]Dasein is not only 
generally null because of its thrownness but also null because of its concrete 
                                                          
103
 “If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein’s Being, then such Being-towards-
death is possible only as something futural [….] by the term ‘futural’, we do not here have in view a “now” 
which has not yet become ‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming in 
which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself [….]” 
     “[But] Only in so far as Dasein is authentically as ‘having-been’, can Dasein come towards itself futurally in 
such a way that it comes back [to itself as it already was or as it always has been]. As authentically futural, 
Dasein is as ‘having-been’. [….] The character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future” (BT 
372-3). 
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projection, that is to say, insofar as the latter is a choice which can choose one 
alternative only by rejecting the other. (Pöggeler 44-45; see also Ricoeur, Time 69-70)  
For Heidegger, conscience attests to the fact that Dasein can be itself in an authentic manner, 
and “becoming-guilty is nothing more than carrying the past” within ourselves; thus, to 
become guilty means to be the past authentically (Kisiel and Sheehan 267). The importance 
of Heidegger’s notions of heritage, repetition, conscience and Dasein’s being-guilty for a 
comprehensive understanding of Heideggerian temporality or die Sorge cannot be overstated. 
Moreover, readers will already begin to see how the subject of this chapter, Heideggerian 
Geschichtlichkeit or having-been, is so closely bound up not only with the notion of being-
towards-death elaborated in the previous chapter but equally so with Dasein’s being-
alongside-the-world, which completes the triadic constellation of die Sorge and Heideggerian 
time. Thus it may be appropriate at this (mid)point to share with readers how Heidegger 
himself summarizes the dynamic temporality that Dasein is, which is also to say, how we 
have arrived at this point and in which direction we intend to go from here: 
Dies Vorlaufen in die äuβerste Möglichkeit meiner selbst, die ich noch nicht 
bin, aber sein werde, ist Zukunft-sein. Ich bin selbst meine Zukunft durch das 
Vorlaufen. Ich bin nicht in der Zukunft, sondern die Zukunft meiner selbst. 
Schuldig-werden ist Vergangenheit-Sein. Die Vergangenheit ist im Schuldig-
Sein festgehalten und sichtbar. Und damit kommt das menschliche Dasein 
eigentlich in die Gegenwart, ins Handeln. Im Entschlossen-Sein ist Dasein 
seine Zukunft, im Schuldig-sein seine Vergangenheit und im Handeln kommt 
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es in die Gegenwart. Dasein ist nicht anders als Zeit-Sein. Die Zeit ist nichts, 
was drauβen in der Welt vorkommt, sondern was ich selbst bin. (DF 169)104 
This is the full scope (albeit only superficially considered) of Heidegger’s original 
conception of Geschichte and its place within his temporal ontology, but it nevertheless 
adequately prepares us for the literary analysis that follows and which will from time to time 
necessitate the substantive elaboration of key aspects of a Heideggerian history merely 
outlined above. In fact, it is partly my goal to demonstrate that only through such analysis, 
and in particular the analysis of Mann’s contemporary historical novels, can Heidegger’s 
otherwise nearly inaccessible and categorically idiosyncratic approach be adequately 
explained and/or justified. Suffice it to say for now that when Heidegger describes 
Geschichte (and the authentic repetition that is its basis) as “[Der Modus] […] durch den das 
Dasein ausdrücklich als Schicksal existiert” (SZ 510),105 and that inasmuch as “Schicksal die 
ursprüngliche Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins konstuiert, dann hat die Geschichte ihr 
wesentiches Gewicht weder im Vergangenen, noch im Heute und seinem ‘Zusammenhang’ 
mit dem Vergangenen, sondern im eigentlichen Geschehen der Existenz, das aus der Zukunft 
des Daseins entspringt,” (SZ 510),106 or when he contends that “Nur wenn im Sein eines 
Seienden Tod, Schuld, Gewissen, Freiheit und Endlichkeit dergestalt gleichursprünglich 
zusammenwohnen wie in der Sorge, kann es im Modus des Schicksals existieren, das heiβt 
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 “This anticipatory running forward into the most extreme possibility of my self, which I am not yet but will 
be, means to be futural. I myself am my future by way of this anticipatory forerunning. I am not in the future, 
but rather am the future of myself. Becoming guilty is nothing but carrying the past within myself: to become 
guilty means to be my past. In the state of being guilty, I hold onto the past thus made visible to me. Human 
Dasein thus comes properly [i.e. “authentically” or “eigentlich”] into the present, into action. In being resolved 
Dasein is its future, in being guilty it is its past, and in acting it comes into the present. Dasein is nothing other 
than to be time itself. Time is not something that occurs out there in the world, it is rather what I myself am” 
(Becoming 266). 
105
 “the mode by which Dasein exists explicitly as fate” (BT 438) 
106
 “But if fate constitutes the primordial historicality of Dasien, then history has its essential importance neither 
in what is past nor in the ‘today’ and its connection with what is past, but in that authentic historizing of 
existence which arises from Dasein’s future” (BT 438). 
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im Grunde seiner Existenz geschichtlich sein” (SZ 509),107 he comes very close to describing 
the ongoing preoccupations of Mann during the turbulent years that saw the publication of 
both The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus, and he certainly and at the very least opens 
the door for radical new readings of Mann’s representation(s) of time and history in both 
novels. 
 
The Magic Mountain 
As I pointed out at the beginning of my last chapter, that history remains a point of 
entry into any critical interrogation of the novels is always guaranteed by the author’s own 
insistence on the dual meaning of The Magic Mountain as a Zeitroman, i.e. as “einmal 
historisch,” and on the essentially historical character of Doctor Faustus as well as the 
chronological matrix that many describe as the most remarkable quality of the latter’s 
narrative structure (Bergsten et al.). When compared to Doctor Faustus, the treatment of 
history in The Magic Mountain is generally seen as a superficial yet overarching 
preoccupation of the earlier novel.  
As I have already discussed, the description of the novel as “einmal historisch” refers 
almost exclusively to two facets of its structure and themes, both of which Stephen Kern’s 
brief analysis of the novel from The Culture of Space and Time may be said adequately to 
repeat and summarize. First, there is the question of the contending worldviews of which the 
novel, in particular the lifestyle and atmosphere of the Berghof, is suggested as an allegory. 
The sanitorium is said to be a microcosm of Europe’s historical situation before the First 
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 “Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside equiprimordially in the Being of an entity […] 
can that entity exist in the mode of fate; that is to say, only then can it be historical in the very depth of its 
existence” (BT 437). 
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World War, where rigid divisions separate the guests along diplomatic, national lines and 
there is a steady, exaggerated emphasis on the cultural differences between East and West. 
Secondly, there is the question of death and its penetration into historical life and reality. 
With this second example, of course, I mean the equation that links the individual’s so-called 
sympathy with death that prevails on the mountain with the broader and thus even more 
dangerous cultural sympathy with death that is played out in the morbid routine of the cure, 
Castorp’s infatuation with disease, the “politically suspect” lure of German Romanticism 
(Vaget et al.), as well as in the cultural debates between Settembrini and Naphta that are said 
to exert such a powerful influence on the young Hans Castorp.  
But these aspects of the novel’s Geschichtsdeutung are well-known and have been 
elaborated through and through within Mann scholarship. Given the nuances of a 
Heideggerian history, which I have already described, it is fair to say that my goal will be to 
show how Heidegger’s views of history, contemporary with The Magic Mountain, point to 
what I would like to argue is a shared, or, at least, sympathetic understanding of time and 
history in Mann’s novel. Thus we can begin with the claim, as we did in the previous chapter, 
that, as far as The Magic Mountain is concerned, the authentic significance of history in the 
novel lies first and foremost not in the political worldviews it describes or in the allegory of a 
nation’s romantic sympathy with death, but rather somewhere else, and this somewhere else, 
I will argue, is in the narrator’s anxiety over the history he proposes to narrate and in the 
private-public nexus of Castorp’s personal past, both of which a Heideggerian reading asks 
that we not attempt to extricate from their essential relationship to the future-oriented 
teleology of the narrative itself or of its protagonist’s Bildung.  
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The strange and forceful way in which the past insinuates itself so very early on in a 
novel otherwise meant to advocate for the progressive self-development of its protagonist 
helps to demonstrate what I mean. Not only does the narrator’s foreword begin with an 
uncomfortable description of the unintelligible qualia of pastness, but the unexpected 
intrusion of the past again and so early on in the second chapter of the novel also already 
complicates the novel’s awkward relationship to its genre.108 Moreover, this forceful 
intrusion is often overlooked as central to the nature and character of that history the novel is 
said to engage and describe and toward which the foreword is literally leading the reader, and 
it is a Heideggerian temporality which perhaps best helps us to explain this intrusion and its 
meaning within the scope of Mann’s composition. 
While the second half of the novel’s foreword, in which the narrator deliberately 
describes the complicated temporality that binds the time of the narrative with the time taken 
up in reading it, is more often cited in scholarly references to the opening of the novel, and 
thus it is generally well-known, too, that with The Magic Mountain Mann set out to write a 
novel which in its structure mirrors its themes and in which the experience of reading very 
much parallels the experience of the protagonist on the magic mountain “as he sits spun 
round in his spell” [“während sie ihn umsponnen hält”] (2).109 Nevertheless, it is with the 
first half of the foreword that this chapter is interested. There, the narrator, in attempting to 
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 The second chapter of the novel is divided into two sections, each dealing, respectively, with Castorp’s 
paternal (Von der Taufschale und vom Groβvater in zweifacher Gestalt) and maternal (Bei Tienappels. Und von 
Hans Castorps sittlichem Befinden) ancestry and heritage. 
109
 It is interesting to note that the translation provided neglects to mention the ambivalence of the agent that 
casts the so-called “spell,” a word which doesn’t appear in the original text.  The referent of the German sie is 
unclear, which explains the radical difference in the translation; it could refer, it seems to me, to either “die 
Erdenzeit,” “die Tagen,” “die Jahren,” oder “[Castorps] Geschichte.” Either way, the clear suggestion is that 
Castorp is “spun round in his spell” both of/by time. 
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situate the temporality of the launching point of his narrative, describes something like the 
problem of the past as it was at the time also being imagined by Heidegger: 
Die Geschichte Hans Castorps […], die uns in hohem Grade erzählenswert 
scheint (wobei zu Hans Castorps Gunsten denn doch erinnert werden sollte, daβ 
es seine Geschichte ist, und daβ nicht jedem jede Geschichte passiert): diese 
Geschichte ist sehr lange her, sie ist sozusagen schon ganz mit historischem 
Edelrost überzogen und unbedingt in der Zeitform der tiefensten Vergangenheit 
vorzutragen. 
Das wäre kein Nachteil für eine Geschichte, sondern eher ein Vorteil; denn 
Geschichten müssen vergangen sein, und je vergangener, könnte man sagen, 
desto besser für sie in ihrer Eigenschaft als Geschichten und für den Erzähler, 
den raunenden Beschwörer des Imperfekts. Es steht jedoch so mit ihr, wie es 
heute noch mit den Menschen und unter diesen nicht zum wenigsten mit den 
Geschichtenerzählern steht: sie ist viel älter als ihre Jahre, ihre Betagtheit ist 
nicht nach Tagen […], nicht nach Sonnenumläufen zu berechnen; mit einem 
Worte: sie verdankt den Grad ihres Vergangenseins nicht eigentlich der Zeit, -- 
eine Aussage, womit auf die Fragwürdigkeit und eigentümliche Zwienatur 
dieses Geheimnisvollen Elementes im Vorbeigehen angespielt und hingewiesen 
sei. 
   Um aber einen klaren Sachverhalt nicht künstlich zu verdunkeln: die 
hochgradige Verflossenheit unserer Geschichte rührt daher, daβ […] sie spielte 
und hat gespielt vormals, ehedem, in den alten Tagen, der Welt vor dem groβen 
Kriege, mit dessen Beginn so vieles began, was zu beginnen wohl kaum schon 
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aufgehört hat. Vorher also spielt sie, wenn auch nicht lange vorher. Aber ist der 
Vergangenheitscharakter eine Geschichte nicht desto tiefer, vollkommener und 
märchenhafter, je dichter ‘vorher’ sie spielt? (DZ 9-10).110 
Of course, with this beginning, we see Mann’s famous irony especially hard at work, for the 
relationship of the actual historical past to the narrative attempt at representing it and to the 
private past of Hans Castorp that is called into being through the representation is anything 
but a “plain matter” [“eine klaren Sachverhalt”]. Indeed, as both Heidegger and Mann seem 
to agree, the very pastness of the past is altogether a matter of difficulty and mystery that is 
always as much of an issue for Dasein as it is for both “den Erzähler, den raunenden 
Beschwörer des Imperfekts” as well as for the young Castorp, to whom the “Geschichte” 
belongs, and for narrative as such insofar as “Geschichten müssen vergangen sein.” For the 
sake of my argument, several key ideas are worthy of note here.  
First, the reader is told that the past recounted by the narrative belongs to Hans 
Castorp alone: “daβ es seine Geschichte ist, und daβ nicht jedem jede Geschichte passiert.” 
Just as the narrator must dismiss him in the end toward his own death, which Heidegger tells 
us is in each case mine and thus never available in any original way to another, Castorp’s 
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“The story of Hans Castorp […], which seems to us highly worth telling – though it must needs be borne in 
mind, in Hans Castorp’s behalf, that it is his story, and not every story happens to everybody – this story, we 
say, belongs to the long ago; is already, so to speak, covered with historic mould, and unquestionably to be 
presented in the tense best suited to a narrative out of the depth of the past. 
   That should be no drawback to a story, but rather the reverse. Since histories must be in the past, then the 
more past the better, it would seem, for them in their character as histories, and for him, the teller of them, 
rounding wizard of times gone by. With this story, moreover, it stands as it does to-day with human beings, not 
least among them writers of tales: it is far older than its years; its age may not be measured by length of days 
[…]. In a word, the degree of its antiquity has noways to do with the passage of time – in which statement the 
author intentionally touches upon the strange and questionable double nature of that riddling element. 
   But we would not willfully obscure what is a plain matter. The exaggerated pastness of our narrative is due to 
its taking place [….] – in the long ago, in the old days, the days of the world before the Great War, in the 
beginning of which so much began that has scarcely left off beginning. Yes, it took place before that; yet not so 
long before. Is not the pastness of the past the profounder, the completer, the more legendary, the more 
immediately before the present it falls?” (MM 1).  
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past, essentially the story itself and the history of which the story is supposedly a record, is 
his and thus incapable in an authentic sense of being made available to the narrator or to the 
reader in all of its fullness. The problem or question, however, does not thus become a matter 
of trust between reader and narrator or of the competency of the latter or of the relationship 
between reality and fiction but rather of how one narrates what is essentially an 
unavailability. To paraphrase Doritt Cohn, the problem is not so much a matter of narrating 
time, as the narrator claims it is, but rather it is a matter of narrating “timelessness” (Cohn). 
In a similar way, Cohn argues, the narrator of The Magic Mountain, as omniscient as he is 
vis-a-vis the Historie of Hans Castorp, cannot adequately narrate the sort of time which has 
cast its spell over the protagonist, a time that of course includes the fullness of Castorp’s 
Geschichte, or better, Castorp’s gewesen sein [his having-been], precisely because it is not 
his time. 
Secondly, that the story belongs to both Castorp and “the long ago” immediately and 
surreptitiously equates the protagonist with his very own past in such a way as to suggest 
before the story even begins the possibility of an authentic history, which is precisely never 
past, so that what belongs to the “long ago” also belongs to the ongoing, in this case, both the 
narrative which is about to (but which has not yet) begun as well as the history which has 
already begun – it is even past, in one sense of the word – but which has also “scarcely left 
off beginning,” i.e. both Castorp’s and Germany’s. Consequently, the story of Hans Castorp 
is covered with the patina of history [“historischem Edelrost”] not only because it has already 
happened but because it is always already historical. One, for instance, may ask whether, or 
better, how Castorp is configured in the time of the forward. On the one hand, he isn’t at all 
in the sense that the story takes place after him and from the historical perspective of a world 
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in which he no longer is living, or as Heidegger would certainly put it, in which he is no 
longer [Nichtmehrdasein]. Thus it is precisely his having-been that makes Castorp, the 
protagonist, possible, and insofar as it is his Geschichte that is being told, it is Hans Castorp 
as the coming-towards the history that he is that the forward promises to share with the 
reader.   
Finally, the reader is confronted with the viciously original “Aussage,” precisely in 
line with Heidegger’s own thoughts on time and history, that “the degree of [the narrative’s] 
antiquity has noways to do with the passage of time” [“sie verdankt den Grad ihres 
Vergangenseins nicht eigentlich der Zeit”]. Here, the narrator, and presumably Mann as well, 
appears to draw a distinction between a notion of history that treats the past as if it were 
finished, as if it had been left behind by time’s passage, a past measured “nach Tagen [und] 
Sonnenumläufen,” and an entirely different conception of the past – what Heidegger might 
call an authentic idea of history as Geschichte – in which, although “denn Geschichten 
müssen vergangen sein” [“histories must be in the past”], they needn’t ever not be because 
stories, like Dasein, are precisely nie vergangen [“never past”]: “je vergangener, könnte man 
sagen, desto besser für sie in ihrer Eigenschaft als Geschichten und für den Erzähler, den 
raunenden Beschwörer des Imperfekts.”  
Consequently, the narrator suggests, Castorp’s past arises out of the future of his tale. 
In the last chapter, and in response to Eric Downing’s claim with respect to the symbolic and 
actual function of the x-ray in the The Magic Mountain – “The x-ray photograph […] 
disassociates both the moments of truth and death from the end point and relocates them, 
along with their joint authority, elsewhere and earlier on (and on)” (59) – that being-towards-
death displaces Dasein’s end in much the same way, dispersing it backwards over the course 
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of Dasein’s existence precisely the way that Castorp’s “sudden glimpse into his own grave” 
is vouchsafed to him much too early on. But if a Heideggerian temporality requires that death 
is thrown backwards as a shadow over Dasein’s entire life or Erstreckung, then it equally 
requires, as we have seen, that Dasein’s past (and, as I of course will argue, Castorp’s past, 
too) is displaced or dispersed forward, and as such the past constitutes the very passage that 
Dasein/Castorp is and toward which he is always heading in the novel itself. Thus we are 
given a young hero, both at the beginning and at the end of the novel, heading toward his 
future and at the same time coming toward his past, which would at least offer one 
explanation for the narrator’s wonder at the fact that the depth of the past lies in its proximity 
to and not its distance from the present: “Aber ist der Vergangenheitscharakter eine 
Geschichte nicht desto tiefer, vollkommener und märchenhafter, je dichter ‘vorher’ sie 
spielt?”. In this way the foreword helps prepare the ground for a rereading of the novel’s 
treatment of time altogether, a reading in which the complicated temporality described in the 
novel’s opening pages is illuminated in and through the narrative itself. 
To begin with, the narrator’s recognition in the foreword that the depth of the past has 
nothing to do with the passage of time should recall Heidegger’s insistence in his letter to 
Hannah Arendt that time in the way it is typically understood is not the way into the novel, 
and it is clearly this riddle [“die Fragwürdigkeit und eigentümliche Zwienatur dieses 
Geheimisvollen Elements”] that the novel is set up to unravel if not to resolve. But if the 
passage of time is not the key to the understanding of the novel’s treatment of time, as it is so 
often said to be, then the full answer to this famous mystery must lie elsewhere, somewhere 
outside or alongside the alleged absence of time’s passage on the mountain and its allegorical 
correspondence to the diseased cultural atmosphere of Germany before the war (“Sympathie 
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mit dem Tode,” “das Leben ohne Zeit,” etc.). It is interesting to note that here in the foreword 
no thought is given to these powerful associations. Thus I believe this riddle is a suitable 
basis from which to launch a Heideggerian reading of the novel’s portrait of the past, in 
which the so-called absence of time’s passage certainly doesn’t dispense with time but rather 
marks its authentic disclosure.  
Just as the author promises to make his novel read like that which it is about, the tale 
of Castorp that follows bears out in fundamental ways the narrator’s striking thoughts on 
time and history in his foreword, and it is not very long after the beginning of the novel, after 
Castorp’s “Ankunft” (emphasis mine) at the Berghof, that the reader is thrust again out of the 
present and “back” into the protagonist’s past. In the previous chapter I discussed how the 
scene of Castorp’s memory of his grandfather’s wake served to underscore the meaning of 
Castorp’s Bildung as being-towards-death. On the one hand, I argued it was the first serious 
challenge of his Faustian quest in as much as the encounter with the grandfather’s corpse was 
not only a premonition of his own death but it also forcefully established very early on in the 
novel the telos of his self-development as oriented toward an authentic confrontation with 
death as such, which I suggested is the very point of his time on the magic mountain. On the 
other hand, I argued that the encounter was also much more than the young Castorp’s 
meeting with the possibility of his own death, but as such it was also the encounter with his 
own impossibility, an encounter with death as impossibility, and that the measure of the 
authenticity of Castorp’s Bildung lay in the degree to which he absorbs this truth about the 
nature and meaning of death while at the Berghof. Whatever the case, I have already made 
much of the fact that for Heidegger the possibility of authentic being-towards-death is always 
also a thrown possibility, and that this thrownness is the basis of authentic historical 
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existence; in other words, for Heidegger it is not only the case that in order for there to be a 
future at all a past must first be gathered up behind it, but there is in Dasein’s approach 
toward death a physics at work in which the momentum that drives Dasein towards its future 
has its source in Dasein’s past. As such, in so far as Castorp’s memory of his grandfather’s 
corpse serves to underscore the double meaning of being-towards-death, a futural prospect 
that defines his sojourn on the magic mountain, it also discloses the idiosyncratic nature of 
Heideggerian Geschichte, which, as we have seen, remains closely connected in its essence 
to Sein zum Tode. 
 Such a fundamental entanglement is clearly present in Castorp’s memory of his 
grandfather, where the young boy recalls the moment when his grandfather relates the history 
of his family’s christening basin [“Taufschale”]: 
Auf der Rückseite aber fanden sich in wechselnder Schriftart die Namen der 
Häupter einpunktiert, die im Gange der Zeit des Stückes Ingaber gewesen: Es 
waren ihrer schon sieben, versehen mit der Jahreszahl der Erb-übernahme, 
und der Alte in der Binde wies mit dem beringten Zeigefinger den Enkel auf 
jeden einzelnen hin. Der Name des Vaters war da, der des Groβvaters selbst 
und der des Urgroβvaters, und dann verdoppelte, verdreifachte und 
vervierfachte sich die Vorsilbe ‘Ur’ im Munde des Erklärers, und der Junge 
lauschte […] auf das Ur-Ur-Ur-Ur, -- diesen dunklen Laut der Gruft und der 
Zeitverschüttung, welcher dennoch zugleich einen fromm gewahrten 
Zusammenhang zwischen der Gegenwart, seinem eigenen Leben und dem tief 
Versunkenen ausdrückte und ganz eigentümlich auf ihn einwirkte: nämlich so, 
wie es auf seinem Gesichte sich ausdrückte. [….] [G]eistliche Empfindungen 
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mischten sich mit denen des Todes und der Geschichte beim Klang jener 
dumpfen Silbe, und dies alles mutete den Knaben irgendwie wohltuend an 
[…]. (DZ 38-9; emphasis mine)111 
The Castorp legacy is part of that world into which the young Hans has been thrown in the 
Heideggerian sense (the other part, of course, belongs to his maternal Tienappel ancestry 
with which his prophetic eyes are constantly associated throughout the novel), and the 
exaggerated, receding pastness conjured up by the repetition of that “somber syllable” (like 
the lost but always deeply-felt origins of Joseph’s ancestry in the novel that would follow 
The Magic Mountain and for which this section of the novel serves as a definitive model and 
premonition) is a thrownness which Castorp cannot get behind, so to speak. Castorp cannot 
get behind it because, quite literally, he is this thrownness, and as long as he is, according to 
Heidegger, neither he nor his past is ever truly past. Thus it is here in this passage that 
Castorp first begins to learn the truth of what it means to be historical as well as the 
Heideggerian truth that an authentic being-towards-death is the “hidden basis of 
historicality.”  
The point of this passage, then, not only serves as a basis for describing the 
commercial heritage out of which our protagonist emerges for the sake of forming an 
impression of his character and disposition, nor is it meant merely to emphasize the 
bottomlessness of a mythic past to which Castorp is forever linked; rather, and most 
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 “On the back, engraved in a variety of scripts, were the names of its successive owners, seven in number, 
each with the date when it had passed into his hand. The old man named each one to his grandson, pointing with 
beringed index finger. There was Hans Castorp’s father’s name, there was Grandfather’s own, there was great-
Grandfather’s; then the great came doubled, tripled, quadrupled, from the old man’s mouth, whilst the little lad 
listened […]. The great-great-great-great – what a hollow sound it had, how it spoke of the falling away of time, 
yet how it seemed the expression of a piously cherished link between the present, his own life, and the depth of 
the past! All that, as his face showed, made a profound impression. […]. Religious feeling mingled in his mind 
with thoughts of death and a sense of history, as he listened to the somber syllable; he received therefrom an 
ineffable gratification – […]” (MM 22). 
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importantly for our purposes here, this moment signifies for both the author and reader an 
important milestone in the protagonist’s emergent understanding of the ontological 
entanglement and proximity of death and history, or, more precisely, the way the essentially 
historical emerges out of being-towards-death and thus betrays the depth not so much of 
Castorp’s past but moreso the depth of his future. In this very important moment, both the 
lesson of the Taufschale and young Castorp’s encounter with the grandfather’s corpse, 
among other things, signifies the “ontological density” of the past that Ricoeur attributes to 
Heidegger’s theory of historicality – “something in the depth of [Castorp’s] being responded 
to it” [“es lag etwas darin, was er aus dem Grund seines Wesens billigte”] (MM 20/DZ 36)) – 
and it is fair to say that insofar as Castorp’s approach toward an authentic understanding of 
death on the magic mountain has at this point already begun, the intrusion of the past is not 
so much an intrusion but a clear example of how his past, rather than being recovered, has 
been called forth as a result of his Bildung or of what amounts to the same thing, his 
approach toward himself, which is to say, out of his future. And, as such, it is also fair to say, 
along with Heidegger, that “In the state-of-mind in which it finds itself, Dasein is assailed by 
itself as the entity which it still is and already was – that is to say, which it constantly is as 
having been” (BT 376). 
 Consequently, what Castorp’s vision of his time with his grandfather (what I wish to 
call his first encounter with what it means to be historical) suggests is a very different 
temporal dichotomy than is usually associated with the novel’s treatment of historical and 
eternal time, where historical time is typically attributed to the time of the flatland and 
sharply distinguished from die reine Zeit selbst or eternal time that is attributed to the sort of 
time lived out at the Berghof. In fact, just as Heidegger describes Dasein as constitutive of a 
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stretching-along [Erstreckung] that enables it to know a past and anticipate a future, Castorp 
recognizes, not only in the script itself and in the repetition of the “somber syllable” but also 
in his literal proximity to the man who utters it, that he is indeed an expression of this 
Erstreckung; moreover, he realizes or at least has begun to realize Heidegger’s important 
recognition about time and history as such, namely, that he himself is not temporal because 
he stands “in history” or “in time” but rather that he exists amidst this historical stretching 
along because he himself is first and foremost an expression of this temporality, and it is as 
such an expression that he is able to identify, to the point of “ineffable gratification,” with the 
heritage which he is, already was, and is in the course of still becoming. It is in this very real 
sense that the opposition between the einmal historisch and the reine zeitlich dissolves away 
and becomes something very different than even Mann himself may have anticipated– in 
short, history here emerges not as a mere window onto a worldview but rather as an 
ontological density associated with time and Dasein itself, both of which are associated not 
with a stagnating, negative sympathy with death (that the bulk of the novel is said to 
describe) but rather with a progressive, dynamic temporality that Castorp is at first not fully 
cognizant of in the stirred memories of his grandfather’s wake but with which he is 
beginning to identify and to integrate into his developing maturity. 
 The hollow sound of the “great-great-great-great” is on the one hand empty precisely 
because of its blank narration, its insistence on the “falling away” or “passage” of time and 
thus makes no strong impression on the young Castorp. Its hollowness may be compared to 
what Heidegger calls an inauthentic Historie in which the past is recited as if it were merely 
no longer there, no longer a part of lived reality. But there is another sort of narration in 
operation here which is of the authentic sort, and this is what makes the profounder 
  203
impression and inaugurates the young Castorp’s Bildung. As we are told early on, this sort of 
time has “noways to do with the passage of time” but rather with its persistent and ongoing 
disclosure.112 The force of this narration lies in the memory of the voice itself and in the 
extreme love had by young Castorp for his grandfather as well as in the feeling of proximity 
that the voice and the Taufschale make possible between past, present and future, between 
beginning (birth) and end (death). The question of authenticity that is raised by the scene of 
the memory of his grandfather is not only relevant to Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
question, but it is of course, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, raised by Mann as well 
since Castorp’s memory of the wake provokes similar concerns about authenticity.113 For 
Mann, or rather for Castorp, like for Heidegger, there is a sharp distinction between the 
everyday, living grandfather and the powerful suggestiveness of his corpse; thus it is no 
surprise (and completely in line with Heidegger’s own thoughts on the subject) that the 
authentic grandfather is the one who is gone, the one who is on the one hand represented in 
the painting in a magisterial guise and on the other hand vacated in the corpse – in short, in 
the being that once was the grandfather, the grandfather as having been (MM 25-6).114 It is in 
this sense, then, that readers may interpret Castorp’s profound spiritual response to this 
emergent consciousness, where “[r]eligious feelings mingled in his mind with thoughts of 
death and a sense of history” [“geistliche Empfindungen mischten sich mit denen des Todes 
und der Geschichte”] (MM 22/DZ 39). The problem is not simply that the authenticity of the 
grandfather lies, ironically, in the artificiality of his image or the ornate dressing of his 
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 With respect to this problem, Heidegger asks, for instance, “Why do we say that time passes away, when we 
do not say with just as much emphasis that it arises?” (BT 478). 
113
 For the most part, Mann deploys the same term as Heidegger to indicate “authentic” and “authenticity” – 
“eigentlich” and “Eigentlichkeit” – but from time to time he uses other terms, including “wahre,” “richtig,” and 
“Vollkommenheit.”  
114
 E.g. “Der kleine Hans Castorp betrachtete […] das Gesicht und die Hände des ehemaligen Groβvaters,” “der 
Groβvater nur noch Körper und nichts weiter mehr war” (DZ 46-7, emphasis mine). 
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lifeless body, but rather in the impossibility that this artificiality and lifelessness suggest, and 
the recognition of this impossibility that is handed down to Castorp as his heritage and which 
he is bound to repeat (in the Heideggerian sense). This is precisely why, I believe, this scene 
is so explicitly recalled in the famous section in which Hans is provided a view into his own 
grave, i.e. a view toward his own impossibility, and in which Hans marvels at the way the 
ring on his finger, inherited from his grandfather, is destined to remain even while the flesh it 
adorns is fated to melt away beneath it. 
As we have seen a Heideggerian Geschichte is always linked to the concepts of 
heritage, repetition and conscience, but in Heidegger all three have very different meanings 
than are usually assigned to them, a difference, moreover, that typically stands in the way of 
understanding what Heidegger intends with these concepts. With respect to Castorp’s 
Bildung,  heritage and repetition refer not only to the concrete generational inheritance of the 
Castorp and Tienappel lineage (the eyes, habits, disposition, features, names, etc. that define 
him) but also to the ontological heritage and repetition of what the grandfather bequeaths to 
his grandson during this exchange with his grandfather’s body, namely, the inheritance of a 
knowledge of death, “a larger, even […] fervid comprehension” [“einem gewissen 
allgemeineren und sogar eindringlichen Verstande”] (DZ 43/MM 25) of being-towards-the 
end and of the certainty that he, too, will eventually take his place amidst the historical line 
of those Castorps who have been. When Pöggler writes, “To be historical means to have a 
destiny, to anticipate death, to let oneself be thrown back upon the factical There and its 
finitude, to surrender to traditional possibilities, and thus to exist ‘in an insightful moment’ 
for one’s own time […]” (46), he perfectly describes what Mann intends for Castorp to 
remember with the memory-picture of this moment of his past.  
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Moreover, it is in this early surrendering that the young Castorp is able to begin to 
authentically take over, which means resolutely, that thrownness behind which he cannot go, 
but which he can approach through a constant returning (repetition) to that which he already 
is or that which he always has been. And it is through his gathering of this recognition that he 
becomes guilty in the Heideggerian sense, which means only that it is in this moment that he 
begins to witness and bear the past within himself and identify himself with it for the first 
time. Such a guilt, according to Heidegger, lies not only in his thrownness, in the tragic 
negation that underlies all the possibilities available to him (that is to say, that he cannot get 
behind his thrownness or ever stand before his past because he has always been already 
underway as this past and because his most extreme possibility lies in an utter impossibility – 
being-towards-death or Nichtmehrdasein). In addition, as Pöggler suggests, his guilt lies in 
resolutely taking his place amidst the names that both fall away and gather upon the 
Taufschale, which is also to say, in bearing his past authentically, and in the concrete 
restriction that, in so far as he will soon choose to remain on the mountain, he closes off all 
other possibilities for his future. But now we risk getting ahead of ourselves and of Castorp, 
for the encounter with his grandfather’s corpse affords him only a glimpse into these realities 
and form only a very early part of the self-development the novel describes.  
The relevance here of Eric Downing’s essay, “Photography and Bildung in The Magic 
Mountain,” about the influence of photography on the novel’s conception of the modernist 
subject and the tradition of Bildung cannot be overlooked.115 It will prove useful not only for 
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 This essay can be found in Hans Vaget’s edited collection Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain: A 
Casebook [Oxford UP, 2008]. It is a revised, abridged adaptation of a much earlier essay entitled “The 
Technology of Development: Photography and Bildung in Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg” [Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturewissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 77 (2003): 91-129] as well as of a more 
recently published chapter from Downing’s book After Images: Photography, Archaeology, and Psychoanalysis 
in the Tradition of Bildung [Detroit: Wayne State UP, 2006].  
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illuminating the connections already uncovered but also for helping to demonstrate what will 
become even more important later on in the discussion of Doctor Faustus that follows, 
namely, how one may venture to reconcile Heideggerian and historicist readings of Mann’s 
treatment of time and history in The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus. Downing’s study 
manages such an approach primarily because it perfectly describes the way in which the 
technical medium of photography, precisely as a result of its historical specificity – its 
accidental invention, its novelty and its unpredictable category, applications, and potential – 
discloses a fundamental relation of human being to its time and thus, too, (I think Heidegger 
would maintain) alters the meaning of what time is for the historical being-there of Dasein. 
Because Downing emphasizes the way in which photography’s historical emergence 
coincides with the historical advent of psychoanalysis in such a way that the former provides 
critical insight into the latter and vice-versa, Downing’s argument would also appear to allow 
for a certain emphasis on the fundamental relation between photography and a Heideggerian 
historical ontology in which what is disclosed in and through the technology of the 
photographic process is the temporality of being, which is to say, of the time of Dasein.     
Downing argues that insofar as The Magic Mountain is a Bildungsroman it is also an 
Entwicklungsroman and that the “insinuation” of the emergent technical medium of 
photography and the photographic process upon Mann’s conception of Bildung effectively 
refigures the traditional character of the subject of Bildung. Whereas traditional conceptions 
of Bildung proffer the subject-protagonist as a tabula rasa upon which the truth is to be 
simply and opaquely inscribed by the narration, in The Magic Mountain the self-formation of 
the young Castorp is rather developed or “exposed” through a complex dynamic of 
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repression and revelation that Downing associates with the photographic process and the 
concomitant discoveries of contemporary psychoanalysis. Downing writes:  
The blank page or Blatt of the self has been refigured as much like a 
photographic plate or Platte; the clean slate or tabula rasa has become, so to 
speak, the only seemingly opaque tablet (Täfelchen) of a photographic 
negative, with all its invisible ‘script’ (cf. 540/382). As such, the subject, 
rather than being simply inscribed or painted (gebildet), is to be developed 
(entwickelt); or, more precisely, having first been ‘exposed’ and taken on or in 
its impressions from the outside world – and in this respect we must 
understand the sustained emphasis on Hans Castorp as ‘receptive’ 
(aufnahmelustig or aufnahmefähig) – the subject is then to be developed, 
brought out and, finally, potentially, ‘fixed’ or befestigt (cf. 139/96). (46-7) 
As evidence for this recognition, Downing notes the sharp distinction between the narrator’s 
early description of Castorp as “an unwritten page” (dies unbeschriebene Blatt, 55/35; qtd. in 
Downing 46) and Settembrini’s much later reassessment of Castorp as precisely the opposite: 
“This gifted young man is no unwritten page, but rather one on which everything has 
[already] been inscribed, so to speak, with invisible ink, the good with the bad. And it is the 
educator’s task decisively to develop (entwickeln) the good, but forever to obliterate the false 
that would come forth (142/98)” (46).  
Before we return to the novel in order to see how this photographic process of 
development works itself out in the text and begs the comparison with a Heideggerian 
temporality, we should first venture a brief explanation of the way in which Settembrini’s 
assessment of young Castorp in the above passage as “a page on which everything has been 
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inscribed, so to speak, with invisible ink” and Downing’s reasons for referencing the passage 
in his study resonate meaningfully with Heidegger’s own and earliest conceptions of history 
influenced by his reading of the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence. Briefly elaborating the 
correspondences that link the development of Heidegger’s own views of history with the 
critical tradition to which Mann was heir will not only prepare us for reading Downing’s 
claims about modernist refigurations of the subject in terms of Heidegger’s conception of 
history, but, perhaps even more importantly, it will help to justify a reading that claims from 
the beginning to want to describe the proximity of Heidegger’s thought to the specific 
treatment of notions of the past and history in The Magic Mountain. Yorck explains his 
understanding of history in the following passage, and it is within his assessment here that we 
find what Heidegger calls “the germinal point of [Daseins] historicality” [der Keimpunkt der 
Geschichtlichkeit] (SZ 530), namely, that authentic history lies “in the character of Being 
which human Dasein possesses” [“des Seinscharakters des menschlichen Daseins selbst”] or 
better, that history not only lies in what is “invisible” [“unsichtbar”], like the script in which 
Settembrini claims Castorp is written, but it is primarily something “one lives” [sondern 
lebt]:  
[Unsere historische] Erkenntnis [hat sich] bis zur Aufhebung ihrer selbst 
fortgeschritten, der Mensch so weit seiner selbst entrückt, daβ er seiner nicht 
mehr ansichtig [in der Geschichte] ist. Der moderne Mensch […] ist fertig 
zum Begrabenwerden. […] Alle wahrhaft lebendige und nicht nur Leben 
schildernde Historie [….] ist zum besten Theile Kenntniβ der verborgenen 
Quellen. Mit der Geschichte ists so, daβ was Spektakl macht und augenfällig 
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ist nicht die Hauptsache ist. Die Nerven sind unsichtbar wie das Wesentliche 
[von der Geschichte] überhaupt unsichtbar ist. […] (qtd. in SZ 529-30)116 
Count Yorck’s reformulation of history and historical understanding is not only in 
keeping with the Nietzschean tradition of historical critique, but it also anticipates the 
historical views of Freudian psychoanalysis and, coincidentally, also reflects Mann’s own 
conceptions of history in The Magic Mountain. Yorck, for instance, was likely aware of 
Nietzsche’s own review of history in, for example, The Birth of Tragedy [Die Geburt der 
Tragödie] (1872) and his essay “On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life” [“Von Nutzen 
und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben”] from Untimely Meditations [Unzeitgemäβige 
Betrachtungen] (1874). According to Yorck, it is precisely the protagonist of history, namely, 
Dasein, that historical narrative has left behind. And just as he explains the problem of 
history in terms of modernity’s progressive veiling of “[eine] lebendige […] 
Geschichtskenntnis” by “[eine] nur Leben schildernde Historie,” a sort of forgetting that has 
modern man already ready for the grave, so, too, Nietzsche likens the predicament of modern 
man to “a starving man’s greedy grasping for food” [“das gierige Zugreifen und Nach-
Nahrung-Haschen des Hungernden”] (BT 110/GT 141) who has abandoned the wholesome 
nourishment of myth for what he calls “history and criticism” [“Historie und Kritik”] (BT 
109/GT 141) and thus given up any viable means of resolutely and vitally interpreting 
mankind’s “life and struggles” [“sein Leben und seine Kämpfe”] (BT 109/GT 140). In 
Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche again describes conventional historical understanding as a 
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 “[Our historical] knowledge has progressed to the point of canceling itself out; that man has withdrawn so 
far from himself that he non longer sees himself [in history] at all. The ‘modern man’ […] is ready for burial. 
[…] All history that is truly alive and not just reflecting a tinge of life [….] is, for the best part, knowledge of 
the hidden sources. With history, what makes a spectacle and catches the eye is not the main thing. The nerves 
are invisible, just as the essentials [of history] in general are invisible” (BT 452-3). 
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“disease” and “excess” and claims that modern man suffers under the burden of “too much” 
of a certain kind of history. Thus he famously offers as an “antidote” to this sort of 
inauthentic history – the idea of history as and for life, history as a process of becoming 
pressed into the service of life and action, while Count Yorck (and consequently, Dilthey and 
Heidegger, too) believes the possibility of modern man’s recovery lies in in his rediscovery 
of the lebendige historicity that he essentially is. 
Freud, too, offers up a similar paradigm, which proves perhaps even more useful for 
our study here since, according to Downing, the Freudian model of memory and the 
unconscious helps to illuminate Mann’s refiguration of Bildung and the modernist subject in 
The Magic Mountain in terms of the photographic process. Freud’s distinction between the 
conscious and unconscious not only mirrors the relation Downing establishes, respectively, 
between the positive image and its negative master-plate the positive, but the same 
distinction may also be usefully compared to Heidegger’s own differentiation between an 
inauthentic and authentic way of interpreting life and history. On the one hand, the 
inauthenticity, so to speak, of the Freudian conscious lies in its essential quality as a surface 
phenomenon and expression, just as Count Yorck describes an inauthentic Historie as being 
grounded merely in “was Spektakl macht und augenfällig ist.” On the other hand, the 
essential aspect of the unconscious is that it remains by its very nature either hidden from 
view or actively repressed. And since the former “nicht die Hauptsache ist,” the point of both 
a Freudian and Heideggerian view of history is the bringing into the light or the alethetic 
exposure of that hidden history; according to Heidegger, this is the the history that we are, 
just as the the authentic history of the individual, according to Freud, lies in the unconscious.  
Thus it is no surprise that Settembrini’s description of the young Castorp also bridges such a 
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recognition or that Downing’s reasons for referencing the passage also correspond with my 
tasks here.  
In fact, latent in both Settembrini’s evaluation of the young Castorp as well as in 
Downing’s description of the refiguration of a distinctly modernist subjectivity in terms of 
the photographic procedure is also a temporality, or, what is especially important to us here, 
an idea of history. While the conceptual leap from subjectivity to history as a purely 
objective phenomenon may require some convincing, the relationship between Dasein and 
history is not one of difference but of equivalence, and would thus help to explain and justify 
the figurative connection between Castorp and the photographic negative or Platte with 
which he is identified. As I have already shown, this process of identification is emphasized 
in key moments throughout the novel, including the moments of his earliest identification 
with the grandfather, in which “Religious feeling mingled in his mind with thoughts of death 
and a sense of history” [“[G]eistliche Empfindungen mischten sich mit denen des Todes und 
der Geschichte”]. In particular, Castorp emerges out of this memory with the “sense” that he 
himself is caught up in this “mingling” in which the normally distant prospects of death and 
history are invited into the orbit and proximity of Castorp’s subjectivity and that they are, in 
the Heideggerian sense of the terms, both his heritage (past) and his destiny (future):  
Der Name des Vaters war da, der des Groβvaters selbst und der des 
Urgroβvaters, und dann verdoppelte, verdreifachte und vervierfachte sich die 
Vorsilbe ‘Ur’ im Munde des Erklärers, und der Junge lauschte […] auf das 
Ur-Ur-Ur-Ur, -- diesen dunklen Laut der Gruft und der Zeitverschüttung, 
welcher dennoch zugleich einen fromm gewahrten Zusammenhang zwischen 
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der Gegenwart, seinem eigenen Leben und dem tief Versunkenen ausdrückte 
[…]” (DZ 38-9).117  
This merely emergent though powerful moment in his Bildung, however, prepares the way 
for the even more striking example of this identification in Castorp’s encounter with the x-
ray image of his hand. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the primary difference between 
Castorp’s earlier encounter with the grandfather and his seeing into the truth of the x-ray is 
that in the latter he is provided an authentic encounter with his own death. If, as Downing 
suggests, this illuminated Platte exposes a certain refiguration of Castorp’s subjectivity, then 
it may be said that what this x-ray evidence illuminates for the subject is the “larger, fervid 
comprehension,” only sensed in the memory of his grandfather, that this death and the “sense 
of history” with which it is mingled are precisely his. 
   Moreover, just as Settembrini claims that Castorp is a page on which everything, 
which must include both his past and his future, his history and his fate, has already been 
written in “invisible ink,” Heidegger, following the views of Dilthey and Yorck before him, 
argues that an authentic Geschichtskenntnis lies in “verborgene Quellen” and not in “was 
Spektakl macht und augenfällig ist.” According to Downing, it is this “invisible script” that 
Castorp is, which, having first been exposed, must be developed in order to be revealed and 
potentially “fixed.” Likewise, what makes the encounter with the x-ray authentic in the 
Heideggerian sense is that in this case “was Spektakl macht und augenfällig ist” is precisely 
that which in the everyday, inauthentic sense remains “invisible,” or, as Count Yorck says, 
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 “There was Hans Castorp’s father’s name, there was Grandfather’s own, there was great-Grandfather’s; then 
the great came doubled, tripled, quadrupled, from the old man’s mouth, whilst the little lad listened […]. The 
great-great-great-great – what a hollow sound it had, how it spoke of the falling away of time, yet how it 
seemed the expression of a piously cherished link between the present, his own life, and the depth of the past!” 
(MM 22).  
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“unsichtbar” – “Hans Castorp sah […] was aber eigentlich dem Menschen zu sehen nicht 
bestimmt ist” (DZ 333).118  
Finally, along with this logic of development presented by Downing is the 
assumption, central to Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s being-historical, that the past is 
precisely never past. The past cannot be said to refer simply to a time that has passed and that 
is no longer, or to the mere “falling away of time”; rather, it refers to a certain inexorable 
availability and potential, albeit a negative one (this I will elaborate in a moment). Insofar as 
the past has by its very nature always already been exposed, it is always, too, in line for 
development, or what Settembrini above calls the “educator’s task.” In Heideggerian terms, 
in order for Dasein to be anything at all, it must first have already been exposed, which is 
also to say, it must have already been thrown into a world – thus Dasein always exists as a 
thrown Fact. And we will remember that insofar as Dasein is thrown into its world, Dasein’s 
history is always the history that it has been and that it is still to become. While it cannot get 
behind the thrownnness that it is, which is also to say, while it cannot ever find itself in a 
time in which it was not already exposed, Dasein can authentically take over the possibilities 
of its past only insofar as it carries the burden of the past within itself, a carrying and 
becoming-guilty that makes the potential of Dasein’s past always available for what 
Downing refers to as development. Consequently, insofar as we are given a protagonist 
whose photographic relation to his past is one in which the past is always already 
written/exposed and whose Bildung requires that this invisible script be developed and 
disclosed out of his future, then what we also have is a temporality and a particular idea of 
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 “Hans Castorp saw […] what it is hardly permitted man to see, and what he had never thought it would be 
vouchsafed for him to see” (MM 218). 
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history at work that suggests not only a photographic relation but also, Heidegger would 
claim, an a priori ontological relation of Dasein to the temporality that it always already is. 
In addition to the correspondences noted above, it is significant, too, to note other 
ways in which Downing’s insights into the mechanisms of photography and Bildung in The 
Magic Mountain are confirmed in Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, especially with respect to 
the latter’s conception of history and the historicality of Dasein. For instance, one can 
certainly admit that the relationship of history to being-towards-death, which is also to say, 
the relationship between past and future in Heidegger, certainly resonates with Downing’s 
claim that the “positive-additive” tropes of the conventional Bildungsroman are countered in 
The Magic Mountain by a “subtractive-negative” apparatus made possible and visible 
through the photographic process:  
[T]he new metaphorical regime […] certainly stresses how Entwicklung or 
development is always somehow a matter of repression: not the simple 
additive or expressive procedure of Bildung, but rather necessarily subtractive 
or censorious. Or to draw the distinction less radically, we might say […] that 
the desired manifest image-of-the-self is not simply a positive product, nor for 
that matter a release of a potential but oppressed and occulted self, but is 
rather itself somehow a negative product, a matter of repressive 
(non)production. (48)   
Although it may be said that Castorp’s past, like Dasein’s, is developed out of his future, it is 
always a negative potential that is developed. In other words, although Castorp is provided a 
glimpse into his grave and consequently positively enlightened by the “electrical storm” that 
discloses his future, it is not only a forbidden glance, but it is the disclosure of impossibility 
  215
as such. As Heidegger insists, being-towards-death not only always already includes but it 
also gains its momentum precisely because of Dasein’s having already been thrown into its 
world, something very much like the having-already-been-exposed that Downing attributes 
to Mann’s radical-modernist characterization of Castorp’s Bildung. As I have already 
mentioned, both Dasein’s thrownness and its coming-towards itself as the possibility of 
impossibility are grounded in a fundamental negation at the core of Dasein’s being – on the 
one hand, the negation that is Dasein’s being-guilty and the thrownness behind which it can 
never go; and, on the other hand, the ultimate negation toward which it is always headed, 
namely, the possibility of its no-longer-being. Likewise, Castorp’s glimpse into his future is, 
on the one hand, filtered through the negative image of his grandfather’s ring that now adorns 
his hand and the “penetrating, prophetic” eyes of his maternal ancestors, and, on the other 
hand, oriented toward his very own death. And just as Downing claims that the goal of 
Castorp’s Entwicklung (and thus, too, of the Mannian conception of Bildung), is to expose 
and integrate this negativity into a positive self-image, so, too, according to Heidegger, is 
Dasein’s goal to confront the negativity which is its basis in order to apprehend itself 
authentically.  
Moreover, the bringing out of this exposure, that is, the disclosure of this negative 
certainty, which one might venture to call the goal of a Heideggerian conception of Bildung, 
is the potentiality of Dasein’s coming towards being fixed, which in its most extreme 
manifestation refers very literally to Dasein’s death, to the possibility of Nichtmehrdasein, 
and, to use Downing’s terminology, may be said to refer, figuratively speaking, to the 
positive fixation of the photographic image. Although Downing is working explicitly within 
a model of reproducibility and repetition inherited from Freud, Benjamin (and, too, Barthes), 
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the slippage that he associates between the positive and negative potential of the 
photographic image may be said to repeat a Heideggerian temporality in photographic terms. 
As we have already seen, the image of the grandfather’s corpse is a suitable case in point. 
Insofar as the grandfather is positively fixed in the frozen aspect of death, the image serves 
only to impress upon the young Castorp the negative apprehension of what had been his 
grandfather, that is to say, the apprehension of what is not only not captured by his Bild but 
that is also incapable of being captured, as well as that toward which the young Castorp is 
already coming-towards as himself, namely, the being-guilty that he is and the possibility of 
his ownmost impossibility, i.e. his death. Thus we have both in Castorp’s encounter with his 
grandfather’s corpse and with the image of his own death in the x-ray an example of 
Castorp’s becoming his grandfather, which is to say, an example of Castorp’s coming-
towards himself as having-been: “Even as the grandfather develops into his Bild through the 
chemical metabolic workings of death, so, too, does Hans develop into the same Bild by the 
chemical metabolic workings of the Mountain, which brings out the resemblance to the 
grandfather through an Entwicklung of one of Hans’s stored unconscious impressions (or 
“scripts”), recasting the present image through the background negative cliché” (Downing 
53).  
Likewise, as Downing points out with respect to photography, the fixation is only 
potentially positive; its meaning is always deferred because of the inevitable finiteness of the 
image itself, which is always prone to decay. Given what has already been established with 
respect to Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death and its vital entanglement with the 
having-been of Dasein, it is no surprise that Downing’s insistence upon this deferral occurs 
alongside what he calls the inevitable certainty of the death of the photographic image: 
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“[T]he fading away, vanishing, even dying of the photograph, can only be deferred, not 
denied” (66). Consequently, even the photographic image itself shares with Dasein the 
essential features of being-towards-death, namely, what I called in the previous chapter the 
indefinite certainty of its very literal being towards its own impossibility.  
Moreover, Downing’s essay helps to both illuminate and at the same time challenge 
familiar, yet incomplete, views of the way the advent of photography helped to reshape the 
human experience of time under modernism. Consider, for instance, Stephen Kern’s claims 
from The Culture of Space and Time that the final positive image, the picture as Bild, stands 
in as a metaphor for death and essentially stops time insofar as the image comprises a slice 
out of time. But this assessment of the temporality of the photograph, Downing’s argument 
suggests, fails to account for the dynamic telos of the photograph, which is to say, it fails to 
account for the process that leads towards its becoming (only potentially) fixed, or for the 
process of Entwicklung as such, for its having-been-exposed. Nor does the static temporality 
described by Kern account for the future portended in every photograph; for example, in the 
case of Castorp’s grandfather, inasmuch as the memory-picture of his wake belongs to the 
hero’s past, it arises out of his future on the mountain and is even made possible by it 
(Downing 53), and it clearly initiates the progressive development of the young Castorp’s 
Bildung, which is also to say, the future toward which Castorp himself is coming-towards as 
having-been. In this sense, the development of the negative into the “positive” refers only to 
Castorp’s journey toward his own death, which the end of the novel anticipates. In short, if 
we interpret Downing’s findings in terms of Heideggerian temporality, then both being-
towards-death and Dasein’s having-been emerge as something very much like what Downing 
may be apt to call being-towards-the-negative in the double sense intended by Heidegger – 
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being towards death as the possibility of Dasein’s impossibility and being towards the 
beginning, being towards Dasein’s own authentic Geschichte, toward the past and the 
having-been, which is always also to say, toward history as the “unsichtbaren,” “verborgenen 
Quellen” of Dasein as such, of which the photographic negative as it is described by 
Downing is a very suitable analog. 
 Although his primary aims and the details of his compelling analysis of the theme of 
photography are beyond the scope of my concerns here, Downing’s subsequent emphasis on 
the relationship between Pribislav Hippe and Clavdia Chauchat in Castorp’s imagination and 
the impact of this relationship upon the trajectory of Castorp’s Bildung is anything but 
coincidental and in even more forceful ways helps to illuminate and confirm my own 
objectives. With respect to the relation between Hans Castorp’s memory-image of his 
grandfather and the even more strikingly photographic relation between Hippe and Chauchat 
and their interconnectedness with the novel’s treatment of Bildung and modernist subject-
formation, Downing writes: 
[…] only once [Castorp] has retrieved and worked up the negative, 
unconscious Urbild of [Pribislav] Hippe does the figure of or image of 
Clavdia Chauchat emerge in all its clarity. Thus, even as Hans Castorp here – 
precisely here – develops into the Bild of his grandfather, succumbing to a 
certain logic of reproducibility, of belated reproduction of the unconscious 
cliché , so does Clavdia Chauchat develop out of the negative unconscious 
cliché of Pribislav Hippe, reproducing in her image the generic features of the 
master-template [….]. Thus memory qua photography and self-formation qua 
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Entwicklung come doubly to further and to refigure the traditional thematics 
of Bildung. (54) 
Downing describes this distinctly photographic relation that links the figures of 
Pribislav Hippe and Clavdia Chauchat according to a Bergsonian model of memory, in 
particular a form of memory Bergson calls spontaneous recollection, which the relation, 
Downing argues, does of course imitate. Nevertheless, when he goes on to note the way in 
which this particular relation complicates the more facile binary opposition between model 
and copy as it is upheld in the relationship between Castorp and the Bild of his grandfather, 
Downing implicitly suggests precisely what Heidegger viewed as the most striking omission 
of Bergson’s theory of time and memory, namely, the omission of the future’s primacy as 
well as its inextricable entanglement with the essentially historical character of Dasein. In 
other words, what for Bergson (and Husserl, too, in fact) was a more straightforward, even 
transparent matter of storage and retrieval was for Heidegger a matter of the past’s 
Entwicklung out of a future; thus, Heidegger’s model of temporality even more forcefully 
supports Downing’s assertions about the photographic model of time and Bildung displayed 
in the novel.  
For instance, when Downing claims that “the relationship between Hippe and Clavdia 
is […] conceived in terms even more challenging to the standard mimetic relation of model 
and copy than that posed by the grandfather and his Bild, terms that again draw on the photo-
relation of negative and positive, but in such a way as to challenge their oppositional relation. 
That is, there is an emphatic sense in which Hippe and Clavdia are the same figure, the same 
image [….]; and similarly, a sense in which there is no stable or secure way of fixing on one 
as the source or prior term for the other […],” he not only notes the “major repercussions” 
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this recognition has for Mann’s reconception or revision of the traditional schematics of 
Bildung, but he also underscores precisely what it is I have hoped all along to demonstrate, 
namely, how Heidegger’s theory of historicality may help to illuminate the novel’s insistence 
on an historical ontology.   
As Downing points out, this identity of past and future not only renders the storage-
retrieval model inadequate to the truth suggested by the narrative, but it also suggests a 
revised conception of the relation between past and future as such – a revision accounted for 
by a Heideggerian conception of Geschichte and being-towards-death, where the authentic 
meaning of the past (Pribislav Hippe, insofar as he is the historical source of those 
possibilities held in reserve) is made manifest not in the form of a recollection but rather in 
Castorp’s authentic, future encounter with Clavdia, which, as Heidegger would have it, 
comprises the very coming-towards of Castorp’s fate or, put another way, that which Castorp 
still is and already was or constantly is as having been. Thus what Downing calls the Urbild 
of Hippe and the grandfather function not so much as images of the past but rather as images 
of the future, images of anticipation and the coming-towards, which, not unlike the magic 
atmosphere of the mountain itself, pull Castorp unrelentingly and inevitably toward himself 
and the uttermost possibility of his certain fate. Moreover, as Downing admits, “Hans’s 
spontaneous recollection of the image of Hippe and his pairing of it with the present image of 
Clavdia occurs in the same chapter – indeed at the same moment – in which he also develops 
the trembling chin, or cliché, of his grandfather” (53). It is in this sense that the past not only 
becomes the future but more importantly that the future becomes the past and, even more 
explicitly, that Castorp authentically becomes the history that he is. For this reason, midway 
through the novel Castorp concedes that the Errinerungsbild of Pribislav Hippe no longer 
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appeared to him except to draw his attention to the “gläsernde Angebinde” and x-ray tablet 
[“Täfelchen”] or, what Downing might call the photographic plate or Platte of Clavdia, and 
thus Castorp acknowledges, and naively so, that “the progress of his acclimatization was 
over.” This progress, however, as Downing shows us, is only potentially “complete” or 
“fixed.” Castorp has not merely exchanged his earlier fascination with Hippe for the currency 
of his love for Clavdia; rather, Downing claims, “[w]hile the positive, manifest image fades, 
the Bild is nonetheless retained in the ‘negative’ space of Hans Castorp’s unconscious, where 
it remains stored, latent, awaiting, like the memory-image of the grandfather, its subsequent 
development and duplication. And it finds this […] in the figure of Clavdia Chauchat” (54). 
In this way, Downing’s photographic relation mirrors Heidegger’s exegesis of Dasein’s 
fundamental relation to its past in which Dasein’s coming-towards itself as having-been is 
clearly indicated in the way Castorp’s past is continually absorbed or, even better, developed 
into the dynamic and anticipatory tension that makes up his future – whether by future I 
mean to refer to the erotic pull toward Clavdia’s Platte or to the equally ecstatic pull toward 
his own Platte, the truth of which, as we have already established, lies not only in the 
“vouchsafed” glance into his own grave but also in his recognition that he has in a sense 
become his grandfather.     
This future by necessity is never permitted to become fixed in any positive sense since 
throughout and to the end of the novel and beyond the negative Urbild of Hippe and the 
grandfather remains undeveloped – for Downing as a repressed feature of the unconscious 
and for Heidegger as the coming-towards of Dasein’s being-guilty in which something is 
always left unsettled. It is important to remember here that for Heidegger Dasein’s being-
guilty indicates something very different than a moral guilt, but refers rather explicitly to the 
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nullity at the core of Dasein’s being. First of all, such a guilt coincides with Castorp’s 
unconsummated desire for Clavdia. Castorp does go marching toward his death still thinking 
of her, after all – the aspect of the ending, remember, that made the strongest impression on 
Heidegger because it is “an end without an end” [“eine Ende ohne Ende”] in which the love 
between Castorp and Hippe/Chauchat is never resolved or fully assimilated. Secondly, such a 
guilt refers to the “negative” basis of this desire, in which the x-ray negative of Clavdia 
remains, in the end, the most powerful evidence of Castorp’s otherwise positive eroticism 
vis-à-vis Clavdia.  
Consequently, Downing’s recognition that neither Hippe nor Clavdia can be 
distinguished temporally as the source of or prior term for the other only reconfirms 
Heidegger’s account of the past’s authentic relation to the future, namely, that both are 
always already out ahead of Castorp and the measure of their authenticity for Castorp lies 
precisely in this mode of repetition that is peculiar to a Heideggerian conception of history, 
where both history and the future exist quite explicitly as concomitant forms of possibility 
which comprise the entire orientation of Castorp’s radical Bildung. As Downing rightly 
points out, the significance of Clavdia’s x-ray “portrait” is that it is, in the end, not a portrait 
at all but rather a photograph. Thus it follows that logic of development described by 
Downing, as well as its accompanying temporality, according to which the negative image of 
Clavdia Chauchat is developed out of the Urbild of Pribislav Hippe, which is also to say, that 
Castorp’s future involves nothing short of his coming-towards the “innermost and most 
permanent possibilities” of his past. And the same may be said, I believe, and perhaps even 
more forcefully so, of the relationship between Hans Castorp and his grandfather, according 
to which the lebendiges history that Castorp is involves nothing short of Castorp’s 
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progressive taking over of the possibilities that lie “stored, latent, awaiting […] development 
and duplication” in the Urbild of the grandfather and that are quite literally handed down and 
transmitted to Castorp.  It is in this sense that Mann’s narrative helps us to better understand 
Heidegger’s admittedly opaque claim that “[o]nly in so far as Dasein is authentically as 
‘having-been’ can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back [to 
itself]. As authentically futural, Dasein is as ‘having-been’” [“Nur sofern Dasein überhaupt 
ist als ich bin-gewesen, kann es zukünftig auf sich selbst so zukommen, dass es zurück-
kommt. Eigentlich zukünftig ist eigentlich gewesen”] (BT 373/SZ 431), where Dasein’s 
coming back to itself signals much more than “a mere mechanical repetition or an attempt to 
reconstitute the physical past; it means rather an attempt to […] retrieve former possibilities, 
which are thus ‘explicitly handed down’ or ‘transmitted’” to Dasein (qtd. in BT 437). 
Before moving on to a discussion of the portrayal of history in Doctor Faustus and 
the way it, too, resonates with Heideggerian conceptions of history, I would like to say a few 
words about the ending of the novel and way in which what Heidegger might call an 
authentic Geschichte collides with its inauthentic counterpart. Much has been made in Mann 
scholarship of the “Donnerschlag” that occurs at the end of the novel, the outbreak of the first 
world war and the “shock that fired the mine beneath the magic mountain, and set our sleeper 
urgently outside the gates” [“der Donnerschlag, der den Zauberberg sprengt und den Sieben-
schläfer unsanft vor seine Tore setzt”](MM 709/DZ 1075). Conventional wisdom describes 
this moment as the moment in which the hermetic and suspect allure of the mountain is 
broken loose and Castorp is returned to the ordered world of life and history. Nevertheless, 
and here we should recall Ricoeur’s formidable analysis of the novel, the historical time into 
which Castorp and the rest of Europe are thrust with the outbreak of war is something very 
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different from either the so-called timeless world of the Berghof or the measured, orderly, 
chronological time of the flatland. And given our analysis of what I have already described as 
the authentic history traced by the novel, we may well read this suddenly historical time in 
the same light.  
Consider, for instance, the narrator’s problem at the end of the novel of narrating this 
portion of his protagonist’s past. On the one hand, he is ready to condemn Castorp for having 
allowed himself to be lured by the narcotic and illusory charms of the Berghof, “der sich 
zwar von den geistigen Schatten der Dinge regierungsweise das eine und andere träumen 
lieβ, der Dinge selbst aber nicht geachtet hatte und zwar aus der Hochmutsneigung, die 
Schatten für die Dinge zu nehmen, in diesen aber nur Schatten zu sehen” (DZ 1075).119 On 
the other hand, the narrator is self-aware enough a few pages later to admit his own guilt for 
participating in this same game of shadows, the game of narrative as such:  
O Scham unserer Schattensicherheit! Hinweg! Wir erzählen das nicht! Ist 
unser Bekannter getroffen? Er meinte einen Augenblick, es zu sein. [….]. 
[Aber] [e]r macht sich auf, er taumelt hinkend weiter mit erdschweren Füβen, 
bewustlos singend: 
 ‘Und sei-ne Zweige rau-uschten, 
 Als rie-fen sir mir zu –’ 
Und so, im Getümmel, in dem Regen, der Dämmerung, kommt er uns aus der 
Augen. (DZ 1084)120 
                                                          
119
 “[Castorp preoccupied himself] with this or that among the subjective shadows of things; but the things 
themselves he had not heeded at all, having the willful tendency to take the shadow for the substance, and in the 
substance to see only shadow” (MM 709). 
120
 “Shame of our shadow-safety! Away! No more! – But our friend? Was he hit? He thought so, for the 
moment. [….]. [But] [u]p he gets, and staggers on, limping on his earth-bound feet, all unconsciously singing: 
‘Its waving branches whi – spered 
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Is it too much of a reach to believe that the message, which is unspoken [unausgesprochen], 
is nevertheless, and perhaps precisely because of the narrator’s inability to transmit it, 
authentic? Or put another way, is it only coincidence that it is precisely here at this moment 
that we find Castorp courting not shadow but rather the substance of his past, the authenticity 
of which lies in his coming-towards himself? – his coming-towards both the object of his 
desire, his still burning love for Clavdia, and his coming-towards the possibility of his own 
impossibility that is anticipated in his march toward death, which is always also to say, that 
he is coming toward authentic historical possibilities that cannot be handed down by the 
inauthentic shadow-safety of narrative but only by a resolute Dasein to itself, which of course 
helps to explain the solitary, fading figure of Hans Castorp as he disappears toward himself at 
the end of the novel. 
 
Doctor Faustus 
Over the last three decades debates over the question of history in Doctor Faustus 
have fallen, more or less, into three recognizable categories. First, there is the question of 
whether the story of Adrian Leverkühn evokes one Germany, in which “the good and bad 
components [are] so inextricably and homogenously mixed […] that National Socialism 
appears inborn,” or two Germanies, “the one good [rational] and the other evil [irrational, 
diabolical]” (Fetzer 64).121 The second debates whether the novel’s account is even 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 A mess – age in my ear –’  
and thus, in the tumult, in the rain, in the dusk, vanishes out of sight” (MM 715). 
 
121
 For one or another variant of this approach to the novel’s treatment of history, see, for example, Vaget’s 
“Kaisersaschern als geistige Lebensform. Zur Konzeption der deustchen Geschichte in Thomas Manns Doktor 
Faustus” in Der deutschen Roman und seine historischen und politischen Bedingungen [ed. Wolfgang Paulsen, 
Berne: Francke, 1977.200-35]; Wiegand’s Thomas Manns ‘Doktor Faustus’ als zeitgeschichtlicher Roman 
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commensurate with or adequate to actual history. For instance, Helmut Koopmann doubts 
whether the novel is capable of shedding much light on historical events the author himself 
did not witness, and along with others, including Martin Travers, goes even further when he 
claims (following Adorno it would seem) both that the historical events in question exceed 
language and that the use and function of the Faust myth and the analogical treatment of 
music and literature betray a symbolic vision that is ahistorical, anachronistic and otherwise 
incompatible with contemporary German history (Fetzer 66).122 And finally, there are those 
which debate the decidability of the text’s treatment of history.123 Typically, such readings 
end by repeating the claim that the novel ends in the Zweideutigkeit with which it began, a 
“frustratingly familiar concept that, with Thomas Mann, always has the last word” (Fetzer 
131).124 Of course, as John Fetzer rightly points out, Zweideutigkeit in Doctor Faustus is 
never meant to indicate a “lack of clarity” but rather a “double valency” and thus he calls for 
future readings of the novel to overlook the “threadbare concepts of equivocality and 
ambivalence […] in favor of something resembling a definitive commitment” (131).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[Frankfurt: Fischer, 1982]; Wiβkirchen’s Zeitgeschichte im Roman. Zur Thomas Manns ‘Zauberberg’ und 
‘Doktor Faustus’ [Berne: Francke, 1986]; and Kreutzer’s “Fausts Weg vom Wissenschaftler zum Künstler oder 
Thomas Manns Deutung der deutschen Geschichte” in Zeitschrift für deutsche Studien [8 (1989-90): 79-85].  
122
 See Koopman’s “Der Krieg als Höllensturz: Zu Thomas Manns Kriegsberichterstattung und seinem Doktor 
Faustus” in Krieg und Literatur [2.3(1990): 13-32] and Travers’s “Doctor Faustus and the Historians: The 
Function of ‘Anachronistic Symbolism’” in The Modern German Historical Novel [ed. Roberts and Thomson, 
New York: Berg, 1991].  
123
 See, for example, Ryan’s The Uncompleted Past [Detroit: Wayne State, 1983]; Cobley’s comparative essays 
“Political Ambiguities in Under Western Eyes and Doctor Faustus” in Canadian Review of Comparative 
Literature [10 (1983): 377-88] and “Closure and Infinite Semiosis in Mann’s Doctor Faustus and Eco’s The 
Name of the Rose” in Comparative Literature Studies [26 (1989): 341-61]; and Barnouw’s “Fascism, 
Modernity, and the Doctrine of Art from Mario and the Magician to Doctor Faustus” in Michigan Germanic 
Studies [18 (1992):48-63]. 
124
 The novel begins with Serenus Zeitblom’s self-deprecating and mild-mannered admission that he may in fact 
not be the right one to narrate the tale of Adrian Leverkühn: “[…] gerade dadurch dem Leser Zweifel zu 
erwecken, ob er sich auch in den richtigen Händen befindet, will sagen: ob ich meiner ganzen Existenz nach der 
rechte Mann für eine Aufgabe bin, zu der vielleicht mehr das Herz als irgendwelche berechtigende 
Wesensverwandschaft mich reizt” (DF 7). And ends with his famously impossible “Wunder, das über den 
Glauben geht” und “Das Licht der Hoffnung [in] “letzter Hoffnungslosigkeit” (DF 672). 
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These separate but interrelated trends in Mann criticism, however, rarely consider the 
text’s radical undecidability as an essential commitment to a particular idea of time and 
history, and this is something even Fetzer overlooks when he casually admits without further 
emphasis or explanation that Mann was “accustomed to viewing history as a function of his 
own fate” (65). Understanding what Fetzer may have been on the verge of establishing with 
his description of Mann’s treatment of history in Doctor Faustus as a “function of his own 
fate” is not only critical to a deeper understanding of the portrayal of the potentiality of 
history in Doctor Faustus, but it is also a matter of emphasizing Mann’s commitment to 
something like a Heideggerian understanding of history and to a historical understanding 
made legible perhaps only through the filter of Heideggerian temporality. The various 
positions that make up these debates over the function of history in Doctor Faustus rarely 
engage the aporias of historical life and understanding that make these conversations 
possible, even likely, and which, I maintain, the novel ultimately registers. Consequently, I 
will forego an extensive commentary on the dilemma of whether there are one or two 
Germanies, perhaps a truly undecidable question, and focus the bulk of my attention on 
unraveling the more compelling question of the text’s adequacy to the history it attempts to 
narrate and the question of what some scholars have called the “radical undecidability” of 
this relationship. With such a focus I intend to show that Mann’s portrayal of history in 
Doctor Faustus is not only commensurate with what Heidegger calls an authentic Geschichte 
but also that what I refer to above as Mann’s “commitment to radical undecidability” is not at 
all unlike Heidegger’s conception of authenticity as such, in which Dasein’s fundamental 
interpretive task (through which we may say Dasein is gebildet) involves the resolute and 
anticipatory taking over of the possibilities it inherits from this undecidability, namely, 
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being-towards-death, history – in short, die Sorge – all of which Dasein itself is in constantly 
coming towards itself as having been. 
It is no coincidence, it seems to me, that in the very same passage in which Heidegger 
recalls Count Yorck’s emphasis on the “verborgenen Quellen” and “unsichtbares” essence of 
history – the passage, remember, which in the previous section of this chapter I linked with 
Settembrini’s description of the “invisible ink” in which the entirety of Castorp’s past was 
(and already had been) written – Yorck also makes a telling reference to Goethe’s Faust. For 
Yorck, as for Heidegger, an authentic encounter with the history that Dasein is is an 
encounter with a mode of invisibility that is also a laying bare out of the future, or as 
Downing might explain it, an Entwicklung of the hidden secrets of the past, which is also to 
say, a sort of communing with what Yorck calls “der Geist der Geschichte” [“the Spirit of 
History”] (SZ 530/BT 453). And both Yorck and Heidegger, knowing their situation much 
further along the historical path of modernity, find it both curious yet understandable that 
“the Spirit of History” “is one [Spirit] who did not appear to Faust in his study, or to Master 
Goethe either” [“Der ist in seiner Klause dem Faust nicht erschienen und auch dem Meister 
Goethe nicht”] (qtd. in BT 453/SZ 530).  
That the Spirit of History was omitted from Goethe’s version of the tale is significant 
because it may be argued that it is precisely this spirit that appears to Adrian in his study in 
Palestrina in Mann’s decidedly modernist account of the myth in Doctor Faustus. Readers 
need only recognize that the Devil’s part of the conversation involves the repeated insistence 
on the nature of history and the past as they directly relate to Adrian’s crisis. In fact, when 
Adrian notes early on the irony of the Devil’s having appeared to him in Italy, where the 
latter “enjoys no popularity,” rather than in the Germany of Adrian’s childhood, namely, 
  229
Kaisersachern, where a “medieval dread of sin” and the figure of the Devil remain alive and 
well, the Devil goes so far as to suggest that their meeting and thus, too, the bargain itself, 
would not even be necessary if only Adrian would admit the fundamental link between his 
own fate and the history that is his: “Had you but courage to say to yourself: ‘Where I am, 
there is Kaisersachern,’ why then, of a sudden the matter would be in accord […]” [“Wenn 
du den Mut hättest, dir zu sagen: ‘Wo ich bin, da ist Kaisersaschern’, gelt, so stimmte die 
Sache auf einmal”] (DF 242/DF 304).  
Not only does Adrian’s lack of courage, or better, his lack of acknowledgement, 
enforce the necessity of the pact, it is also the basis of the Devil’s continuing his history 
lesson (which, I maintain, is precisely the lesson of the pact itself), which in turns, takes up 
the history of Germany, German art and music, Adrian’s private past, etc. In addition, it is 
clear that Kaisersachern is much more than a place but forcefully equated with Adrian’s 
being as such and that this, too, is what Adrian is unable to grasp. Thus Kaisersachern is one 
of the boldest terms in the invisible script of that composition which is Adrian. Though 
Adrian speaks of Kaiserschern as if it belonged to the long ago, it is clearly the Devil’s 
premise that history “nie vergangen, nie vorbei ist,” that in fact it is always where he is as 
being-there or Dasein, and inasmuch as this is the case, he recalls not only Heidegger’s 
famous question – “Why do we say of time that it passes away but do not say with just as 
much emphasis that it arises?” – but also the claims of his Goethean counterpart, who at the 
end of Faust denounces the lemur chorus, just as the Devil denounces Adrian, for their 
unhistorical thinking, for “if it had not been, then it would make no difference” (MacNeice; 
emphasis mine): 
  Vorbei! ein dummes Wort. 
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  Warum vorbei? 
  Vorbei und reines Nicht, vollkommenes Einerlei! 
  Was soll uns denn des ew’ge schaffen! 
  Geschaffenes zu nichts hinwegzuraffen! 
  ‘Da ist’s vorbei!’ Was ist daran zu lesen? 
  Es ist so gut, als wär’ es nicht gewesen.125 
Given the particularly strong correspondence between Mephistopheles’s claims above and 
the extended account of this historical dynamic throughout the XXV chapter of Doctor 
Faustus, one is tempted to say that Mann’s Devil appears to take over precisely where 
Goethe’s Mephisto leaves off, i.e. with the task of elaborating this question, or better, the 
temporality of das Vorbei, what Heidegger calls the having-been or Dasein’s Gewesenheit. 
According to Downing, the development of the photographic negative into the fixed, 
positive image does not merely refer to an explicit transition from one term to the other, but 
rather it describes a fundamentally revelatory process in which the negative is hidden 
precisely through the process of its development (into the positive) even as it remains the 
very content of the positive and the condition of all its possibilities, including the possibility 
of its impossibility. And although Downing does not venture a discussion of Doctor Faustus, 
both his and Mann’s emphasis on the photographic temporality of Bildung resonates 
meaningfully with what Heidegger may agree is the authentic having-been exposed of Dasein 
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 Gone by! A stupid phrase. 
Why say gone by? 
Gone by – pure naught – complete monotony. 
What use these cycles of creation! 
Or snatching off the creatures to negation! 
‘It is gone by! – and we can draw the inference: 
If it had not been, it would make no difference […] 
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to what Downing calls the “negative” image of itself. Consequently, Downing’s analysis 
would appear to offer a promising point of reentry into the problem of history in the later 
novel (61), and as I have already begun to explain, one of the more remarkable examples of 
this problem and its accompanying temporality in the novel lies in the dynamic role played 
by Kaisersaschern in the narrative of Adrian’s life and fate as well as in Zeitblom’s 
imagination. 
We are, of course, very familiar by now with Heidegger’s claim that the past, like 
Being itself, must always be an issue for Dasein insofar as Dasein is itself never, strictly 
speaking, past, and this being an issue is always closely connected with Dasein’s 
understanding of itself, with its projection toward its ownmost possibilities – Dasein’s past is 
for it the history that it has been and that it is yet to come. As a result, Kaisersaschern is 
much more than the place from which Adrian receives his musical education, but it is also 
much more than the source of the diabolical elements that infect Adrian, his music and his 
homeland, i.e. the edge of that dangerous and precarious balance between “petit bourgeois 
morality and […] [the] medieval dread of sin” [“teils kleinbürgerlich-moralisch, teils 
mittelalterlich-sündenscheue”] that even Zeitblom admits does not adequately “serve the 
truth” [“Das würde die Wahrheit sehr unzulänglich gerecht und hätte nicht ausgereicht”] of 
its significance in the novel (DF 157/198). Kaisersaschern is the burden and potential of the 
past itself – which, as the novel forcefully suggests is for Adrian precisely never past – and it 
thoroughly determines Adrian’s and Germany’s historical ambition and predicament. In fact, 
Adrian’s fate is the fate of Kaisersaschern coming towards itself and is portrayed as such 
throughout the novel by Zeitblom:  
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[…] denn ist nicht der Augenblick des Flüggewerdens und anbrechnder 
Freiheit, wenn das Tor der Schule hinter uns schlieβt, das Stadtgehäuse, in 
dem wir herangezogen worden, sich auftut und die Welt uns offen liegt, der 
glücklichste oder doch der erregend erwartungsvollste in unser aller Leben? 
[….] War es so? Hat Kaisersaschern [Adrian] jemals freigegeben? Hat er es 
nicht mit sich genommen, wohin immer er ging, und ist er nicht von ihm 
bestimmt worden, wann immer er zu bestimmen glaubte? Was ist Freiheit! 
Nur das Gleichgültige ist frei. […] nachträglich fragte ich mich, was ich denn 
sonst erwartet hatte. Er widmete sich später der Komposition. Aber wenn es 
sehr kühne Musik war, die er schrieb, -- war es etwa ‘freie’ Musik, 
Allerweltsmusik? Das war es nicht. Es war die Musik eines nie Entkommenen 
[…] [es war] Musik von Kaisersaschern. (DF 114-15)126  
In addition to its moral and psychological significance, Mann gives to Kaisersaschern 
an ontological weight that Heidegger’s philosophy of history helps to elaborate. It is clear 
from the passage above that it is precisely a lack of indifference toward the past, its ‘being an 
issue’ for both the narrator and the protagonist, that motivates not only the narrative of 
Adrian Leverkühn but also the narrative impulse itself. It is, for example, no surprise that 
Adrian’s initial theological pursuits are so closely linked with his musical compositions. And 
this is the real reason for Adrian’s so-called indifference, which in the end is not indifference 
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 “For is not that fledgling moment of dawning freedom, when the school door closes behind us, when the 
shell of a town in which we have grown up cracks open, and the world lies before us – is that not the happiest or 
at least the most excitedly expectant in all our lives? [….] Was that true? Did Kaisersaschern ever really set 
[Adrian] free? Did he not take it with him wherever he went, and was he not controlled by it whenever he 
thought himself in control? What is freedom? Only what is indifferent and detached is free. […] Looking back I 
ask myself what else I should have expected. He later took up composing. But even if it was very bold music 
that he wrote – was it in any sense ‘free’ music, music for one and all? That it was not. It was the music of 
someone who had never escaped; it was the music […] of Kaisersaschern” (Faustus 91-2).     
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at all but rather a devoted attentiveness: the “excited expectancy” of the future is replaced by 
a colder understanding that what can be expected of the future is only the coming to ripeness 
of a past. Thus in the end Adrian’s musical achievement, despite all of its boldness and 
novelty, nevertheless comes toward the “edge of impossibility” and remains bound to its 
repetition of what has been and already is. It is in this stretching-along of life, which Dasein 
essentially is (later in the novel Adrian finally and explicitly admits this recursive temporality 
when he claims: “Ich bin Kaisersaschern” [“I am Kaisersaschern”], that it is able to 
apprehend the implicit and explicit connectedness of itself with the past and to anticipate its 
connectedness with a future, and it is only because Dasein historicizes itself in this way that 
history in the ordinary sense is meaningful. With respect to the novel, this interdependency of 
the future with the past and the amplitude of the future in the past is what first opens it for a 
Heideggerian reading of history.  
It is certainly no coincidence that the temporality activated in Kaisersachern’s role in 
the novel is reflected again in the temporality of the strenger Satz. As the Devil points out, 
and here he explicitly echoes Adorno’s claims in Philosophy of Modern Music, the twelve 
tone cannot be the “freies Spiel” [“free play”] of “permutations and derivations” it proposes 
to be precisely because it is fundamentally comprised of material handed down to it not only 
from history but also as history, including the history of the “work” [Aufgabe] (as opposed to 
the “play”) of the small folk, who long before Adrian’s conversation with the Devil are 
already busy at their morbid task. In fact, one of the fundamental characteristics of 
Schönberg’s twelve-tone system (and thus, Adrian’s, too) is that “none of the tones is to be 
repeated until the other eleven have been heard” (Mitchel and Blomster x).  Here we should 
recall my claim in the previous chapter that this strict consistency certainly doesn’t, as it is 
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frequently alleged, need to indicate a static atemporality. Although it is said to “scorn 
extension in time” it nevertheless insists upon a formula of temporality: on the one hand, a 
future is always already promised by the term-limit of the prohibition; on the other hand, this 
future consists fundamentally of a series of repetitions. Consequently, twelve-tone music 
seeks to describe an elemental musical temporality that may be called a mirror image of 
Dasein’s own, in which Dasein is said to authentically come-toward itself as having-been.  
Even while it seeks to avoid repetition and cut the edge of art by presenting one 
unprecedented chord after another with no appeal to a past or future (and thus, according to 
Scaff, rejecting both the time and humanity of narrative development), the strenger Satz 
remains bound essentially to something very much like a Heideggerian repetition, which is 
always also to say, it is bound to its material content and the historical specificity of those 
material conditions whose source is always its past; just as Dasein remains bound to the 
concrete heritage of its own having-been, the advancing musical row is bound to those 
possibilities, the “permutations and derivations,” released by its own material having-been or 
the series of musical notes (and the repetitions of these notes) of which it is made. And yet 
the temporality of the twelve-tone, like the temporality that Dasein is, in coming-towards 
itself as having been nevertheless approaches what is still very much a prohibition. And as 
the Devil advises Adrian, it is in the taking over of these possibilities that Adrian is said to be 
authentically historical, keeping in mind, of course, that in this taking over of the 
possibilities that are his inheritance (in the sense of the term indicated by Heidegger), Adrian 
chooses the terms of the Teufeslvertrag and thus literally signs off on the meaning of what it 
is to think historically, which means, as we have already shown in some detail, knowing what 
it means to be toward death, toward one’s uttermost impossibility: “Das ist es, du denkst 
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nicht an die Läufte, du denkst nicht historisch, wenn du dich beklagst, daβ der und er es ganz 
haben konnte, Freuden und Schmerzen unendlich, ohne daβ ihm das Stundglas gestellt war, 
die Rechnung endlich präsentiert wurd” (DF 318). 127 
Many of the novel’s critics claim in one way or another that the history recounted by 
the novel was “beyond the limits of language to express or even to approximate” or that it 
was unwise for Mann “to persist in operating within the confines of German intellectual and 
cultural history (music, for instance) when seeking an objective correlative for the Nazi 
period or to make the mythic background (for example, the Nietzschean prototype) the 
vehicle through which to come to terms with contemporary historical events” (Fetzer 67). 
These critical responses are heir, however indirectly, to the broader cultural and institutional 
influence of Adorno’s critique of both Heidegger’s metaphysics and the theory of 
authenticity that is so central to it.  
In The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno clearly implicates Heidegger as having 
committed to a blank but influential nominalism that overstrains and dehistoricizes language 
and its possibilities; such a jargon, according to Adorno, leaves Heidegger’s charged rhetoric 
of authenticity “untouched by history” (8). And while the basis of Adorno’s criticism is his 
insistence on the interpenetration of history and language, the corruption of the one by the 
other and the laying bare of language’s motives and recommendations amidst the material 
content of history, in Heidegger, Adorno claims, language takes refuge from history and 
resonates with the “theological addictions” of German culture in the years leading up to WW 
II. Heidegger’s authenticity becomes a space of deferral and distraction where a bourgeoning 
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 “That’s the thing – you are not thinking historically when you complain that some one or another could have 
it entire, joys and pains unending, without that his hour-glass had been turned or that at the end his bill be 
presented him” (DF 252). 
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fascism is nurtured (rather than critiqued) (5). Heidegger’s failure to account for his 
complicity in the historical developments of the mid-twentieth century in Germany and the 
policy of deferral underwritten in and by the jargon of authenticity means that Heidegger’s 
irresponsibility lies in his ambivalence and in the ambivalence of his language with respect to 
actual history and that as a result both Heideggerian history and Heidegger in history fail.  
It should immediately strike readers that the situation of Heidegger (especially as he 
appears when in Adorno’s grip) resonates not only with the situation of Adrian – the “most 
beloved creature of [Mann’s] imagination” – and thus, too, with the situation of the author 
himself, but it also resonates meaningfully with traditional currents in Mann criticism in so 
far as Mann’s novel is deemed problematic and controversial for the same reasons as 
Heidegger’s philosophy.128 And it is no less important that Adorno, who himself had a say in 
the novel’s composition, emerges here not merely as an antagonist but rather as the most 
productive and appropriate point of contact for a comparison of Mann’s and Heidegger’s 
theories of history.  
Adorno urges us never to forget the terrible specificity of modern German history and 
famously announced the end of art after Auschwitz in order to suggest, among other things, 
the limits of language and art when faced with the task of representing this specificity. In 
Adorno and Literature, a recent collection devoted to exploring the scope and breadth of 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory, more than one essay takes up the question of forgetting in 
Heidegger and Adorno, in particular the question as it relates to the myth of Faust. These 
readings are useful primarily because they suggest an important historical link between 
                                                          
128Readers will remember from the preface that Rüdiger Safranski begins his biography of Heidegger, Between 
Good and Evil, with a direct comparison of Heidegger with Adrian Leverkühn and throughout the text even 
models the controversy of Heidegger’s life and fate after the controversy surrounding Mann’s protagonist. 
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Heidegger’s philosophy and contemporary readings of the Faust myth, but they are also 
useful for bringing the Heidegger-Adorno debate into closer proximity with the complexities 
of reading Mann’s Doctor Faustus.  
Adorno reads the problem of Faust’s and history’s salvation in terms of forgetting. 
Forgetting must be combated, endured and passed through; it is the necessary precondition of 
both a return and the possibility of transformation (Fleming).  But this return, according to 
Adorno, is the return of an immanent freedom tied to concrete historical conditions and 
involves “making historical processes intelligible in such a way as to liberate specific 
possibilities from the structures […] that suppress them” (Macdonald 123). And for Adorno 
the so-called “extra-historical” emphasis with which Heidegger approaches the question of 
forgetting (that is to say, his tying it to the forgetting of Being) irresponsibly overlooks or 
avoids the historically concrete nature of forgetting (Macdonald 123). Thus Adorno’s most 
convincing criticism of Heideggerian history and the jargon of authenticity that accompanies 
it is that “the move from beings to being [essentially, too, the basis of the difference between 
an inauthentic and authentic history] suppresses the real, determinate historical needs that 
motivate thought […] [and] requires that real existing conditions […] be left unanalyzed – 
entailing that they are merely accepted as is and thereby condoned” (Macdonald 123; ND 
99).  
However, when critics insist on reading the key differences between Adorno and 
Heidegger as a struggle between a historical materialism and an abstract metaphysics – in 
terms of forgetting this amounts to a difference between “the forgetting of the truth of being” 
on the one hand, and the complex entanglement of a purely material guilt on the other – they 
fundamentally miss the point. At least, they miss Heidegger’s point – an oversight that at the 
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very least short-circuits potentially dramatic re-readings of Mann’s novel(s) as well as the 
potential of literature, more generally, to give substance to Heidegger’s abstractions. Given 
what we have already established with respect to a Heideggerian conception of history, it 
should be very evident that a Heideggerian temporality does not allow for the sort of 
transcendence indicated by Adorno and his followers, especially of the past. In fact, it is fair 
to say that it is precisely through what Adorno calls the material insufficiency, guilt and 
suffering of Dasein that it is first opened not only toward the forgetting of being 
[Seinsvergessenheit] but also toward the question of its being as such, which is also always a 
question of its time, or more precisely, the time that it is. Put differently, what Adorno (and 
historicism, more generally) refers to as the real, historical conditions which Heidegger’s 
historicity allegedly dispenses with is actually the content of the world into which every 
Dasein finds itself always already thrown as being-in-the-world; moreover, every Dasein is 
either inauthentically or authentically disposed toward this world – as we have seen, it either 
flees from that in the face of which it has been thrown or it confronts this world and itself in 
the authentic taking over of its guilt, its having been, and in so doing comes towards itself 
authentically. 
On the one hand, guilt, as it is understood by Heidegger, is certainly grounded in an 
ontological insufficiency, with which it probably is in fact beyond the capacity of language to 
correspond in any decisive way, although Mann doesn’t hesitate to make the attempt. In 
Doctor Faustus, for example, it is precisely such a guilt that is hinted at in the irrevocability 
of the Faustian pact. Adrian is thrown toward a fate which he cannot get behind because he 
has not himself “thrown the thrownness which is [his] basis.” It is despite himself that Adrian 
is lured into his Teufelsvertrag and signs it with his blood and lust, an encounter the Devil 
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tells us is in the end only an afterthought and not the real source of his infection or the fate it 
foreshadows, for such a fate had been decided well before Adrian’s private decision to 
consummate his destiny and thus condemn his body to the same agony that had always been 
his intellectual heritage. In The Magic Mountain, in fact, it is this same atmosphere of 
expectation and inevitability that fills Hans Castorp’s seven years atop the magic mountain 
despite his insistence that he is only there to pay his cousin a brief visit before embarking on 
his professional career. And, as we have already discovered, the most salient moments of 
Castorp’s acclimatization to what is ultimately at stake in his Entwicklung (Downing) are 
moments in which he comes to terms with his past as the ecstatic release or “exposure” of his 
future possibilities – this, it was shown, is the meaning of the temporality that accompanies 
his love for Hans Lorenz Castorp and for Pribislav Hippe/Clavdia Chauchat. It is fitting, too, 
that Adrian’s introduction in the novel carefully conceals the circumstances of his youth and 
discloses rather the circumstances of his family’s Herkunft and the character of those places 
that most shaped his nature, the historical specificity of the past he has inherited and of which 
he is an expression. So just as he in coming toward his fate and thus, too, himself, also comes 
toward his past, i.e. the past of Buchel and Kaisersaschern, Adrian is described as the 
singular emergence [Entstehung] of a constellation of historical forces “thrown” toward a 
fate, and as an abyss of private and public meanings, all of which point to the fact that Adrian 
“is not [only not] master of [his] Being” but that “[his] possibilities stem from an ultimate 
impossibility,” which for Heidegger is the very basis of the being-guilty that Dasein is 
insofar as it resolutely and authentically comes toward itself as having-been. 
On the other hand, though such an understanding of guilt is purely formal in one 
sense and thus does not ‘indicate’ a moral guilt, it does make possible and give way to such a 
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guilt insofar as it is brought to the surface of the present as action, which is also to say, as the 
essentially concrete projection expressed in every moment of choosing. As a result, Adrian’s 
choice not only involves the physical consummation of his fate, but his choice is also always 
Germany’s and is thus bound up with the concrete political character and consequences of its 
historical rendezvous with evil.  Even more importantly, perhaps, rather than becoming 
guilty, in choosing to embrace the “ill-fated creature” (Faustus 164) – Hetaera Esmeralda 
(the woman from whom he contracts his fatal infection) – Adrian, like Germany, remains 
guilty, both generally and concretely, by closing off and at the same time deciding the 
possibilities of his future, which at the same time is the mere confirmation of his becoming 
precisely what Zeitblom fears he had always been. Here we have only to consider that 
Hetaera Esmeralda refers not only to the gypsy girl with whom Adrian violates his pact long 
before his conversation with the Devil nor only to the motif that underlies and inspires all of 
his musical compositions, but it refers first to the mysterious butterfly introduced to Adrian 
and Zeitblom in their youth by Jonathan Leverkühn, Adrian’s father, whose own mystical 
leanings prefigure Adrian’s demise. Just as the butterfly’s camouflage allows it at once both 
to conceal and present itself in nature – “its wings smudged with just a dark splash of violet 
and pink, so that in flight, with nothing else visible, it imitates a windblown petal” [“Nur 
einen dunklen Farbfleck in Violett und Rosa hatte Hetaera auf ihre Flügeln, der sie, da man 
sonst nichts von ihr sieht, im Flug einem windgeführten Blütenblatt gleichen läβt”] – the 
past, which this symbol represents throughout the novel, follows the same logic of “defensive 
mimicry” [Schutz-Nachahmung] (DF 17/DF 21).   
All of this, of course, gives new meaning to the infamous circularity of the novel, 
which finds Adrian in very much the same place at the end of his life as he was at the 
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beginning: “Der landschaftlich-häusliche Rahmen, in den Adrian später, als reifer Mann […] 
stand zu demjenigen seiner Kindheit in der seltsamsten Ähnlichkeits- und 
Wiederholungsbeziehung, anders gesagt: der Schauplatz seiner späteren Tage war eine 
Nachahmung desjenigen seiner Frühzeit” (DF 36).129 Of course, as with Heideggerian 
repetition, what is suggested here is not the mere repetition of Adrian’s past in his future but 
rather a much more meaningful and influential recursiveness, which is alluded to in the 
musical analogy with which Zeitblom invests his recognition: “Ich weiβ nicht, wie weit 
Adrian damals etwas ‘merkte’, ob er sofort oder erst allmählich, nachträglich und in 
errinnerndem Abstand gewisse Verhältnisse, in eine andere, aber nicht ferne Tonart 
transponiert wieder erkannte” (DF 276)130 or in Zeitblom’s even more deliberate claim that 
in Adrian’s deteriorating health, for which his settlement at Pfeiffering is the decisive venue, 
one can not only trace certain correspondences with the deteriorating situation in Germany, 
but may also be witnessing the “fulfillment of something long expected” (DF 360).  This 
circularity is typically viewed as a negative symbol of historical stasis or even backsliding 
precipitated by or at least served up as an analogy for the cultural primitivism that is 
associated with the historical atrocities of National Socialism; however, it can also be viewed 
as a dynamic narrative expression and example of authentic repetition and being-guilty, or 
simply what it means to be historical in Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s fundamental 
temporality – Dasein’s coming towards itself as having been. 
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 “The framework of landscape and house where Adrian later established his life as a mature man […] very 
strangely resembled, even replicated, the framework of his early childhood [at Buchel]; or put another way, the 
setting of his later years curiously imitated that of his youth” (DF 29). 
130
 “I do not know to what extent Adrian ‘noticed’ anything that day, whether he immediately or only gradually, 
in the afterthought of memory, recognized certain relationships, transposed here [in Pfeiffering] in a different 
but not too distant key” (DF 219). 
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This becoming the past or being-guilty (though on the surface of history it produces 
an excessive, if corrupt, creativity and the semblance of health in Adrian) is grounded 
squarely in both an ontological and material insufficiency that is the basis of Dasein’s 
suffering. And it is this sort of suffering that the novel gives to Adrian and with which 
Zeitblom has such difficulty coming to terms. Indeed, as I am trying now to show, the novel 
itself is Mann’s own attempt [as the myth has always been Germany’s attempt] at coming to 
terms with the temporality of what Heidegger calls thrownness and the guilt that 
accompanies it. Of course, Mann’s original plans for the novel underscore the importance of 
the role of moral or spiritual guilt in the novel’s conception,131 but his later emphasis on the 
relationship of guilt to both the private past of the individual and the public past of the nation 
– namely, history – exposes an even more deeply felt correspondence with Heideggerian 
temporality. Such a temporality infuses the biographical structure of the novel as well as the 
narrative world it presents because the novel’s historical architecture is bound to the idea of 
the past and history as a problem of guilt. It presents itself for the novelist and narrator as a 
problem not only of “reckoning” (Reed) with the ontological weight of history but also with 
Heidegger’s question of what it means that “time always temporalizes itself only at one time, 
as human, historical Dasein.”  
As I have demonstrated, it is because Dasein is always already historical that it can 
have a history at all, and the novel’s most substantive task, it seems to me, lies in negotiating 
the dynamic gap between the history that Zeitblom and Adrian, in fact, are and the history 
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“Novella oder zu ‘Maja’. Figur des syphilitischen Künstlers: als Dr. Faust und dem Teufel Verschriebener. 
Das Gift wirkt als Rausch, Stimulans, Inspiration; er darf in entzückter Begeisterung geniale, wunderbare 
Werke schaffen, der Teufel führt ihm die Hand. Schlieβlich aber holt ihn der Teufel: Paralyse […]” [“Story or 
for ‘Maja’. Figure of the syphilitic artist: as Dr. Faust who has sold himself to the Devil. The effect of the virus 
is intoxication, stimulus, inspiration; in transports of exaltation he is allowed to create wonderful works of 
genius, the Devil guides his hand. But in the end the Devil carries him off: paralysis […]” (qtd. in Reed 361). 
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(of Adrian) that Zeitblom literally suffers to articulate. Thus we are given Zeitblom, for 
instance, whose being-historical first calls him to his task in so far as he is both embedded in 
and identifies himself with the history he narrates and in which he narrates, and he at the 
same time acknowledges the unavailability of that history which is the basis of his own guilt 
or, better, his perceived inadequacy for the task to which he has been called. For Heidegger it 
is only through such guilt that we authentically encounter the truth of being as forgotten or 
concealed; in fact, it is in the disclosure of this truth that we are said to authentically suffer, 
and it is in this way that authenticity discloses itself to Dasein as being-guilty and is directly 
tied to an engagement with the so-called concrete, material insufficiencies of history that 
Adorno describes and upon which he insists. On the one hand, both Adrian and Zeitblom are 
guilty in so far as they both are, which is always to say, in so far as they are their own 
coming towards as having been; on the other hand, their authentic taking over of this guilt 
occurs in their actively choosing the guilt that is theirs. Where Zeitblom takes over his guilt 
in the very undertaking that is the story of Adrian’s fate, Adrian chooses his guilt in the 
signing of the Teufelsvertrag. It is for this reason that the answer to Mann’s alleged dilemma, 
framed in the moral ambivalence attached to Adrian’s choices and fate, lies in Heidegger, 
who describes the authentic being-guilty of Dasein not so much as a choosing either the side 
of guilt or that of innocence, of choosing between condemnation or redemption, but rather as 
preparing the way to hear the appeal of this fundamental being-guilty in “wanting [first and 
foremost] to have a conscience” [“Gewissen-haben-wollen”] (BT 334/SZ 382). 
Mann expertly narrates the tale of the “small folk,” the biological agents of Adrian’s 
disease and the protagonists of the novel’s hidden narrative, whose furtive labor in Doctor 
Faustus is fundamentally heir to the hidden marks of the “silent sister” or to the secrecy of 
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Downing’s negative(s) in The Magic Mountain. While Adrian enjoys his high-flying time 
(though, technically speaking, Adrian was incapable of joy) as well as the productive and 
prodigious ‘free play’ of his intellect, it is the small folks’ Aufgabe [Arbeit, Werke] that 
carries the weight of the novel’s significance.  As I have ventured to explain already, the 
history of their Aufgabe is the alternate history of the novel, which Heidegger’s theory of 
history (and Downing’s analysis, too) helps us to better understand or at least gives us 
reasons to reconsider. As we discussed with respect to The Magic Mountain, Castorp’s 
Bildung (his coming towards himself as a positive, befestigt image) is tantamount to his 
becoming guilty or coming towards himself as having been (what Downing might call his 
own negative cliché and the hidden basis of his Bildung or, as Downing rightly shows, his 
Entwicklung [self-development]). In Doctor Faustus, it is likewise the positive image of 
Adrian’s excessive creativity that is not only fostered by but developed out of the negative 
cliché of his infection. The final taking over of the negativity that Adrian is – something akin 
to Castorp’s way of becoming his grandfather, his coveting of the x-ray negative of Clavdia 
or of the gramophone at the end of the novel – occurs, not coincidentally, in his last musical 
work, The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus, in which Adrian finally attests to what the Devil calls 
thinking historically. Such a moment, while representative of Dasein’s authentic taking over 
of its own coming towards as having been, coincides with the authentic disclosure of 
Dasein’s uttermost impossibility, and thus has as its essential function the laying bare of 
impossibility as such, the radical unavailability that is both Dasein’s thrownness and the 
possibility of its Nichtmehrdasein.  
With respect to the narrative itself, this moment, really a non-moment (as we 
established in the previous chapter), occurs when the time of writing intersects with the time 
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that is being written about. This intersection, so central to the composition of Doctor 
Faustus, amounts essentially to the seemingly impossible encounter between the Geschichte 
that we are and the Historie that we write, an encounter thoroughly conditioned by its 
entanglement with the temporality of conscience, the being-guilty that is grounded in 
Dasein’s first of all being-historical and which more perfectly than most accounts describes 
the reasons for Mann’s and Zeitblom’s ambivalence not only with respect to the question of 
Adrian Leverkühn’s life and fate but also with respect to the narrative attempt to reckon with 
a historical past that not only includes the author – that is also to say, a past which the author 
in a sense is – but also a past which is never yet, strictly speaking, past.  
As in The Magic Mountain, where the narrator shamefully acknowledges the 
“shadow-safety” of the narrative world that conceals and mitigates the violent actuality of 
history (715), the essential meaning of the past and history in Doktor Faustus is partly and 
necessarily lost to Zeitblom, and Mann’s emphasis on its hiddenness is apparent everywhere 
in the novel. Most notably, it appears in the hesitancy and mistake-prone introduction to the 
novel, in the equivocality about the life narrated, in the gaps and qualifications that guide the 
account of Adrian’s life, in the certain dramatic projection of Zeitblom’s historical analogies 
and in the tragic structure of his interpretations, and most importantly perhaps, in the 
uncertainty that thoroughly overshadows the reciprocity of his love for Adrian and the 
authenticity of his love for his homeland in whose history he shares a great part of himself. 
As Anne Hall points out, for example, Zeitblom does not so much believe in the Faustian 
meanings he reads in Adrian’s biography as cling “pathetically” to their possibility (442). In 
this way Mann calls attention to the limits and inevitable failures of language and memory to 
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comprehend the history it narrates and, for lack of a better term, stores, and thus admits the 
difficulty of his undertaking with respect to narrating history.  
In Doctor Faustus, and this is what has always served to problematize the frequent 
trope in Mann criticism that is called Zeitblom’s failure, an authentic repetition is precisely 
what Zeitblom’s biographical impulse requires. In so far as the tale is cultivated as a project 
of care and infused from the beginning with the weight of conscience, it testifies to the 
authenticity of Zeitblom’s effort and character, to his resolutely continuing the project for 
which he claims he is not suited. It is thus out of a confrontation with what is not himself that 
he reveals the potential of the having been in the coming towards of an individual’s and a 
nation’s fate.  
Ricoeur describes authentic repetition in this way: 
[R]epetition is the name given to the process, by which, on the derived level 
of historicality, the anticipation of the future, the recovery of fallenness, and 
the moment of vision in tune with ‘its’ time reconstitute their unity [….] The 
cardinal function of the concept of repetition is to reestablish the balance that 
the idea of a handed-down heritage tipped to the side of having-been, to 
recover the primacy of anticipatory resoluteness at the very heart of what is 
abolished, over and done with, what is no longer. Repetition thus opens 
potentialities that went unnoticed, were aborted, or were repressed in the past. 
It opens up the past again in the direction of coming-towards. By sealing the 
tie between handing-down and resoluteness, the concept of repetition succeeds 
at once in preserving the primacy of the future and in making the shift toward 
having-been.” (Time 76)  
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Perhaps it goes without saying that this predicament corresponds meaningfully with 
the situation of both the narrator and the protagonist in Doctor Faustus and likely underlies 
the mysterious identity they share in the novel as well as in the author’s imagination. In the 
first place, Adrian’s coldness and sterility, for which he is both punished and saved in the 
novel, is first and foremost his authentic response to the inauthenticity of a certain kind of 
history and the cultural and political life it hands down to Germany in the first half of the 
twentieth century. He rejects the pettiness of the political possibilities, even the political tone, 
of both Zeitblom’s bourgeois humanism as well as his other friends’ and acquaintances’ 
antiquated views on the future of Germany; as Zeitblom points out, Adrian’s work 
“‘confirms and realizes’ their discussions ‘on a higher, creative plane’” (qtd. in Reed, 377-8; 
DF 470) and as such is said to be free from the critical judgments of history that recognize, 
fear and condemn in the views upheld by the likes of the Kridwiss circle the dangerous, 
barbaric origins and potential of totalitarianism and the inevitable destruction wrought by 
National Socialism. Secondly, but most importantly, at the heart of Leverkühn’s indifference 
(and, too, Zeitblom’s anxious concern) is the very emergence of the being-guilty that 
accompanies Dasein’s authentic having-been and the resolute coming-towards that lies at the 
basis of both being-towards-death and Heideggerian historicity. Both Adrian and Zeitblom, 
unlike most of the other characters in the novel and although in admittedly different ways, 
seem to be acutely aware of something like the Heideggerian recognition of what it means to 
be historical.  
They come to understand, for instance, that just as “[t]here is no impetus toward the 
future that does not turn back toward the condition of finding itself already thrown into the 
world,” nor can any impetus toward the past avoid coming toward itself as it is. Just as 
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Adrian’s music flirts with the edge of the future, it remains the music “eine nie 
Entkommene,” the music of Kaisersaschern and Buchel, and just as the telos of his infection 
moves forward at a steady rate toward its certain end, it owes its momentum to Adrian’s 
having been thrown into the world that is only his; as was the case with Castorp’s becoming 
his grandfather, so, Adrian’s suffering is but the futural expression and outcome of his 
father’s boldest intellectual propensities and the authentic repetition of his fatal illness which 
Adrian inherits long before the Devil arrives to remind him of and to “confirm” his fate. 
Jonathan Leverkühn is not only the most critical source of Adrian’s suffering, the Devil 
claims, but his father also discovered the organic “wizardry” that explains the biological telos 
(temporality) of what would become his son’s fatal infection:  
‘Oh, dein Vater ist in meinem Maule gar nicht so fehl am Ort. Er hat es hinter 
den Ohren, mochte immer gern die elementa spekulieren. Das Hauptwee, den 
Ansatzpunkt für die Messerschmerzen der kleinen Seejungfrau, hast du auch 
von ihm…Im Übrigen, ich habe ganze recht gesprochen, um Osmose […] 
handelt sich’s bei dem ganzen Zauber. Ihr habt da den Lumbalsack mit der 
pulsierenden Liquorsäule darin, der reicht ins Zerebrale, zu den Hirnhäuten, in 
deren Gewebe die schleichende venerische Meningitis am leisen, 
verschwiegenen Werke ist’ (DF 316).132   
Likewise, we have Zeitblom, our narrator, who wonders whether there isn’t some 
“characteristic authenticity” to Adrian’s life, his music, and his fate. This wondering takes 
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 “Oh, your father is not at all misplaced upon my tongue. He is sly, aalways wanting to speculate the 
elements. From him you also have hat megrim in your head, the starting place for those knifing pains the l;ittle 
mermaid knows…I spoke quite rightly, by the way, sicne the whole wizardry is osmosis, a diffusion of liquor, a 
proliferous process. You have there the spinal sac, a pulsing column of liquor within, reaching to cerebral 
regions, to the meninx, in whose tissue the furtive venereal meningitis goes about its soft, silent work” (DF 
251). 
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the form of the narrative as such, in which Zeitblom’s “impetus toward the past” reveals the 
apparent inevitability of the past as it comes toward itself in the future (namely, fate) as 
something like that “characteristic authenticity” he searches for in the meaning of Adrian for 
him and his life – a meaning, not coincidentally, which he discovers in the last pages of the 
novel when it is disclosed to Zeitblom that his Geschichte is also Adrian’s, indeed that 
Zeitblom’s “essential content” lies not in him alone but in Adrian; it is in this sense that 
Zeitblom, like Adrian (or as Adrian) comes toward himself as authentic having been. 
My aim has not been to undermine the accepted premise of the novel – the parallel 
between aesthetic creativity and political barbarism that Zeitblom ponders throughout – 
rather, the goal has been to expose the temporality of the narrative framework’s limitations 
with respect to the history it intends to describe and for which it hopes to account. Moreover, 
a Heideggerian reading of the novel’s treatment of history would appear to admit a certain 
positive potential in Zeitblom’s inadequacy for the tale, which is usually read as a failure of 
moral or political courage. Of Zeitblom, Herbert Lehnert writes:  
[H]e does not know why his enmeshing of the time of which he reports with 
the time in which he narrates fascinates him [….]. Zeitblom may have an 
inkling that his friend’s artistic anti-conventionality may be analogous to the 
amorality of the regime from which he himself withdrew and the violent end 
of which he describes. But he is prevented from recognizing the analogy 
because the code of the bourgeois culture by which he lives and understands 
his world gives such a high value to creative art that he has to stop short of 
realizing its destructive potential. The readers have to break his silence, and 
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decode the text by comparing the fictional world with its real historical 
horizon. 
Such decoding engages the reader with the question of whether or not the 
fall of Germany also meant the fall of its culture […] or whether the highest 
level of artistic achievements, fictionally represented by Leverkühn’s 
compositions, remain above and untouched by National Socialist crimes. (3) 
I think Mann, at least, knew why the enmeshing of the times fascinated Zeitblom. Because 
the task of decoding that Lehnert assigns to the reader is both an impossible and a tragic one. 
The reader can no more decode the nature and absorb the implications of this comparison 
than Zeitblom can reconcile it in the narrative. The central question of the text, then, remains 
a question, albeit a decisive one. And for my purposes here it is less a question of the 
relationship between German art and the historical evolution and psychological origins of 
Nazi Germany, since that question is more or less answered on the text’s surface in the text’s 
central thesis, than it is a question of how to narrate the difference between an inauthentic 
Historie and an authentic Geschichte, a problem of the weight and scope of memory and of 
the past. Thus, too, the problem of whether the destructive potential of art and history lies in 
transcending the limits of morality, in not being at home in one’s historical circumstances 
and revolting against these circumstances, gives way to a more fundamental problem of 
whether it is possible to transcend the limitations of one’s historical horizon and the problem 
of what it means to be at home in one’s historical situation. It is thus not only a question of 
historical specificity but a question of the ontology of such specificity. 
Zeitblom’s shared guilt and complicity with contemporary historical events, namely, 
the atrocities of National Socialism, is said to lie in his inability to irrevocably condemn 
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Adrian’s artistic hubris, and thus, too, contemporary German history and the violence it 
unleashed on the world (Lehnert). Even if this is true, which I suspect it is to a certain extent, 
it does not preclude an altogether different reading. Such helplessness is also grounded in the 
identity that is established between the narrator and the protagonist as well as in Zeitblom’s 
inability to adequately “know” that for which Adrian is to be condemned.133 Lehnert claims 
that “[i]f the novel would carry the analogy of high art and evil as a message to its 
conclusion, it would offer closure. But it is merely suggested in the play between the 
symbolical deep structure and Zeitblom’s realistic biography [….] It is [left] up to the reader 
to recognize an analogy to the ideal of the National Socialist cultural policies […]” (8). We 
have already explored (in the previous chapter, for instance) the mechanisms by which Mann 
and Heidegger claim to dispense with the problem of closure, but the importance of that 
discussion rightly resurfaces here with respect to the question of history and authenticity. As 
Lehnert and others, including myself, have pointed out, the modernism of the novel resists 
narrative closure, but as I have made it a special point to articulate, this is much less a matter 
of narrative technique or a modernist experimentalism than a symptom of the very 
temporality Mann and Heidegger are trying to explain and accommodate. If we consider for 
the moment Zeitblom’s account of Nepomuk Schneidewein, where words fail him just as he 
undertakes to “describe” the little boy – “Wieviele Schriftsteller vor mir schon mögen die 
Untauglichkeit der Sprache beseufzt haben, Sichtbarkeit zu erreichen, ein wirklich genaues 
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 What is prohibited to Zeitblom is one of the most overlooked leitmotifs of the novel, for he, too, makes a 
fateful bargain and in return for something that is never settled him. Thus he is not only prohibited Adrian’s 
love and in a sense also prohibited to love Adrian, but he is also prohibited from ever “knowing” whether he is 
adequate to his task, namely, sharing with the reader the “essential content” of his life. I believe this, by the 
way, to be the meaning of being-guilty for Heidegger, yet another explanation for why one is always already 
guilty. Moreover, the authentic taking over of this guilt (as Adrian does with his musical compositions and as 
Zeitblom attempts to do in his tale) is what Heidegger (and I think Mann, too, would agree to) call a running 
after conscience and understanding (which is precisely the temporal thrust of die Sorge and thus, too, the unity 
of the temporal ecstases). 
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Bild […] hervorzubringen! Das Wort is geschaffen für Lob und Preis, es ist ihm verleihen, zu 
erstaunen, zu bewundern, zu segnen und die Erscheinung durch das Gefühl zu kennzeichnen, 
das sie erregt, aber nicht, sie zu beschwören und wiederzugeben” (DF 609)134 – it seems 
clear enough that the analogy cannot be maintained because it is first and foremost an 
analogy, a Historie, and thus non-identical with and perhaps as a result also inadequate to 
authentic historical experience, especially of the sort that provokes the narrative effort in the 
first place, namely, the having been of both Adrian’s love for Echo and the narrator’s 
complex love and sympathy for Adrian. In the case of the former, in particular, Echo is much 
too young to have a history and prohibited a future because of Adrian’s love for him – 
consequently, he underscores the authenticity of both being-towards-death and the having-
been in the strange impossibility which he essentially is.  
Consequently, even if we ignore for the moment Adorno’s warnings about the 
language through which it is expressed, the issue of Heideggerian authenticity is problematic 
on its own terms. But these warnings are hard to ignore, and in the end are presupposed, I 
believe, by Heidegger himself. Authenticity is an encounter with the ground of being, which 
in the end is always a question. It is fundamentally an encounter with the question of what it 
means to have been. To recover what has been there for the future, to restore what has been 
cast aside by history, is to engage the specific possibilities inherited from the past, but such 
an engagement always takes place at the “edge of impossibility,” as Mann might describe it, 
because, as I’ve already demonstrated, for Heidegger Dasein is always a thrown possibility. 
It is never past, and as such can never get behind the thrownness which it has not itself 
                                                          
134
 “How many writers before me have lamented language’s inadequacy at making things visible, at calling 
forth a truly precise likeness […]. Words are made for praise and tribute, they have been granted the power to 
admire, to marvel, to bless, and to characterize a phenomenon by the emotion it arouses, but not to conjure it up, 
not to reproduce it” (DF 484). 
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thrown; its having already been “delivered over to its [own] death”  is always already 
concealed. The recognition and taking over of this unavailability (guilt) both completes the 
moment of authenticity and describes the way an authentic history is revealed to us or is 
brought out of concealment in history. But this turn also brings our discussion back to the 
problem of representability since Adorno as well as Heidegger describe language as being, in 
one sense, at least, and especially with respect to history, a barrier to either a critical or 
ontological authenticity.   
Krzysztof Ziarek views the work of art as being grounded in the very impossibility of 
representation; following Heidegger’s claims in The Origin of the Work of Art, Ziarek 
explains how the work of art “default[s] from history and historicism in order to keep in view 
the historicity of being” (224). As I explain above, the analogy that haunts the entire novel, 
that binds Adrian’s creative efforts with the political consequences of National Socialism and 
that would bring closure to the novel by committing to an indictment of history and to the 
idea of a nation’s failure belongs in part to a fictional world that the Devil in the novel tells 
us is no longer possible. Thus when the Devil insists that thinking historically means 
thinking of time in its courses – a thinking on the end in which historical change itself 
emerges as a series of finite intervals, which is also to say, a series of endings – 
the other sort of dwelling on history as “praise and tribute [with] the power to admire” and 
presumably, too, to condemn or regret, etc., is certainly not adequate to the deeper weight of 
the past for which these circumstances are meant to invoke our understanding and sympathy. 
And this is the primary claim the following and final section of the chapter hopes to 
demonstrate – to complete the analogy would mean to fall short of the authentic response to 
history the novel wishes to be because it inevitably casts aside the hope and possibility 
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invested in Adrian’s character by Zeitblom and Mann, for whom Adrian, remember, was his 
most “beloved” character, and it is this same sort of hope that Heidegger invests in his own 
idea of authenticity and die Sorge.  
When Zeitblom wonders whether National Socialism isn’t “nach Worten und Taten 
nur die verzerrte, verpöbelte, verscheuβlichte Wahrwerdung einer Gesinnung und 
Weltbeurteilung, der man charakterliche Echtheit zuerkennen muβ […]” (DF 636),135 he not 
only (and rightly) condemns the historische course taken by Germany in the first half of the 
twentieth century, despairs at the means available to him for “coming to terms” with that 
history, but he also complicates the matter of his judgment by pointing to a “characteristic 
authenticity” that throughout the novel is associated with Adrian, who is said to live out the 
aborted promises of a corrupt National Socialism on a higher, more creative plane. 
This authentic encounter would only appear to be revoked by history itself. Just as 
Germany, according to some, ignored and permitted the only retrospectively transparent telos 
of National Socialism, Adrian in one sense dismisses and evades the confirmation of his guilt 
and fate that the Devil’s visit is said to be. Likewise, in Zeitblom’s forgetting, Mann 
explicitly throws into question not just the reliability of his narrator but the very possibility of 
his task and undertaking. Adrian, on the other hand, in his authentic being-guilty (and in a 
sense, Mann, too) represents what it means to “know” (in the Heideggerian sense of the term) 
the temporality that always already accompanies such a series of (im)possibilities. Thus the 
impossibility of the analogy that would provide the reader with closure is grounded in the 
historicity not only of the artwork as such, as Ziarek suggests, but also in the historicity of 
the contemporary past the novel attempts to comprehend and narrate. The history to which 
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 “both in word and deed, merely the distorted, vulgarized, debased realization of a mindset and worldview to 
which one must attribute a characteristic authenticity […]?” (DF 506). 
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the analogy cannot authenticate a response is the historicity of the event [Ereignis], which is 
precisely never past, and as such it can never get behind the thrownness which it has not 
itself thrown; its having already been “delivered over to its [own] death” is always already 
concealed, which, according to Ziarek, forcefully releases thought from the burden of 
signification and narrative closure that the analogy is meant to facilitate (225). 
Ziarek points to avant-garde literature as embodying/enacting such a displacement: 
avant-garde writings are said to be “deliberately set up against interpretation, they disallow it, 
or, to put it differently, they release literature from the grasping power of interpretation. 
Temporality and event underpin […] [this] idiosyncratic writing, a writing that does not ‘use’ 
language but instead invents or refigures it as it goes along. It functions as a writing not in 
language but of language” (225). Such writing “stages” and “transcribes” the temporality of 
the artwork rather than defines or describes it. One may be tempted to ascertain from this that 
since Doctor Faustus is anything but an avant-garde novel and since it very consciously, like 
all of Mann’s novels, avoids the sort of radical experimentalism typical of Stein, Joyce, and 
others in the modernist tradition (remember Lukács’ special admiration for Mann’s critical 
sort of modernist realism), that it falls short of such a performance. But this could not be 
further from the truth. In fact, I think it is safe to say that Doctor Faustus attempts to narrate 
the confrontation between Geschichte and Historie that the writing of the avant-garde 
supposedly demonstrates, and in this attempt directly engages the struggle as it really is, that 
is, as necessarily and intrinsically historical and as first and foremost a matter of history.   
If, according to Ziarek, historicity is the basis of the social figure of art, then it is also, 
according to Heidegger, the basis of the ontological figure of history. Ziarek writes:  
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As the event-constitution of occurring, historicity marks a remainder over the linear 
temporality, a kind of residual happening, giving presence but itself withdrawn from 
it and, thus, always already without place or presence in the present, the past, or the 
future. Historicity is what, composing or writing at any moment the relations between 
the three dimensions of time, does not belong to those dimensions: it does not 
constitute a past origin, a present instant, or a future presence. Without a dimension of 
its own, it marks the futurity of the present, that is, it unfolds the present as coming 
from what has been and dislocated toward what is to come. The work of art secretes 
this historicity […]. (224) 
This is a precise description of what I have always thought a Heideggerian temporality could 
bring to a rereading of Mann’s novel and especially the complex understanding of history 
that it describes. If traditional readings fault Mann’s portrayal of history as an anachronistic, 
overly simplistic portrayal of the linear, historical development of Germany’s tragic fate and 
as inadequate to the contemporary history of the novel, they thereby overlook the ontological 
foundations of a more fundamental historicity of which the novel is both a commentary and a 
staging. 
Doctor Faustus is, after all, a book of remainders, which testify to both the 
unavailability and the insistence of the having-been.136 It is not so much that in employing 
the mythic background, or by remaining squarely within the confines of German intellectual 
and cultural history, Mann anachronistically neglects or distorts contemporary history, but 
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 As I show in the previous chapter,  in so far as it is a book of remainders, Doctor Faustus is also a book of 
endings, in the sense of an authentic being-towards-death, where the inevitability of death is always 
accompanied by the remainder of its impossibility, its existential deferral, that something which is always still 
to be settled, even in death: “Although it knows its end absolutely, [Dasein] will always be that in relation to 
which it will never know anything: the knowledge of the end always withdraws, is concealed in being deferred” 
(Stiegler 231). 
  257
rather that he actively engages the ontological depth and comprehensive temporality of 
authentic being-as-having-been. With Adrian and Zeitblom we have shown how the past as 
having-been withdraws from presence in precisely the way that Heidegger suggests, but we 
have also measured the way in which historicity opens up the possibilities of what remains of 
the past in its continued unavailability. Just as Adrian’s bargain is the “residual happening” 
toward which he “dislocated,” Adrian is Zeitblom’s, which, even as his “essential content” 
withdraws from the surface of his life, simultaneously marks the limits of his past and the 
“futurity” of his suffering. To say, then, along with many of the novel’s critics, that the myth 
no longer obtains in history or that German history is not the only place from which to launch 
an authentic investigation into its historical fate is to overlook the force, temporality, and 
what I want to call the historical specificity of this unavailability. 
This alethetic structure in the novel signifies and demonstrates the potential for 
knowing (or disclosing) that which is concealed in and by an inauthentic history, namely, the 
essential historicity of Dasein. According to Ziarek, 
[I]t is a knowing that takes the form of preserving the strife figured in the 
work of art, of the space of deciding, in which one confronts the temporality 
and undecidability of the identities – material and ‘spiritual’ – at play in art. 
[….] The work of art opens up history, which means that in art one comes 
face to face with the essenceless occurring of what is, with the fact that being 
does not give stable identity, truth, or knowledge but keeps displacing them, 
always singularly. Historicity marks the withdrawal from presence and 
manifests the undecidability opened up by this retraction as what is decisive 
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about being – a decisiveness of depresencing, which art keeps staging in its 
figure. (227) 
Isn’t what is usually taken as Mann’s equivocality and ambivalence with respect to his 
willingness to condemn the events that unfolded in the mid-20th century in Germany really 
more of a formidable statement on this decisive question of Dasein’s historicity? Isn’t what 
the novel offers a “space of deciding, in which one confronts the temporality and 
undecidability of the identities at play” in history between an inauthentic and authentic 
having-been, between the various representative modes of bringing history to presence and 
“the essenceless occurring of what is”? Whereas historicism “covers the ‘presenting’ or the 
occurring and evacuates the historicity of what it presents” (Ziarek 229), historicity reveals 
this occurring as an ever-present accompaniment to everyday being-in-the-world. What is 
decisive about Being, then, is still the decisiveness of its withdrawal both in and as history.  
And, as I have pointed out all along, this alethetic “play” of being is not just the 
provenance of art. Even more immediately than the work of art, the historical event itself 
“secretes” historicity; it is what is “at play” in history, and this is why the historical novel is 
perhaps the most appropriate place to analyze its significance. Historicity exceeds language 
even while the history we write is excessive in it. Contrary to conventional views of the 
novel, Mann would far from disagree that an authentic history exceeds the limits of language; 
in fact, he dramatizes this excess throughout his writings. For instance, Zeitblom writes on 
April 25, 1945, of an American general who leads the residents of Weimar past the 
crematoria at Buchenwald  
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[und] erklärt diese Bürger, die in scheinbaren Ehren ihren Geschäften 
nachgingen und nichts zu wissen versuchten, obgleich der Wind ihnen den 
Stank verbrannten Menschenfleisches von dorther in die Nasen blies – 
erklärt sie für mitschuldig an den nun bloβgelegten Greulen, auf die er sie 
zwingt, die Augen zu richten. Mögen sie schauen – ich schaue mit ihnen, ich 
lasse mich schieben im Geiste von ihren stumpfen oder auch schaudernden 
Reihen. (DF 634)137 
Nowhere else in the novel does contemporary history more clearly and emphatically intersect 
with Mann’s allegorical portrayal of it. The passage that follows this one in the novel both 
reckons with the problem of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and then returns to that most 
creative and seductive period of Adrian’s life and work that, according to Zeitblom, may 
have in fact finally prepared the way for the somber line past Buchenwald, the time period in 
which the time of writing “closes ranks with [the] frame of this biography” [“schlieβen sich 
[mit dem] Raum dieser Biographie”] (DF 507/636).  
Zeitblom’s description of the Weimar citizens’ encounter with historical actuality is 
in one sense the lack of an encounter, and not only for the citizens but for Zeitblom and 
Mann as well. It thus very consciously reminds the reader (and in this sense is also an 
authentic repetition) of the final pages of The Magic Mountain, in which Hans Castorp 
literally disappears amidst the distant cries of his fellow soldiers. The specificity of the 
encounter, its final disclosure, amounts to the withdrawal of experience, not to the 
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 “[in order to demonstrate] that they, citizens who went about their business in seeming honesty and tried to 
know nothing, though at times the wind blew the stench of burned human flesh up their noses – […] that they 
share in the guilt for these horrors that are now laid bare and to which he forces them to direct their eyes. Let 
them look – I shall look with them, in my mind’s eye I let myself be jostled along in those same apathetic, or 
perhaps shuddering lines” (DF 505-6). 
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withdrawal of specificity but the disclosure (out of withdrawal) of an altogether different sort 
of historical meaning [Geschichtsdeutung]. It may be understood as a moment of 
Heideggerian and Mannian authenticity, in which what is confronted, what returns, is much 
more than an abstract, forgotten truth of being ungrounded in and unresponsive to “real, 
determinate historical needs” and thus inadequate to historical actuality. Rather what returns 
is the very being of these conditions in their unmediated having-been, which is also to say, 
what is preserved is the strife of Dasein’s fundamental historicity. Put another way, what 
returns is not so much the historical meaning of this specificity (in the sense of an inauthentic 
historiographical account that would propose to record the unavailability of the event, to 
write it down and thus not have to repeat it as the adage goes), but rather the specificity of 
historical being as such, the specificity of what it means to be historical, which both the novel 
and the Weimar image intend to communicate. Heideggerian historicity shows us that being 
and history withdraw even as they are disclosed, and what better describes not only the way 
Weimar confronts and is confronted by its own history but the way, too, that Mann (and 
Zeitblom) anxiously approach their subject or even the way that we readers typically 
encounter the oblivion of the histories that we are.  
In conclusion, although Heidegger has shown us that an authentic encounter is an 
encounter with impossibility, this doesn’t mean authenticity is impossible. When Zeitblom 
visits Adrian for the last time, he is encouraged to approach the bedside of his dying friend 
with the ironic, painful (for Zeitblom) invitation: “Come on in, he won’t notice you” 
[“Kommen Sie nur, er bemerkt Sie nicht!”] (DF 533/DF 671). Yet like the citizens of 
Weimar and even Hans Castorp, Zeitblom shudders at his witnessing what it is not his to 
witness, and he wonders, precisely as Castorp had wondered at his grandfather’s corpse, at 
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the “trick of nature […] [that] is able to create the image of highest spirituality where the 
spirit has departed!” [“Welch ein höhnisches Spiel der Natur […] daβ sie das Bild höchster 
Vergeistigung erzeugen mag, dort, wo der Geist entwichen ist!”] (DF 533/DF 671). Any 
chance of authenticity in this encounter would appear to be negated in Adrian’s aloofness and 
in the certainty of his death and the final judgment handed down to him and his nation for 
keeping the pact they had “signed with [their] blood.” And it is easy enough to confirm this 
following the terms of Adorno’s critique of Heideggerian authenticity, where authenticity 
evacuates the world of spirit even while it assures the world it is guided by it. It is also easy 
enough to read Adrian’s fall and the fall of Germany as something like the failure of 
Heideggerian authenticity – the taking over of the possibilities of the past in the handing-
down of heritage, the “authentic” repetition of elemental forces recovered and erupting in the 
present only to bring about the destruction of an age in the coming-towards of the destiny of 
an individual and his homeland.  
Nevertheless, as I have tried here to argue, this sort of closure casts aside something, 
too, leaves something unfigured. Among other things, it casts aside that deep, life-sustaining 
love which the novel prohibits to Adrian as well as the reciprocity of that love which is both 
prohibited to Zeitblom and yet which gives his life its essential content. It also conceals 
Adrian’s profound love for humanity, which he himself stages and confesses in his only and 
final performance of the Faust cantata, in which Adrian takes upon himself the burden of the 
past and the burden of guilt that his audience (and thus, too, Germany), like the citizens of 
Weimar, are unable or unwilling to acknowledge.  
In the end, then, it is a matter of recalling the narrator’s final wish in The Magic 
Mountain, that “Out of this universal feast of death, out of this extremity of fever […] may it 
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be that Love one day shall mount?” [“Wird aus diesem Weltfest des Todes, auch aus der 
schlimmen Fieberbrunst […] einmal die Liebe steigen?”] (MM 716/DZ 1085) and of 
emphasizing the echo of this earlier plea in Zeitblom’s insistence that “[d]ie unvermeidliche 
Anerkennung der Heillosigkeit ist nicht gleichbedeutend mit der Verleugnung der Liebe. 
[….] der oft verschreckten, der immer bangen, aber in Ewigkeit getreuen Liebe zu einem 
bedeutend deutschen Menschen- und Künstlertum geweiht, dessen geheimnisvolle 
Sündhaftigkeit und schrecklicher Abschied nichts über diese Liebe vermögen, welche 
vielleicht, wer weiβ, nur ein Abglanz der Gnade ist’ (DF 597).138 Thus do the prohibitions 
that would appear to preclude authenticity disclose themselves authentically in the very 
undertaking the novel represents. In this sense what is cast aside by one reading is another 
reading which recovers what the other leaves behind, and the taking over of this past for the 
future is called for in Zeitblom’s final wish for “a miracle that goes beyond faith” and that 
will one day “bear the light of hope” and in what is ultimately the Heideggerian task to which 
both Dasein and Mann have called themselves. For in so far as the novel narrates the 
historical demise of Zeitblom’s friend and homeland (and in this sense it may be said to 
narrate the failure of authenticity), Heideggerian temporality also certifies the historicity of 
Zeitblom’s (and Mann’s) effort.  This effort, then, demands an inquiry into the possibility of 
authentically engaging a having-been that now includes the damaging, totalizing effects of 
world war and genocide and its bringing to bear on existence a difficult heritage with which 
to “authentically” come to terms. The possibility of such an inquiry lies, according to Mann it 
would seem, only in taking over the being-guilty that Dasein is, in the so-called “reckoning” 
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 “The ineluctable recognition of hopeless doom is not synonymous with the denial of love. [….] the often 
terrified, always fearful, but eternally faithful love of a significant German human being and artist, whose 
mysterious sinfulness and horrible end have no power over this love – which perhaps, who knows, is but a 
reflection of grace” (DF 474). 
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the novel is said to stage, and in the possibility that some part of that having loved and having 
been loved may be preserved for recovery. 
  
 
 
Chapter V 
 
Conclusion 
 
Critical Care, or Care as Critique: Thomas Mann and the Adorno-Heidegger Debate 
 
 
The time has come to bring this comparison to a satisfactory end and conclusion, a 
pivotal moment, really, if we take to heart what has already been said about the nature of the 
end and endings in the works of Mann and Heidegger and for the world(s) they both inhabit 
and essentially are. It is at the very least a time to reestablish the overarching significance of 
my study and to situate that discussion within the scope of other important and related 
questions relevant to the ongoing study of modernism and modernist time and temporality. 
These important and related questions include what Fredric Jameson has called the “end of 
temporality” and what Eva Geulen rightly refers to as the “rumor” of the end of art, both of 
which find distinct and comparable expression in the works of Mann and Heidegger during 
the late modernist period under study here.  
 
The End of Time 
Just as the essential meaning of art and tragedy lies somewhere in the interstices of 
reality and representation, so does the meaning of the question of time, and the problem of 
knowing what time is has to some extent also always existed. We have only to take into 
account St. Augustine’s famous version of the problem in Book Nine of his Confessions, 
where he asks, “What then is time?” and goes on to answer, “If no one asks me, I know: if I 
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wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not.” (qtd. in Ricoeur; Miller; and Kavaloski). 
Likewise, Paul Valery writes:  
It is almost comical to ask oneself exactly what is the meaning of a term that 
one uses all the time with full satisfaction. For example: I catch the word 
Time as it flies by. This word was absolutely limpid, precise, honest, and 
faithful in its service, as long as it played its part in a proposition, and as long 
as it was spoken by someone who wanted to say something. But here it is, all 
by itself, seized by its wings. It takes revenge. It makes us believe that it has 
more meaning than it has functions. It was only a means, and now it has 
become an end. It has become the object of a frightful philosophical desire. It 
changes itself into enigma, into abyss, into torment of thought. (qtd. in Miller)  
And like tragedy, time only carries with it the stability of meaning when it is represented, as 
in the regimented yet fluid movements of the hands of a clock, but when the various modes 
used to represent time are stripped away from it, it emerges as an untransfigured, 
“unfathomable enigma” (Miller). And yet this unknowable thing time carries with it a name, 
and it can be argued that it is precisely because of its unknowability that it calls out for a 
name in the first place and demands to be figured, as Paul de Man argues in The Rhetoric of 
Temporality, where “The word ‘time’ is a trope. To be more exact, it is a catachresis, or 
‘abusive transfer,’ for something that remains unknown and therefore has no literal name. 
The word ‘time’ is posited, without authority or possibility of verification, as a figurative 
expression for something unknowable” (qtd. in Miller). Despite the essential instability of the 
term, critical analyses of modernist time typically agree about the significant position 
occupied by time in modernism’s coming to terms with its own historical specificity and 
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otherness, and it has been the primary aim of this study to show how the instability of the 
term is much less a barrier to literary and philosophical speculations on time than it is the 
essential way toward a concrete apprehension of the fullness and complexity of its character 
and nature under the pressures and vicissitudes of modernity. In other words, the dynamics of 
its instability, portrayed as an end in itself in traditional readings of modernist time, really 
functions more as the ground or means of preparing a way toward what Heidegger insists 
upon calling an idea of time as the possibility of an impossibility, the essential instability of 
which is the fundamental basis, according to both Heidegger and Mann, for venturing an 
understanding of the concomitant volatility of the modernist world, the modernist cogito, the 
modernist narrative and modernist art, and both modernist history and the history of 
modernism. 
It has been the secondary aim of this study to challenge head-on traditional readings 
of modernist time as well as more contemporary claims that, in view of the limits of these 
readings, would want to dispense with time altogether. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this 
evolution, or better, the current state of feeling with respect to scholarly engagements with 
the subject of time, is by recalling J. Hillis Miller’s and Fredric Jameson’s more or less recent 
insistence on the untimely nature of contemporary critical approaches to both modernist time, 
more generally, and the question of time as such.139 J. Hillis Miller writes unequivocally in 
“Time in Literature” (2003) that “All literature is about time. Yet concern with time in 
literature today is untimely. It comes at the wrong time. These two contradictory propositions 
should govern all contemporary reflection about time in literature.  […] [T]he topic seems 
these days somewhat outmoded, old hat, vieux jeu. […] In these days of focus on class, race, 
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 See J.H. Miller’s “Time in Literature,” Daedalus, 132.2 (Spring 2003): 86-98; and Fredric Jameson’s “The 
End of Temporality,” Critical Inquiry, 29.4 (Summer 2003): 695-718.  
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and gender, the subject would seem to many literary scholars far too abstract, artificial, 
philosophical, and formalistic to be worth pursuing” (Miller 86). Likewise, Jameson’s essay 
“The End of Temporality” (2003) lays out the generally accepted version of this overcoming 
and in the process makes a telling but rather incomplete reference to both Heidegger and 
Mann: 
After the end of history, what? No further beginnings being foreseen, it can 
only be the end of something else. But modernism already ended some time 
ago and with it, presumably, time itself, as it was widely rumored that space 
was supposed to replace time in the general ontological scheme of things. At 
the very least, time had become a nonperson and people stopped writing about 
it. The novelists and poets gave it up under the entirely plausible assumption 
that it had been largely covered by Proust, Mann, Virginia Woolf, and T.S. 
Eliot and offered few further chances of literary advancement. The 
philosophers also dropped it on the grounds that although Bergson remained a 
dead letter, Heidegger was still publishing a posthumous volume a year on the 
topic. And as for the mountain of secondary literature in both disciplines, to 
scale it once again seemed a rather old-fashioned thing to do with your life. 
Was aber war die Zeit?  
What is time? A secret – insubstantial and omnipotent. A prerequisite 
of the external world, a motion intermingled and fused with bodies 
existing and moving in space. But would there be no time, if there 
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were no motion? No motion, if there were no time? What a question! 
[….]140 
In any case, neither phenomenology nor Thomas Mann offered promising 
starting points for anything calculated to fire the imagination. (695-96)  
Here Jameson describes Mann’s apparent recognition in The Magic Mountain that the 
irresolvable paradox of time must eventually exhaust itself as a valid preoccupation of 
writers and philosophers, and he clearly assumes that with The Magic Mountain the topic, 
and not only for Mann, had by this time been “largely covered” by modernist literature and 
philosophy. Yet while this realization makes perfect sense when understood from within the 
contemporary limits of Jameson’s perspective, that is from the perspective of a scholarly 
climate in which, as Heidegger might say, time, like being, is no longer the issue, the 
historical context of Mann’s passage at the time it was written poses an immediate challenge 
to Jameson’s sweeping claim.  
First, as I have I hope already demonstrated, Mann’s own preoccupation with time 
certainly doesn’t end with the publication of The Magic Mountain but deepens quite radically 
over the next two decades of his career, and despite the monumental scope of Being and 
Time and Heidegger’s persistent engagement with the subject, Heidegger’s work has never 
been properly addressed either with respect to modernism as such or with a view toward the 
specific “time-obsession” of modernist narrative(s). And secondly, while the passage above 
certainly reiterates the seeming impossibility of comprehending or narrating time and 
certainly appears to be responding in earnest to its contemporaries’ experiments with time in 
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 “Was ist die Zeit? Ein Geheimnis, -- wesenlos und allmächtig. Eine Bedingung der Erscheinungswelt, eine 
Bewegung, verkoppelt und vermengt dem Dasein der Körper im Raum und ihrer Bewegung. Wäre aber keine 
Zeit, wenn keine Bewegung ware? Keine Bewegung, wenn keine Zeit? Frage nur! [….]” (ZB 521/MM 339, 
Trans. John Woods; qtd. in Jameson’s “The End of Temporality”). 
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literature and philosophy, of which The Magic Mountain is typically said to be an example, it 
is perhaps more apt and urgent to say that here Mann seeks explicitly to move beyond and to 
acknowledge both the limits of modernist narrative’s experimentations with time as well as 
the methods of its inquiry. Moreover, both Stephen Kern and T. J. Reed would appear to 
confirm this when they point out that the various excurses on time in The Magic Mountain, 
of which the above passage is a perfect example, merely recapitulate modernism’s frustrated 
attempts to reckon with the question of time rather than actually illuminate its character or 
value for life (Kern 106; Reed).  
But this needn’t indicate a sort of surrender, neither on Mann’s part nor on the part of 
modernist narrative; rather, as I have sought to argue, it signals a need to overcome the 
hermeneutic limits of conventional approaches to time, which insist upon breaking time up 
into the familiar oppositional categories of active/passive, change/rest, plural/singular, 
linear/nonlinear, fluid/discrete, homogenous/heterogeneous, public/private, 
time/timelessness, etc. and consequently always find themselves in the end caught up in a 
web of circular logic not unlike the one in which Castorp finds himself above. Recent 
examples of this predicament can be seen in Joshua Kavaloski’s monograph The Fourth 
Dimension: Time in the Modernist Novel (2004), which, although it proposes to revitalize 
critical approaches to modernist time, merely reiterates these well-known obstacles, as 
evidenced not only in his total dismissal of Heideggerian temporality but also in the 
preoccupations of each chapter, which focus explicitly on time’s dissolution, arrest, 
discontinuity and nonlinearity in the works of Mann, Kafka, Woolf, and Faulkner, 
respectively.  
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In another example, even J. Hillis Miller ignores the contradiction he insists readers 
and critics take into account when tackling the question of time in literature by merely 
refashioning what we already know about modernist time, namely, that it is depicted as 
private, relative and pluralistic. Thus he ends with the revelation that time in Faulkner is an 
“all-at-onceness or always-already” that he reductively describes as “simultaneity” or that 
“W. B. Yeats’s […] [work] expresses a quite different conception of […] time from 
Faulkner's. For Yeats, time is neither a simultaneity (as it is for Faulkner) nor a seamless 
continuum between past, present, and future. It is, rather, a flow punctuated rhythmically by 
violent instantaneous interruptions” (96).  It is precisely these sort of reductivist and cliché 
approaches to time that have led to their untimeliness and to the question of their usefulness 
because, as Heidegger would certainly insist, they tell us so little any more about either 
Faulkner or Yeats or the worlds their characters inhabit. As we have seen, both Mann and 
Heidegger break through this impasse by more closely identifying time’s disclosure not with 
the perhaps truly irresolvable questions of time’s “number, direction, texture and division”141 
but with the concrete (because lived) categories of death, history and subjectivity in the 
world, the world, moreover, from which the subject can neither extricate nor distinguish 
itself: Dasein, remember, is time. [“Dasein ist die Zeit”]. 
Jameson very interestingly concludes his essay, “The End of Temporality,” with the 
claim that the end of time in which he wants to believe and that he seeks to demonstrate in 
his description of the historical-epochal shift from modernism to post-modernism as 
simultaneously a shift from a temporal to a spatial ontology cannot in the end be upheld. In 
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 These are the categories, each one comprised of its own polemical binary – e.g. the direction of time as 
reversible or irreversible or the division of time into private and public – around which Stephen Kern organizes 
The Culture of Space and Time. 
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fact, Jameson recognizes that latent in the claim itself is the inexorable imposition of a 
movement and activity that is not only historical-epochal but that as a result is also 
fundamentally generated by the “structural effect of the temporality […] of postmodernity” 
(718), in which every postmodern space is one, too, in which a fundamental and specific 
temporality is always already produced (Geulen 133). Although I agree wholeheartedly with 
the openness of the question, which Jameson finally admits, namely, the difficulty if not the 
impossibility of dispensing with the subject of time, as one would expect given my 
comparison of Heidegger and Mann above, I certainly disagree that Heidegger’s 
phenomenology and Thomas Mann’s novels aren’t precisely the place to launch a renewed 
investigation into the question(s) of time and modernism. In fact, following my study it may 
be said that the best chance of reinvigorating the value of time as a conceptual tool for 
literary, cultural and self-analysis and interpretation lies squarely in Thomas Mann, in 
particular, and in the modernist Zeitroman [time-novel], more generally, as well as in 
Heidegger’s “hermeneutic phenomenology,” neither of which Jameson ever respectfully or 
comprehensively engages, but which I try to do above in order to show that a reading which 
takes both into account and reads the one in terms of the other and vice-versa does indeed 
offer a promising start for something “calculated to fire the imagination” and to revitalize 
literary and philosophical evaluations of time. 
If this, then, is what I hope to have accomplished with my comparison of Mann and 
Heidegger above, then in venturing at this late stage to engage the tragic question of the end 
of art I hope merely to outline the potential scope and significance of my discussion of time 
and temporality with respect to these other interrelated discourses that are so critical to 
explorations of modernism and modernity. Thus I do not intend in what follows anything 
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demonstrative or complete but rather something that is merely suggestive, something perhaps 
“calculated [only] to fire the imagination.”  
 
The End of Art 
The temporality of the end of art is readily acknowledged in most critical discussions 
about it, but it is also varied and complicated and carries with it a long history that I cannot 
treat in any way comprehensively here. As a result, I will limit my comments to those that 
most directly concern my reading of Heidegger and Mann above, which is to say, to the 
temporal determinations of what Eva Geulen calls “a reading in a rumor after Hegel” and to 
the potential implications of such a temporality for understanding Mann’s and Heidegger’s 
later works within the broader context of modernism and modernity. It is no accident that I 
referred above to the question of the end of art as a tragic one; the question(s) of the end of 
tragedy and of the possibility of the tragic are of course closely connected to the broader 
question of the end of art, the very asking of which is often said to have signaled the onset of 
modernity. Moreover, and however paradoxical it may sound, the end of either is not only a 
thoroughly temporal and tragic recognition but, even more to the point, the tragedy lies in the 
specific temporality assigned to it. If the work of art, in which the potentialities of Dasein’s 
past are said to be held in reserve, is said to be one the bedrocks of a historical recovery, then 
what do they mean, Mann and Heidegger, when they speak of the end of art and of the sort of 
world in which such an end can be imagined? And this will mean dealing, respectively, with 
the situation of the end of art in the wake of modernity with a view toward the perceived 
function of art and the very real question of what is needful in history with respect to this 
situation. 
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 In many respects I have already elaborated the connection that binds Mann’s 
portrayal of the “critical” situation of art in Doctor Faustus with Adorno’s own discussions 
of it in The Philosophy of Modern Music, which is to say, the situation of art at the “edge of 
[its own] impossibility.” But Adorno’s continued preoccupation with the question of art’s 
impossibility only serves to elaborate and deepen the dilemma as it was depicted in Mann’s 
Doctor Faustus. Echoing Adorno’s own views on the subject from The Philosophy of 
Modern Music, in Doctor Faustus we are confronted with the image of modern art standing 
on the threshold of its own untergehen [going under] in the double-sense of both its 
imminent loss and disappearance and its overcoming or radical reestablishment as something 
both more originary and original: 
An einem Werk ist viel Schein, man könnte weitergehen und sagen, daβ es 
scheinhaft ist in sich selbst, als ‘Werk’. Es hat den Ehrgeiz, glauben zu 
machen, daβ es nicht gemacht, sondern entstanden und entsprungen sei. [….]  
   Ich habe [Adrian] sagen hören: ‘Das Werk! Es ist Trug. Es ist etwas, wovon 
der Bürger möchte, es gäbe das noch. Es ist gegen die Wahrheit und gegen 
den Ernst. Echt und Ernst ist allein das ganze Kurze, der höchst konsistente 
musikalische Augenblick…’ [….] 
   Ich habe ihn ebenso sagen hören: ‘Schein und Spiel haben heute schon das 
Gewissen der Kunst gegen sich. Sie will aufhören, Schein und Spiel zu sein, 
sie will Erkenntnis werden. (DF 242-3)142 
                                                          
142
 “There is a great deal of illusion in a work of art; one could go farther and say that it is illusory in and of 
itself, as a ‘work.’ Its ambition is to make others believe that it was not made but rather simply arose. […] 
I have heard [Adrian] say: ‘The work! It’s a sham, something the bourgeois want to believe still exists. It is 
counter to truth and counter to all seriousness. Only the briefest, highly compact musical moment is genuine 
and serious…’ [….] 
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Written well before Adorno’s famous dictum on the impossibility of art after 
Auschwitz, both the passage above and its place within the broader goals and context of 
Doctor Faustus clearly anticipate Adorno’s now famous claim from “Cultural Criticism and 
Society” (1951). Even Zeitblom, on a separate occasion, recognizes this tendency of art 
toward its own overcoming in his own narrative attempt to adequately render the complex 
history and fate of his subject matter, its tendency toward the serious and the tragic and away 
from the liberation of the illusory Spiel with which it had always been identified:  
Habe ich nicht mehr als einmal gesagt, daβ das Leben, von dem ich handle, 
mir näher, treuer, erregender war, als mein eigenes?  Das Nächste, 
Erregendste, Eigenste ist kein ‘Stoff’; es ist die Person – und nicht danach 
angetan eine künstlerische Gliederung von ihr zu empfangen. Fern sei es von 
mir, den Ernst der Kunst zu leugnen; aber wenn es Ernst wird, verschmäht 
man die Kunst und ist ihrer nicht fähig. (DF 236).143  
As the novel certainly attempts to explain, Auschwitz is a powerful historical example of 
“things get[ting] serious,” and in its wake Adorno does indeed scorn the barbarity of an art 
that would offer up precisely that which he believed made the atrocities of Auschwitz 
possible, namely, illusion – and here we may want to recall Zeitblom’s description of those 
Weimar citizens being led through Buchenwald following the Allied victory, those “who 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
I have likewise heard him say: “Illusion and games have art’s conscience opposed to them nowadays. Art 
wants to stop being illusion and games; it wants to become comprehension.’ 
But if something has ceased to conform to its definition, does it not cease to exist altogether? And how will 
art live as comprehension” (DF 193; emphasis mine). 
143
 “Have I not said more than once that the life with which I am dealing was closer, dearer, more intriguing to 
me than my own? And what is closest and most intriguing, most truly my own, is not mere ‘material’, it is the 
person himself – and so hardly suitable for artistic segmentation. Far be it from me to deny the seriousness of 
art; but when things get serious one scorns art and is no longer capable of it” (DF 187). 
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went about their business in seeming honesty and tried to know nothing, though at times the 
wind blew the stench of burned human flesh up their noses.”  
 According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the miscarriage of humanity that was the 
Holocaust was made possible by what both famously refer to as the ‘dialectic of 
enlightenment’ in which progressively “enlightened” social activity, including art, gives way 
to a progressively “unenlightened” and unreflective barbarism: 
We are wholly convinced – and therein lies our petit principii – that social 
freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought. Nevertheless, we believe 
just as clearly to have recognized that this very way of thinking – no less than 
the actual historical forms (the social institutions) with which it is interwoven 
– already contains the seed of the reversal universally apparent today. If 
enlightenment does not allow reflection on this regressive element, it seals its 
own fate. (qtd. in Dallmayr 170) 
In other words, where reason would like to free itself from its reliance upon nature, it in turn 
infers from this accomplished liberation its concomitant right to dominate nature and to bring 
this ‘otherness’ into the fold of its own jurisdiction and power:  
[T]he regressive counterpoint of enlightenment – its dialectical underside – 
derives from the streamlining of rational thought into a calculating, 
instrumental form of rationality, a process that underscores the growing 
division between human beings and nature, between cognitive power and its 
external targets. [….] In expelling or cleansing itself of qualitative differences, 
cognitive rationality inevitably prepared the ground for the ‘systematization’ 
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or homogenization of social life and thus for the establishment of increasingly 
effective social controls and disciplines. (Dallmayr 170)  
And it is precisely because art is made complicit in this barbaric reversal that Adorno 
prohibits it and demands its end. As in Doctor Faustus, where the future of art is oriented 
toward the comprehension of this reversal and away from art’s reliance upon illusion, which 
conceals the violent undercurrents of enlightened thought, in Adorno’s view, according to 
Fred Dallmayr:  
Only through critical reflection – one mindful of its tendentious complicity 
with power – is reason able to break the spell of (ancient or modern) 
mythology and reification. [….] [T]he only way to rupture this self-enclosure 
[of reason] is through thought’s attentiveness to non-thought or reason’s turn 
toward the (conceptually) ‘non-identical’ […]. [….] [O]nly a negative 
dialectics holds out both intellectual and social promise: by being attentive to 
the ‘otherness’ or underside of reason as well as to the social-political 
underside of modernity […] (172-3). 
 Perhaps it goes without saying at this late moment in my study that it is precisely such a 
reflective power and attentiveness that in Doctor Faustus characterizes Zeitblom’s narrative 
attempt to comprehend the meaning of his friend’s life and fate and that is attributed to 
Adrian himself in what I called his becoming-guilty in the Heideggerian sense, which is also 
to say, in his having always already comprehended his guilt. More importantly for now, 
however, we need only note the temporality of Adorno’s plan for the preservation of art and 
the proximity of this plan to Heidegger’s own. 
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According to Eva Geulen, Adorno’s claim about the end of art after Auschwitz was 
rescinded almost as quickly as it was uttered. That it was rescinded is of course not only 
clearly apparent in the fact that many of Adorno’s writings after Auschwitz revolve squarely 
around the question of art and aesthetics, e.g. Aesthetic Theory and Negative Dialectics, but 
his famous statement is qualified almost immediately after it is made in “Cultural Criticism 
and Society,” where Adorno adds: “And this corrodes even the knowledge of why [art] has 
become impossible […] today” (qtd. in Geulen 94). Moreover, and with a view toward this 
alleged contradiction in Adorno’s thought, Geulen is right to point out the disclosure of “two 
poles between which the innumerable negativities of Adorno’s aesthetics are suspended” 
(95): what she calls the formulae of “afterthought” [Nachspiel] and “process” [Vorgang] 
(95). To help to explain the former, Geulen refers to Adorno’s considerations of the 
possibility or impossibility of art after Auschwitz as “an index of survival and afterlife,” and 
she quotes a stirring passage from Negative Dialectics to illuminate her claim: 
[I]t may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz no poem can be written. 
But it is not wrong to raise the […] question whether after Auschwitz it is 
possible to go on living, whether someone who accidentally escaped and by 
rights should have been killed still can genuinely live. His mere survival calls 
for the emotional coldness, the fundamental principle of bourgeois 
subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz. (Geulen 95) 
Elsewhere Adorno extends the reach of this impossibility to include not only the lives of the 
perpetrators of history but also his own life and art, more generally, where art, too, must 
content itself with always already being an “afterthought,” an always already mediated 
response, i.e. bound to a priori determinations that necessarily precede it (Geulen 95). 
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“Process,” on the other hand, Geulen associates with the inner workings of the work of art 
itself and forms the basis of art’s “autonomy” that Adorno elaborates in Aesthetic Theory and 
elsewhere. The artwork always stands in relation to what it isn’t, to what is not itself, whether 
we mean by this other works, genres, or the artist himself, the social framework in which it is 
created or the interpretations imposed upon it: “Art requires something quite heterogeneous 
to it, in order to be art” (“Art and the Arts,” qtd. in Geulen 96), and as a result, the processes 
in which the development of art unfolds are always synonymous with the processes of its 
ending or “collapse” (qtd. in Geulen 96). 
 The correspondences here between the temporality of “afterthought” and “process” 
and the temporal ecstases of Heideggerian temporality should immediately strike the reader. 
Of the former Geulen says: “the end always already lies behind us and condemns what 
survives to an endless afterlife, whereby afterlife signifies both the temporal post finem as 
well as the fatal compulsion to repeat. The dictum against art after Auschwitz is […] an 
expression of the fact that after Auschwitz there can be no before Auschwitz” (96) – and in 
the process reiterates a Heideggerian thrownness. We will remember, for instance, that 
Dasein is in a sense also tragically “condemned” to an endless afterlife insofar as it is always 
out ahead of itself in precisely this way and inasmuch as its future possibilities are always 
constricted by a past behind which it cannot go. As I said earlier, Dasein can never return to a 
place in time in which it was not always already Dasein in the same way that after Auschwitz 
there can no longer be any before it. But in contrast to Geulen, for whom the situation of art 
and experience as “afterthought” also leads to fatal compulsion to repeat, we must also 
remember that for both Heidegger and Adorno, the concept of repetition always leaves room 
for the possibility of authentic experience (ND 144); indeed, according to Adorno what has 
  279
been “cast aside” or “forgotten” in history may be retrieved by the present in a transformative 
political moment whereby a future is ordained and freedom of consciousness is asserted 
“[…] as what is needful within history” (Macdonald 121). Thus at the end of the previous 
chapter I conclude my discussion of history and authenticity in Mann and Heidegger with the 
claim that the only means of authentically or genuinely living (and of producing an authentic 
mode of art) in the aftermath of the Holocaust requires a historical-critical stance on the part 
of Dasein that first and foremost must absorb the having-been of Auschwitz into the current 
of its own thrownness. It is only insofar as Dasein can manage this feat that it can come-
towards itself authentically as having-been.  
Likewise, the so-called “process” of the interior workings of art, which Geulen 
attributes to the other side of what she calls the double-logic of Adornian aesthetics would 
seem also to beg for Heideggerian interpretation. Like the temporality that Dasein essentially 
is, art is an end in itself that betrays not so much a hermetic self-enclosure (as is often 
claimed to be the case in Adrian Leverkühn’s twelve-tone style, for example), but as I have 
shown a temporally dynamic process or Erstreckung that fundamentally refigures the end as 
that “for the sake of which” it exists (Walker 100), namely, possibilities and potentials that 
lie outside of it, or more specifically, out ahead of it, and with which it is not identical – the 
most extreme example of such a constant relation, of course, is art’s relationship to its own 
end in the same way that Dasein’s most extreme possibilities lie in the possibility of its being 
nothing at all, in its own impossibility. Thus it can be seen how these “two poles in which the 
innumerable negativities of Adornian aesthetics” are situated correspond quite meaningfully 
with the temporalities, based in their own way in negation and impossibility, that bookend 
the stretching-along of Dasein’s existence, i.e. being-towards-death and historicity or 
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thrownness, and, moreover, how Adorno’s extended critique of the end of art is critical to 
understanding the relationship I have already forged between The Magic Mountain and, 
especially, Doctor Faustus, and Heideggerian temporality.  
 Even more pertinent, perhaps, than these temporal correspondences (because it is 
neither intuitive nor predictable) is the way in which both Adorno’s and Mann’s call for what 
is needful in history with respect to the possibility of art and life after Auschwitz echoes 
Heidegger’s own. As I pointed out above, the conceptual core of Adornian critique and thus, 
too, of the reinstatement of art’s “right to exist” (AT 251) lies in his conception of critical 
reflection. Just as Adrian Leverkühn’s musical breakthrough with The Lamentation of Doctor 
Faustus, in which the highly codified prohibitions of the twelve-tone and the Teufelsvertrag 
[blood-pact] provoke the very love that transgresses and negates these prohibitions, the sort 
of genuine, i.e. critical, reflective posturing called for by Adorno first requires as its object 
the very threat it wishes to overcome – in the case of both Mann and Adorno, this is the 
threat of that barbaric, regressive reversal called the “underside” or “dialectic” of 
enlightenment, which is said to be embodied in Adrian’s character and music and that is 
associated by Zeitblom (and thus, too, Mann) and Adorno with the rise of fascism in 20th 
century Germany. At any rate, this “underside” or totalitarian expression of modern 
rationality, according to Fred Dallmayr, results in the “alienation of reason from the target of 
knowledge or, more precisely, the isolation of reason from possible learning experiences 
induced by its targets. Among these learning experiences are the lessons provided by human 
sensuality and affectivity (that is, the realm of ‘inner’ nature)” (171).  And an authentic 
critical reflectiveness or consciousness in Adorno is described here and there as “a distinctive 
way of disclosing truth” (Walker 97), as a way of “allowing things ‘to be’ and [of] giving a 
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hearing to voices otherwise excluded by modern reason” (Dallmayr 174), as a “willingness to 
‘heed a potential slumbering in things’ and thereby ‘make amends’” to them for the violent 
“incursions” of an instrumentalized modern rationality that wants to or has already cast them 
aside (Adorno, qtd. in Dallmayr, 174), and, finally, as “an authentic form of experience” very 
different from but nevertheless a radical response to the one that places not only art but life 
as such under the harrow of impossibility in a post-Auschwitz world, all of which should 
remind us not only of Mann and Heidegger but also of the pressing significance of 
temporality for an understanding of the closely related question of the end of art.  
Heidegger’s speculations on the situation of the end of art are likewise heir to the 
same Hegelian tradition to which Adorno and Mann are responding. And, as with Adorno, 
the question of the end of art in Heidegger has multiple variations and expressions. For 
instance, on the one hand, Heidegger takes up the idea of the end of art precisely as Hegel 
had but within the specific context of 20th century aesthetics and metaphysics. Insofar as 
Heidegger sought to describe the end of metaphysics in the closing stages of the long 
philosophical tradition of the West that begins with the Greeks, can be traced through Hegel 
and German Idealism and that culminates in Nietzsche, “the last metaphysician,” he also 
sought to articulate and herald the end or overcoming of philosophy itself and hence, too, of 
art and aesthetics. In another sense, and one much more closely connected to the issues taken 
up in Being and Time, the backing away from art, in the authentic sense of art as the place in 
which we witness “the truth of beings setting itself to work” (BW 162), is at the same time a 
backing away from the question of Being as such since art is privileged, at least in 
Heidegger’s later works, such as his well-known essay The Origin of the Work of Art (1936), 
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as the site at which Being is opened up just as Dasein occupies this privileged position in 
Being and Time. 
In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger defines the function of art as “the 
becoming or happening of truth” precisely inasmuch as in the work of art what is laid bare is 
being itself [aletheia]. As with Adorno, Heidegger’s insistence on art as origin stems from his 
recognition of his own historical circumstances in which, according to Heidegger, art is not 
only no longer possible but it is also, and paradoxically, precisely what is needful in history:  
   Whenever art happens – that is, whenever there is a beginning – a thrust 
enters; history either begins or starts over again. [….]  
   Why doe we inquire in this way? We inquire in this way in order to be able 
to ask more properly whether art is or is not an origin in our historical 
existence, whether and under what conditions it can and must be an origin. 
Such reflection cannot force art and its coming-to-be. But this reflective 
knowledge is the preliminary and therefore indispensable preparation for the 
becoming of art. Only such knowledge prepares its space for art, their way for 
the creators, their location for the preservers. (BW 202) 
The specific historical conditions that prompted this question for Heidegger are precisely 
those that prompted Adorno’s own reflections on the subject both before and after 
Auschwitz. In Contributions to Philosophy [Beiträge zur Philosophie] (1936) and Meditative 
Thinking [Besinnung] (1938-9), Heidegger launches an equally and undeniably forceful 
polemic against the totalizing effects of ‘power’ [Macht], ‘violence’ [Gewalt] and the 
concomitant rationalization and assimilation of these forces in modern technology and 
politics. This for the most part unexplored region of Heidegger’s thought, unleashed in the 
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middle of the Nazi period in Germany, Fred Dallmayr refers to as Heidegger’s decisive 
‘inner emigration’ away from whatever faith he may have had in the regime and its ambitions 
in 1933 (175).  
Nevertheless, for my part, what is important for now as I venture to end this report, is 
the recognition that in looking to either Mann, Adorno or Heidegger for an answer to the 
question of whether art is possible in modernity we are confronted with the same thing. In 
explaining what is “needful in history,” Heidegger only recalls the most formidable challenge 
for thinking in Being and Time, namely, Sorge, and just as Adorno calls upon a critical 
attentiveness to history in order to preserve both art and the freedom of consciousness it 
signifies, Heidegger calls on Sorge. In Besinnung, in particular, Heidegger “urges a more 
reflective rethinking of human being-in-the-world, a rethinking [that opens] human hearts 
and minds again to the ‘call of being’ (which guides them into a more careful and caring 
mode of living). [….]” (Dallmayr 177). Dallmayr’s insistence on the correspondence here 
between “a more reflective rethinking of human being-in-the-world” and “a more careful and 
caring mode of living” cannot be properly, i.e. authentically, grasped outside of the context 
of its use and function in Being and Time, where, it must of course be remembered that care 
or Sorge is not only the name for the temporality that Dasein essentially is, but where Sorge 
is defined as that “for the sake of which” Dasein is (BT 235). Thus it is no surprise that I 
chose to end my analyses of Mann’s The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus with an 
emphasis on the significance of love, since to a large extent, the possibility of a historical and 
human recovery as well as the possibility of recovering an authentic art and aesthetics, 
whether we consult Mann, Adorno or Heidegger, involves something very much like what 
Heidegger might be wont to call Dasein’s being-towards-love, or as Mann so famously 
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wonders at the end of The Magic Mountain: “Augenblicke kamen, wo dir aus Tod und 
Körperunzucht ahnungsvoll und regierungsweise ein Traum von Liebe erwuchs. Wird auch 
aus diesem Weltfest des Todes, auch aus der schlimmen Fieberbrunst, die rings den 
regnerischen Abendhimmel entzündet, einmal die Liebe steigen?” (1085).144  
 
                                                          
144
 “Moments there were, when out of death, and the rebellion of the flesh, there came to thee, as though tookest 
stock of thyself, a dream of love. Out of this universal feast of death, out of this extremity of fever, kindling the 
rain-washed evening sky to a fiery glow, may it be that Love one day shall mount?” (MM 716). 
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